1
Positive polarity items, negation, activated propositions1
Pierre Larrivée, Aston U
P.Larrivee@Aston.ac.uk
Abstract
The received view on the distribution of polarity items is that positive polarity items
(PPIs) such as something are found in positive contexts, they are anti-licensed by
negative contexts, which license negative polarity items (NPIs) such as anything. PPI
some can however be found under the scope of clause-mate negation. Such a paradoxical
use has been analysed by Szabolcsi (2004) as a special case of licensing: two negative
polarity licensors are required by the internal constitution of some. Some is however
shown to occur under the scope of a single clause-mate negative. Single and dual
negative environments are argued to depend on the same determinism. This determinism
is proposed to be activated propositions in the sense of Dryer (1996). After an exposition
of the notion involving propositions that are accessible to the hearer, a demonstration is
offered on the basis of transferable texts that it characterises the contexts allowing some
and other PPIs under the scope of negation in English and other languages. The
speculation is that activation brings the whole proposition into the focus of negation, that
does not interact directly with the PPI to produce infelicitous interpretations. Supposing
no rescuing mechanism, the intervention of a simple and general pragmatic determinism
accounts for the marked character of the sequences, that allows a clear distinction to be
maintained between licensed NPIs and anti-licensed PPIs.
1. Introduction
Items sensitive to contexts come to bear on the shape of grammars as they raise the issue
of the relations and boundaries between the lexicon, syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
One example of context sensitivity is provided by items depending on negative contexts
for their distribution or interpretation. Negative polarity item anything can thus be the
object of the verb in the negative sequence John didn't say ___, which normally will
hardly accept positive polarity item something with a comparable reading. The absence of
negation reverses acceptability to * John said anything and John said something. The
empirical generalisation therefore has been assumed to be that positive polarity items
(PPIs) such as something are found in positive contexts, they are anti-licensed by
negative contexts (Giannakidou 1998), which license negative polarity items (NPIs) such
as anything.
This clear distinction can however be muddled by positive polarity items such as
those of the some paradigm occurring under the scope of a clause-mate negation. While
* John didn't say something is unacceptable, I don't think that John didn't say something
raises no such query. This observation first analysed by C. Leroy Baker (1970) has been
considered in details by Anna Szabolcsi (2004). She seeks to bring positive polarity items
1
Earlier versions of this work benefitted from the detailed feedback from Laurence Horn and Paul Postal;
from the participants of the LAGB September 2007 Annual Meeting at King's College, and of an April
2007 Institut de linguistique seminar at the Université de Neuchâtel; and the anonymous reviewers from
premier American journals. I wish to express my gratitude to each for their input on this paper, for the
shortcomings of which they should incur no blame.
2
into the fold of items amenable to licensing by negation. Some would not be anti-licensed
by negative contexts, it would require dual negative licensing, which is why I don't think
that John didn't say something is acceptable unlike * John didn't say something. The
reason for this particular sensitivity would be the semantic composition of positive
polarity items, which include two negative traits that each require contextual licensing. It
would therefore be the internal structure of the item some that accounts for the question
of polarity licensing and sensitivity. The distinction between the PPI and NPI is
maintained, although as two types of licensed items.
The proposed analysis of the paradoxical use of positive polarity items with a
clause-mate negation by Anna Szabolcsi (2004) is the starting point of this paper. The
analysis presented in section 2 rests on the internal constitution of some requiring two
negative polarity licensors. The limitations of the analysis are considered in section 3
concerning the proposed constitution of some, the assimilation of PPIs to NPIs through
licensing, and the status of dual licensing contexts. Whether dual licensing should define
a particular treatment is the question raised by attested cases with a single licensor. The
fact that environments with one as well as with two negatives allow for different PPIs
suggests the possibility of a common determinism. This determinism is proposed in
section 4 to be activated propositions in the sense of Dryer (1996). After an exposition of
the notion involving propositions that are accessible to the hearer, a demonstration is
offered on the basis of transferable tests that it characterises the contexts allowing
positive polarity items under the scope of negation. The argument is summarised in the
conclusion, which speculates on the causes of the correlation that the atypical use of
positive polarity items under the scope of a clause-mate negation is dependent on
activated propositions. Needing no independently stipulated mechanisms, this maintains a
clear distinction between licensed NPIs and anti-licensed PPIs.
2. Szabolcsi (2004)
The most common cross-linguistic way to produce the equivalent of a n-word such as
nothing is to use an indefinite like something with a sentential negation (Haspelmath
1997, Reesink 2002: 250, van der Auwera et al 2006: 314-318). The English way is to
propose different formal paradigms. Whereas any is routinely used with negation, this is
assumed not to be the case of some.
(1)
(2)
John didn't say anything.
* John didn't say something.
