UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units ) ) ) Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 COMMENTS OF THE LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION On June 18, 2014, as part of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) proposed sweeping carbon dioxide (“CO2”) regulations governing the power sector1. The proposal, referred to as the Clean Power Plan (“CPP”), requires widely disparate reductions in state-by-state emissions of CO2. These reductions range from approximately 11% in North Dakota to 72% in Washington. Louisiana has an interim goal of 38% in 2020 and a final goal of 42% in 2030. The proposed reductions are purportedly justified on the basis of the State’s ability to improve the heat rate efficiency of coal units, an assumption with no basis in fact as further discussed herein, and by relying on drastic changes to the State’s generation portfolio. As discussed in more detail throughout these comments, the EPA has overstepped the bounds of its authority in attempting to regulate state-by -state electricity generation portfolios. Even assuming Congress has given EPA such grant of authority, however, the assumptions relied on by EPA in developing the CPP were erroneous and technically flawed. Comments are currently due on or before December 1, 2014. As the regulatory agency with jurisdiction over public utilities in the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana Public Service Commission (“LPSC” or “Commission”), has a substantial interest in this proceeding and 1 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (2014). . through undersigned counsel submits the following comments. The LPSC worked diligently with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”), the Louisiana Attorney General, the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources and other state officials in analyzing the CPP. We adopt the comments of those agencies to the extent they are not inconsistent with the specific comments included herein. We also support the legal challenge previously made by the Louisiana Attorney General in State of West Virginia, et al., v. EPA2 and the § 307(d) challenge submitted in this rulemaking August 25, 2014 by several States’ Attorneys General, including Louisiana’s. Further, we have solicited input from LPSC stakeholders, including utilities, consumer groups, and regional transmission organizations in developing these comments. 3 It is our hope that EPA will take all of these comments into consideration and withdraw the proposed rule in its entirety. Alternatively, the LPSC respectfully requests that the EPA make significant modifications to the rule consistent with the recommendations set forth in § IV, infra, and as explained more fully herein. I. INTRODUCTION The LPSC is the constitutionally-created agency tasked with regulating public utilities in the State of Louisiana. Louisiana Constitution Article IV, Section 21, provides as follows: The commission shall regulate all common carriers and public utilities and have such other regulatory authority as provided by law. It shall adopt and enforce reasonable rules, regulations, and procedures necessary for the discharge of its duties, and shall have other powers and perform other duties as provided by law. 4 In addition, La. R.S. 45:1163(A)(1) provides as follows: The commission shall exercise all necessary power and authority over any street, railway, gas, electric light, heat, power, 2 D.C. Cir. 14-1146 (pending). LPSC Docket R-33253. 4 LA Const. art. IV, § 21. 3 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 2 . waterworks, or other local public utility for the purpose of fixing and regulating the rates charged or to be charged by and service furnished by such public utility.5 In accordance with its constitutional and legislative mandates related to electric utilities, the LPSC regulates electric utilities within its jurisdiction in a manner that provides adequate and reliable electric service at a fair and reasonable rate to all Louisiana ratepayers. The LPSC regulates four large investor-owned utilities (“IOUs”) and thirteen smaller electric cooperatives in the State. The four IOUs are Cleco Power, LLC (“Cleco”), Entergy Gulf States, Louisiana, L.L.C. (“EGSL”), Entergy Louisiana, LLC (“ELL”), and Southwestern Electric Power Company (“SWEPCO”, a division of American Electric Power “AEP”). The Commission does not regulate municipal electric utilities or Entergy New Orleans. 6 The LPSC has previously provided comments in EPA rulemakings that were anticipated to have an impact on LPSC ratemaking authority and the services provided by utilities regulated by the LPSC. The LPSC provides these comments on the proposed CPP to express deep concerns about the EPA’s legal authority to implement this rule, the practical implications of the proposed rule, technical flaws in the EPA’s models and assumptions, and the extreme negative impacts that the proposed rule will have on the citizens of Louisiana - some of the country’s poorest citizens.7 As will be explained in § III.G., infra, the potential economic impacts of this rule in Louisiana range from $3.9 billion to $5.6 billion. Given the Commission’s objective of ensuring safe, reliable electric service at reasonable prices, the Commission has worked tirelessly to maintain affordable electricity rates for the citizens of Louisiana. The LPSC is in the best 5 La. R.S. 45:1163(A)(1). La. R.S. 45:1164. 7 According to the United States Census Bureau, 18.7% of Louisiana citizens lived below the poverty level from 2008-2012. United States Census Bureau State and County Quickfacts. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22000.html 6 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 3 . position to determine, within the police power of the state, which regulatory policies are most closely aligned with the public interest of its citizens. The LPSC respectfully submits that the CPP will create undue hardships on Louisiana families through unwarranted electricity bill increases and potential service interruptions. As explained in more detail below, the LPSC believes there are significant legal and technical defects associated with the CPP and respectfully requests that the EPA withdraw the proposed rule in its entirety. In the alternative, the LPSC requests that the EPA, at a minimum, modify the rule in accordance with the specific enumerated recommendations below, all other comments herein, and those of other Louisiana agencies and planning authorities, giving due consideration to the following statement made by Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in deciding whether or not to uphold CAA regulations: “…as with other questions of national or international policy, informed assessment of competing interests is required. Along with the environmental benefit potentially achievable, our Nation's energy needs and the possibility of economic disruption must weigh in the balance.”8 II. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE RULE IS FLAWED While the LPSC appreciates the difficult position in which the EPA finds itself given the politics of climate change regulations, the LPSC respectfully submits that the proposed CPP exceeds the congressional grant of authority provided in the CAA and must be withdrawn or drastically modified in order to withstand a legal challenge. 8 American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011). LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 4 . A. EPA’s attempt to coerce states to enact laws and regulations under threat of penalty is unlawful. The CPP goes beyond EPA’s grant of authority in the CAA by imposing requirements on states to develop a state implementation plan (“SIP”) under threat of a federal implementation plan (“FIP”) by requiring states to : “…measures, along with implementing and enforcing measures, that will achieve a level of emission performance that is equal to or better than the level specified in the state plan. The state must then adopt the state plan through certain procedures, which include a state hearing. Within the time period specified in the emission guidelines (from as early as June 30, 2016 to as late as June 30, 2018, depending on the state's circumstances), the state must submit its complete state plan to the EPA. The EPA then must determine whether to approve or disapprove the plan. If a state does not submit a plan, or if the EPA does not approve a state's plan, then the EPA must establish a plan for the state.”9 Unlike historical regulation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) pursuant §110 and mercury pursuant to § 111, this regulation does not merely set a currently achievable emissions standard. Rather, this regulation effectively mandates that states enact laws and regulations allowing them to enforce resource planning decisions over and above those already adopted pursuant to state resource planning authority, by imposing drastic emissions reductions incapable of being achieved otherwise. This type of regulation would set shaky legal precedent and fundamentally change the cooperative federalism approach currently imposed by the CAA. i. States have police power over resource planning decisions. The CPP is a thinly veiled attempt to assume powers not previously granted to or historically exercised by the EPA, without the benefit of any clear Congressional authorization to invade this area of regulatory expertise reserved to the States under the Tenth amendment to the 9 Clean Power Plan, VIII.A. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 5 . U.S. Constitution.10 Individual states have traditionally exercised jurisdiction over resource planning decisions.11 The LPSC has jurisdiction over electric utility resource matters pursuant to its constitutional authority found in Article IV Section 21 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Pursuant to that authority, the LPSC has extensively investigated and provided rules and programs in attempts to diversify Louisiana’s fuel mix including its new nuclear incentive rule, integrated resource planning (“IRP”), renewable energy (“RE”), and energy efficiency (“EE”) as discussed in greater detail below. Despite these and other efforts involving multi-year studies and numerous stakeholders, the CPP disregards the findings and recommendations of the LPSC’s technical experts and attempts to replace sound rules and regulations with those of its own. The LPSC recently approved participation by three of its four investor-owned jurisdictional electric utilities in Louisiana in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”) Regional Transmission Organization (“RTO”) and along with the other MISO states has incurred extensive costs to “provide independent transmission system access, deliver improved reliability coordination, perform efficient market operations, coordinate regional planning, and foster a platform for wholesale energy markets.12 The proposed rule threatens to disrupt the voluntary participation and collaboration in MISO and other RTOs. EPA presumes that it can usurp state regulatory functions by merely referring to the resource planning mandates as Building Blocks or guidelines. Calling them flexible does not make them so. Below are some of the Commission rules and policies that would potentially be disrupted by this regulation. Certification of the Public Convenience and Necessity Since 1983, the LPSC has required jurisdictional electric utilities to seek a determination from the Commission, prior to “commenc[ing] any on site construction activity or enter into any 10 See generally US Const. amend. X. Federal Power Act (FPA) § 16 U.S. Code § 201. 12 MISO Workshop Presentation (November 12, 2014). 11 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 6 . contract for construction or conversion of electric generating facilities or contract for the purchase of capacity or electric power, other than emergency or economy powered purchases”, that such project or purchase of capacity or electric power (other than emergencies or other stated exceptions).13 The LPSC routinely reviews utility requests for certification pursuant to its constitutional authority. Integrated Resource Planning Approximately 27 states, including Louisiana have enacted rules on IRP.14 When the LPSC adopted its rules in 2012, the stated objective was for electric utilities to pursue a resource plan that offers the most economic and reliable combination of resources satisfying the forecasted load requirements, including evaluation of supply-side, demand-side, and economic transmission resource options. The LPSC’s IRP rules were adopted as part of a lengthy rulemaking process with input from many stakeholders. It is uncertain how the CPP would impact the LPSC’s ability to continue to effectively guide this process when resource planning decisions may be made on the front end, as part of an environmental rulemaking, as oppose to the stakeholder process contemplated by the IRP. New Nuclear Incentive Rule The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created incentives for the development of nuclear energy. In order for Louisiana utilities to avail themselves of these incentives, the Commission directed its Staff to develop an incentive rule to promote nuclear power plant development in Louisiana. The Commission thereafter, in 2007, after an extensive rulemaking process, enacted a general order establishing guidelines for the development of nuclear power by utilities in Louisiana, and 13 LPSC General Order dated May 29, 2009, modifying the LPSC General Order dated September 20, 1983, Docket R-30517). 14 LPSC General Order dated April 18, 2012 (Docket R-30021), Pg. 8, Para. 2, Synapse Energy Economics, Inc., Best Practices in Electric Utility Integrated Resource Planning, June 2013. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 7 . to “create a high degree of regulatory certainty for utilities considering developing nuclear power plants in Louisiana.” 15 The rule remains in place today. Energy Efficiency In conjunction with its IRP rules the LPSC implemented a “Quick Start” EE program to develop, in the short term, a set of EE programs that could be implemented quickly and economically, in order to begin developing the infrastructure necessary to support the successful implementation of energy efficiency programs in Phase II and over the long-term.16 Renewable Energy Congress has not successfully passed legislation mandating a renewable portfolio standard, despite attempts to do so. Nor has it delegated to any agency that which it was unable to do itself. Certainly there is no unambiguous expression of Congressional intent to empower EPA to adopt such policies under § 111 of the CAA, which pre-dated the failed WaxmanMarkey legislation of 2009.17 Nevertheless, many states have passed renewable legislation in the form of goals and mandatory RPS. As discussed more fully under Section III.E., infra, Louisiana has investigated the feasibility of an RPS on multiple occasions, finding that an RPS did not make economic sense for Louisiana at the current time but that Louisiana utilities should continue to monitor and report on RE developments.18 Rather than implement an RPS, which is essentially what the EPA suggests Louisiana should do in its § 111(d) SIP, the LPSC undertook a pilot program pursuant to which mandatory requests for proposal for RE were issued. As a direct result of the RFPs issued by 3 of 15 LPSC General Order dated May 18, 2007 (Docket R-29712) LPSC General Order dated September 20, 2013 (Docket R-31106). 17 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.(American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009). 18 LPSC Dockets R-28271 In Re Re-study of the feasibility of a renewable portfolio standard for the State of Louisiana and R-28271 Subdocket B, In Re Re-study of the feasibility of a renewable portfolio standard for the State of Louisiana. 16 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 8 . Louisiana’s investor-owned electric utilities, approximately 80 (“MW”) of RE was acquired.19 As an indirect result, an additional 356 MW of wind energy were purchased.20 Unfortunately, all except about forty MW of the RE is sited outside of the state of Louisiana.21 The Commission considered limiting the RE pilot to in-state resources, but ultimately expanded it due to concerns over potential Commerce Clause challenges and the delay that may be caused by litigation. The fact that out-of-state resources were ultimately chosen over in-state resources is further evidence of the limited availability of RE resources in Louisiana. ii. Wholesale dispatch of power plants in FERC regulated under FPA. The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) did not displace the previously discussed state regulation of intrastate sales of electricity. It did, however, close the gap in regulation across state lines left by the Supreme Court’s decision in Public Utilities Comm’n of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927). The FPA empowered the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”, and its successor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or “FERC”) to regulate wholesale electricity rates but limited the power “to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.” 22,23 Specifically, the FPA grants FERC authority over all facilities for interstate transmission or sale of electric energy.24 Congress expressly reserved for state regulation (a) any aspect of the delivery of electricity from a generator to a retail consumer in the same state, or (b) the use of local distribution facilities.25 19 LPSC Order Nos. U-32814, U-32557, U-32981. LPSC Docket No. U-32814. 21 Id. 22 FPA § 201, Federal Power Commission v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 214 (1964). 23 Id. 24 FPA § 201. 25 Id. 20 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 9 . Pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, FERC has approved mandatory and enforceable reliability standards promulgated by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) with which the electric industry must comply. Contained in these standards are key requirements necessary to ensure the bulk electric system meets an adequate level of reliability. Failure to comply with these standards affects the ability of the power grid to operate reliably and subjects registered entities and its member utilities to civil monetary penalties. Yet, reliability concerns seem to have been a non-factor in EPA’s analysis. The LPSC urges EPA to consider the comments of reliability planning organizations on this issue. For example, MISO filed comments in this docket on November 25, 2014, requesting that the EPA eliminate the interim deadline of 2020, finding the deadline unfeasible and stating that the EPA’s “timeline will force decisions that pit environmental compliance against electric reliability."26 Similarly, the Southwest Power Pool ("SPP"), the RTO in which LPSC-regulated SWEPCO is a member, has provided comments stating that the EPA's proposal will impact reliability and will have material impacts on the market based dispatch of electric generating units within the region and that the timing proposed for compliance is "infeasible."27 2. Louisiana has regulations. legislation governing carbon emissions EPA’s proposed rule is inconsistent with Louisiana Revised Statute Title 30 § 2060.1, which requires the LDEQ, “in collaboration with and input from the Commission” to set fossilfueled electric generating unit performance standards, not the EPA.28 These agencies are to set the standard based on inside-the-fence measures, and allow for a more lenient standard based on such factors as cost and impacts on the ratepayers and the economy. EPA’s proposed rule is in 26 MISO comments dated November 25, 2014. SPP comments dated October 14, 2014. 28 La. R.S. 30:2061.1 (2014). 27 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 10 . direct conflict with the interests of Louisiana citizens, as expressed through their elected representatives, by refusing to allow Louisiana a sufficient role in setting the standard, or any flexibility or exceptions based on cost, engineering or economic factors. In pertinent part, the statute provides: In developing a plan for the implementation of any guidelines for greenhouse gas emissions that the United States Environmental Protection Agency may issue under Section 111 (d) of the Clean Air Act, the Department of Environmental Quality, in collaboration with and input from the Public Service Commission, may establish standards of performance for carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units… [T]he standard of performance… shall be based on: (1) The best system of emission reduction, taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction…; (2) Reductions…that can reasonably be achieved through measures undertaken at each fossil fuel-fired electric generating unit; … (3) Efficiency improvements … that can be undertaken … without switching to other fuels, co-firing with other fuels, or limiting the utilization of the unit.” Even more importantly, the statute goes on to provide that the Department may adopt “less stringent standards or longer compliance schedules” than those provided in federal rules based on: (1) Consumer impacts, including any disproportionate impacts of energy price increases on lower income populations; (2) Unreasonable cost due to plant age, location, or basic process design; (3) Physical difficulties or impossibility of implementing emission reduction measures; (4) Absolute cost of applying the performance standard to the unit; (5) Expected remaining useful life of the unit; (6) Economic impacts of closing the unit; (7) Need to maintain reliability on electric grid; and, (8) [A]ny other factors specific to the unit.”29 29 Id. These criteria for setting a more lenient standard and longer compliance schedule are based on the federal implementing regulations promulgated by EPA, at 40 C.F.R. § 60.24 (f). LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 11 . B. Section 111(d) of the CAA does not provide a legal basis for the proposed rule. i. Section 111(d) does not provide give EPA authority to regulate “outside the fence”. When looking at the Building Blocks and “outside the fence” regulations contained therein, one cannot help but ask how this type of regulation purportedly emanates from the specific grant of authority found in § 111(d) of the CAA. EPA has effectively commandeered resource planning authority as a mechanism for reducing CO2 emissions through § 111(d) and implement an emission reduction plan at a federal level. While EPA goes to great lengths to suggest that the states have flexibility in developing their plans, it has provided no viable alternative to the resource planning options contained in the CPP. Even if states could come up with alternatives, there is significant uncertainty regarding the circumstances under which a SIP will ultimately be approved. The LPSC does not believe it was the intent of Congress to give EPA this much authority through § 111(d) and create this much uncertainty surrounding regulation traditionally left to states. Section 111(d) is a rarely used provision of the CAA found under a section entitled “new or modified sources”. In contrast to the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) found in §§ 108-110, which were a central part of the CAA prior to the 1970 amendments, § 111 was implemented to establish nationwide uniform emissions standards for new or modified stationary sources to prevent new pollution problems rather than address existing ambient air quality. 