Toolbox talk 6: Supervisor’s instructions ASSET INTEGRITY Locked Open / Locked Closed Valves This toolbox talk is designed to: •Help your team understand the significance of a locked valve and why it is locked •Inform your team of the importance of following procedure when changing the position of a locked valve •Identify likely areas where locked valves might be encountered on a facility Carry out this toolbox talk before commencing a new task/job involving a change in status of a Locked Open or Locked Closed valve. It is best to complete this talk in small groups – maximum ten people. Additional information and training may be required at the discretion of local management. 1)Give a copy of the Group Sheet to your group. 2)Using the flow chart given below discuss the process that must be followed to change (and reinstate) the status of a locked open / locked closed valve. Ask the Group to identify who is the responsible person for each of the stages in the process by marking or colouring the boxes as applicable. 3)Ask the Group to study the diagrams on the Group Sheet showing the various classifications of LO/LC valve types. Ask the Group to identify the hazard that might arise if they move the valve from its status designated in the LO/LC Register without applying suitable controls or mitigation. 4)Use the diagrams on the Group Sheet to discuss the mitigations/controls that should be put in place prior to moving the position of the LO/LC valves in each case. 5)At the end of the Toolbox Talk, provide the Group with their own copy of the Supervisors Sheet for them to keep as a reference; ‘Know the Process, Know the controls’. 6)Ask what the team should do if they become aware of any improperly locked valves or broken locks (first step would be to report them to their supervisor). MAJOR HAZARDS AWARENESS LO/LC valves – Flow chart of approval process Start Request approval to change valve status Confirm classification Identify Mitigation and controls needed Authorise and sign LOLC register and issue keys Apply Mitigation and Controls Remote PA confirms to Authorising Authority controls in place Complete Task Part of Isolation Certificate Yes Update tags with status change Move valve No Approve de-isolation Part of Isolation Certificate Yes Return valve to normal position Update tags with status change Remote PA confirms to Authorising Authority Valve returned to normal position and tags updated Key Performing Authority No Authorising Person Apply Isolation TAG to valve Sign LOLC register activities complete -valve returned to normal status Toolbox talk 6: Supervisor’s instructions Answers 1 PSV 2 LC 3 Vent/ flare/ LP system Flare/Vent LO LO Spec Break Spec Break LO PCV LC NC Blow down valve LO LO LCV Spec Break LO ? Type A 1 & 2 Single PSV with Isolation Valves Hazard: There is a risk of loss of containment if an over pressure event occurs and the PSV is isolated from the system under pressure. Mitigation: The system being protected should be isolated and depressured before changing from LO to LC. 4 Hazard: If the BDV is isolated when the system is pressurised it will not be possible to depressurise the system in an emergency. This could lead to overpressure and loss of containment in a fire event. Mitigation: The system being protected should be isolated and depressurised before changing from LO to LC. 5 Vent/ flare/ LP system LO ? Type A 3 Blow down valve with Isolation Valve(s) Atmospheric Vent Air/ Hydraulics LO LC LO LO HIPS / ESD Trip function transmitter LO LO LO Hazard: If a LC manual valve is opened when the system is pressurised there is a risk of loss of containment and uncontrolled discharge of gas, hydrocarbons or toxic fluids. Mitigation: The system to be depressurised / drained should be isolated from the pressure source before changing from LC to LO. Mitigation: The system being protected should be isolated and depressured before changing from LO to LC. ? To Vent/Flare Stack LoLo/ Hi Hi Level trips LT Corrosion monitoring Vent/Flare Header Pilot gas supply LO LO Fiscal/critical metering &, Analysers ? Hazard: If the PCV/LCV is isolated when the system is pressurised there is a risk of loss of containment if an over pressure / overfill