Some can however be found with negation in certain environments. This is the issue to
which Szabolcsi (2004) devotes her attention. These environments include some scoping
over negation, as in the following elicitation:
(3)
John didn't mention something (and that was the rising interest rates).
that suggests that there was something that wasn't mentioned by John. That scope
behaviour is related by Giannakidou (2008) to the semantic specificity of emphasised
some, which is not the case that is the primary object of our consideration here. We are
3
looking at the cases where some does scope under negation. It so happens when negation
is non-clause-mate:
(4)
I don't think that John saw someone.
when it focuses on an intervening item in its direct scope:
(5)
(6)
John didn't offend someone because he was malicious (but because he was
stupid). (not > because > some) (p. 420, example (49))
John didn't say something at every party. (not > every > some) (p. 420,
example (50))
Denials and contrast also allow some (p. 409, 413):
(7)
(8)
– He found something.
–Wrong! He didn't find something. (not > some) (p. 413, example (7))
If you push the red button, you will see something, but if you press the
blue button, you won't see something. (p. 413, example (9))
a case, which on the basis of a suggestion by Giannakidou, is said to involve extra-clausal
negatives (p. 413, footnote 4), and is thus considered no more problematic than (4) for
instance.
The proposed generalisation is therefore that some PPIs do not occur within the
immediate scope of certain clause-mate operators. These operators are described as antiadditive ones, which typically license strong NPIs such as yet.
(9)
(10)
John hasn't talked yet.
No one has talked yet.
Anti-additive operators can nonetheless have some under their immediate scope in
characterised contexts. The following yield perfectly acceptable elicitations:
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
I don't think that John didn't call someone. (not > not > some) (p. 417,
example (33))
I regret that John didn't say something. (regret > not > some) (p. 418,
example (36))
If we don't call someone, we are doomed. (if (not > some)) (p. 418,
example (37))
Only John didn't call someone. (only > not > some) (p. 418, ex (39))
in sharp contrast to the sequence * John didn't call someone. Such a sequence can be
rescued by a higher clause negation, the commanding verb regret, a conditional and
clause-mate only NP, as it could be by a commanding doubt, without, a universal
quantifier antecedent of the relative, a clause-mate n-word, clause-mate few and most.
These operators are all decreasing licensors that have the potential to license a weak NPI
such as ever, but not necessarily yet.
4
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
I don't claim that John will ever talk.
?? I don't claim that John has talked yet.
If John ever talks, we are doomed.
?? If John has talked yet, we are doomed.
The observation is that a decreasing operator can rescue a clause-mate antiadditive operator scoping over some. The rescuing facts can conceivably be dealt with at
least two ways. Either the crucial decreasing operator impacts on the anti-additive
operator, or the two operators could together affect PPI some. The first option amounts to
cancellation of the lower operator by the higher one. Cancellation of negatives would
leave a sequence roughly equivalent to a positive, in which the occurrence of a PPI would
therefore be unproblematic. This reasoning is ideally suited to deal with an example such
as (11) I don't think that John didn't call someone and is attributed to Jespersen (1917),
Baker (1970), Ladusaw (1980a), Dowty (1994), and also pursued by Hasegawa (1991).
Not all the noted contexts are accounted for by cancellation however. Szabolcsi observes
that there is no strict cancelling in I regret that John didn't come up with something scary
(p. 423, example (64)) or in Only John didn't come up with something scary (p. 423
example (66)), which do indeed fail to communicate that John came up with something
scary. A further argument is made concerning the addition of a third negative operator. If
two negatives cancel out, negation should by reinstated by a third operator. A third
negative should therefore affect the acceptability of the PPI, which it doesn't: A sequence
such as I don't regret that John didn't come up with something scary is just as good as I
regret that John didn't come up with something scary (contra Baker 1970). In any case,
the cancellation analysis seems to be relevant to only a subset of rescuing environments.
It is therefore to the second option that Szabolcsi resorts in order to account for PPI some
under the scope of a clause-mate negation. It predicates that it is the combined effect of
the two operators that impacts on the PPI. The impact would emanate from the semantic
constitutions of some. Some would consist of the strong NPI feature requiring the clausemate (anti-additive) licensor that yet demands and the weak NPI feature allowing the
non-local (decreasing) licensor that is permitted by ever. These features are described by
Szabolcsi as two underlying negative traits applying to an existential quantifier (¬¬∃)
making up the semantic composition of some. These traits are dormant in a standard
positive context such as John said something, and simply cancel out to yield the
existential value. They are awakened when the strong NPI feature is activated by a local
anti-additive licensor as in (2) * John didn't say something. However, this licensor can
only legitimise the strong NPI feature. Although awakened, the weak NPI feature remains
unlicensed without a decreasing operator, explaining the contrast between the
unacceptability of (2) * John didn't say something and the well-formedness of (11) I don't
think that John didn't say something. Two operators are therefore required to allow some
under the scope of negation. This is hypothesised to be effected by resumptive
quantification to form a binary quantifier where the licensing trait absorbs the licensed
one. Being sensitive to intervention effects as evidenced in (5), the resumption operation
is inspired by the work of de Swart and Sag (2002) on negative concord.