30 The standards were meant to control emissions through the introduction of the best system of emission reduction (“BSER”) when units were being built, and therefore easier and more efficient to control. Yet, this proposed rule goes even further than the NAAQS, which have always been a central part of the Act. 30 Domiki and Zacaroli, The Clean Air Handbook, Ch. 9 (2011). LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 12 . ii. The CPP is inconsistent with the statutory text of Section 111(d) EPA cannot overlook the fact that Section 111(d) actually provides a very specific and unambiguous grant of authority to EPA, as follows: 42 USC § 7411 - Standards of performance for new stationary sources … (d) Standards of performance for existing sources; remaining useful life of source (1) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall establish a procedure similar to that provided by section 7410 of this title under which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which (A) establishes standards of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant (i) for which air quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on a list published under section 7408 (a) of this title or emitted from a source category which is regulated under section 7412 of this title but (ii) to which a standard of performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new source, and (B) provides for the implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance. Regulations of the Administrator under this paragraph shall permit the State in applying a standard of performance to any particular source under a plan submitted under this paragraph to take into consideration, among other factors, the remaining useful life of the existing source to which such standard applies. (emphasis added) EPA’s reliance on this provision for implementing CO2 emissions from power plants is problematic for a few reasons. First, § 111(d)(1)(A) requires that the use of the language “any air pollutant” was intended to encompass carbon dioxide. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the United States Supreme Court held that greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions from motor vehicles are “air pollutants” under § 202(g) of the Clean Air Act, going so far as to say that “air pollutant” LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 13 . included “all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.”31 Massachusetts triggered a heightened desire for EPA regulation of CO2 emissions from the power sector and breathed new life into efforts to require EPA to undertake such regulation. Previously, this agency has declined to regulate GHG emissions, finding that none of the approaches to reducing CO2 were well-suited to regulation by the EPA specifically acknowledging as early as 2003 that the Department of Energy was better equipped to set efficiency standards for products such as air conditioners and appliances and that “Any widespread effort to switch away from fossil fuels in either sector would likewise require a wholesale transformation of our methods for producing power and transporting goods and people” and it is “hard to overstate the economic significance of making these kinds of fundamental and widespread changes in basic methods of producing and using energy.“32 The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts and the subsequent “Endangerment Finding”33 cannot stand for the proposition that the reduction of CO2 emissions is necessary at all costs. What Massachusetts did stand for was the proposition that EPA could not simply decide not to act for policy reasons but “must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.”34 In Massachusetts, the question was one of whether the EPA was fulfilling its duty under CAA § 202. By contrast, the pendulum has now swung in the other direction and EPA is attempting to enact rules that far exceed the statutory text or any statutory duty. Relying on the expansive definition of air pollutant found in § 202(g) (“all airborne compounds of whatever stripe”), the EPA attempted to require best available control technology (“BACT”) and “major source” permits on the basis of CO2 emissions pursuant to several 31 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922. 33 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (2009). 34 Id. at 535. 32 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 14 . enforcement provisions that referenced “any air pollutant”. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA35 the Court upheld the EPA’s authority to require “anyway sources” to obtain PSD and Title V permits but declined to give EPA the wide latitude it had assumed in “tailoring” those statutory provisions to suit its policy objectives. In light of UARG, EPA is required to give a “reasonable, context-appropriate meaning” to the regulation it wishes to enforce.36 It is worthy of note that similar to its BSER analysis conducted by EPA in the proposed CPP, the UARG Court acknowledged EPA’s intention that improvements in EE would be the foundation of GHG BACT pursuant to § 7602. The Court acknowledged this but did not decide whether BACT could be used to force improvements in EE, stating only that BACT was already limited to control technology that “did not require a fundamental redesign of the facility” and that the record did not reflect that EPA’s demands would be of a significantly different character than those traditionally associated with PSD review or that BACT is “incapable of being sensibly applied to greenhouse gases.37 LPSC submits that this is indication that EPA’s deference is not unlimited on these issues and BSER in § 111(d), likewise, cannot force the type of fundamental changes proposed herein. Assuming for arguments sake that CO2 meets the definition of any air pollutant for the purposes of § 111(d), EPA still has to overcome a number of statutory hurdles to make the CPP fit within the plain text of the statute. Specifically, § 111(d)(1)(A)(i) explicitly prohibits the regulation of source category[ies] regulated under § 112. The Supreme Court in Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 n.7 (2011), stated “EPA may not employ [§ 111(d)] if existing stationary sources of the pollutant in question are regulated under . . . the ‘hazardous air pollutants’ program, [§ 112]. Nevertheless, on February 16, 2012, EPA finalized 35 573 U.S.____ (2014). Id. 37 Id. 36 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 15 . § 112 regulations on “stationary sources” that included coal-fired power plants. See 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304 (Feb. 16, 2012). Those very same plants are included in the CPP despite their being explicitly prohibited and that such explicit prohibition has been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court. Even if EPA could overcome the aforementioned statutory prohibition, which we do not think it can, there is yet another requirement: that the source category is one regulated under the new source performance standards found in § 111(b). iv. Section 111(d) envisions a state-directed approach with guidelines by EPA. Despite the promise of flexibility, EPA has provided no opportunity for states to have a meaningful role in this process, as the proposed rule requires SIPS to meet draconian standards of “emission performance equivalent to the goals established by the EPA, on a timeline equivalent to that” in the rule. EPA’s proposed rule is inconsistent with § 111(d) because while it purports to allow flexibility, in fact, it provides only one way of accomplishing the standards – EPA’s way. Given the severity of the emissions reductions, there is no meaningful way for States to develop an autonomous plan for compliance, despite the United States Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that this state authority is necessary given that § 111 allows “each State to take the first cut at determining how best to achieve EPA emissions standards within its domain.”38 Section 101(a)(3) of the CAA provides a clear definition of the role of States in regulating pollutants, namely that “the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments….”.39 As the D.C. Court has recognized in multiple cases, Congress has clearly recognized that states are in a superior position compared to the EPA to make a determination regarding the exact method and process that the individual 38 39 AEP v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011). 42 U.S.C. Section 1857(c)(4). LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 16 . [electric generating units] within its borders will follow to meet the applicable standards.40 One obvious reason for this deference required by Congress is the state’s familiarity with the problems and issues confronting the industry within the state and the status and cost of various emission controls that are required to meet the standards. The EPA is clearly attempting to usurp the authority granted to the States in the CAA as well as the police power of the states by taking away any meaningful opportunity for states to determine how they will meet required emissions reductions within their own borders. v. EPA fails to consider efficiency implications of its other rules and regulations. The U.S. power industry has already been subjected to a number of other state and federal environmental regulations that require the installation of pollution-cutting and control technologies. As explained further in § III.B.4, infra, the recent Mercury and Air Toxics Rule (“MATS”) required the installation of pollution control technologies that will reduce most coalfired units’ thermal efficiencies by as much as one to four percent.41 The installation of the controls necessary to achieve and maintain compliance with MATS is still underway at many units and may further degrade unit efficiency making the emissions reductions required by the CPP even more difficult to achieve. Further, many of the heat rate improvement projects involve equipment replacements or upgrades that will trigger the new source review (“NSR”) provisions of the Clean Air Act. EPA offers no relief from NSR enforcement for operators who seek to comply with § 111(d) by improving unit efficiency, and without such relief, many 40 See e.g., Train v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 86-87 (1975); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 269 (1976). 41 Cleco comments, LPSC Docket R-33253, In Re: The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed rule on carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil-fuel fired electric generating units under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 17 . operators will be reluctant to engage in more expensive efficiency improvements like turbine replacements and other equipment upgrades that offer the most cost-efficient improvements. Adding to the confusion, EPA’s proposal for modified and reconstructed units42, issued the same day as its existing source plan, establishes a much less ambitious target rate for heat rate improvements for these units, offering alternatives based on a two percent improvement over a unit’s best historic heat rate, or another value based on a unit-specific evaluation conducted by the states. EPA’s proposal assumes that heat rate improvements can be measured and verified for compliance purposes through existing monitoring and reporting conventions developed for the Acid Rain Program and used in other allowance trading programs, as set forth in 40 CFR Part 75. However, EPA now proposes to augment this reporting regime by requiring new methods to be employed for reporting net generation, in order to calculate CO2 emission rates in terms of pounds per megawatt-hour of electricity. III. TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE RULE IS FLAWED The LPSC found numerous instances of incorrect data and assumptions, as further detailed below. The LPSC submits that the errors in EPA’s modeling and analysis are further proof that states are in the best position to oversee utility resource planning. The LPSC has worked closely with LDEQ, in addition to other Louisiana stakeholders, in reviewing the baseline information included in the EPA technical support documents. This collective review has identified several data deficiencies that were identified by LDEQ in their initial comments. The LPSC does not envy the position of trying to understand the resource availability and requirements of all fifty states. To the extent that EPA attempts to redeem this rule, the LPSC requests the following technical flaws be remedied in the final rule. 42 Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units; Proposed Rules, 79 Fed. Reg. 34959 (June 18, 2014). LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 18 . A. EPA’s Proposed BSER for Louisiana is Discriminatory. The EPA sets 2 target CO2 emission rates for Louisiana as shown in Figure 1. The 2020 Interim Goal will require Louisiana to reduce its CO2 emissions by 38 percent from a baseline level of 1,533 lbs/MWh to 948 lbs/MWh. The EPA’s 2030 Final Goal of 883 lbs/MWh is a 42 percent reduction relative to EPA’s 2012 baseline. Overall, the Interim Goal will require Louisiana to reduce its power sector CO2 emission by as much as 17.8 million metric tons, and 19.7 million metric tons by 2030.43 The EPA’s proposed final CO2 emissions reductions is comparable, in level terms (or mass balance terms) to the carbon emissions of three of Louisiana’s four major coal facilities (Brame Energy Center, Dolet Hills, and RS Nelson). 1,800 1,600 lbs CO2/MWh 1,400 2020 Interim Goal: 948 lbs/MWh; a reduction of 585 lbs/MWh, or 38 percent. 1,200 1,000 2030 Final Goal: 883 lbs/MWh; a reduction of 650 lbs/MWh, or 42 percent. 800 600 400 200 0 2012 Baseline 2020 Interim Goal 2030 Final Goal Figure 1. Proposed Louisiana CO2 State-wide Emission Rate Reduction Source: EPA Technical Support Documents. Louisiana will be required to reduce its CO2 emissions at a level comparable to the national average reduction under the proposed CPP. Figure 2 highlights Louisiana’s required 43 EPAs Rate to Mass Technical Support Document and Data File, issued November 2014. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 19 . emissions reductions relative to other states despite the fact that Louisiana uses about 27 percent more natural gas to generate electricity than the overall U.S. average. Louisiana gets effectively no credit, under the proposed CPP, for having spent decades concentrating its power generation resources into cleaner burned fuel sources: Louisiana will be required to reduce its CO2 emissions by 650 lbs/MWh, an amount virtually equal to the national average of 649 lbs/MWh. 1,600 1,400 lbs CO2/MWh 1,200 Louisiana’s emission rate reduction: 650 lbs/MWh US average emission rate reduction: 649 lbs/MWh 1,000 800 600 400 0 AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE FL GA HI ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NV NH NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA WA WV WI WY 200 Figure 2. State Comparison of Emission Rate Reductions Source: EPA Technical Support Documents. Figure 3 highlights the inequity of the proposed EPA CPP in greater detail. The figure charts the percent emissions reductions (star symbols) required under the proposed CPP against each state’s share of coal generation. In 2012, 16 states reported that they generate 80 percent or more of their electricity from coal. Of those 16 states, only one (South Dakota) has a proposed CPP carbon emissions reduction that is greater than the national average (67 percent reduction). Another four states have reductions that are comparable to the national average, while the balance are below, and in some instances, well below the national average and the required LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 20 . reductions EPA is imposing on Louisiana. Consider that four states (Kentucky, North Dakota, Wyoming, and West Virginia) all report 100 percent of their power being generated from coal, and yet all four have emissions reductions less than 30 percent. 100% 90% 80% Percent 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 0% KY ND WY WV SD MT NE IA KS MO IL IN TN UT MD OH CO MN NC WI SC MI AR PA NM GA AZ AL OK TX LA VA WA HI FL OR DE MS NH NV NJ MA AK NY CA CT ID ME RI 10% Coal Generation as Percent of Total Emissions Reduction U.S. Average Emissions Reduction Figure 3. Myth: Louisiana Will Not be Impacted Much Since it is a Natural Gas State Source: EPA Technical Support Documents. Even more imposing is the impact that the proposed CPP will have on Louisiana ratepayers. Louisiana’s required emissions reductions, as a share of state Gross Domestic Product (or “GDP”) is considerable. Figure 4 shows that Louisiana will be one of the hardest impacted states on an emissions reduction per GDP basis of any state in the country. Louisiana, for instance, ranks 8th in the required reductions per unit of state GDP under the proposed CPP. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 21 . New Natural Gas End Uses & Fuel Diversity Concerns ` Greater than 100 M short tons per million $ 50M-100M short tons per million $ Less than 50M short tons per million $ No Requirement Figure 4. Emissions Reductions per State GDP Source: EPA Technical Support Documents. Figure 5 outlines the various components of EPA’s estimated BSER for Louisiana. Building Block 1, which estimates the percent reductions available from improved coal plant thermal efficiencies, accounts for 8 percent of Louisiana’s required CO2 reductions under the proposed CPP. Building Block 2, which estimates the CO2 reductions that would arise if Louisiana required its natural gas combined cycle (“NGCC”) units to increase their operating utilization rates to 70 percent on an annual average basis, accounts for the overwhelming share (58 percent) of the reduction under the EPA’s BSER estimates for Louisiana. Building Block 3a, representing the emissions reductions associated with preserving “at-risk” nuclear generation, accounts for three percent of Louisiana’s BSER. Building Block 3b, estimated to be the potential emission reductions available from the utilization of greater levels of renewable energy, would account for 16 percent of Louisiana’s BSER. Lastly, Building Block 4, estimated by EPA LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 22 . as the potential CO2 reductions that could arise from greater levels of energy efficiency, are estimated to account for 15 percent of Louisiana’s BSER. Building Block 1: EPA reviewed the opportunity for coal-fired plants to improve their heat rates. BSER assumes all coal plants can increase their efficiency by 6 percent. Building Block 2: EPA found an average availability of 70 percent for natural gas CCs to be technically feasible. 8% Building Block 4: EPA estimated energy efficiency deployment in 12 leading states and assumes all states can increase their current annual savings rate to reach annual savings of 1.5 percent by 2030. 15% Each building block accounts for a portion of the total goal. 16% 3% 58% Building Block 3b: EPA developed targets for renewable energy penetration in six regions and calculated regional growth factors to achieve each target by 2030. Building Block 3a: EPA identified five nuclear units currently under construction and assumes that 5.8 percent of existing nuclear capacity is ‘at-risk” but can be retained. 6 Figure 5. EPA’s Proposed CPP, Louisiana BSER Targets Source: EPA Technical Support Documents. As will be discussed in greater detail herein, the LPSC takes serious issue with the development of EPA’s BSER, in general, and the methods by which each of the building blocks associated with the BSER are calculated. The LPSC believes there are errors associated with each of the analyses that leads to significant overestimates of the potential emissions reductions available in each of the building blocks. Further, the LPSC believes EPA has failed to consider other critical policy issues in estimating Louisiana’s BSER such as cost and power system reliability. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 23 . B. Building Block 1 is flawed. EPA’s heat rate analysis uses data for 884 coal- and petroleum coke-fired electric generating units (EGUs) for an 11-year period to examine the potential for gross heat rate efficiencies.44,45 EPA performed a statistical analysis of hourly heat rates to evaluate variations in efficiency and derive a potential for heat rate improvement. EPA concluded that the heat rate of U.S. coal-fired EGUs could be improved by an average of four percent by adopting ‘best practices’ that have the potential to improve heat rate. In addition, EPA relied upon a 2009 engineering study46 to conclude that another two percent of heat rate improvement was possible throughout the U.S. fleet through equipment upgrades. EPA added together these two average improvement percentages and concluded that the entire U.S. fleet of coal-fired EGUs could increase heat rate efficiency by six percent. i. Heat rate assumptions are incorrect. An EGU’s heat rate is traditionally defined as the amount of fuel energy input needed to produce one unit of electric energy output. Thus, the more efficient the unit is, the lower its heat rate. The heat rate of an EGU can be expressed as a gross heat rate or a net heat rate. A gross heat rate is the total energy input from the fuel divided by the total electrical energy generated. A net heat rate still uses the total energy input from fuel, but subtracts from the denominator the generated electricity used by the facility to power the unit itself.47 44 The study population included units that reported both heat input and electrical output to the EPA’s Clean Air Markets Division in 2012. 45 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-18. 46 Sargent & Lundy 2009, Coal-Fired Power Plant Heat Rate Reductions, SL-009597, Final Report, January 2009, available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/coalfired.pdf. 47 The electricity used by the facility is termed auxiliary load and can include the energy used to run pumps, fans, pulverizers, emissions controls, lighting and various other components. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 24 . Typical industry practice is to report a unit’s net heat rate. 48 The EPA’s use of gross heat rate is contrary to industry practice and EPA’s own analysis. Most studies examining thermal efficiency opportunities (heat rate improvements or “HRI”) at power generation facilities utilize net heat rate measurements, not gross heat rate. In fact, the Sargent & Lundy report frequently cited and relied upon by the EPA in developing Building Block 1, defines an EGU’s heat rate as: …the amount of fuel energy input needed (Btu, higher heating value basis) to produce 1 kWh of net electrical energy output. It is the metric most often used in the electric power generation industry to track and report the performance of thermal power plants.49,50 Moreover, EPA’s analysis was inconsistent. While EPA’s statistical analysis uses gross heat rate as the measure of operating efficiency, its Building Block 1 recommendations are based upon on a net heat rate. EPA attempts to explain this inconsistency by saying that any HRI method that reduces gross heat rate will also reduce net heat rate, and that some HRI methods reduce net heat rate without reducing gross heat rate. Similarly, the EPA “expect(s) the HRI potential on a net output basis is somewhat greater than on a gross output basis, primarily through upgrades that result in reductions in auxiliary loads”.51 While the assumptions made by the EPA to extrapolate a net heat rate value based on a gross heat rate estimate may be valid on average, there is not a relationship between net and gross heat rate that is applicable to all types of plants, and thus, these assumptions are likely problematic at the state and regional level. 52 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) recently released a review of the “reliability implications and potential consequences from the implementation of the 48 See U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Glossary. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=H. 49 Sargent & Lundy 2009, Coal-Fired Power Plant Heat Rate Reductions, SL-009597, Final Report, January 2009, available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/coalfired.pdf, (emphasis added). 