event occurs. To Flare Pilot Source of pressure/fluids Type A 5 Manual isolation from vent, atmosphere or drains Type A 4 Pressure/ Level Control Valve with Isolation Valve(s) and atmospheric vent LO PT ESDV LP system/ drains LP system/ drains 6 LoLo/ Hi Hi Pressure trips LC ? Atmospheric Vent Vent/Flare KO Drum Purge Gas supply into vent/flare header LO LO Type B Control of Safety Critical Instruments and High Integrity Protection Devices (HIPS) Hazard: If manual valves are closed safety critical devices will not function. Mitigation: Over-ride process to be used with risk assessment. The downstream primary SCE to be fully functional keeping at least 1 barrier in place. ? Type C 1 Protection against ingress of air/ gas into a system/ Equipment / flare purge systems Hazard: If purge valves are closed there is a risk that air will enter the vent allowing an explosive atmosphere to develop inside the vent system with a risk of internal explosion. If the pilot gas valves are closed there is a risk of flare flame-out resulting in (potentially toxic) process streams being vented to atmosphere. Mitigation: If no pilot gas; facility shutdown or alternative flare ignition method in place. If no purge gas; facility shutdown if no alternative purge system available. MAJOR HAZARDS AWARENESS Toolbox talk 6: Supervisor’s instructions Answers 7 8 ESD 9 LC LCV/ PCV LO Pressurised instrument cabinet LC Plant/ Equipment LC LC LC Spec Break Air or Inert Purge gas LO Spec Break Spec Break LC LC ? Type C 2 Protection against ingress of gas into a Pressurised instrument cabinets ? Type D 1, 2 Protection of Downstream Facilities against adverse conditions Hazard: If purge valves are closed and flammable gas enters the cabinet there is a risk of an internal explosion in the cabinet. Hazard: Loss of control of volumes/pressure can occur when by-passes/ start up lines are left open. Mitigation: Gas checks negative, power isolated, Facility should be shutdown if no alternative purge system is available and the instrument cabinet is in a classified area. Mitigation: Adherence to procedure and isolation standards. (does not apply to automatic start up facilities and by passes controlled by PLC). LT Spec HT Spec HT Spec LT Spec ? LO Type D 3, 4, 6 Protection of downstream facilities against adverse conditions Hazard: Open by passes have the potential to increase flow / pressure on downstream equipment and lead to loss of containment. Exposure of downstream systems to temperature extremes may cause low temperature embrittlement, or weakened material due to high temperatures. Mitigation: Correct engineering design. Specified Safe Operating Envelope limits. Compliance with procedures. Valves should only be opened when temperatures have normalised. 10 PSV PSV 11 12 Non-Nace piping LO LO Nace piping INTERLOCK LO LC LC Spec Break Chemical Storage High H2S Stream FT LO LO PT LO LO Off Spec fluid ? Type D 5 Protection against adverse downstream conditions – dual PSVs Hazard: There is a risk of loss of containment if an over pressure event occurs and both PSVs are isolated from the system under pressure. Mitigation: Interlock procedure used to ensure one PSV is on line at all times. ? LC Type E 1, 2 Isolation valves preventing off spec fluids reaching downstream facilities Hazard: Open valves would allow high H2S stream to enter a non-Nace spec piping/ equipment with potential for failure of equipment. Open valves would allow off-spec fluid to mix with on-spec fluids with potential for scale formation, napthenates or off-spec product. Mitigation: There are no circumstances where high H2S should be allowed to enter non-Nace facilities. Specified Safe Operating Envelope limits should be applied. Off-spec fluid should only be allowed to mix with on-spec fluids where appropriate procedures and mitigations are in place. LO ? Type E 3 Protection of Downstream Facilities Protected by Chemical Injection Hazard: Loss of protective chemicals (e.g. corrosion inhibitor) can lead to adverse downstream conditions and a risk of loss of integrity. Mitigation: Adherence to procedure and isolation standards. Apply Management of Change (MOC) procedures if changes required. MAJOR HAZARDS AWARENESS