Using negative traits in the underlying representation of items is done
independently by Paul Postal (2000a, b). The idea as presented by Szabolcsi is that
5
surface items may map different underlying representations. A representation such as ¬∃
will surface as no if the negative trait stays in place (I saw no one). It will map to any
where the negative trait is either raised (I didn't see anyone) or licensed by a local antiadditive expression such as No one (No one saw anyone). Leaving aside the case of
raising as Szabolcsi does, the in situ traits of representation ¬¬∃ should surface as some,
which, while it has no special licensing requirements in standard positive contexts, will
demand licensors for both its negative traits when it is dominated by a local strong
negative polarity licensor.
The opposition between ¬¬∃ and ¬∃ allows capturing the otherwise puzzling
distribution of exceptive phrases, as illustrated below:
(19)
a.
b.
c.
I saw no one except Mary.
I didn't see anyone except Mary.
* I saw someone except Mary.
The question of why the exceptive requiring universal quantification can be
accommodated by NPI any generally conceived of as an existential2, but not by
paradigmatic existential some finds an immediate answer in the underlying
representations. Since ¬∃ yielding no and NPI any is equivalent to ∀¬, it satisfies the
universal reading demanded by except, which cannot be met by the ¬¬∃ underlying
some, hence the lack of parallelism with NPI any. This would therefore predict that I
don't think that John didn't see someone except Mary is unacceptable, contrasting with
the presumably acceptable I don't think that John didn't see anyone except Mary. The trait
analysis reminds one of the work by Viviane Déprez (2000) on the internal structure of
expressions involved in negative polarity and negative concord, and of the foundational
proposals on the some / any rule by Edward Klima, although it is a ternary opposition
between some, any and no that is being proposed.
Thus, an interpretation of Postal's analysis is exploited by Szabolcsi to bring PPI
some with NPI any into the fold of licensed polarised items. This would be desirable
because of the common properties of PPIs and NPIs. The acceptability of either is
reversed by intervening operators as evidenced by negative focus on the universally
quantified phrase at every party which makes PPI something acceptable under one single
local negation (6) and NPI anything (20) unacceptable3:
(2)
(1)
(6)
(20)
* John didn't say something.
John didn't say anything.
John didn't say something at every party.
?? John didn't say anything at every party.
Licensing is unaffected by the addition of further licensors:
2
In an alternative proposal, Laurence Horn argues (2001) that the impossibility for some to be determined
by an exceptive (as by almost and absolutely) is due to the fact that unlike any, it does not evoke the end of
a scale.
3
Paul Postal finds example (20) acceptable under a denial reading There isn't anything such that John said
it at every party marked by stress on both any and every, which is not required of (6).
6
(21)
(22)
a.
b.
a.
b.
We regret that John didn't say something.
Should we regret that John didn't say something?
We regret that John said anything.
Should we regret that John said anything?
and it could be added that the same licensor can affect several licensees:
(23)
a.
a.
I regret that someone didn't say something at some point.
I regret that anyone ever said anything at all.
Finally, sensitivity to the same ternary distributive classes of licensors (decreasing, antiadditive, anti-morphic) proposed for NPIs by Ton Van der Wouden (1997) applies to
PPIs. These parallels would suggest that PPIs are in certain uses at least a type of NPIs
with particularly stringent licensing requirements deriving from their semantic
representation.
The occurrence of some under the scope of negation is proposed to follow from its
internal constitution. This would comprise two underlying negative traits applied to an
existential quantifier. In an assertive context, an existential reading obtains from
cancellation of the two negative traits. A clause-mate anti-additive operator such as not in
* John didn't say something would awaken the strong negative feature of some. This
would leave the weak negative feature to be licensed, which is what the decreasing
operator does in the acceptable I don't think that John didn't say something. Dual
licensing thus follows from the two underlying features that make-up the representation
of some. These proposals are assessed in the next section.
3. Assessment
A sophisticated model is proposed by Szabolcsi (2004) seeking to explain the use of PPI
some under the scope of a clause-mate negation. The significance of an often dismissed
grammatical phenomenon is thus asserted, and rightly so: the sole sequence He didn't say
something yielded 843 000 Google hits in July 2007. The analysis does provide an
explanation of the fact that some is infelicitous in a sequence such as * John didn't say
something; its strong feature is awakened by negation without the weak feature being
licensed. The licensing of the weak feature accounts for why a second licensor must
rescue the item, and in what environments rescuing obtains. Double licensing
requirements justify the marked nature of the sequence.
For all its merits, the analysis raises some questions. These have to do with the
representation of some, the status of polarity items and that of the dual licensing contexts.