50 The U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration also expresses heat rates in terms of net generation. See EIA’s website, “What is the efficiency of different types of power plants,” available at: http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=107&t=3. 51 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-37. 52 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-37. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 25 . proposed CPP and its underlying assumptions.” In its review, NERC also highlights the error in EPA’s Building Block 1 methodology: The EPA calculated unit-specific heat rates using gross generation data … With this approach, the EPA excluded generation-reducing effects from postcombustion environmental controls, such as selective catalytic reduction and fluegas desulfurization controls. The EPA then used net generation data, without consideration for these retrofits, for coal-fired EGUs when calculating the state CO2 emission rate goals. These retrofits will reduce the net output of these units, as well as their associated net heat rate efficiency. Not considering these reductions creates an inconsistent approach, especially considering that most coalfired EGUs will require control retrofits to comply with environmental regulations, such as the Mercury Air Toxic Standards (MATS) and Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act.53 ii. Not all EGUs are created equally The heat rate of an EGU is not a constant value and, as the EPA points out, a number of factors can affect an EGU’s efficiency that include its: thermodynamic cycle; coal rank and quality; facility size; pollution control systems; operating/maintenance practices; type of cooling system; geographic location and ambient conditions; load generation flexibility requirement (baseload vs. load following); and plant components.54 In addition, not all EGUs are designed to be operated at the same exact heat rate. Coal-fired EGUs throughout the U.S. differ in age; burn differing types of coal; and have been designed and constructed by different manufacturers. For instance, an EGUs “design heat rate,” and its actual average heat rate, are likely to differ significantly since the design heat rate is a “theoretical target that represents an optimal, fullload, steady-state condition and is considered the best a unit could potentially achieve under its original design conditions.”55 The age of a coal generation unit, its historic operations and 53 North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 2014. Potential reliability impacts of EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan, p. 8. 54 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-4. 55 Southwestern Electric Power Company’s (SWEPCO) Comments dated July 25, 2014, LPSC Docket No. R-33253, In re: The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed rule on carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil-fuel fired electric generating units under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 26 . maintenance, and the retrofit of any auxiliary equipment like emissions controls will significantly impact the coal unit’s heat rate. In other words, unit HRIs are unit-specific and it is unreasonable to assume that all EGUs could incorporate all heat rate improvement methods and that each method would impact each and every EGUs in the same manner. For instance, in Louisiana, Cleco recently noted in formal comments before the Commission that its Madison 3 unit is a “new generation sub-critical circulating fluidized bed boiler with state-of-the-art technologies to achieve low heat rate and low emissions that has very limited opportunities (“marginal opportunities”) for any thermal efficiency gains.”56 Cleco also noted that an additional 6 percent thermal efficiency improvement at its other 2 coal generation facilities would also be equally unlikely since the utility (and its partners) have already installed HRI measures at these plants. The Sargent & Lundy report, upon which much of the EPA’s HRI assumptions are based, identified a series of HRI measures and their potential effectiveness. The Sargent & Lundy report offers guidelines to be used to evaluate individual facilities, on a case-by-case basis and applies its findings to two case studies to calculate potential improvements. The EPA, however, erroneously assumes that these potential improvements and case study results are applicable and achievable to all coal fired EGUs in the U.S. Further Sargent & Lundy has noted that many of the assumptions EPA utilized in its proposed rule take conclusions from their study out of context noting that: ï‚· The results in the 2009 Report were mostly based on publicly available data, data from original equipment manufacturers, and Sargent & Lundy's power plant experience. Furthermore, the case studies showed that not all of 56 In re: The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed rule on carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil-fuel fired electric generating units under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. Louisiana Public Service Commission, Docket No. R-33253, Cleco Power LLC’s Responses to LPSC Staff’s Notice of Request for Specific Comments dated July 25, 2014. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 27 . the examined alternatives were feasible to apply to an individual generating unit due to a number of factors, including plant design, previous equipment upgrades, and each plant's operational restrictions. ï‚· Various limitations exist for applying each heat rate improvement strategy, and these limitations depend on the unit type, fuel type, and many other site-specific conditions. Therefore, the ability to apply each strategy and the amount of heat rate reduction that can be achieved by each strategy is sitespecific and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. ï‚· It appears as though the EPA assumed that heat rate improvements cited in our 2009 Report were additive and applicable to all coal-fired units. Heat rate improvement ranges described in the 2009 Report case studies were estimated at a conceptual level, and were not based on detailed site-specific analyses. Verification of actual heat rate improvements was not made determine whether any of the strategies were implemented and what actual heat rate improvements were realized based on site-specific design. ï‚· Combinations of strategies to achieve heat rate improvements do not always provide heat rate improvement reductions equal to the sum of each individual strategy's heat rate improvement because many of the technologies affect, or are dependent upon, plant operating variables that are inter-related. Therefore, case-by-case analyses should be conducted to determine whether the incremental heat rate improvement through the application of multiple strategies is economically justified. ï‚· The performance of some of the evaluated heat rate improvement strategies degrades over time, even with best maintenance practices. Therefore, depending on the strategy employed or the technology installed to reduce heat rate at an existing coal-fired EGU, the unit heat rate initially obtained may increase over time.57 iii. Lower loads equal higher heat rates The EPA’s proposed rule also fails to consider the impact of its Building Blocks upon one another. For instance, the aim of Building Block 2 is to increase the dispatch of NGCCs, thereby decreasing the base-load usage of coal-fired units. What the EPA does not consider in its analysis is that this change in dispatch of coal-fired EGUs is likely to have a negative effect on the efficiency of coal-fired EGUs. Coal-fired units are designed to operate as base-load units, 57 Sargent & Lundy. Letter to National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, re: Coal Fired Power Plant Heat Reduction, dated October 15, 2014. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 28 . running continuously at a steady load. Changing the dispatch of these units to cycle up and down, or run at minimum loads will reduce its thermal efficiencies (i.e., increase the unit’s heat rate) thereby requiring more, not less thermal input per unit of generation. The relationship of unit load to heat rate is shown in Figure 6 below. Figure 6. Heat Rate Change (Relative to Full Load) vs. Load Source: In re: Swepco Comments dated July 25, 2014, LPSC Docket R-33253. Sargent & Lundy identified this problem in their summary of study conclusions upon which EPA purports to base its proposed thermal efficiency improvement building block: Heat rate is increased when plants operate at lower loads, and the benefit of a heat rate improvement strategy is reduced at lower loads. Therefore, if an existing EGU is currently base-loaded and shifts to a load-cycling operating profile in the future, that unit's annual average heat rate will increase, and the heat rate reduction strategy (or strategies ) implemented will not lower the annual average heat rate as much as compared to base-load operation. In some cases any HRI improvements achieved by undertaking the relevant options described in S&L's LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 29 . 2009 Report could, in some cases, be negated by HRI losses associated with loadcycling.58 A recent NERC review of the EPA’s Proposed CPP Rule also reaches a similar conclusion regarding coal-fired capacity factors and increased heat rates: Lower-capacity factors will cause an increase in heat rates, particularly if the lower-capacity factors are due to the cycling of the coal units. As a result of Building Block 2, coal units will cycle more often; therefore, assumed heat rate improvements across the entire coal fleet are unlikely. While recognizing capacity effects in the regression analysis, the EPA did not evaluate the effects of lowercapacity factors resulting from the dispatching of natural gas generation before coal generation.59 iv. MATS-related improvements raise net heat rates. EPA’s MATS rule will require some facilities to add pollution controls that could raise net heat rates by 1 to 4 percent.60 Both Cleco and SWEPCO have undertaken improvements of emissions control systems that will impose increase the facilities’ net heat rates.61 Cleco has an application currently pending before the LPSC in which it is seeking to recover $114 million in MATS retrofits at three facilities the effect of which could be to raise net heat rates.62 This problem is also highlighted by Sargent & Lundy, again, in response to the EPA’s use of its prior work in developing the first building block of the Proposed CPP: The installation of additional pollution controls such as that required by regulations including BART, MATS, etc. will decrease the heat rate efficiency of any unit as compared to its heat rate efficiency before the installation.63 58 Sargent & Lundy. Letter to National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, re: Coal Fired Power Plant Heat Reduction, dated October 15, 2014. 59 North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 2014. Potential reliability impacts of EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan, p. 8. 60 Cleco comments dated July 25, 2014, LPSC Docket R-33253. 61 SWEPCO Comments dated July 25, 2014, LPSC Docket R-33253. 62 LPSC Docket U-32507. 63 Sargent & Lundy. Letter to National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, re: Coal Fired Power Plant Heat Reduction, dated October 15, 2014. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 30 . v. Improvements may (“NSR”) process. trigger New Source Review The EPA also fails to consider the relationship between its Proposed CPP Rule and prior standards it has imposed on EGUs under NSR. The EPA regulates emissions from new, large stationary sources through the NSR process. If a new emissions source will produce emissions above a certain threshold, it must acquire a permit. This permit requires that the emissions source employ the BACT to ensure it will take all feasible steps available to limit emissions. BACT is set on a source-specific basis, and it is quite possible that capital investments and upgrades to EGU efficiency would trigger NSR and even higher capital investments in retrofitting additional environmental controls. This is an issue also highlighted by Sargent & Lundy in its reply to the EPA’s use of its study results for the development of Building Block 1: “many of the options for HRI listed in our 2009 Report have triggered New Source Review actions by EPA and others.”64 vi. Empirical modeling used in heat rate analysis is flawed. In an effort to estimate the potential emissions reductions from heat rate improvements, the EPA performed three analyses: 1) A regression analysis to understand the impact of capacity factor and ambient temperature; 2) A bin model to determine the potential from best practices; and 3) An evaluation of available data and information to assess the potential from equipment upgrades.65 64 65 Id. EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-22. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 31 . The EPA performed 3 regression analyses: (1) heat rate onto capacity factor; (2) heat rate onto ambient temperature; and (3) heat rate onto capacity factor and ambient temperature. 66 The EPA explains that because it is evaluating heat rate under normal operating conditions, it eliminated records with hourly heat rate values outside of +/- 2.6 standard deviations.67 While this may be an acceptable practice for the EPA, it is contrary to standard statistical and economic practice for empirical work. As explained in Chambers (1986), if the outliers in question are “elements with values that have been correctly recorded and that cannot be assumed…[that] there are no more similar outliers in the non-sampled part of the target population,” then they should not simply be dropped from a regression.68 The EPA states that these outliers occur for plants utilizing partial operating hours and low load conditions and are not due to incorrect data or other problems.69 This type of outlier should not be ignored, since it is still representative of some portion of the population.70 There is simply no statistical rationale for the EPA’s selective exclusion of this data. The EPA’s regression results are expressed as the “R-squared” of the regression, which is one measure of the goodness of fit. However, the EPA’s model omits a number of important variables,71 and thus it cannot be said with certainty that the R-squared is attributable to capacity factor and ambient temperature alone. When variables are omitted, the estimated coefficients may be biased in the amount that they are correlated with the included variables. 66 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-24. EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-24. 68 Chambers, Raymond, 1986. Outlier Robust Finite Population Estimation Journal of the American Statistical Association, p. 1063. Available: http://0-www.jstor.org.iii-server.ualr.edu/stable/2289084 69 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-24. 70 The proper weighting to be used has been addressed theoretically as well as empirically, for instance, Chambers, Raymond, 1986. Outlier Robust Finite Population Estimation Journal of the American Statistical Association, p. 1063. Available: http://0-www.jstor.org.iii-server.ualr.edu/stable/2289084. 71 As noted by the EPA in its TSD, variables such as thermodynamic cycle, coal rank and quality, facility size, pollution control systems, operating/maintenance practices, type of cooling system, geographic location and ambient conditions, load generation flexibility requirement (baseload vs. load following), and plant components are relevant in determining heat rate, but were omitted from the regression analysis. GHG Abatement Measures, p.2-24. 67 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 32 . One example of an omitted variable is one representing the degree to which the unit is load-following. The EPA recognizes that load-following is vitally important in determining heat rate.72 If a load-following plant has a large capacity, then the estimate for the impact of capacity on heat rate will be higher since it is also capturing the impact of load-following on heat rate. Thus, the capacity impact will be overestimated. Similarly, plants that have many starts, will have higher heat rates since it takes more fuel to produce less energy. However, the EPA’s analysis removes observations with higher heat rates even if those higher rates were due to higher number of starts. The second portion of the EPA statistical analysis, which utilizes a bin model to determine the potential improvement from using best practices, groups plants into bins based only on temperature and capacity.73 This analysis raises similar concerns with reliability and comparability as noted earlier in the criticisms of the initial regression analysis. For instance, if plants with similar temperature and/or capacity are different in other important yet unconsidered ways, then the EPA’s statistical bin analysis will not be appropriate. This is of particular importance since the EPA’s proposed HRI is based on “comparable” plants within the same bin, that very well could be unreliable if plants differ based on unconsidered factors. EPA also cites Fredricks and Todd (2009) as proponents for the widely applicable reduction in heat rate in power plants by better data monitoring: statistical process control (“SPC”).74 Fredricks and Todd discuss the use of what is today more frequently referred to as the use of “big data” in improving the identification of problem areas in electricity generation. While these methods can be informative in the use of better statistical methods and data 72 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-24. EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p.2-30. 74 Fredrick & Todd, 1993. Statistical Process Control Methods in Performance Monitoring. Available at http://famos.scientech.us/Papers/1993/1993section11.PDF. 73 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 33 . collection processes, Fredrick and Todd warn that their findings cannot be generally applied, which is what EPA appears to be doing in its third methodology. Fredrick and Todd, for instance, only consider the impact of SPC in 2 plants, where the costs and improvements found are in no way representative of the population of power plants in operation. The authors stress (much like Sargent and Lundy) the importance of plant-by-plant analysis to provide true cost and potential heat rate reduction estimates. The cost estimates provided by the EPA are too general, and contradict suggested methodology by existing literature. The EPA concludes that the results of its analysis display a wide range of heat rate variability thus indicating the potential for heat rate improvement. The generation-weighted mean RSD for the study population is 5.4 percent: a value weighted more heavily for large units, which also likely have larger potential improvement on average. This methodology will provide a disproportionate estimate which does not directly correspond for smaller units. Similarly, the EPA admits that there has been a large change in quality of reporting for a number of plants over the 11 year sample, the implications of which are not fully considered in the development of the Building Block 1 recommendations. For example, EPA does not indicate how Table 2-8 (in its GHG Abatement Measures TSD) will change if instead of using data from the previous 11 years, only the previous five years’ data are included, where the data reporting changes have already occurred. The reporting methods for heat rate are noisy: the level of accuracy for heat rate measurement varies by EGU, which causes statistical noise in any analysis using this measure. Statistical noise is a common concern in empirical research, but nonetheless needs to be addressed in a straightforward and open manner. The EPA states, “approximately two-thirds of the large decreases in heat rate can be associated with changes in reporting method implemented LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 34 . to provide more accurate heat input data.”75 If the heat rate measures remained noisy throughout the sample period, this would just create attenuation bias in any regression estimates for heat rate. However, in this case, the heat rate measures for some EGUs become less noisy over time. This means that if the “noisiness” of a plant’s heat rate reporting is related to one of the variables in the estimated regressions, the error term will be heterogeneous and dependent on time. Heterogeneous errors violate the assumptions of OLS regression, but the full extent of the impact cannot be determined without further analysis. vii. EPA fails to consider the potential stranded costs and rate impacts associated with its recommendations. While the EPA calculates costs associated with its proposal based on the cost of compliance, it does not consider the potential for significant stranded costs associated with the reduced production, or premature retirement of coal-fired EGUs.76 A utility’s investment in an EGU is recovered through depreciation over the life of the facility. “Stranded costs” are incurred when the undepreciated value of that facility is no longer recoverable. Many coal plants facing potential shut down from the Proposed CPP Rule (and the cumulative impact of other EPA regulations) are older with most of their original investment being recovered through utility rates over an extended period of time. These plants, however, are not completely depreciated, since many require ongoing capital in order to continue to run, and remain compliant with ongoing changes in EPA regulations. For Louisiana, the EPA’s target for reduced coal generation is about 48 percent of the reported 2012 coal-fired generation (from 24.3 million MWh in 2012 to a target of 11.5 million MWh). Table 1 presents the cost estimate for coal plant capital investments and associated 75 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 2-34. The investment of an EGU is recovered through depreciation expense over the life of the plant. Stranded costs are the undepreciated value of a facility that ceases to be “used and useful”. 76 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 35 . stranded costs. Assuming a capital cost of $150/kW (mid-range estimate for thermal upgrades), capital upgrades in Louisiana required by Building Block 1 of the EPA’s proposal would total over $638 million. Compounded with this costs, are the stranded costs associated with having to make these new HRI investments, and recover these new costs, in addition to each EGU’s remaining plant in service, over a lower generation amount (i.e. stranded facilities costs). The LPSC estimates these potential coal facility compliance and stranded costs to total $1.5 billion in net present value terms.77 Louisiana ratepayers will likely be required to foot this bill. Preliminary Cost Estimates Low Mid High Range Range Range Cost Cost Cost ------ ($ Millions, NPV) ------ Building Block Strategy Building Block 1 Increase Coal Plant Thermal Efficiency Coal plant capital investment costs: Stranded coal plant capital cost: Building Block 2 $ $ 425.5 842.6 $ $ 638.3 842.6 $ $ 851.0 842.6 Increase Natural Gas Generation Capacity Factor New transmission capital investments: Stranded oil/gas steam plant capital cost: Building Block 3a At Risk Nuclear Generation Building Block 3b Increased Renewable Generation Increased capital cost margin: Utility lost revenue recovery: Building Block 4 Increased Energy Efficency Increased energy efficiency program expenditures: Utility lost revenue recovery: Total Louisiana Cost Impact: $ 1,268.1 $ 1,480.8 $ 1,693.6 Table 1. Estimated Cost of Building Block 1 Note: Coal plant capital investment costs are assumed to be: $100/kW (low); $150/kW (mid); and $200/kW (high) for all Louisiana coal units. Stranded cost estimates are only included for utility-owned units with publicly available data. 77 The reported 2012 plant in service figures for Louisiana coal-fired units total $1.7 billion. If one were to assume that the 48 percent decrease in Louisiana’s coal-fired generation were applied to these facilities uniformly, this would result in a potential stranded cost of over $842 million. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 36 C. Building Block 2 is Flawed i. Incorrect data The LPSC supports the initial comments filed by LDEQ on September 12, 2014 focusing on several data errors and omissions that would significantly alter the EPA’s calculations in “Building Block 2” and impact the final goal for Louisiana. For instance, the EPA calculations inadvertently exclude two NGCC units that are “under construction,” as defined by the Proposed CPP. First, Entergy Louisiana is constructing 2 new NGCC units at its Ninemile Point Electric Generating Plant in Westwego, Louisiana. As noted by the LDEQ, permits for this facility were issued in August 2011, and, according to the Entergy website, these units are expected to come online in mid-2015.78 A recent report from Entergy indicates that Ninemile 6 may come online before the end of 2014. The new units will have a nameplate capacity of 640 MW and a projected net summer capacity of 559 MW. Also, a new NGCC is being constructed by Louisiana Energy and Power Authority (“LEPA”) in Morgan City Louisiana (at the current Morgan City Power Plant location). This new NGCC unit is expected to come online in late 2015 and will have a nameplate capacity of 84 MW and a net summer capacity of 64.5 MW.79 The impact of these omitted NGCC units totals 724 MW of nameplate capacity, or 624.5 MW of net summer capacity that should be added to the EPA calculations for “Under Construction NGCC Capacity.” 78 See “Entergy Louisiana to Build State-of-the-art Generation Unit at Ninemile Point Plant.” http://www.entergy.com/news_room/newsrelease.aspx?NR_ID=2178. 79 See “PA breaks ground on $120 million power plant.” Available at: http://www.postsouth.com/article/20140425/News/140429706. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 37 Available at: Conversely, in its Block 2A calculations, the EPA includes 655 MW of capacity for a NGCC unit as being under-construction. This facility, however, has been technically listed as being “under-construction” for an extended period of time, and is not likely to reach commercial operation in the time period envisioned in the Proposed CPP. The Washington Parish Energy Center was originally permitted by the LDEQ in June 2000, however, it was never completed and to date, no longer has an active air permit. As a result, this EGU should be removed from the Louisiana baseline calculation reducing the state’s existing NGCC capacity from 6,508 MW to 5,853 MW. The LPSC and LDEQ have also identified a number of other units that should not be included in the EPA’s baseline NGCC calculations. First, the EPA’s calculations include 5 units at Entergy Gulf States Louisiana’s Louisiana Station No. 1 as NGCCs. These units total 406 MW of nameplate capacity. As noted by LDEQ, three of these units are actually boilers and not turbines and the relevant pages from the Permit for these units were included in the LDEQ’s comments. In addition, Louisiana Station No. 1 is located adjacent to an ExxonMobil refinery and chemical facility. The majority of power generated at Louisiana Station No. 1 is dedicated to this facility and thus does not meet the requirement of an “affected electric generating unit.”80 Removing these facilities from the EPA’s calculations further reduces Louisiana’s total NGCC nameplate capacity to 5,447 MW. As also noted by the LDEQ, all 3 units at Entergy Louisiana’s Perryville Power Station are classified by the EPA as NGCC units. However, one of these units (Unit 2-1) is actually a simple cycle and should not be included as an NGCC. The removal of this Perryville unit 80 Publicly available data from the EIA’s Form 923 for 2012 show that Louisiana Station 1’s sales for resale were just 27.3 percent of the facility’s total disposition. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 38 represents a further decrease of 186 MW in NGCC capacity, resulting in a total NGCC nameplate capacity of 5,261 MW. Table 2 uses the EPA’s spreadsheet to show the impact of these corrections and resulting baseline emissions rate. The addition of 724 MW of Under Construction NGCC capacity, along with the reduction of 1,248 MW of current NGCC capacity results in an increase of Louisiana’s baseline emissions rate from 883 lbs/MWh to 981 lbs/MWh. Coal NGCC O/G Steam (lb/MWh) Step 2 (HRI) Step 1 (2012 Data for Fossil Sources) 2012 Generation Emissions Rate Other Emissions Coal (lbs) NGCC O/G Steam Other Under Construction NGCC NGCC Capacity Capacity Adj. Coal Rate (MW) (lbs/MWh) (MWh) Step 3a & 3b (Redispatch) Resdispatched Generation Coal O/G Steam (MWh) Other Emissions Final Goal (2030 and Other Gen. thereafter) (lbs/MWh) (lbs) (MWh) 40,018,850 3,267,065,650 5,223,728 883 6,456,931 6,727,786 6,984,289 6,707,787 6,662,950 8,257,755 40,862,114 40,129,528 38,873,943 39,105,753 38,433,689 35,991,386 5,636,440,288 3,578,046,071 3,267,065,650 2,353,497,076 1,681,085,998 3,267,065,650 8,315,696 5,629,549 5,223,728 3,699,551 2,577,715 5,223,728 866 881 891 898 910 944 7,953,968 33,302,164 3,671,015,973 4,551,327 981 EPA Proposal Louisiana 2,323 766 1,581 3,267,065,650 24,300,393 19,771,182 14,254,748 5,223,728 6,508 - 2,184 11,538,767 6,768,706 Corrections 1. Add Ninemile 6 2. Add Morgan City 14-01 3. Remove Perryville 2-CT 4. Remove Louisiana St, 1A, 2A, 3A 5. Remove Louisiana St, 4A, 5A 6. Remove Washington Parish 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323 766 766 763 786 803 766 1,581 1,581 1,581 1,581 1,581 1,581 3,267,065,650 3,267,065,650 3,267,065,650 2,353,497,076 1,681,085,998 3,267,065,650 24,300,393 24,300,393 24,300,393 24,300,393 24,300,393 24,300,393 19,771,182 19,771,182 19,209,368 18,693,317 17,899,980 19,771,182 14,254,748 14,254,748 14,254,748 14,254,748 14,254,748 14,254,748 5,223,728 5,223,728 5,223,728 3,699,551 2,577,715 5,223,728 6,508 6,508 6,322 6,360 6,251 5,853 640 84 - 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 11,007,278 11,469,009 11,906,277 11,434,918 11,358,482 14,077,182 2,323 830 1,581 767,517,423 24,300,393 16,260,301 14,254,748 1,053,538 5,261 724 2,184 13,559,310 Cumulative (Corrections 1 through 6) NGCC Table 2. Corrections to EPA’s Calculations for Louisiana NGCCs. ii. Incorrect use of capacity The LPSC supports the LDEQ’s assertion that the capacity used to calculate NGCC availability and resulting output should be based on a generating unit’s net summer dependable capacity, not its nameplate capacity. The EPA employed its Integrated Planning Model (“IPM”) to estimate the economic and emissions implications of its proposed rule. As described in the GHG Abatement TSD the IPM is: a multi-regional, dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S. electric power sector that the EPA has used for over two decades to evaluate the economic and emission impacts of prospective environmental policies. IPM provides a wide array of projections related to the electric power sector and its related markets (including least cost capacity expansion and electricity dispatch LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 39 projections) while meeting fuel supply, transmission, dispatch, and reliability constraints.81 It is clear that the EPA has used this IPM model extensively to conduct various analyses of regulations and legislative proposals. The EPA believes that the “IPM represents a powerful tool to evaluate the technical feasibility of requiring increasing levels of re-dispatch from higher to lower-emitting EGUs.”82 The inputs to the IPM for existing and under construction EGUs however, are based on data from the National Electric Energy Data System (“NEEDS”). This database “contains the generation unit records used to construct the "model" plants that represent existing and planned/committed units in EPA modeling applications of IPM.”83 And the NEEDS database uses capacity values that reflect an EGU’s net summer capacity. This is explained in the EPA’s documentation for IPM and NEEDS: The NEEDS unit capacity values implemented in EPA Base Case v.5.13 reflect net summer dependable capacity18, to the extent possible. Table 4-4 summarizes the hierarchy of primary data sources used in compiling capacity data for NEEDS v.5.13; in other words, data sources are evaluated in this order, and capacity values are taken from a particular source only if the sources listed above it do not provide adequate data for the unit in question.84 81 GHG Abatement TSD, 3-20. GHG Abatement TSD, 3-21. 83 EPA’s Power Sector Modeling Platform v.5.13. Available at: http://www.epa.gov/powersectormodeling/BaseCasev513.html#needs. 84 Id. See documentation for v.5.13, Chapter 4: Generating Resources. 82 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 40 If the EPA’s underlying model that instructs the development of its proposal relies upon net summer capacity, why then does EPA’s proposal and calculations of target emission rates use nameplate capacity? Table 3 includes the corrections made in Table 2, and also adjusts for the change from nameplate capacity to net summer dependable capacity listed in the NEEDS database. This correction results in a further increase to Louisiana’s baseline emissions rate, to 1,078 lbs/MWh. Coal NGCC O/G Steam (lb/MWh) Step 2 (HRI) Step 1 (2012 Data for Fossil Sources) 2012 Generation Emissions Rate Other Emissions Coal (lbs) NGCC O/G Steam Other Under Construction NGCC NGCC Capacity Capacity Adj. Coal Rate (MW) (lbs/MWh) (MWh) Step 3a & 3b (Redispatch) Resdispatched Generation Coal O/G Steam NGCC (MWh) Other Emissions Final Goal (2030 and Other Gen. thereafter) (lbs/MWh) (lbs) (MWh) 40,018,850 3,267,065,650 5,223,728 883 6,456,931 6,727,786 6,984,289 6,707,787 6,662,950 8,257,755 40,862,114 40,129,528 38,873,943 39,105,753 38,433,689 35,991,386 5,636,440,288 3,578,046,071 3,267,065,650 2,353,497,076 1,681,085,998 3,267,065,650 8,315,696 5,629,549 5,223,728 3,699,551 2,577,715 5,223,728 866 881 891 898 910 944 13,559,310 7,953,968 33,302,164 3,671,015,973 4,551,327 981 2,184 20,267,815 11,889,215 26,169,293 3,267,065,650 5,223,728 1,092 2,184 17,537,203 10,287,423 26,990,816 3,267,975,083 4,065,791 1,078 EPA Proposal Louisiana 2,323 766 1,581 3,267,065,650 24,300,393 19,771,182 14,254,748 5,223,728 6,508 - 2,184 11,538,767 6,768,706 Corrections 1. Add Ninemile 6 2. Add Morgan City 14-01 3. Remove Perryville 2-CT 4. Remove Louisiana St, 1A, 2A, 3A 5. Remove Louisiana St, 4A, 5A 6. Remove Washington Parish 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323 766 766 763 786 803 766 1,581 1,581 1,581 1,581 1,581 1,581 3,267,065,650 3,267,065,650 3,267,065,650 2,353,497,076 1,681,085,998 3,267,065,650 24,300,393 24,300,393 24,300,393 24,300,393 24,300,393 24,300,393 19,771,182 19,771,182 19,209,368 18,693,317 17,899,980 19,771,182 14,254,748 14,254,748 14,254,748 14,254,748 14,254,748 14,254,748 5,223,728 5,223,728 5,223,728 3,699,551 2,577,715 5,223,728 6,508 6,508 6,322 6,360 6,251 5,853 640 84 - 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 2,184 11,007,278 11,469,009 11,906,277 11,434,918 11,358,482 14,077,182 Cumulative (Corrections 1 through 6) 2,323 830 1,581 767,517,423 24,300,393 16,260,301 14,254,748 1,053,538 5,261 724 2,184 7. Change NGCC Capacity to Summer MW 2,323 766 1,581 3,267,065,650 24,300,393 19,771,182 14,254,748 5,223,728 4,256 - Cumulative (Corrections 1 through 7) 2,323 830 1,581 767,517,423 24,300,393 16,260,301 14,254,748 1,053,538 4,256 624 Table 3. Corrections to EPA’s Calculations Adjusting for Net Summer Capacity. iii. The CPP fails to recognize the significant carbon emissions reductions already made by Louisiana through an increase in NGCC dispatch The CPP also fails to recognize the significant strides Louisiana’s regulators have taken over the past several years to maximize the use of new generation technologies and efficiencies to reduce costs and emissions while also evaluating the impact these changes may have on rates. Figure 7 for instance, shows that Louisiana’s natural gas heat rates have fallen 9.7 percent in the last 10 years, at an average annual rate of one percent. Similarly, natural gas-fired emissions have fallen 11.2 percent, at an average annual rate of 1.2 percent. This result was achieved LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 41 through considerable, concerted, and coordinated statewide regulatory actions that balance costs 12,000 1,400 11,500 1,350 11,000 1,300 10,500 1,250 10,000 1,200 9,500 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Natural Gas Heat Rate 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 CO 2 Emissions (lbs/MWh) Heat Rate (Btu/kWh) and benefits to all Louisiana power market stakeholders. 1,150 Natural Gas Emissions Figure 7. Recent Trends in Louisiana Gas-Fired Generation Source: EPA Clean Air Markets database. Figure 8 highlights the efficiency of Louisiana’s NGCC units. On average, Louisiana’s NGCC units operate at heat rates that are 29 percent lower than Louisiana’s steam units and emit 30 percent less emissions. [Space intentionally left blank.] LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 42 14,000 1,800 1,600 Heat Rate (Btu/kWh) 1,400 10,000 1,200 8,000 1,000 6,000 800 600 4,000 400 2,000 0 200 2004 2005 2006 NGCC Heat Rate 2007 2008 Steam Heat Rate 2009 2010 2011 NGCC Emissions 2012 2013 0 Steam Emissions Figure 8. Louisiana NGCC Efficiency and Emissions Source: EPA Clean Air Markets database. iv. The proposed rule does not appreciate the significance of the required dispatch modification The EPA’s estimated CO2 emissions reduction associated with Building Block 2 is the largest share of proposed reductions (58 percent) of any building block included in the CPP’s proposed BSER. The EPA estimates, if utilized for SIP purposes, would entirely reconfigure Louisiana’s economic dispatch from one that currently relies on a modest level of baseload coal generation, to one almost exclusively reliant upon natural gas generation. Figure 9 compares Louisiana’s current generation fuel mix to the one likely to arise under the EPA’s proposed plan. EPA’s analysis suggests that Louisiana should shift its current 31 percent reliance on natural gasfired generation to one that would be forced to rely on natural gas for 63 percent of its power generation: a level that is more than double the national average for natural gas-fired generation as forecast by the Energy Information Administration in its most recent Annual Energy Outlook (“AEO”). This represents a considerable change in Louisiana’s power generation configuration LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 43 CO 2 Emissions (lbs/MWh) 12,000 that may very well lead to a significant increase in ratepayer costs as well as potential service interruptions. CPP Proposed Generation Mix 2012 Generation Mix Coal, 38% NGCC, 31% Coal, 18% NGCC, 63% Oil/Gas Steam, 23% Other, 8% Oil/Gas Steam, 11% Other, 8% Figure 9. Louisiana’s 2012 Generation Fuel Mix and EPA’s Proposed CPP Fuel Mix. Source: EPA Technical Support Document, Goal Computation. This change in fuel mix is highlighted by NERC in its reliability assessment. NERC explains that: the power industry relies upon diversification of fuel sources as a mechanism to offset unforeseen events (e.g., abnormal weather, regional transfers, labor strikes, unplanned outages); ensure reliability; and minimize cost impacts. Fuel diversification is also a component of an “all-hazards” approach to system planning, which inherently provides resilience to the BPS.”85 85 North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 2014. Potential reliability impacts of EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan, p. 9. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 44 There is currently 60 GW of nameplate coal-fired capacity in the U.S. that is expected to retire by 2020.86 This, plus the additional 49 GW estimated to retire as a result of the EPA’s proposal87 means the U.S. electric power industry will need to compensate for over 100 GW of retired coal-fired capacity. EPA’s proposal threatens to exacerbate this shift in the resource mix further threatening fuel diversity. Table 4 lists the NGCC units included in EPA’s CPP baseline calculations. Base year (2012) generation is provided along with the estimated generation level arising from EPA’s Building Block 2 analysis, and the percent increase this generation represents relative to base year 2012 levels. A number of anomalies are apparent from this table. First, under the EPA’s estimates, Louisiana Station No. 1 would actually need to ramp-down to meet the arbitrary 70 percent utilization level upon which EPA’s second building block is based. Thus, based upon EPA’s own analysis, Louisiana should adopt policies that promote (or incent) one of its more efficient CHP units to operate at a lower, rather than higher operating efficiency. [Space intentionally left blank.] 86 The EIA AEO for 2014 estimates 60 GW of retirements by 2014. This assumes implementation of the MATS standard as well as other existing laws and regulations. See “Planned coal-fired power plant retirements continue to increase.” Available at: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15491. 87 EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution Guidelines for Existing Power Plants and Emission Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants, p. 3-32. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 45 Nameplate Capacity (MW) Louisiana Station No. 1 Coughlin Power Station Sterlington Acadia Energy Center Carville Energy LLC Ouachita Washington Parish Energy Center Perryville Power Station J Lamar Stall Unit Total EPA 2012 Estimated Generation Generation ------ (MWh) ------ Capacity Factor EPA Highest Highest Assumed in Last in Last Increase 10 Years 5 Years (%) 406.3 922.8 226.3 1,376.0 570.0 903.9 655.0 824.1 624.0 2,949,067 1,434,842 4,610 4,785,503 2,899,630 1,658,025 2,486,523 3,552,982 2,498,257 5,674,113 1,391,473 8,460,749 3,504,816 5,557,900 4,027,464 5,067,226 3,836,851 -12.6% 52.3% 69.8% 30.4% 12.1% 49.1% 70.0% 35.7% 5.2% 99.5% 26.9% 15.6% 40.8% 62.6% 20.8% 0.0% 29.4% 43.0% 99.3% 26.3% 1.4% 40.8% 62.6% 20.8% 0.0% 29.4% 43.0% 6,508 19,771,182 40,018,850 34.7% 29.9% 28.0% Table 4. Building Block 2, Louisiana NGCC Units The final averages in last two columns reflecting maximum capacity factors in the last ten and five years do not include Louisiana Station No. 1. Source: EPA Technical Support Document, Goal Computation. What is more dramatic is the substantially increased utilization from the remaining units that would be required under EPA’s proposed rule. The Coughlin Power Station will be required to increase it generation utilization by 52 percent over 2012 levels, the Sterlington unit will be required to increase its power generation utilization by close to 70 percent, and the Ouachita unit would be required to increase its power generation utilization by close to 50 percent. These are considerable increases that are simply unrealistic for the implementation time afforded by EPA for CPP compliance. The last two columns of Table 4 underscore the implausibility of EPA’s Building Block 2 calculations. These two columns present the highest generation utilization levels for each NGCC unit over the past 10 years and 5 years, respectively. At no point over the past decade has any CPP-eligible EGU reached a 70 percent utilization level. Only the Carville Energy LLC unit has reached a level close (63 percent) to that assumed in EPA’s second building block. In fact, even this utilization level is exceptional and has only arisen in the 2012 base year. Over the past 10 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 46 years, Carville has operated, on average around 50 percent and has operated at an average utilization of 57 percent over the past five years. On average, most Louisiana EGUs (excluding Louisiana Station No. 1) report 10 year average generation utilization levels of 20 percent and five year average utilization levels of 32 percent: both of which are significantly lower than the EPA’s target of 70 percent. v. EPA modeling does not properly account transmission-related constraints and costs. for The conclusions reached in the EPA’s Building Block 2 analysis suggests that Louisiana could, and should, improve its generator efficiency performance, and that the IPM assumptions and results simply reflect these efficiency opportunities. These conclusions are naïve and inconsonant with conclusions reached in prior LPSC investigations. The LPSC has spent a considerable amount of time and resources over the past decade investigating the opportunities for better utilizing NGCC generation that includes leveraging a considerable amount of CHPbased generation at many of the state’s large industrial facilities. The LPSC has consistently reached the conclusion in most of these investigations that the costs of expanding newer NGCC generation, and ramping down older, less efficient natural gas-fired steam generation, is costly.88 In theory, as the EPA correctly notes, the efficiency opportunities, and opportunities for reduced emissions across a range of pollutants (not just CO2), through the increased utilization, and “re-dispatch” of NGCC generation are considerable. Just as important to the Commission, however, are the possibilities for lowering overall generation costs for Louisiana ratepayers by utilizing more efficient and lower-cost natural gas based generation. The EPA should rest assured that the LPSC, like many state utility regulators, is vigilant in assessing these types of efficiency opportunities. The EPA can also rest assured that the LPSC’s past investigations were 88 LPSC Docket U-27136, Subdocket A, LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 47 based upon very detailed multi-area electric generation dispatch modeling with utility-specific data and operational input that go well beyond any generalized model like the IPM used in the development of the CPP. However, the LPSC has determined through these analyses that in-state improvements arising from increased NGCC utilization comes at a cost: billions in transmission-related and other bulk-power sector investments. The EPA building block analyses simply fails to consider the rather expansive and expensive transmission costs that will need to be incurred to accommodate dispatching regional NGCC units to an average 70 percent utilization rate. The Proposed Rule, as will be discussed in greater detail later in our comments, also fail to appreciate the substantial time investment needed to facilitate the types of changes envisioned in EPA’s BSER analysis. vi. Reliability The CPP could very likely result in serious adverse reliability-related impacts. Louisiana’s electric utilities, as well as several RTOs, have clearly indicated that future compliance could hinge on the use of systematic curtailment of service through “brown-outs” and rolling black-outs. The EPA has not provided any information, nor conducted any independent reliability analyses to contradict this assertion. The SPP, for instance, recently express three primary concerns in comments filed before the LPSC as well as the EPA.89 The SPP notes that the Proposed CPP will likely negatively impact bulk power system reliability, has a challenged compliance timeline, and will have a material impact on regional economic dispatch.90 The SPP conducted two different analyses: 89 See Comments of the Southwest Power Pool filed before the EPA on October 9, 2014 (hereafter “SPP Comments”). These comments were also formally filed before the LPSC on October 14, 2014. 90 SPP Comments, p. 1. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 48 one on the impacts the Proposed CPP would have on transmission system reliability and a second analysis on the impact of the Proposed CPP on regional reserve margins and generation adequacy. The SPP’s transmission system reliability analysis considered two potential bulk power system scenarios that included: one where unused/underutilized (existing) generation is dispatched to offset generation anticipated to be retired by the CPP; and a second that assumes new generation will be developed, to supplement existing generation, to meet regional power generation requirements (and offset generation retired due to CPP implementation). The SPP transmission system reliability analysis found, under both scenarios, that the Proposed Rule would result in “extreme reactive power deficiencies” that would expose the system, including areas in northwestern Louisiana, to widespread reliability risks and violations of NERC standards. The SPP also conducted a generation adequacy analysis finding that the proposed CPP would result in as much as 6,000 MWs of retirements: an amount that is some 200 percent above current SPP unit retirement projections. The SPP notes that the Proposed CPP will have “serious detrimental impacts on the reliable operation of the bulk power system” that will likely introduce “the real possibility of rolling blackouts or cascading outages.” The SPP notes that it currently utilizes a 13.6 percent minimum planning reserve margin and, based upon its estimates, the CPP could drive actual reserve margins to 4.7 percent for the overall region, by 2020 and into a negative level by 2024. Some localized areas are anticipated to see reserve margins fall to levels even lower than the 4.7 percent. For instance, parts of northwest Louisiana are estimated to see their reserve margins fall to -10.0 percent by 2020 and by -25.0 percent by 2024. These potential LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 49 resource adequacy outcomes are simply unacceptable from the LPSC’s perspective and represent a very important and fundamental flaw in the CPP proposal. Further, while Louisiana has considerable natural gas infrastructure, it is not clear that many other places of the country do, and the power sector ramifications of this gas infrastructure inadequacy can ripple backwards into Louisiana through power and/or gas service interruptions, cascading brown-outs, power and gas commodity price spikes, as well as a variety of other unanticipated market and policy outcomes. vii. The CPP’s proposed compliance timeline is unreasonable and likely to lead to unnecessary costs. The short time frame for compliance with this rule creates a number of resource planning uncertainties for utilities and the LPSC. As noted earlier, the LPSC has solicited information from its utilities and other stakeholders, through a written comment process and is not likely to understand the full impact that the Proposed CPP will have on its regulated utilities given the continued uncertainties associated with this new regulation. Most utilities, to date, have indicated that a number of difficult decisions will have to be made, and are currently being investigated, should the CPP continue along its currently-proposed framework. Major electric reliability organizations such as the regional reliability coordinating councils (MISO, SPP, as well as NERC), and reliability regulators, like the FERC, are also in the process of evaluating the CPP’s potential impacts. To date, these analyses are ongoing and preliminary. Most important is the fact that all Louisiana regulated investor-owned utilities have advised the LPSC that they will have difficulty complying with the rule and that it will likely result in considerable cost increases to their respective ratepayers. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 50 The EPA proposes interim reductions of 38 percent by 2020 with the total 42 percent reduction to occur by 2030. Thus, 90 percent of the overall proposed reductions for Louisiana are expected to occur by the interim goals period. It will be difficult to meet such requirements within the given time period given the national scope of this rule, and the near-term transmission constraints noted earlier. While the EPA hails the Proposed Rule’s “flexibility,” the LPSC finds the proposals anything but flexible, representing a return to the command-and-control regulation of the 1970s. The currently proposed CPP timeline envisions a final rule being developed by June 2015. States will be given 12 months to develop initial State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) (June 30, 2016) and 24 months for final SIPs (June 30, 2017). States developing a regional response are given until June 30, 2018. Thus, states are likely to have approved SIPs in place sometime in the 2017-2018 time period. Interim reductions, however, begin in 2020: some two to three years after compliance plans are approved. This is simply not enough time given the Rule’s potential compliance requirements. For instance, it takes at least 3 years to plan, permit, and develop a new NGCC unit, assuming no development congestion and a relatively normal business-as-usual development environment that will likely not be the case given the broad, far-reaching national nature of the proposed CPP. It takes, on average, some 8 years to plan, permit, and develop a new transmission project. New generation and transmission will likely be necessary to maintain resource adequacy requirements if Building Block 2 is chosen as a compliance option using EPA’s estimates. Louisiana will also be required to increase its renewable power generation by 103 percent by 2020 to meet the CPP’s proposed interim emissions reduction goals. This is equivalent to a LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 51 495 MW increase in renewable generation capacity that will have to be developed in a post-SIP approved 24 to 36 month compliance window. Consider that it has taken some states, such as New Jersey, Maryland, and Colorado, at least 5 to 6 years to increase their in-state renewable generation shares to six percent of total generation. Likewise, Louisiana will be required to increase its commitments to energy efficiency from 0 to 1.14 percent in 2020 and 9.33 percent in 2030. Between 2020 and 2030 represents an increase of 720 percent. This new requirement is comparable to 1.4 GW of avoided generation capacity that, again, will have to be developed within a two to three year period: a time period far more escalated that the time it took EPA’ best practices states to reach what EPA believes to be an optimal level of energy efficiency adoption. What this all adds up to is offering Louisiana, and other states, a choice between three bad state implementation options. First, Louisiana can choose speed over cost-effectiveness by adopting a set of poorly-examined emissions reductions strategies included in EPA’s deficient building block analysis in order to meet the unnecessarily expedited interim goals deadline. Second, Louisiana, by adopting EPA’s proposed building blocks on an expedited basis, can run the risk of compromising system reliability since the ability of the bulk power system to accommodate these EPA strategies, as discussed earlier, is questionable. Third, Louisiana can try to develop a more cost-effective set of strategies, on a more reasonable pace, and run the risk of paying considerable penalties and potential fines for non-compliance. The LPSC finds all of these potential outcomes (or any combination of them) simply unreasonable and inconsistent with its charge to provide safe, economic and reliability electricity service to Louisiana ratepayers. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 52 The comments offered by MISO support the LPSC’s conclusions that EPA’s expedited time frame will be expensive and could very well challenge system reliability. In in comments before the LPSC, MISO noted that the compliance timeline included in the proposed rule significantly challenges its ability to sustain adequate reserve margins91. MISO also noted that CPP compliance costs would be “non-trivial” and heavily dependent on timing factors. MISO developed a number of compliance cost estimates, for instance, and found that regional approaches would save MISO states, collectively around $3 billion in implementation costs over a state level approach.92 MISO also noted that the expedited timing of the CPP would likely discourage regional-based solutions, thereby leaving these opportunities for reducing overall compliance costs on the table.93 viii. PA did not account for the potential rate impacts of the CPP. While the EPA calculates costs associated with its proposal based on the cost of compliance, it does not consider the upgrades in transmission required for the increase in NGCC dispatch. Nor does the EPA consider the potential for significant stranded costs associated with the reduced production, or premature retirement of Louisiana’s existing oil and gas-fired steam EGUs.94 For Louisiana, the EPA’s target for reduced oil/gas steam generation is about 48 percent of the reported 2012 oil/gas steam generation (from 14.3 million MWh in 2012 to a target of 6.8 million MWh). Table 5 presents the cost estimate for new and upgraded transmission investments and associated stranded costs. Transmission related costs are simply illustrative and are based upon 91 LPSC Docket R-33253. Id. 93 Id. 94 The investment of an EGU is recovered through depreciation expense over the life of the plant. Stranded costs are the undepreciated value of a facility that ceases to be “used and useful”. 92 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 53 the additional of several new transmission projects at a typical per-project costs of around $500 million. The midrange estimate for new transmission is $1.0 billion. The stranded costs associated increased NGCC dispatch and decreased oil/gas steam generation (i.e. stranded facilities costs) results in a potential mid-range estimate of $986.4 million. When these costs are added to the costs calculated for Building Block 1, the total potential costs eligible for recovery from Louisiana ratepayers increases to almost $3.5 billion. Preliminary Cost Estimates Low Mid High Range Range Range Cost Cost Cost ------ ($ Millions, NPV) ------ Building Block Strategy Building Block 1 Increase Coal Plant Thermal Efficiency Coal plant capital investment costs: Stranded coal plant capital cost: Building Block 2 $ $ 425.5 842.6 $ $ 638.3 842.6 $ $ 851.0 842.6 $ $ 500.0 986.4 $ 1,000.0 $ 986.4 $ 1,500.0 $ 986.4 $ 2,754.5 $ 3,467.3 $ 4,180.0 Increase Natural Gas Generation Capacity Factor New transmission capital investments: Stranded oil/gas steam plant capital cost: Building Block 3a At Risk Nuclear Generation Building Block 3b Increased Renewable Generation Increased capital cost margin: Utility lost revenue recovery: Building Block 4 Increased Energy Efficency Increased energy efficiency program expenditures: Utility lost revenue recovery: Total Louisiana Cost Impact: Table 5. Estimated Cost of Building Block 2 Note: Coal plant capital investment costs are assumed to be $100/kW (low); $150/kW (mid); and $200/kW (high) for all Louisiana coal units. Stranded cost estimates are only included for utility-owned units with publicly available data. Typical transmission investment resulting from increased NGCC dispatch assumed to be $500 million: low estimate assumes one project; mid-range estimate assumes two projects; high assumes three projects. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 54 D. Building Block 3(a) is Flawed The EPA uses its Building Block 3(a) to include a factor for “preserved” nuclear generation that might otherwise be retired. The EPA identifies a number of factors that could put nuclear EGU’s at risk: facility age; increased fixed O&M costs; low wholesale electricity prices; and additional capital investment associated with ensuring plant security and emergency preparedness.95 Using an estimate published in the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook for 2014, the EPA assumes that six percent of each state’s nuclear generating capacity is “at-risk.”96 Louisiana has two nuclear facilities in operation with a combined capacity of 2,134 MW (net summer capacity).97 EPA included 985 GWh of generation from these facilities in its target emission rate calculation for Louisiana.98 a. EPA’s allowance for “at risk” nuclear capacity effectively subsidizes unprofitable generation The EPA’s proposal effectively penalizes states with operable nuclear facilities by adding nuclear generation to the denominator of its equation thereby lowering a state’s emission rate. The EPA’s proposed formula is basically a ratio of carbon emissions-to-generation. Thus adding to the equation a zero-carbon emissions generation value increases the denominator while holding the numerator constant. The result is a reduced target emission rate, requiring greater carbon emission reductions. Penalizing a state for zero-carbon generation seems contradictory to the EPA’s goals. The rule should be designed to reward a state for utilizing zero-carbon emitting generation, not penalize it. 95 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, 4-33. EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, 4-33. 97 U.S Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Electric Generator Data, 2012. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/. 98 This assumes 5.86 percent of capacity at a 90 percent capacity factor. 96 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 55 This issue is highlighted by NERC in its reliability assessment: “The nuclear retirement assumptions add pressure to states that will need to retire nuclear units. For these states, more CO2 reductions from other measures than originally estimated by the EPA may be required.”99 Because neither of Louisiana’s existing nuclear facilities are “at-risk” an no new nuclear is under construction, this component should not be included in the denominator of the equation.100 b. The basis for EPA’s “at risk” nuclear capacity estimates is weak and not well supported The EPA based its assumption of “at-risk” nuclear capacity on an estimate published in the EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook for 2014. The EIA however, does not provide any detailed calculations, nor does it identify specific plants, timeline or rationale for this estimate other than “continued economic challenges.”101 The simply states: Additionally, the AEO2014 nuclear projection assumes a decrease of 5.7 GW by 2020 in several regions where existing nuclear units appear at risk of early closure due to a combination of high operating costs and low electricity prices. 102 The Entergy Companies also noted this in comments filed with the LPSC on the proposed rule: While the Companies do not know which units the EIA had in mind, the Companies do not consider any of their nuclear units in Louisiana to be 99 North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 2014. Potential reliability impacts of EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan, p. 8 100 Pg. 6, Joint Comments of Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, L.L.C. and Entergy Louisiana, L.L.C., LPSC Docket R33253. 101 Jones, J. and M. Leff. 2014. Implications of accelerated power plant retirements. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. April 2014. 102 Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. 2014. Annual Energy Outlook, Electric Market Module. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 56 vulnerable to the type of economically-forced closure described by the EPA in this proposed rule.103 The EPA also notes the lack of specific retirement assumptions, but yet determines that the 5.7 GW retirement projection “is a reasonable proxy” and applies it to all states with nuclear generation regardless of region or fleet characteristics (e.g., age of facility, historic capacity factor, economic dispatch, regulatory environment). c. EPA’s “at risk” nuclear proposals are ambiguous on how nuclear generation will be treated for compliance purposes The EPA’s “at-risk” nuclear component is not a compliance requirement and no specific monitoring or verification is required. This portion of the EPA’s BSER seems only to serve as a method for reducing a state’s target emission rate. It is unclear how actual net generation values will be accounted. For example, if the two units in Louisiana operate below a 90 percent capacity factor in one year (as a result of refueling or outage), it is unclear if Louisiana would still be able to claim “credit” for the entire 985 GWh used in calculating the state goal, or if some adjustment would be applied. d. At-Risk nuclear is not anticipated to impose additional costs upon Louisiana ratepayers at the current time. The nuclear component of EPA’s proposed rule is not expected to impose a cost to Louisiana ratepayers. If the EPA allows a state to use the same 6 percent of nuclear generation for compliance of the target emissions rate, and nuclear generation remains constant, then it should impose no cost. This could change, however, over time, if the costs associated with operating nuclear power exceed wholesale market rates. At that time, Louisiana could be compelled to assume an “above-market” cost in order to remain compliant with CPP provisions. 103 Joint Comments of Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, L.L.C. and Entergy Louisiana, L.L.C. p. 6, LPSC Docket R33253. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 57 Preliminary Cost Estimates Low Mid High Range Range Range Cost Cost Cost ------ ($ Millions, NPV) ------ Building Block Strategy Building Block 1 Increase Coal Plant Thermal Efficiency Coal plant capital investment costs: Stranded coal plant capital cost: Building Block 2 $ $ 425.5 842.6 $ $ 638.3 842.6 $ $ 851.0 842.6 $ $ 500.0 986.4 $ $ 1,000.0 986.4 $ $ 1,500.0 986.4 $ - $ - $ - Increase Natural Gas Generation Capacity Factor New transmission capital investments: Stranded oil/gas steam plant capital cost: Building Block 3a At Risk Nuclear Generation Building Block 3b Increased Renewable Generation Increased capital cost margin: Utility lost revenue recovery: Building Block 4 Increased Energy Efficency Increased energy efficiency program expenditures: Utility lost revenue recovery: Total Louisiana Cost Impact: $ 2,754.5 Table 6. Estimated Cost of Building Block 3a $ 3,467.3 $ 4,180.0 Note: Coal plant capital investment costs are assumed to be $100/kW (low); $150/kW (mid); and $200/kW (high) for all Louisiana coal units. Stranded cost estimates are only included for utility-owned units with publicly available data. Typical transmission investment resulting from increased NGCC dispatch assumed to be $500 million: low estimate assumes one project; mid-range estimate assumes two projects; high assumes three projects. Nuclear assumed to have no additional cost. [Space intentionally left blank.] LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 58 E. Building Block 3(b) is Flawed i. Based on erroneous method of averaging. Section 4.2 of EPA’s GHG Abatement Measures TSD details how annual renewable energy (“RE”) generation goals are calculated. First, the EPA starts with a regional approach, by assigning each state to 1 of 6 regions.104 An RE generation target is calculated for each region based on an average of the 2020 RPS requirements for states within that region. Then, a regional annual growth factor is developed to allow the region as a whole to reach the regional RE target by 2029. This annual growth factor is applied to each state’s reported 2012 non-hydro RE generation for the years 2017 through 2029. For Louisiana, the EPA methodology results in a 2020 non-hydro RE generation target of 3.3 million MWh for Louisiana, which is a 38 percent increase over Louisiana’s 2012 non-hydro RE generation. This target increases to 6.9 million MWh by 2030, which is 184 percent greater than Louisiana’s 2012 non-hydro RE generation. [Space intentionally left blank.] 104 Alaska and Hawaii are assigned to their own separate regions. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 59 8 7 Million MWh 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Figure 10 EPA Estimated Louisiana Non-Hydro RE Generation Targets Source: EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, Data File: Proposed Renewable Energy (RE) Approach (XLS). The regional growth factors calculated by EPA are defined by the assignment of states to a region and the states’ mandates regarding RE generation. For the South Central region, to which Louisiana is assigned, EPA calculated an average annual growth factor of 8.35 percent. This percentage is applied to Louisiana even though non-hydro RE generation in Louisiana has actually been falling over the past decade. The LPSC is concerned about the EPA’s non-hydro RE targets for Louisiana since RE resources are some of the most expensive to deploy, and will have a considerable impact on the cost of complying with the proposed rule. While considerable strides have been made in reducing costs and increasing efficiencies of RE technologies, the costs of RE technologies are still considered “above market” by most measures as seen in Figure 11. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 60 Conventional Conventional Coal $96 IGCC $116 Natural Gas CC $66 Natural Gas Advanced CC $64 Natural Gas CT $128 Natural Gas Advanced CT $104 Advanced Nuclear $96 Renewable Geothermal $48 Biomass $103 Wind $80 Offshore Wind $204 Solar PV $130 Solar Thermal $243 0 50 100 150 200 250 Levelized Cost of Electricity ($/MWh) Figure 11 Comparison of Fossil Fuel and Renewable Energy Resource Costs ($/kW) Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. 105 The EPA’s method for estimating RE targets is unreasonable in general and unrealistic as it applies specifically to Louisiana. First, the use of a regional average is highly subjective and assumes that the states in a region are similar in terms of their specific policies and incentives regarding RE development. It also assumes that all states included in a region are comparable in terms of their technical potential for RE generation. This is clearly not the case for Louisiana and the region in which it was assigned. Applying an RE generation target to Louisiana that is derived from other states’ RPS policies is unreasonable since it suggests a capability and public interest finding consistent with adopting similar RE goals. As will be discussed later, the LPSC has twice examined the merits of adopting an RPS in Louisiana. The EPA’s average regional approach effectively sweeps 105 The cost provided here is for traditional geothermal applications. This differs from the geo-pressure/geothermal applications that may have limited applicability in Louisiana and would have a significantly higher cost. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 61 under the rug over 10 years of Louisiana-specific analysis in favor of its own generalized approach. The LPSC believes this is highly unreasonable and inconsistent with the basic tenets of the CAA. The use of a regional average determined by the policies of other states is also inconsistent with traditional utility resource planning practices in Louisiana that seek to acquire supply and demand side resource on a least-cost basis. There is no way an approach that averages projected RE generation additions over a geographic region that spans from the plains of Nebraska to the Gulf of Mexico can be consistent with these least cost resource procurement practices. ii. EPA’s RE target calculations for Louisiana are in error. State RPS polices have been developed and deployed by individual states based the state’s own assessment of its ability to implement a reasonable, achievable and cost-effective renewable requirement. The EPA’s GHG Abatement TSD explains that it relied on these individual state RPS requirements to develop the regional RE targets. 