The semantic representation of some is hypothesised to comprise two underlying
negative features. This view should be received with scepticism on the basis that double
negatives are highly marked in natural languages (Horn 2001, 1989, Larrivée 2004:
section 3.5). Apart from its apparently lower frequency and its more elaborate prosodic
and morphosyntactic manifestations, double negation is found to be marked in that it does
not cancel without leaving an interpretative trace. Different interpretations are signalled
by the recursive attachment of a negative marker in the Peruvian language Capanahua:
(24)
ha:
'he'
7
ha:-ma
'not he'
ha:-ma-ma
'not not he' (= he indeed)
ha:-ma-ma-ma 'not not not he' (= someone else)
(Loos 1969: 41, cited by Adelaar 2004: 420, example (30))
Such interpretative effects are manifested by Latin nonnemo 'not no one'. Cited by
Szabolcsi as meaning someone, which indeed it may, the item may also mean some
persons, a few according to the Oxford Latin Dictionary4. This is confirmed by
attestations from Orlandini (2001: 63), whose French translations are cited before the
English glosses are provided:
(25)
a.
b.
non nemo etiam in illo sacrario rei publiceae, in ipsa [...] curia, non
nemo hostis est (Cic. mur. 84)
Il y a même plus d'un ennemi dans le sanctuaire de la République, oui, il y
en a jusque [...] dans la curie !
There are many ennemies in the sacred temple of the Republic, there are
some even in the senate-house!
Quas leges ausus est non nemo improbus, potuit quidem nemo conuellere
(Cic., Pis. 10)
Ces lois, que plus d'un malhonnête homme avait souhaité abolir, sans que
nul y eut réussi.
These laws, which many a dishonest man had wanted to abolish, without
anyone succeeding to do so.
This quantifying reading on the part of the expression that is the closest natural language
reflection of the logical representation proposed for some is not accounted for by that
representation. Similarly unexplained are the interpretative traces left by double negative
cancellation found at the sentential level. Sequences such as You didn't not take it in the
Peruvian language Pano mean not You took it, but You did actually take it (Forest 1990).
A less exotic example may be given by the sequence I don't think that John didn't talk to
someone, which is compatible with I think that John talked to someone as much as it is
with I think that John talked with different people. The point is that double negatives in
natural languages yield particular interpretative effects. These may well be pragmatic,
deriving from the application of a maxim of manner that leads one to suspect that a
contribution that could have been shorter must communicate more than it says. But this is
orthogonal to the fact that these effects are not predicted by the cancellation or licensing
of two negative operators. It could be proposed that operators are not amenable to the
same conditions as natural language items, but that would then amount to an admission
that the model cannot be verified on the basis of observable data. The interpretative
effects of natural language double negative cancellation illustrate their markedness that
should be reflected in their distribution and productivity. While it is true that considerable
constraints restrain the distribution of some under the scope of negation, no such
markedness affects the common use of the ordinary existential some in affirmatives
4
Latin also features nemo non, which means everyone (Laurence Horn, personal communication). Whether
this reading can be derived from an underlying existential raises further question for the considered
analysis.
8
where cancellation between the negative traits is hypothesised to take place, and where
this hypothesised cancellation leaves none of the effects observed with natural language
cancellation of negatives. In other words, to echo Giannakidou, it is not clear why a
natural language would bother to comprise an elaborate double negative representation
only for it to be cancelled in most of the uses of a common-or-garden item, making this
look very much like a stipulation (2008: 38).
The representation of some as a licensed item in its use with clause-mate negation
raises the further concern of the division between PPIs and NPIs. The distinction between
PPI and NPI is in effect abolished in the analysis under scrutiny, as a PPI in the scope of
anti-additive operators in effect becomes a type of negative polarity item with dual
licensing requirements. One reason why this abolition may be undesirable is that any
generalities that may have been proposed for NPIs might have to be given up. One such
generality is the scalar nature of NPIs. NPIs have the distinct property of bringing about
widening effects (Kadmon and Landman 1993). No such effects are found with some
however (Szabolcsi 2004: 415). Thus, only the sequence I regret that John didn't phone
anyone gives rise to widening5, not I regret that John didn't phone someone. Widening is
evidenced by the possibility for the first elicitation with NPI anyone to be naturally
continued by the scalar phrase not even Sally6, which does not apply to the second one
with PPI someone. Classifying the non-scalar item some as a licensed item means giving
up the generality that NPIs are scalar, as indeed Szabolcsi does. This renders any
definition of NPIs an even more difficult affair. This might be judged a trivial point if
only some and any were involved. Yet, the issue seems to extend to all PPIs, which
follow the same pattern as some in their co-occurrence with clause-mate negation:
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
?* John hasn't already talked to Paul.
I regret that John hasn't already talked to Paul.
?* John hasn't talked to several people.
Only John hasn't talked to several people.
This point must be kept in mind, as the fact that we are often resorting to saying
something for reasons of frequency and comparison cannot be taken as an indication of a
phenomenon narrowly restricted to a more or less set phrase. Therefore, there is some
substance to the question of whether PPIs should be considered NPIs and how the
difference between some and any, already and yet, several and many is to be handled.
The argument so far is that the double negative operator representation does not
give way to the effects observed with double negatives in natural languages, that the
markedness of these does not correspond to the common character of the uses of some in
positive environments, and that if the uses of some in negative contexts are captured by
the representation, it should extend to all PPIs, a costly stipulation. What we will now
argue is that not all the uses in negative contexts are captured by Szabolcsi's
representation.
5
with focus on anyone; for a recent assessment of the relations between any and scales,
see Duffley and Larrivée (in press). While any is not always scalar, the point remains that
some never is.
6
Adjunction by anyone at all is however possible in both elicitations, as Laurence Horn reminds me, but
seems to create a widening effect for some that the item does not provide on its own.
9
The proposed analysis crucially rests on dual licensing. A single clause-mate
negation is nonetheless found to occur with some. Different such occurrences are noted
by Szabolsci herself. The case of most (p. 418, n. 13):
(30)
Most boys didn't say something.
is not very troubling, as although not a downward-entailing item, it does license NPIs
(Israel 2004: 717, Rothschild 2006), maybe by virtue of the contrast that is established
with its complementary set (on which a relatively recent discussion is offered by Nouwen
2003). A single negation suffices in denial:
(7)
– He found something
–Wrong! He didn't find something.
and contrastive environments (Szabolcsi 2004: 409, 413):
(8)
If you push the red button, you will see something, but if you press the
blue button, you won't see something.
as confirmed by attested cases:
(31)
(32)
a.
b.
c.
d.
Well, he didn't say something about Artest, I did, so I thought it was me.
(www.kingstalk.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=3182&pid=54417&mo
de=threaded&start=)
"I know that they have prioritized items, but I think that should have been
a priority item when you call and say someone's being shot at," Wagstaff
said. "We should have seen someone, and I didn't see someone." (R.
Glass, The Herald-Sun, May 9, 2000. Lexis-Nexis)
I then spied a couple of women with either skin tone or suntan but didn't
see someone along the lines I was thinking until Schmidt asked whether I
was interested in "a hot personal trainer. (Cheryl Johnson, Star Tribune,
August 4, 2002. Lexis-Nexis)
In a poignant expression of regret, Radler said of one payment:
"Ultimately I didn't know if the transaction was legal or not. I didn't like
the transaction. I should have said something and I didn't say something.
I regret today that I didn't." (Andrew Clark, The Guardian, July 14, 2007.
Lexis-Nexis)
Here is another gem of uselessness overheard at a wine show: A wine
writer-educator was asked by a TV interviewer who was understandably
overwhelmed by the sheer number of wines available for tasting: "Which
wine shall I taste first?" The consultant didn't say something useful like,
"If you're inexperienced you would do well to start with something white,
light and fruity like the such and such." (M. Anderson, The Gazette, June
23, 2007. Lexis-Nexis)
10
Cases of single licensors other than those noted by Szabolcsi are attested. Notably,
examples are found in subordinates the fact that7:
(33)
a.
b.
And so their point is, obviously, if he had known about it, he would have
said something, and the fact that he didn't say something, when coupled
with the with the ambiguities on the pages, you know, 404 or 405 or 401402... you get what we're talking about, the footnote... coupled with that
shows that the correct reading of that is he didn't know about it.
(www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_311/argument/)
But, my point was only that this decision was clearly within the area where
Alito was free to act, but was the only decision that could be even
minimally decent. But, doing the minimally decent thing is what should be
expected of everyone, and so isn't a ground for praise. The fact that he
didn't do something awful is grounds to be happy, but it's not ground for
praise. (http://www.volokh.com/posts/1130832558.shtml)
These contain an element of contrast clearly evidenced by the larger context, between
somebody saying something or not in (a), and the negative or positive assessment of
someone's actions in (b). The contrast between the negative or positive value of the event
is tangible in presuppositional interrogative negatives (Asher and Reese 2005, van Rooy
2003):
(34)
Didn't John say something?
Finally, contrast is the motivation of focus relations (Rooth 1996, Larrivée 2001) that
makes it possible for some to collocate with clause-mate negations, with the alternative
between those parties where John spoke and those where he remained silent in the
following:
(6)
John didn't say something at every party.
The recursion of contrast supports the view that there is coherence in the uses of
some under the scope of a clause-mate negation. This raises the question of the
legitimacy of a different treatment of clause-mate negation scoping over some depending
on whether there are two operators – with a commanding negation, regret, a conditional
and a clause-mate only:
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
I don't think that he didn't say something.
I regret that he didn't say something.
If John doesn't say something, we're doomed.
Only John didn't say something.
or only one – with metalinguistic negation, denial, contrast, focus, interrogative
negatives, and the fact that subordinate clauses:
7
The ability of this context to promote negation scoping over a preceding indefinite subject is first noted in
Attal (1976).
11
(39)
(40)
John didn't say something, Jane did.
John said something.
– Come on, now. He didn't say something
John should have said something, and he didn't say something.
John doesn't often say something.
Didn't John say something?
The fact that he didn't say something is good.
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
That it is is suggested by Szabolcsi on the basis of a suggestion from Giannakidou. She
proposes that licensors in cases of denial and contrast are extra-clausal. This tallies with
the intuition that negation in its metalinguistic and denial uses is not at the same level as
the propositional material it applies to (Horn 2001: 392, 397). The intuition is formalised
by different representations proposed independently to account for particular cases.
Metalinguistic negation is represented by Linebarger by means of a TRUE operator
standing between the negation focusing on it and the rest of the propositional material.