106 The EPA also notes that it “did not include targets that were capacity-based.”107,108 The EPA’s method calculates an RE generation target for each region based on an average of the 2020 RPS requirements for each state in that region. An annual growth factor is then applied to each state within a region so that the region as a whole will reach the regional target by 2029. The EPA assigns Louisiana to what it refers to as the South Central region. Figure 12 highlights the states included in the South Central region, which also includes Arkansas, Kansas, 106 GHG Abatement TSD, p. 4-9, fn 108. GHG Abatement TSD, p. 4-9, fn 108. 108 While most state RPS requirements are based on a percentage of total electric generation or retail sales, there are some that are capacity based. 107 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 62 Nebraska, Oklahoma and Texas.109 Only 2 of the 6 states in the South Central region have implemented a mandatory RPS.110 And, both of those RPS goals are based upon total capacity rather than a share of retail sales (or generation).111 The RPS in Kansas requires each investorowned utility and electric cooperative to generate or purchase 20 percent of its peak demand from renewable resources for each year beginning in 2020. This is the sole basis for the EPA’s South Central target of 20 percent by 2020.112 Texas also has a mandatory RPS. Like Kansas, the Texas Renewable Generation Requirement is not based on percentages, but rather a fixed capacity amount that is irrespective of statewide generation or capacity totals.113 Texas has a fixed RE capacity requirement of 5,800 MW by 2015, and a voluntary target of 10,000 MW by 2025. [Space intentionally left blank.] 109 The U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration uses a somewhat different regional definition. The EIA’s Southwest region includes Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas. So, the EIA Southwest region includes New Mexico, but does not include Kansas and Nebraska. The U.S. Census Bureau also has its own definition, defining the West South Central as Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas (no Kansas or Nebraska). 110 Oklahoma has a voluntary Renewable Energy Goal for its electric utilities that calls for 15 percent of total installed capacity to be derived from renewable sources by 2015. Available at: http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/2009-10bills/HB/hb3028_enr.rtf. 111 See Kansas Corporation Commission, Kansas Renewable Energy Standard, at: http://kcc.ks.gov/energy/res.htm; and Public Utility Commission of Texas, Goal for Renewable Energy at: http://www.puc.state.tx.us/agency/rulesnlaws/subrules/electric/25.173/25.173.pdf. 112 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, Data File: Proposed Renewable Energy (RE) Approach (XLS). 113 Public Utility Commission of Texas, Goal for Renewable Energy at: http://www.puc.state.tx.us/agency/rulesnlaws/subrules/electric/25.173/25.173.pdf. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 63 KS: 20% of capacity by 2020 TX: 5,800 MW by 2015 Figure 13 South Central Region States Source: EPA GHG Abatement Measures TSD, p. 4-14. The EPA does not consider that the other states in the South Central region have chosen not to implement an RPS. Nor does the EPA identify how a 20 percent capacity standard translates to a comparable generation (MWh) standard. Correcting for these errors substantially changes the estimated EPA target for Louisiana RE generation as shown in Figure 14. For instance, converting the Kansas RPS standard from a capacity based target to a generation based target, results in a reduction of the target RE generation for Louisiana by an average of 14 percent. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 64 8 7 Million MWh 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 EPA Target RE Generation 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 Corrected RE Target Generation Figure 14 Corrected RE Target Generation for Louisiana. Note: Assumes a 38 percent capacity factor for Kansas renewable generation. Source: Kansas Corporation Commission, 2014 Report on Electric Supply and Demand; and Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. NERC addresses this issue in its reliance review: The EPA method of assigning renewable regions is questionable. Of the six renewable regions created in the lower 48 states, targets for two regions (South Central and Southeast) were set based upon a single-state RPS. For example, the South Central state region (AR, KS, LA, NE, OK and TX) was set based upon only the Kansas RPS. Kansas accounts for only 6 percent of this region’s retail power sales and has the third-best wind resources in the country. Given the combination of a low population, large land area, and very high wind resource availability, Kansas has relatively low costs to meet its RPS. However, Louisiana (ranked #48 in wind resources and double the retail sales) is assigned the same non-hydro renewable target. To put these two states in the same region sets unattainable targets for Louisiana.114 It should also be noted that the EPA fails to consider the consumer protection components of many state RPS mandates. The EPA assumes that because other states in the region have set renewable energy goals to a certain level, that these goals are directly applicable 114 North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 2014. Potential reliability impacts of EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan, p. 12. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 65 to the surrounding states. However, many states have carefully crafted rate caps and other protection mechanisms to safeguard ratepayers against large increases in their bills. For instance, in Kansas the Renewable Energy Standard has a one percent cap on the rate impact of compliance. The Kansas Corporation Commission may exempt any utility that can demonstrate that compliance with the RPS would cause retail rates to increase by one percent or more. Other states with rate impact or revenue requirement caps include: Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina Ohio, Oregon and Washington.115 In its reliability review, NERC highlights a number of other issues with the EPA’s reliance on state RPS standards:116 A. States RPS qualifications vary and may or may not include hydroelectric generation, municipal solid waste (MSW), combined heat and power (CHP), clean coal, carbon capture and sequestration, and energy efficiency measures. Using New York as an example, NERC points out that the state’s hydroelectric generation accounts for 18.25 percent of total generation and is included as a baseline renewable for RPS purposes. This is different from what the EPA assumes in its methodology. B. Energy efficiency also plays differing roles in state RPS standards. For instance, the RPS in North Carolina allows up to 25 percent of the target to be met by energy efficiency gains. NERC explains that if this had been excluded from the EPA’s calculations, the targets for all of the states in the Southeast region would decrease. C. EPA did not consider multipliers given to certain resources. For example, Nevada gives 2.4 credits for every one kWh of energy produced by solar photovoltaics. 115 Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, U.S. Department of Energy. Available at: http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm. 116 North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 2014. Potential reliability impacts of EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan, pgs. 12-13. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 66 NERC identifies six states that have multipliers. Excluding these suggests a target that is higher than actual. D. The determination of state goals does not fully reflect the economic aspects and resource limitations due to “permitting, market saturation, transmission access, and project financing issues.” For instance, wind projects may have difficulty getting necessary permits and may be objected to at the local level. And, many high-grade wind sites are located in remote areas that would require large capital investments to move the energy to consuming areas. E. The EPA also neglected to consider the expiration or reduction of federal tax credits in upcoming years and the impact that will have on investment decisions. Those uncertainties “will directly impact the electric industry’s plan to quickly adapt to the CPP requirements. iii. EPA lumps Louisiana into a region that has nothing to do with this RE capabilities. EPA’s regional approach imposes the same target percentage to all states in a given region regardless of their RE technical capabilities. The regional definition for EPA’s South Central region is dominated by states that have considerable opportunities for onshore wind development and are already some of the larger wind developers in the country. Table 7 highlights each of these South Central States, their 2012 wind generation capacity and their share of total U.S. wind generation capacity. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 67 State Capacity (MW) Percent of Total (% ) Texas California Iowa Illinois Oregon Oklahoma Minnesota Washington Kansas Colorado North Dakota New York Indiana Wyoming Pennsylvania Idaho Michigan South Dakota New Mexico Montana 12,178.9 5,506.3 5,005.0 3,520.1 3,151.9 3,132.9 2,842.3 2,806.2 2,719.1 2,271.1 1,759.2 1,636.4 1,539.7 1,407.3 1,343.9 962.7 874.8 790.5 777.5 627.8 20.6% 9.3% 8.5% 6.0% 5.3% 5.3% 4.8% 4.8% 4.6% 3.8% 3.0% 2.8% 2.6% 2.4% 2.3% 1.6% 1.5% 1.3% 1.3% 1.1% State West Virginia Ohio Missouri Nebraska Maine Wisconsin Utah Arizona Hawaii New Hampshire Nevada Vermont Maryland Massachusetts Alaska Tennessee New Jersey Delaware Rhode Island Capacity (MW) Percent of Total (% ) 583.3 461.7 458.5 455.4 427.6 369.6 324.4 237.3 205.6 171.0 150.0 120.2 120.0 63.8 32.7 29.1 7.5 2.0 1.5 1.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Table 7 South Central States Wind Capacity and Relative Share of Total U.S. Wind Capacity (2012) Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. As highlighted in the table, four of the South Central states account for over 30 percent of total U.S. wind generating capacity. What is also important about Table 7 is that Louisiana is not included in the table. As will be discussed in greater detail later, Louisiana does not have, and very likely never will have, any wind generation. Louisiana simply does not have the technical capabilities for any meaningful grid-scale wind generation. Thus, placing Louisiana in a set of states with such tremendous wind development opportunities is unreasonable for at least two reasons. First, wind energy tends to be the lower cost of all commercially-available RE technologies. Figure 15 shows the total system levelized costs of commercially-available RE LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 68 technologies. At an average of $80/MWh, onshore wind can currently be developed and installed for 22 percent less than the next closest (non-hydro) RE option which is biomass. If Louisiana were to attempt to develop wind energy, it is likely that the resource would be need to be developed offshore rather than onshore, requiring Louisiana to pay a 154 percent RE development premium relative to other states with abundant wind resources. Average Levelized Cost (2012 $/MWh) 300 $243 250 $204 200 150 100 $130 $103 $85 $80 50 0 Wind Biomass Solar PV Offshore Wind Solar Thermal Hydro Figure 15 RE Generation Levelized Costs ($/MWh) Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. 117 Wind energy is not only one of the lower cost RE resources, but is also one of the few RE resources that can be considered grid-scaled, bringing a meaningful level of capacity that could be used to displace fossil-fueled generation. Table 8 shows the average installation size for active 2012 RE projects across the U.S. 117 Biomass estimates are based on the overnight capital cost of biomass and do not include potential transportation costs that would be incurred. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 69 Capacity (MW) Agricuture Crop Byproducts Black Liquor Geothermal Landfill Gas Municipal Solid Waste Biomass Gases 1 Biomass Liquids 2 3 Biomass Solids Solar (Photovoltaic, Thermal) Tires Wood Waste Liquids Wood Waste Solids Wind 4 5 Number of Installations Average Capacity (MW) 351 4,029 2,592 1,895 2,203 22 163 197 1,501 96 16.0 24.7 13.2 1.3 22.9 207 143 1.5 115 2 57.4 40 3,170 26 2 553 1 20.0 5.7 26.0 89 5 17.8 3,390 59,075 183 947 18.5 62.4 Table 8. Average RE Installation Size (kW) Note: 1Biomass Gases include digester gas, methane, and other biomass gases; 2Biomass Liquids include fish oil, liquid acetonitrile waste, medical waste, tall oil, ethanol, waste alcohol, and other Biomass Liquids not specified; 3 Biomass Solids include animal manure and waste, solid byproducts, and other solid biomass not specified; 4Wood Waste Liquids include red liquor, sludge wood, spent sulfite liquor, and other wood related liquids not specified; and 5 Wood Waste Solids include paper pellets, railroad ties, utility poles, wood chips, and other wood solids. Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. Wind projects have an average nameplate capacity of 62 MW relative to the next best alternative, which is biomass liquids at 57 MW. After that, all other renewable installations have an average capacity of 26 MW percent or less. There is no way Louisiana can cost-effectively scale a set of RE projects that are comparable to the size of the wind facilities located in Texas or the Midwest, and even if possible, they would likely be located in such remote (offshore) areas requiring additional, and likely cost-prohibitive, interconnection and integration investments. iv. The paucity of RE resources in Louisiana is wellrecognized. As part of its Alternative RE Approach the EPA compared each state’s existing RE generation to an estimate of its RE technical potential. To do so, EPA used measurements of LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 70 technical potential estimated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (“NREL”).118 The EPA’s Alternative RE Approach TSD states that “[t]he comparison of RE technical potential to existing RE net generation yields – for each state and for each selected RE technology – a proportion of achieved renewable generation from technical potential.”119 However, the Alternative RE Approach shows that Louisiana has very little RE technical capabilities. In fact, the EPA’s estimate of “State-Level Target Generation Levels Under the Alternative RE Approach” for Louisiana is actually 607 GWh less than Louisiana’s reported 2012 RE generation.120 The EPA sets a target that suggests considerable RE growth for Louisiana (184 percent), while the EPA’s own alternative analysis shows that this is almost impossible. The NREL document EPA relied upon includes a number of tables reflecting each state’s RE technical potential. Each of these charts, with the exception of biomass, shows that Louisiana is technically challenged in the area of RE development. For instance, Figure 16 provides a summary map using NREL’s measurements of technical potential for onshore wind by state: the darker the color, the greater the achievable energy generation from wind. The map shows that the Upper Plains region, the Midwest and Texas have considerable wind resources. A state or region’s wind resource (defined in part by its average annual wind speeds) should be an important input into any RE target or goal. The estimated technical potential for Louisiana is at the lowest end of the spectrum. Yet, it has been lumped into a region with considerable wind energy resources and technical potential. 118 See Lopez, et al., NREL, “U.S. Renewable Energy Technical Potentials: A GIS-Based Analysis,” July, 2012. Alternative RE Approach Technical Support Document, p. 1. 120 Table 1.1 in the EPA’s Alternative RE Approach Technical Support Document shows a RE Target Generation value of 2,503 GWh, while Louisiana’s 2012 RE Generation is 3,110 GWh. 119 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 71 Thousand GWh < 50 50 – 100 100 – 500 500 – 1,000 > 1,000 Figure 16. NREL Estimated Technical Potential for Onshore Wind Power by State Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy. Likewise, a state’s solar exposure provides considerable inference into its ability to support solar energy investments. Figure 17 shows that Louisiana is not well endowed with solar energy resources, particularly relative to other South Central states. While solar can be installed in areas with lower solar exposure, the effectiveness is significantly reduced, thereby raising the cost of using this resource as a carbon emissions mitigation strategy. [Space intentionally left blank.] LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 72 Thousand GWh < 10 10 – 50 50 – 75 75 – 100 > 100 Figure 17. NREL Estimated Technical Potential for Urban Utility-Scale Photovoltaics by State Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy. v. The use of biomass is ambiguous and raises additional unaddressed concerns. Louisiana does not have a significant potential for large wind and solar installations, however, it does have some biomass opportunities. Figure 18 presents a comparable map reflecting NREL’s measurements of technical potential for biomass. The map shows that Louisiana has potential for biomass, but is still second to states with greater potential like California, Texas, Illinois, Iowa and Nebraska. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 73 Thousand GWh <1 1–5 5 – 10 10 – 15 > 15 Figure 18. NREL Estimated Technical Potential for Biopower by State Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy. Most of Louisiana’s current and likely future biomass capabilities are restricted to a few agricultural sectors that include: (1) forestry harvesting and paper processing, (2) rice production, and (3) sugar production. Louisiana could, in theory, use some of this biomass capability to meet EPA’s target RE goals but the ability to do so is entirely dependent upon EPA’s willingness to accept and support extensive biomass development. Figure 19 for instance, estimates the biomass capacity requirements that would be needed to meet EPA’s annual RE generation targets assuming that the current biomass composition is increased proportionately. Louisiana’s 2012 non-hydro RE generation translates to an implied capacity value of 334 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 74 MW.121 Using EPA’s proposed non-hydro RE generation targets, Louisiana would have to add 614 MW of biomass capacity to reach an implied target of 948 MW by 2030. 1,000 900 800 Capacity (MW) 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Agricultural Byproduct Wood/Waste Wood Black Liquor 2012 Implied Capacity Figure 19. Estimated Louisiana Biomass Capacity Under Proposed EPA RE Targets Note: Assumes an 83 percent capacity factor to convert target generation (MWh) to capacity (MW). EPA’s proposed rule may allow for increased use of biomass to meet the non-hydro RE generation targets. However, while burning biomass may be technically renewable, it is not necessarily clean. In fact, the EPA’s own data shows that solid biomass fuels such as wood waste and agricultural byproducts can emit as much, if not more CO2 than coal, and significantly higher quantities of NOx.122 And, in July 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals vacated the EPA’s “biogenic carbon deferral” in which the EPA had exempted CO2 emissions from biomass plants 121 This assumes a capacity factor of 83 percent. See “Emission Factors for Greenhouse Gas Inventories,” Available at: http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/documents/emission-factors.pdf. 122 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 75 for purposes of CAA permitting for a period of 3 years pending further study.123 Thus it is unclear how increased biomass generation will be subjected to, or impacted by other EPA rules such as the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”). Large scale biomass generation applications, particularly more economical co-firing applications, could lead to a number of environmental compliance issues not addressed in EPA’s Proposed Rule. For instance, larger biomass co-firing applications designed to displace existing fossil generation will likely be grid connected and as such, will likely be CSAPR-eligible. While Louisiana has a number of biomass co-firing applications today, these biomass generators are not CSAPR-eligible since the power generated is used almost exclusively on-site. Future gridconnected biomass applications would put a considerable amount of pressure on Louisiana in meeting its already stringent CSAPR NOX emission requirements. Further, emissions associated with the transportation of biomass could negate emissions reductions and increase costs. vi. EPA fails to appreciate the age of Louisiana’s existing RE generation fleet. Figure 20 compares the 2012 base level of non-hydro RE generation for Louisiana against the annual target amounts included in the EPA TSDs. The line running across the chart shows the current 2012 baseline level, whereas the bars show the total levels of RE generation that arise through the use of EPA’s regional average growth factors. The difference between the line and the bars is the growth needed to reach the annual targets. 123 Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2014). LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 76 8 7 Million MWh 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Target Baseline Figure 20. EPA Projections of Louisiana Baseline and RE Generation Targets Source: EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, Data File: Proposed Renewable Energy (RE) Approach (XLS). What is potentially lost in the analysis included in Figure 20 is that the baseline level of current Louisiana RE generation is almost exclusively associated with biomass co-firing applications. And, most of these biomass were developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a means of reducing on-site agricultural processing costs through on-site generations. In fact, prior to 2005, Louisiana’s share non-hydro RE generation as a percent of total was higher than that of the U.S. average. However, Louisiana’s non-hydro RE generating fleet has aged over time. Few upgrades have been made to this fleet since the 1970s making the RE generation baseline upon which EPA assumes Louisiana will be able to build is faulty: Louisiana, in fact, will be lucky to just maintain its exiting share of RE generation over the next several years, much less add to it at levels envisioned by the EPA. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 77 Company Name Over 40 Years Old KPAQ Industries LLC Boise Packaging & Newsprint LLC Over 30 Years Old Temple-Inland Corp Temple-Inland Corp IPC-Mansfield Mill IPC-Mansfield Mill IPC-Mansfield Mill M A Patout & Sons Ltd M A Patout & Sons Ltd Agrilectric Power Partners Ltd Over 20 Years Old Georgia-Pacific - Port Hudson Under 20 Years Old Temple-Inland Corp Red River Mill Intl Paper Company Capacity (MW) Percent of Total Capacity (% ) 48 45 12.5 61.5 2.8% 13.8% Black Liquor Wood/Waste Wood 1979 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1981 1984 35 33 33 33 33 33 33 30 37.5 25.0 40.0 40.0 30.0 1.0 2.0 12.1 8.4% 5.6% 9.0% 9.0% 6.7% 0.2% 0.4% 2.7% Wood/Waste Wood Wood/Waste Wood Black Liquor Black Liquor Black Liquor Agricultural Byproduct Agricultural Byproduct Agricultural Byproduct GEN1 1986 28 67.7 15.2% Black Liquor NO10 3 T-G 1999 2008 15 6 37.0 78.8 8.3% 17.7% Wood/Waste Wood Black Liquor 445.1 100.0% Generator Id Online Date Facility Age (years) GEN2 TG 1966 1969 NO9 NO8 GEN1 GEN2 GEN3 1000 2000 GEN1 Total Fuel Table 9. Louisiana 2012 RE Generation by Age Category Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. Table 9 provides a list of operable RE generating units in Louisiana by age category. The majority of Louisiana’s operable non-hydro RE capacity is over 30 years old (almost 60 percent), and over 16 percent is more than 40 years old. Just 26 percent, or one-quarter of the operable non-hydro RE capacity in Louisiana is less than 20 years old. Not only does EPA fail to consider the age of Louisiana’s non-hydro RE fleet, but it also fails to conduct any analysis of the economic viability of this type of generation. The majority of generation produced by Louisiana’s biomass fleet comes from the burning of black liquor, a byproduct of pulp and paper mills. In fact, over 60 percent of Louisiana’s biomass capacity is fueled by black liquor. Another 36 percent is wood and waste wood and less than four percent comes from agricultural byproduct (such as bagasse from sugar cane production and rice hulls). Continued generation at these types biomass facilities is not a function of an RPS, but rather the LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 78 economic viability of these industries. Moreover, as with other limited resources, increased generation will increase costs of the commodity in manufacturing and other processes. For this reason, the LPSC limited the use of biomass in its RE pilot program. 124 Even if Louisiana adopted an RPS, it is highly unlikely that these existing non-hydro RE generation facilities would see “new life” through re-powering or other marginal investments given their age, and the nature of the industries to which they are tied. For instance, the paper mill industry across the U.S. has been in steady decline. And, the sugar and rice industries are facing challenges to remain competitive in a global market.125 Louisiana will be challenged to maintain its existing share of RE generation, relative to total, much less growing this generation by a 184 percent as suggested in the EPA RE targets. Any RE target developed for Louisiana needs to factor these unique agricultural sector factors, as well as the age of the existing base of RE generation in the state. EPA proposed RE targets, however, do neither. vii. EPA’s recommendations are inconsistent with prior LPSC findings. The LPSC takes an active regulatory role in the oversight of its utilities’ resource planning decisions. Louisiana was one of the early adopters of the use of competitive bidding rules and requirements to take advantage of environmentally-friendly, and highly efficient natural gas-fired combined cycle generation in the early part of the last decade. Louisiana was 124 LPSC General Order dated December 9, 2010 (Docket R-28271 Subdocket B). The sugar industry in the U.S. faces increasing competition as the Mexican-subsidized industry has been exporting increasing amounts of low-priced sugar into U.S. markets. In recent years Mexico’s surpluses have caused U.S. sugar prices to fall to unsustainably low levels. See: American Sugar Alliance, “U.S. Sugar Producers File Antidumping, Subsidy Cases Against Mexico”, March 28, 2014. Available at: http://www.sugaralliance.org/us-sugar-producers-file-antidumping-subsidy-cases-against-mexico-4732/. Also, the U.S. rice industry faces increased competition from alternative crops and the supply of farmland in rice growing regions is diminishing. See: Rice farming.com, Hybrid-Rice Update. Available at: http://www.ricefarming.com/home/issues/201312/Hybrid-Rice-Update.html. 125 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 79 also one of a few states to adopt cost-recovery rules and guidelines in creating a stable regulatory environment and reduce the risks of zero-emissions nuclear power. Similarly, this Commission has also examined, in significant detail, the opportunities for Louisiana RE generation: not once, but on two separate occasions. First, in October 2004, the LPSC published a notice of a proceeding to examine the feasibility of renewable energy development and the various policy merits of adopting an RPS.126 This initiative examined how RE generation would fit into Louisiana utility resource plans and was designed to assess cost-effective RE potential and public interest in adopting RPS policies. The proceeding continued for over two years and included numerous intervernors and stakeholder groups.127 The LPSC solicited a wide range of Louisiana-specific RE generation and technological information during the course of its first RE proceeding. While the LPSC Staff and independent consultants conducted their own analysis of RE potential, utilities and other stakeholders were encouraged to submit their data and analysis on the costs and benefits of RE development. A wide range of information was analyzed including: the technological status of various RE technologies; the efficiencies of these technologies; trends in current and emerging RE technologies; and the costs of employing these technologies. Most importantly, the LPSC examined in detail the Louisiana-specific costs and rate impacts associated with various RE technology development scenarios. This investigation was a comprehensive “bottoms-up” analysis, not a highly generalized “top-down” analysis like the one upon which the EPA’s proposed RE generation targets is based. 126 127 LPSC Docket R-28271. Id. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 80 The Commission issued an Order in its first comprehensive RE investigation in January 2007 finding that the “availability of acceptable renewable resources, the willingness of customers to enroll and the relationship between the participation levels and pricing” were uncertain and it declined to adopt and RPS.128 It was also noted that while Louisiana has the potential for “developing renewable resources such as biomass, landfill gas and offshore wind, it does not have the same opportunities as some other states for building on-shore wind, geothermal, hydro and solar generation resources.”129 The LPSC re-opened its RE proceeding in January 2009 to again evaluate the feasibility of an RPS for Louisiana. This second investigation was conducted in response to a new focus on renewable standards at the Federal level and the increasing adoption of RPS policies in other states.130 Similar to the first proceeding, this second investigation included an exhaustive examination of the potential for RE in Louisiana. The LPSC considered the interests of 50 intervenors, held multiple technical conferences and meetings and solicited several rounds of comments. The LPSC concluded that additional analysis was needed to provide “Louisianaspecific, actual cost data and enable a long-term decision tailored to meet Louisiana’s needs.”131 It was determined that there that a Renewable Energy Pilot Program (“REPP”) would be the best solution for the State of Louisiana. The pilot would: meet the Commission’s objective of developing real cost data to assist the Commission in making a decision with regard to a long-term ROS and at the same time provide developers with an incentive to market their resources to Louisiana utilities and take advantage of federal and state subsidies that may expire in the near term.132 128 Id. Id. 130 Notice of Final Task Force Report and Strawman Policy Proposal dated February 5, 2010, LPSC Docket R28271 Subdocket B. 131 LPSC Staff’s Final Recommendation dated June 15, 2010, Docket R-28271 Subdocket B. 132 Id. 129 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 81 An implementation plan for a 3-year pilot program was subsequently developed and adopted. Over the course of the pilot, LA utilities acquired approximately 80 MW of RE133. Nearly 400 additional MWs were acquired later and alleged to have been available because of the pilot program.134 Unfortunately, all except approximately 40 MW of the acquired RE is sited outside of Louisiana. In August 2013, the LPSC Staff presented its final annual report on the REPP. The LPSC Staff concluded that the investor-owned electric utilities had complied with the requirements of the REPP and that the REPP enabled the LPSC and its Staff to “evaluate the availability, costs, and potential benefits of renewable generation resources for Louisiana.” 135 In addition, the utilities provided significant analysis and data on the potential for RE development in Louisiana. It was concluded that: the Commission's REPP was a valuable learning experience for the Commission, Staff, and participating utilities. Staff also concluded that based on the information filed by the utilities, as well as Staffs participation throughout the process, a mandatory RPS is not warranted at this time. The data provided by the utilities indicated that the levelized cost of renewable technologies exceeds the costs of conventional resources. For example, the levelized cost of a combined cycle gas turbine is below the cost of any of the major renewable technologies. Current prices for natural gas have put renewable technologies at a cost disadvantage. Finally, interest at the federal level for a mandatory renewable energy policy currently appears to be limited.136 viii. EPA fails to appropriately account for the full costs and rate impacts of its RE proposals. The EPA failed to appropriately account for the rate impacts associated with the RE portion of its proposed rule. The costs of increased renewable energy go beyond the cost of RE technologies and must include lost revenues incurred by Louisiana’s utilities. Table 10 provides an estimate of the potential cost of the EPA’s proposal to Louisiana ratepayers. 133 LPSC Dockets U-32785, U-32557, U-32981. LPSC Docket U-32814. 135 LPSC General Order dated September 20, 2013 (Docket R-28271 Subdocket B). 136 Id. (emphasis added) 134 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 82 Preliminary Cost Estimates Low Mid High Range Range Range Cost Cost Cost ------ ($ Millions, NPV) ------ Building Block Strategy Building Block 1 Increase Coal Plant Thermal Efficiency Coal plant capital investment costs: Stranded coal plant capital cost: Building Block 2 $ $ 425.5 842.6 $ $ 638.3 842.6 $ $ 851.0 842.6 $ $ 500.0 986.4 $ $ 1,000.0 986.4 $ $ 1,500.0 986.4 $ - $ - $ - $ $ 388.8 248.8 $ $ 432.0 276.4 $ $ 475.3 304.0 Increase Natural Gas Generation Capacity Factor New transmission capital investments: Stranded oil/gas steam plant capital cost: Building Block 3a At Risk Nuclear Generation Building Block 3b Increased Renewable Generation Increased capital cost margin: Utility lost revenue recovery: Building Block 4 Increased Energy Efficency Increased energy efficiency program expenditures: Utility lost revenue recovery: Total Louisiana Cost Impact: $ 3,392.1 $ 4,175.7 $ 4,959.3 Table 10. Estimated Cost of Building Block 3b Note: Coal plant capital investment costs are assumed to be $100/kW (low); $150/kW (mid); and $200/kW (high) for all Louisiana coal units. Stranded cost estimates are only included for utility-owned units with publicly available data. Typical transmission investment resulting from increased NGCC dispatch assumed to be $500 million: low estimate assumes one project; mid-range estimate assumes two projects; high assumes three projects. Nuclear assumed to have no additional cost. Renewable energy assumes generation portfolio of 75 percent biomass; 15 percent wind and 10 percent solar. This results in a levelized cost differential of $37.60/MWh (when compared to a new NGCC). Lost base revenues estimated at $24.05 per MWh for both renewable energy and energy efficiency. Assumes 10.915 percent discount rate (based on typical utility allowed rate of return). Assuming a cost differential of $37.60/MWh, the increased capital cost of the EPA’s RE targets are estimated to be $432.0 million (mid-range). This, coupled with likely lost revenues of $276.4 million will result in an increased cost of $708.4 for Building Block 3b. This brings the potential costs associated with Building Blocks 1, 2 and 3 to almost $4.2 billion (mid-range estimate). LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 83 F. Building Block 4 is Flawed i. Building Block 4 is based on inappropriate method of determining technical potentials. Chapter 5 of the EPA’s GHG Abatement Measures TSD provides information regarding the EPA’s determination of appropriate levels of demand-side EE as a component abatement measure within its BSER.137 Section 5.3 details the EPA’s development of annual EE goals.138 The EPA first determined what it refers to as a “best practices” scenario for each state, which was used to estimate the potential for states to implement policies that increase investment in what the EPA believes are cost-effective demand-side energy efficiency technologies and practices. The EPA created this scenario using a level of EE performance demonstrated or required by policies in leading states, while considering each state’s existing level of EE performance and allowing “appropriate time” for states to increase from current EE levels of performance to the identified best practices level.139 The EPA determined that all states should be able to reach an annual incremental EE of 1.5 percent of annual retail sales. Furthermore, EPA has determined a best practices rate of improvement of 0.2 percent of annual retail sales starting in 2017.140 Since within EPA’s data Louisiana had no reported savings from EE in 2012,141 the EPA’s proposed methodology would require Louisiana to continually increase incremental annual EE saving from 2017 through 2025, and furthermore continue this level of annual savings through 2030. The LPSC is concerned that EPA’s proposed methodology may be inappropriate for individual states, including Louisiana. EPA’s proposed methodology by definition applies a 137 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, pp. 5-1 to 5-77. EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, pp. 5-30 to 5-59. 139 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-33. 140 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-33. 141 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-17. 138 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 84 national goal for EE potential to all states, regardless of “on-the-ground” realities. Within Louisiana, the Entergy Companies (Entergy Louisiana and Entergy Gulf States) serve approximately 63 percent of all Louisiana retail electric customers, and is by far the largest electric utility in the State.142 Entergy included in its 2012 IRP a Demand-Side Management (“DSM”) potential study for its Louisiana operating companies.143 This study, conducted by ICF International for Entergy, evaluated EE potential for years 2013 through 2028 across three scenarios: Low, Reference, and High. Entergy DSM Potential EPA Low Reference High Proposed Year Case Case Case Target 2020 2.56% 4.31% 5.95% 1.14% 2021 2.94% 4.96% 6.85% 1.85% 2022 3.31% 5.59% 7.73% 2.71% 2023 3.63% 6.13% 8.49% 3.69% 2024 3.88% 6.56% 9.10% 4.78% 2025 4.08% 6.88% 9.55% 5.88% 2026 4.21% 7.09% 9.86% 6.88% 2027 4.30% 7.24% 10.09% 7.78% 2028 4.37% 7.35% 10.25% 8.60% 2029 4.43% 7.44% 10.39% 9.33% Table 11. Entergy 2012 IRP DSM Potential Study: Cumulative Savings as Percentage of Total Projected Sales. Source: In re: The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s proposed rule on carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil-fuel fired electric generating units under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. Louisiana Public Service Commission, Docket No. R-33253, Joint comments of Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, L.L.C. and Entergy Louisiana, LLC in response to the Commission Staff’s notice of request for specific comments. 142 See, http://www.entergy-louisiana.com/about_entergy/default.aspx; Entergy Louisiana and Entergy Gulf States Louisiana server approximately 1.07 million electric customers in Louisiana. See also, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22000.html; the U.S. Census Bureau estimates there are slightly less than 1.70 million households in Louisiana. 143 Strategic Resource Plan: An Integrated Resource Plan for the Entergy Utility System and the Entergy Operating Companies 2009-2028 (August 21, 2009), LPSC Docket No. R-30021. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 85 Table 11 above shows the cumulative EE savings expressed as a percentage reduction of annual energy sales determined by the Entergy DSM potential study, as well as the target levels for cumulative EE savings included in EPA’s proposed rule. Entergy’s DSM potential study shows that while EPA’s near-term EE savings targets are arguably conservative, the EPA’s proposed methodology overstates the ultimate potential for EE savings within Louisiana in all but the most optimistic scenarios. Only under the study’s high scenario did Entergy’s 2012 study find EE potential sufficient to meet EPA’s proposed EE goal for Louisiana. Entergy recently released a new long-term DSM potential study supporting its current IRP analysis. This study’s findings are lower than Entergy’s earlier study, now finding that Entergy only has the technical potential to achieve 6.1 percent cumulative energy savings under the reference scenario compared to estimated sales by 2034. Even under the high scenario, it finds the utility only has the technical potential to achieve 9.6 percent cumulative energy savings by 2034, just slightly greater than EPA’s proposed target for 2030.144 Louisiana major electric and natural gas utilities are in the early stages of implementing EE programs pursuant to the LPSC EE rules finalized August 21, 2013.145 This situation explains the finding of cumulative EE savings greater than EPA’s near-term cumulative EE savings targets. However, it is clear that Entergy’s DSM potential study examining only EE potential in Louisiana does not support the EPA’s proposal of a 1.5 percent annual savings target relative to annual retail sales as an appropriate target for EE in Louisiana. 144 Long-Term Demand Side Management Potential in the Entergy Louisiana and Entergy Gulf States Louisiana Service Areas (November 3, 2014), LPSC Docket No. I-33014, p. iv. 145 LPSC Docket R-31106. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 86 ii. EPA fails to examine cost-effectiveness. As mentioned previously, the EPA created its “best practice” scenario by examining the level of EE performance demonstrated or required by policies in leading states. EPA’s proposed methodology by definition applies a national goal for EE potential to all states, and nowhere in its analysis did the EPA examine or recognize important differences between individual states. This leads to many mitigating factors omitted from the EPA’s analysis the LPSC believes needs to be considered. First among these is the large variance in electric rates themselves throughout the country. Greater than 15¢ per kWh 12.5¢ -- 15¢ per kWh 10.5¢ -- 12.5¢ per kWh Less than 10.5¢ per kWh Figure 21. Average Retail Price of Electric to Residential Customers (August 2014) Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy Figure 21 presents the average residential electric price per kWh by state for August 2014. Even ignoring Alaska and Hawaii, which due to geographic remoteness see higher LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 87 electricity prices than the contiguous US, electric rates vary considerably throughout the country. The most expensive state, Connecticut, reported electric prices in August 2014 equal to 19.67 cents per kWh, while the least expenses state, Washington, had electric prices less than half this amount at only 8.93 cents per kWh.146 This regional variation is due to many factors, but regional resource availability accounts for a significant portion. For instance, electric prices in the Pacific Northwest have historically been less than the rest of the country due to the abundance of local hydropower. Likewise, New England has historically seen higher electric prices due to the need to import fuel stocks a significant distance. Louisiana is located within a prolific natural gas producing region, and thus has the third lowest residential electric rates in the country, behind only Washington and West Virginia.147 Rarely, if ever, has EE been viewed as a goal in-and-of-itself, but as a means to meet multiple policy objectives, such as reducing the escalation of energy prices through reduction of consumption or demand. Thus, consideration of the cost-effectiveness of potential EE programs has always been central to examination of the appropriate level of EE investment. The EPA’s GHG Abatement Measures TSD restates this role of EE,148 and further acknowledges that “(m)ost states evaluate their EE policy options through the application of cost tests, weighing the projected benefits with the costs of energy efficiency technologies and practices.” 149 EPA’s decision of a national “best practices” standard however does not recognize the costeffectiveness of potential levels of EE investments. Put simply, it is cost-effective to have higher levels of EE investment in states with high energy costs due to the benefits of displacing these 146 Electric Power Monthly: Table 5.6.A. Average Retail Price of Electric to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector (October 27, 2014), U.S. Energy Information Administration. 147 Electric Power Monthly: Table 5.6.A. Average Retail Price of Electric to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector (October 27, 2014), U.S. Energy Information Administration. 148 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, pp. 5-24 to 5-26. 149 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-25. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 88 costs. However, these levels of EE investment may not be appropriate in low energy costs states, such as Louisiana, since the benefits of avoiding energy costs are much lower. Indeed, the EPA’s discussion of states which have either achieved or have policies requiring EPA’s chosen “best practices” levels of percent incremental annual savings demonstrate the relationship between EE and high retail electric prices.150 Of the twelve states that have either achieved or are required to achieve an incremental savings through EE of 1.5 percent per year, eight states are among the top 20 states in terms of residential retail electric prices. Likewise, of the 20 states that have either achieved or are required to achieve an incremental savings through EE of 1.0 percent per year, six (CT, NY, RI, CA, VT, MA) comprise the 6 states in the continental U.S. with the most expensive residential retail electric rates. Fourteen of these states are among the top 20 states in terms of residential retail electric prices.151 iii. Fails to recognize that prior technical potentials arose in high-cost energy environment In addition to the EPA’s omission of accounting for the cost-effectiveness of EE, and the inherent differing economics seen throughout the country, EPA also fails to recognize structural changes occurring in energy markets in the past few years. In most states, natural gas-fueled power plants operate as the “marginal” unit in most hours throughout the year (i.e. natural gas fueled power plants are the most expensive per kWh unit typically dispatched to serve customers). Therefore, the costs to operate these natural gas fueled-plants typically set the overall wholesale electricity rate before transmission and local distribution costs to end 150 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-33. EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-33; and Electric Power Monthly: Table 5.6.A. Average Retail Price of Electric to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector (October 27, 2014), U.S. Energy Information Administration. 