Similarly, a VERUM operator intervening between the proposition and the extra-clausal
negation is proposed by Romero and Han (2004) for presuppositional interrogative
negatives. The higher negative operator of double negative interpretations is represented
by Corblin (1996) as external to the embedded negative proposition. Similar embedding
is proposed for denial by Nuyts (1992) who suggests that it is the whole of the
proposition that is rejected by the extra-clausal negation. The underlying assumption to
these representations is that the propositional material is not in the immediate scope of
the higher negation (Linebarger 1980). This is of course what would be assumed to be the
case for focus, where the focused item would stand between the negation and the
proposition at some logical level of representation. For our purpose, the indirect relation
would be allowing the proposition to comprise elements that would otherwise not easily
occur with negation such as PPIs.
How the suggested extra-clausal character of the negations concerned is to be
tested is not explained, but there is a way to do this. Cases are known of sensitivity to
local licensing in negative polarity items. NPI until is one that displays a strong
preference for being licensed by a local negation. It should therefore be uniformly
infelicitous in the contexts under scrutiny if they involve a non-local negation. That
prediction is contradicted by the data:
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
a.
b.
?* I didn't claim that John finished until 12.
?? John didn't finish it until 12, Jane did
– John finished the work by 12, didn't he?
– ?? No, he didn't until 12!
He should have finished the work by 10 and he didn't finish it until 12.
?? John didn't finish the work until 12 because he's lazy, but because he
has too much to do.
?* Didn't John finish it until 12?
? Did John not finish it until 12?
I don't think John didn't finish it until 12.
I regret John didn't finish it until 12.
12
(53)
(54)
? Only John didn't finish it until 12.
The fact that John didn't finish it until 12 is notable.
The denial contrastive use of a single negation in (48) does license NPI until, whereas the
metalinguistic one in (46) does not. This indicates that negation in these contexts cannot
be thought to be uniformly extra-clausal, and that this therefore cannot be the common
factor underlying PPI distribution.
That a common factor is involved is suggested by cross-linguistic comparison.
French sees PPIs quelque chose 'something' and déja 'already' for instance occur with a
clause-mate negation in exactly the same contexts, as shown by attestations brought
together in Larrivée (in press) reflected by the following elicitations:
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)
(64)
Je ne crois pas que Jean ait déjà dit quelque chose.
I don't think that John has already said something
Jean n'a pas dit quelque chose à Paul, mais à Marie.
John didn't say something to Paul, but to Mary
Jean lui a certainement déjà dit quelque chose.
Jean has certainly already said something to him.
– Non, il ne lui a pas déjà dit quelque chose.
– No, he hasn't already said something to him.
Jean aurait vraiment dû, mais malheureusement, il ne lui a pas déjà dit
quelque chose.
Jean really should have, but unfortunately, he has not already said
something to him.
Jean ne lui a pas déjà dit quelque chose parce qu'il est vicieux, mais parce
qu'il est maladroit.
Jean hasn't told him something because he's malicious, but because he's
clumsy.
Jean ne lui a-t-il pas déjà dit quelque chose?
Hasn't Jean already told him something?
Je ne crois pas que Jean n'ait pas déjà dit quelque chose.
I don't think that Jean hasn't already said something.
Je regrette que Jean n'ait pas dit quelque chose.
I regret that Jean hasn't said something.
Si Jean n'a pas déjà dit quelque chose, nous aurons des ennuis.
If Jean hasn't already said something, we're in trouble.
Seul Jean n'a pas déjà dit quelque chose.
Only Jean hasn't already said something
A similar combination of single and dual licensor is attested for the case of light negation
in German (Schwarz and Bhatt 2006). German sentential negation nicht normally
incorporates to a following indefinite determiner ein 'a' to produce negative determiner
keine 'no' rather than the atypical sequence nicht ein:
(65)
Fritz kann eine Fremdsprache. (p. 179, example (9b))
Fritz can speak a foreign language.
13
(66)
(67)
Fritz kann keine Fremdsprache. (p. 179, example (11b))
Fritz can speak no foreign language.
* Fritz kann nicht eine Fremdsprache. (p. 179, example (10b))
Fritz cannot speak a foreign language
The atypical sequence is however found in negative polar questions, in a subjunctive
conditional, double negation, in surprise subordinates:
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
Hat Fritz nicht eine Fremdsprache? (p. 179, example (12b))
Doesn't Fritz know a foreign language?
Wenn Fritz nicht eine Fremdsprache könnte, wäre et durchgefallen (p.
180, example 13b)
If Fritz didn't know a foreign language, he would have failed.
Wir haben keinen angenommen, der nicht eine Fremdsprache kann. (p.
181, example 14b)
We admitted no one who doesn't know a foreign language.
Ich bin überrascht, das er nicht das Bild einigen von uns gezeit hat. (p.
191, example (42c))
I am surprised he didn't show the picture to some of us.
A similar distribution is evidenced by Hoeksema (1999) for the atypical sequence not
anything and its Dutch equivalent.
German and French data suggest that PPIs are attested with clause-mate negation
in a coherent set of contexts, whether these involve one or two licensors. Were this
coherence to be related to a common factor, it might help us avoid the problems arising
from Szabolcsi's analysis. It was found to postulate an elaborate internal composition for
a common expression, a separation between single and dual negative contexts and an
assimilation between PPIs and NPIs. The factor common to the various contexts of
distribution is not the extra-clausal status of negation, and the recurrent intervention of
contrast points to an interpretative determinism. What that determinism may be is
considered in the next section.
4. Activated contexts
The critical assessment in the previous section has proposed that the set of environments
in which PPIs are found under the scope of a clause-mate negation may be brought
together by a common factor. Defining that factor may start with the contexts that most
obviously infringes Szabolcsi's analysis, and the obvious import of Pragmatics for those
contexts led us to look at whether this aspect of meaning could be relied upon to offer a
unified analysis.
PPIs such as some are recognised to come under the scope of a single
metalinguistic negation (Horn 2001: 374, 397-402, Horn 1995). Metalinguistic negation
is characterised both by formal (van der Sandt 2003, 1991) and in functional (Carston
1998, 1996) approaches as presupposing an anterior assertion of the proposition that it
challenges. To challenge the form of a sequence supposes quite naturally that the
sequence has been used or could have been used in the antecedent context.
14
The role of antecedent discourse for the use of negation is explored by Scott
Schwenter, building of the work of Matthew Dryer (1996). He does so on the basis of
negation in Brazilian Portuguese. Negation in that Romance variety is normally
expressed through a single preverbal use of não (NEG1), which can accompanied by a
post-verbal não (NEG2) in a limited sets of contexts having to do with denial. Post-verbal
não is thus only felicitous in the second one of these exchanges:
(72)
(73)
[Speaker walking down the street and suddenly remembers she forgot to
turn off the stove]
Nossa! Eu não desliguei o fagão (#não)!
'Damn! I didn't turn off the stove!' (2005: 1434, example (2a))
[Same situation as (2a)]
A : Você desligou o fagão, né?
'You turned off the stove, right?'
B: Nossa! Eu não desliguei o fagão não!
'Damn! I didn't turn it off!' (2005: 1435, example (2b))
What is crucial about that second context is that the denied proposition has been
mentioned previously in A's question. No mention has been made of proposition in the
first, out of the blue sequence, where post-verbal não is infelicitous. NEG2 não therefore
lives on discourse-old propositions. Such dependence may be reflected by inheritance of
propositional material from the antecedent context. This is exactly what happens in this
further contrasted Brazilian Portuguese pair:
(74)
A:
B1 :
B2 :
O João votou no Lula?
'Did João vote for Lula?'
(Não.) Não votou não.
'(No.) He didn't vote (for him).'
(Não.) Ele não votou.
'(No.) He didn't vote (for anyone).' (p. 1445, example (17))
The response with a single preverbal negative in B2 simply denies that somebody voted.
The NEG2 response in B1 is necessarily related to the preceding question, which
introduces the issue of voting for a specific candidate, and the denial can only concern
whether somebody voted for Lula.
A discourse-old proposition is what defines the use of a second, post-verbal não in
Brazilian Portuguese. The same analysis is shown to account for other markers
previously described as emphatic or presuppositional such as post-verbal Italian negative
mica (Zanuttini 1997, and also Cinque 1976; on Italian constructions depending on
discourse-old propositions, Godard and Marandin 2006) and post-verbal negatives in
Catalan (Schwenter 2006). Post-verbal negatives are known to be a historical
development adding on to the preverbal negation marking in Romance languages. French
would go from preverbal ne as the unmarked way to express negation to an embracing
negation ne V pas to retain the sole post-verbal marker pas. This evolution known as the
Jespersen cycle highlights the role of the post-verbal markers. These might have initially
relied on discourse-old propositions in the same way that they still do in the Romance
15
languages that have remained at the early embracing negation stage of the Jespersen
cycle. This possible parallel is explored by Mosegaard-Hansen and Visconti (2007). They
seek to establish whether the emergence of post-verbal negative markers mie and pas in
French and mica in Italian is related to discourse-old proposition. This relation would
show that the first stage of post-verbal markers becoming negatives would involve use
with activated propositions, a general hypothesis defended by Kiparsky and Condoravdi
(2006).
The notion of discourse-old information had been defined by Matthew Dryer in
his drive to elucidate the nature of presuppositions. His motivation is to assert the
difference between presuppositions and beliefs, following the distinction between
givenness in the sense of shared knowledge and givenness in the sense of saliency made
by Prince (1981). No belief is involved in the presupposition somebody saw John
deriving from the question Who saw John? If presuppositions were matters of beliefs,
they could not possibly be contradicted, which of course they are by negative responses
such as Nobody. Other accommodated presuppositions should crucially rest on prior
knowledge if they involved belief. No prior knowledge is necessary however for the
felicity of We regret that H.P. Grice is ill and will be unable to attend the conference
(Dryer 1996: 499) that does presuppose the subordinate proposition. Presuppositions
would thus be a matter of activation. Activation is defined as the property of a
proposition that is accessible to the hearer. Accessibility is obviously the case when a
proposition is explicitly mentioned. The assertion in a conversation about astrology that
Leo men are selfish makes the proposition accessible without any necessary prior
knowledge or subsequent credence. Neither is needed for presuppositions accommodated
by constructions such as WH-questions, clefts and regret subordinates to activate a
proposition, the subordinate in I regret that Leo men are selfish forcing to accommodate
as accessible the proposition that was probably not part of the hearer's knowledge and
that they do not have to believe in firmly.