151 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 89 consumers. It follows that this operating cost would follow natural gas prices, as has been noted by many market analysts. Figure 22 presents historic and projected natural gas production in the U.S. as projected in the EIA’s most recent Annual Energy Outlook.152 From 1990 through the late 2000’s, domestic production of natural gas was essentially flat, remaining under 20 Tcf per year. However, the emergence of shale gas extracted through hydraulic fracturing significantly increased domestic production, more than displacing declining production in traditional onshore and offshore production. In 2014, natural gas from shale deposits is estimated to account for nearly 40 percent of all natural gas produced. By 2030, the production of natural gas from shale deposits is estimated to increase to account for over 49 percent of all domestic production. Likewise, total production of natural gas is expected to increase by nearly 42 percent. Whereas historically the natural gas market represented a market that was supply constrained, forecasts now show production to keep pace with all projected growth in consumption. [Space intentionally left blank.] 152 Annual Energy Outlook 2014: Figure MT-44. U.S. Natural Gas Production by Source in the Reference Case, 1900-2040 (May 7, 2014), U.S. Energy Information Administration. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 90 40 Historic Projected 35 Trillion Cubic Feet 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Alaska Lower 48 offshore Tight gas 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 Coalbed methane Lower 48 onshore conventional Shale Gas Figure 22. Natural Gas Production by Source Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy This new reality is highlighted in a review of wholesale natural gas prices as shown in Figure 23. From 1997 through 2000, wholesale natural gas prices averaged just $2.79 per Mcf, and were relatively stable, as shown by a relatively low standard deviation. This changed dramatically in late-2000 through 2008, when natural gas prices increased sharply, averaging $6.24 per Mcf through the period. Wholesale natural gas prices were also much more volatile than seen previously, with a standard deviation of $2.39. With the emergence of large-scale hydraulic fracking in 2009, wholesale natural gas prices have dropped just as dynamically, averaging $3.86 per Mcf. Likewise, volatility in natural gas markets has also fallen, being even more stable than prices were in the late 1990s. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 91 average for period 2000-2001 heating season through 2008: $6.24 $20 $18 (standard deviation: $2.39) $16 $14 $/Mcf $12 average 1997 through 2000: $2.79 (standard deviation: $1.28) since 2009: $3.86 (standard deviation: $0.84) $10 $8 $6 $4 $2 $0 Jan-97 Jan-99 Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Figure 23. Historic Daily Henry Hub Spot Prices Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy Figure 24 shows the effect that changing natural gas markets have had on forecasts of future natural gas prices. In its 2009 AEO the EIA projected that wholesale natural gas prices would increase from then current levels in real terms to a high of $9.91 per MMBtu by 2030. With the significant change in natural gas markets, the EIA has revised these estimates in subsequent AEO publications. In the 2013 AEO, the EIA projected that wholesale natural gas prices would only reach $5.29 per MMBtu in real terms by 2030, a nearly 47 percent reduction from 2009 estimates. [Space intentionally left blank.] LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 92 Figure 24. Historic and Projected Henry Hub Spot Prices from EIA AEO Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy The adoption of energy efficiency resource standards (“EERS”) by various states mirrors this changing outlook on the future prices of energy. Of the 26 states that have adopted EERS, only 3 states (Arkansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin) have adopted such measures since 2010.153 Indeed, 15 states adopted EERS in the years 2007 through 2009, when projections of future natural gas prices were at their highest.154 Since 2011, not a single state has adopted an energy efficiency resource standard.155 LPSC is concerned with the EPA’s proposed methodology of relying on “best practices” in general, as laid out previously. However, the LPSC is also concerned with the EPA’s reliance on requirements of individual states’ EERS to inform what a national “best practice” amount of incremental savings through EE would be. The majority of these EERS were passed during a 153 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-15. EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-15. 155 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-15. 154 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 93 period when the consensus view was rapidly raising natural gas and electricity costs. Since the cost-effectiveness of a proposed energy efficiency program is estimated over the useful life of the program, this pessimistic outlook resulted in higher benefits for proposed energy efficiency investments than would have been estimated if natural gas prices were assumed to be stable, as it is now viewed. By its very nature, the EPA’s proposed methodology overstates the potential for cost-effective energy efficiency nation-wide and then it overstates the potential statewide by using a one-size-fits-all approach. iv. Fails to consider rate impacts and lost utility base revenues Pages 5-27 through 5-29 of the EPA’s GHG Abatement Measures TSD discuss comparative cost statistics of EE resources to alternative electricity resource options utilizing a levelized cost of energy (“LCOE”) or levelized cost of saved energy (“LCSE”) in the case of EE.156 Within this analysis, the EPA finds that a review of studies examining only utility costs find an average LCSE in the range of 1 to 6 cents per kWh. The EPA further references a recent review conducted by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (“ACEEE”) which examined studies across 20 states performed between 2009 and 2012 which found the LCSE for electric energy efficiency programs in the range of 1.3 to 5.6 cents per kWh, with a mean value of 2.8 cents per kWh.157 However, examining cost-effectiveness of EE resources by only examining utility costs is fundamentally flawed. Unlike traditional supply resources, use of demand-side resources affects a utility’s financial position by reducing the utility’s earnings through a reduction in sales. A non-trivial portion of a typical electric utility’s costs arise from fixed costs not directly related to the 156 157 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, pp. 5-27 to 5-29. EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-27. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 94 production of electricity, but to the generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure required to efficiently produce and transport electricity to end-use customers. These fixed costs therefore will not be reduced by increased efficiency of end-use customers, and will still have to be recovered through other means without negatively affecting a utility’s financials. This is sometimes referred to as the lost contributions to fixed costs, lost revenue recovery or lost margin recovery, and has been discussed exhaustively in technical literature, including within an EPA-affiliated November 2007 white paper158 where it was noted that “(f)ew energy efficiency policy issues have generated as much debate as the issue of the impact of energy efficiency programs on utility margins.”159 The LPSC is concerned the EPA is not valuing EE resources and their potential on a correct comparable basis to traditional resources. Recovery of utility lost margins resulting from EE require rate increases in the form of either (1) subsequent base rate cases, (2) lost revenue adjustment mechanisms (“LRAMs”), or (3) decoupling mechanisms. Rate increases to customers are costs directly related to investment in EE and should be included when comparing resource potentials of EE to supply side alternatives. Other issues include the efficiency of demand-side resources from free ridership and endogeneity issues. As noted by the EPA in its GHG Abatement Measures TSD, empirical analyses including these factors “present a wider range of estimates of cost of saved energy.”160 One study referenced in the GHG Abatement Measures TSD estimated the average utility cost of saved energy in the range of 5.1 to 14.6 cents 158 Aligning Utility Incentives with Investment in Energy Efficiency: A Resource of the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (November 2007), National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. 159 Aligning Utility Incentives with Investment in Energy Efficiency: A Resource of the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (November 2007), National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency, p. ES-3. 160 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-28. LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 95 per kWh.161 As noted earlier, Louisiana had the third lowest residential electric rates in the country in August 2014 at 9.77 cent per kWh.162 It is doubtful that extensive EE investments with an average utility cost of saved energy of 14.6 cents per kWh would be cost-effective in low energy cost states such as Louisiana. v. Technical Analysis fails to examine total rate and ratepayer impacts adequately Lastly, the LPSC is concerned that the EPA’s analysis assesses EE potential on an inherently incorrect basis. For best practices, the EPA determined that all states should be able to reach an annual incremental savings through EE equal to 1.5 percent of annual retail sales.163 The finding of an EE potential goal based on annual incremental savings assumes that savings through EE exists no matter how saturated the market may become. In other words, the EPA incorrectly forces states to view EE as the proverbial “gift that keeps on giving,” rather than a demand-side resource comparable to traditional supply resources. For instance, such a goal in terms of renewable energy would require states to increase each year their renewable energy generation, rather than achieve a particular amount of renewable generation capacity or energy, regardless of the need for such generation. The LPSC suggests a more appropriate and theoretically sound goal would be based on cumulative energy savings. Table 12 provides the cost estimate to Louisiana ratepayers given the EPA’s target levels of EE. Like the RE component, the cost to ratepayers is not simply the cost of EE programs, but also the lost revenues incurred. Assuming a mid-range cost estimate of $106/MWh, EE program 161 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-28. Electric Power Monthly: Table 5.6.A. Average Retail Price of Electric to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector (October 27, 2014), U.S. Energy Information Administration. 163 EPA Technical Support Document: GHG Abatement Measures, p. 5-33. 162 LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 96 expenditures would total $538.9 million. This, in addition to $122.3 million of lost revenues to utilities, results in a total Building Block 4 cost of $661.2 million. Preliminary Cost Estimates Low Mid High Range Range Range Cost Cost Cost ------ ($ Millions, NPV) ------ Building Block Strategy Building Block 1 Increase Coal Plant Thermal Efficiency Coal plant capital investment costs: Stranded coal plant capital cost: Building Block 2 $ $ 425.5 842.6 $ $ 638.3 842.6 $ $ 851.0 842.6 $ $ 500.0 986.4 $ $ 1,000.0 986.4 $ $ 1,500.0 986.4 $ - $ - $ - $ $ 388.8 248.8 $ $ 432.0 276.4 $ $ 475.3 304.0 $ $ 462.6 110.1 $ $ 538.9 122.3 $ $ 615.2 134.5 Increase Natural Gas Generation Capacity Factor New transmission capital investments: Stranded oil/gas steam plant capital cost: Building Block 3a At Risk Nuclear Generation Building Block 3b Increased Renewable Generation Increased capital cost margin: Utility lost revenue recovery: Building Block 4 Increased Energy Efficency Increased energy efficiency program expenditures: Utility lost revenue recovery: Total Louisiana Cost Impact: $ 3,964.8 Table 12. Estimated Cost of Building Block 4 $ 4,836.9 $ 5,709.0 Note: Coal plant capital investment costs are assumed to be $100/kW (low); $150/kW (mid); and $200/kW (high) for all Louisiana coal units. Stranded cost estimates are only included for utility-owned units with publicly available data. Typical transmission investment resulting from increased NGCC dispatch assumed to be $500 million: low estimate assumes one project; mid-range estimate assumes two projects; high assumes three projects. Nuclear assumed to have no additional cost. Renewable energy assumes generation portfolio of 75 percent biomass; 15 percent wind and 10 percent solar. This results in a levelized cost differential of $37.60/MWh (when compared to a new NGCC). Energy efficiency costs are assumed to be $91/MWh (low); $106/MWh (mid); and $121/MWh (high). Lost base revenues estimated at $24.05 per MWh for both renewable energy and energy efficiency. Assumes 10.915 percent discount rate (based on typical utility allowed rate of return). LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 97 G. Total Impacts Table 13 provides a complete summary of the LPSC’s preliminary estimates of the potential compliance costs associated with EPA’s proposed CPP. These compliance costs are based upon the emissions reduction targets estimated by the EPA for each of the building blocks included in the BSER. In total, the LPSC estimates that CPP compliance will cost Louisiana ratepayers somewhere between $3.9 billion and $5.7 billion, in NPV terms. Stranded utility costs, a cost estimate excluded in the EPA’s analysis, are estimated at $1.8 billion (NPV). Lost utility base revenues associated with increased renewable energy and energy efficiency programs, represent another cost excluded from the EPA’s analysis. These costs are estimated to range from $360 million to $439 million (NPV). [Space intentionally left blank.] LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 98 Preliminary Cost Estimates Low Mid High Range Range Range Cost Cost Cost ------ ($ Millions, NPV) ------ Building Block Strategy Building Block 1 Increase Coal Plant Thermal Efficiency Coal plant capital investment costs: Stranded coal plant capital cost: Building Block 2 $ $ 425.5 842.6 $ $ 638.3 842.6 $ $ 851.0 842.6 $ $ 500.0 986.4 $ $ 1,000.0 986.4 $ $ 1,500.0 986.4 $ - $ - $ - $ $ 388.8 248.8 $ $ 432.0 276.4 $ $ 475.3 304.0 $ $ 462.6 110.1 $ $ 538.9 122.3 $ $ 615.2 134.5 Increase Natural Gas Generation Capacity Factor New transmission capital investments: Stranded oil/gas steam plant capital cost: Building Block 3a At Risk Nuclear Generation Building Block 3b Increased Renewable Generation Increased capital cost margin: Utility lost revenue recovery: Building Block 4 Increased Energy Efficency Increased energy efficiency program expenditures: Utility lost revenue recovery: Total Louisiana Cost Impact: $ 3,964.8 $ 4,836.9 $ 5,709.0 Table 13. Cost Estimates of EPA's Clean Power Plan for Louisiana Note: Coal plant capital investment costs are assumed to be $100/kW (low); $150/kW (mid); and $200/kW (high) for all Louisiana coal units. Stranded cost estimates are only included for utility-owned units with publicly available data. Typical transmission investment resulting from increased NGCC dispatch assumed to be $500 million: low estimate assumes one project; mid-range estimate assumes two projects; high assumes three projects. Nuclear assumed to have no additional cost. Renewable energy assumes generation portfolio of 75 percent biomass; 15 percent wind and 10 percent solar. This results in a levelized cost differential of $37.60/MWh (when compared to a new NGCC). Energy efficiency costs are assumed to be $91/MWh (low); $106/MWh (mid); and $121/MWh (high). Lost base revenues estimated at $24.05 per MWh for both renewable energy and energy efficiency. Assumes 10.915 percent discount rate (based on typical utility allowed rate of return). Table 14 provides these total compliance cost estimates on a cost per ton of avoided emissions basis. Compliance costs associated with just the capital investments and program expenditures for each of the EPA’s proposed building blocks are estimated to cost Louisiana ratepayers from $90 per ton to $174 per ton. The inclusion of stranded utility costs increases estimated Louisiana ratepayer costs by about $92 per ton. The addition of lost utility revenues LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 99 increases unit-based compliance costs even further by $18 per ton to $22 per ton. In total, the actual estimated cost to Louisiana ratepayers is $200 to $289 per ton. These estimates are far higher than the EPA estimated (national average) compliance costs of $60 per ton. Preliminary Cost Estimates Low Mid High Range Range Range Cost Cost Cost ------ ($ Millions, NPV) ------ Preliminary Cost Estimates ($/ton) Low Mid High Range Range Range Cost Cost Cost ------ ($/ton, NPV) ------ Total Capital Cost and Program Expenditures $ 1,777.0 $ 2,609.2 $ 3,441.4 $ 90.01 $ 132.17 $ 174.32 Total Stranded Costs $ 1,829.0 $ 1,829.0 $ 1,829.0 $ 92.65 $ 92.65 $ 92.65 Total Utility Lost Revenue $ $ 18.18 $ 20.20 $ 22.21 Total Louisiana Cost Impact $ 3,964.8 358.8 $ 398.7 $ $ 4,836.9 438.6 $ 5,709.0 $ 200.84 $ 245.01 $ 289.19 Table 14. Cost Estimates of EPA's Clean Power Plan for Louisiana, $/ton IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The LPSC believes the CPP is legally flawed and should be withdrawn in its entirety. In the alternative, however, and in the event the EPA issues a final rule, the LPSC offers six specific recommendations consistent with its comments herein. 1. Address reliability-related issues associated with the proposed rule in a diligent fashion through the development of a reliability-based study process that would include a number of regional technical conferences, conducted jointly between the EPA, the FERC, state regulatory commissions, and regional transmission organizations/reliability organizations. The LPSC, as noted earlier, is very concerned about the reliability and generation resource adequacy implications of the Proposed Rule. The Commission’s regulated utilities, as well as many RTOs governing transmission operations across Louisiana, have raised serious questions about the region’s ability to meet current reliability requirements in the face of the LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 100 EPA’s proposed CPP implementation timeline. Even with an extension, the LPSC believes that the issue of bulk power system reliability has not been explored adequately in the development of this Proposed Rule. The LPSC recommends the EPA initiate a study process with the FERC, as well as state regulators and RTOs, to understand the full reliability ramifications of not only the proposed CPP, but many other recently-promulgated EPA rules that, cumulatively, are anticipated to have considerable implications for bulk-power system reliability. The LPSC believes that a meaningful, but expedited, reliability study process could be conducted within a 12 month period and that it would be in all stakeholders’ interest to initiate such a process before finalizing the Proposed Rule. 2. Adopt a reliability “safety-valve.” The Proposed Rule would benefit from the inclusion of a reliability “safety valve” that exempts states from CPP implementation, or certain provisions of CPP implementation, if compliance can be reasonably shown to lead to a reliability or generation adequacy challenge. RTOs are likely in the best position to make such findings with potential oversight from both the FERC and the EPA. 3. Accept the proposed data revisions offered in the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality’s Original Comments. The LPSC has worked closely with, and agrees with the initial comments of the LDEQ filed before the EPA in this matter. The LPSC believes that the LDEQ’s proposed recommendations are reasonable and better reflect the “on-the-ground” view of the state’s electric generation resources and their operations than those included in the EPA’s baseline calculations. 4. Extend the existing schedule to allow states the opportunity to develop the adequate physical and institutional infrastructure LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 101 necessary to implement the Proposed Rule as well as to explore regional solutions. The currently-proposed EPA timeline is too aggressive and will likely lead to reliabilityrelated challenges in the very near future. The bulk power system infrastructure is currently insufficient to meet the current EPA CPP timeline. Further, the Proposed Rule provides little insight into whether or not there is enough natural gas infrastructure to support some of the dramatic wholesale power generation market changes anticipated by the CPP. Additional time for implementation would assist in minimizing these potential negative market outcomes. Lastly, the EPA takes for granted the institutional infrastructure that is lacking in certain parts of the country for initiating many of the policies included in its BSER approach. Rather than implement an RPS and EE targets or goals, Louisiana has taken a more measured approach to alternative energy in an effort to avoid the imposition of unduly burdensome energy costs on its ratepayers. The State is lacking in a broad number of potential market suppliers and alternatives (primarily in RE and EE) and does not have the historical institutional background in the development of regional clean power, clean air, and efficiency markets that exists in places like the Northeastern U.S. The EPA implementation period should be extended to give states like Louisiana the opportunity to develop these additional institutional resources to avoid the rate shock and economic harm that will otherwise result. 5. Allow the use of industrial CHP as an efficiency resource under Building Block 4. The EPA’s current energy efficiency building block creates a considerable degree of emphasis on the utilization of “traditional” energy efficiency resources coming from the residential and commercial sectors. The Proposed Rule, and the BSER for Louisiana, is silent on the potential use of industrial CHP as a potential efficiency resource. The LPSC recommends LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 102 that the EPA include industrial CHP as a resource in any Final Rule on this matter. Louisiana is in the middle of an “industrial renaissance” that could see, in a matter of just a few years, the development of over $100 billion in new capital investment. Few industrial projects to date, however, have indicated a willingness to adopt CHP measures. Including CHP in the Final Rule could give Louisiana a meaningful way of meeting its rather stringent CO2 emission reduction requirements, and at the same time, offer increased efficiency opportunities for these new industrial facilities. The LPSC, therefore, encourages EPA to include the thermal efficiencies from new, incremental CHP applications as a compliance measure under the Louisiana BSER. 6. Allow the use of biomass as a renewable energy resource under building Block 3(b). The Commission noted earlier in its comments that biomass is its primary opportunity for adding renewable-based resources. The EPA, however, has not been clear in the degree to which biomass will be allowed as a compliance measure under the CPP. The LPSC recommends that biomass be explicitly included as a compliance option for Building Block 3(b). The LPSC respectfully requests that the EPA give due consideration to all of the foregoing comments, including the specifically enumerated recommendations listed above. Respectfully Submitted, __________________________________ Melanie A. Verzwyvelt (Bar Roll No. 28252) Rusten A. May (Bar Roll No. 34841) Staff Attorneys Louisiana Public Service Commission P.O. Box 91154 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-9154 Ph. (225) 342-9888 Email: melanie.v@la.gov rusten.may@la.gov LPSC Comments – Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 Page 103