The interest of the notion of activation lies in its ability to be put to the test. Such
a test is necessary to assess whether the stable series of contexts that allow PPI some
under the scope of a clause-mate negation involve activation, a hypothesis suggested by
the intervention of metalinguistic, denial and contrast contexts. These involve beyond any
reasonable doubt activated proposition:
(39)
(40)
(41)
John didn't say something, Jane did.
John said something.
– Come on, now. He didn't say something
John should have said something, and he didn't say something.
as they suppose the explicit antecedent use of the proposition or accommodate it.
Accommodated activation is found with focus, presuppositional interrogative negatives,
and the fact that subordinates:
(42)
(43)
(44)
John doesn't often say something.
Didn't John say something?
The fact that he didn't say something is good.
16
as it is by decreasing contexts at the core of Szabolcsi's analysis:
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
I don't think that he didn't say something.
I regret that he didn't say something.
If John doesn't say something, we're doomed.
Only John didn't say something.
Focus induces a complementary value and presupposes the underlying proposition: that
John sometimes says something, but that he mostly doesn't, this makes accessible the
proposition that John says something in (42). The same proposition is similarly accessible
with the focus associated to the use of only in (38) that contrasts John who didn't speak
and those who did8. Negative interrogatives presuppose the underlying proposition rather
than merely enquire about it, and that John did say something is activated in (43). Factive
presuppositions of the subordinate proposition is imposed by the fact that and regret,
which therefore activate the proposition that John said something in (44) and (36).
Double negation presupposes that the negative subordinate has been entertained or could
have been in the discourse environment, and that John hasn't talked is activated in (35) –
a mundane yet rather convincing further example of this is provided by the name of the
American margarine product I can't believe it's not butter, which would make little sense
if allusion wasn't made to the view that margarine is not butter. The conditional in (36)
activates the underlying proposition through the debate between the alternative
possibilities of John saying something and his remaining silent.
Let us pause a moment and look back at what has been accomplished so far. The
question to be addressed is whether there is a common causality to the use of PPI some
under the scope of clause-mate negation. A possible candidate has been considered in the
notion of activated proposition. Propositions are activated when they are accessible to the
hearer. Different types of activation can be distinguished: explicit activation derives from
a proposition being used in the antecedent context, while accommodated activation relies
on a construction that imposes the presupposed status of a proposition. These have been
shown to characterise the particular negative environments allowing PPIs, which can be
further demonstrated by transferable tests elaborating on the contrasting illustrations
proposed by Schwenter (as in (72) to (74) above). Answers with some under the scope of
negation are fine when the proposition of saying something is activated by the question:
(75)
A:
B:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
8
– I'm sure John would remember if he saw someone around the house at
that hour.
– John didn't see someone.
– We don't often see someone around here, you know.
– I don't think that John didn't see someone, but our recollections are
vague.
– I regret that John didn't see someone.
Only John didn't see someone it seems.
The debate as to the exact pragmatic nature of the underlying proposition with only modifying a proper
noun in subject position is not taken up here, as it is tangential to the question under consideration. It is the
object of the debate between Horn (1996) and Atlas (1997) notably.
17
f.
– The fact that John didn't see someone doesn't mean there was no one.
When the question does not activate the proposition however9, the answers are
infelicitous.
(76)
A:
B:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
– I'm sure John would remember if he talked to someone in the area at that
hour.
– % John didn't see someone.
– ?? We don't often see someone around here, you know.
– % I don't think that John didn't see someone, but my recollections are
vague.
– % I regret that John didn't see someone.
– % Only John didn't see someone it seems.
– % The fact that John didn't see someone doesn't mean there was no one.
Note that this is not due to an irrational exchange, as replacing some by regular NPI any
yields acceptable results in the following:
(77)
– I'm sure John would remember if he talked to someone in the vicinity at
that hour.
– John didn't see anyone!
In such an environment, it is the co-occurrence of some with negation that supposes
activation. It is imposed by the other structures, which is why replacement doesn't work
in the other cases.
Testing the ability to validate old information and comparison with sequences
where either negation or some is removed show that the structures that we are dealing
with involve activated propositions. Such status is not limited to accommodated and
explicit contexts. Inference can produce activation, as shown by the following example of
German light negation in a main subjunctive clauses linked to a conditional subordinate:
(78)
Wenn Fritz dumm wäre, könte er nicht eine Fremdscprache.
If Fritz were stupid, he wouldn't know a foreign language.
(Schwarz & Bhatt 2006: 182, example (18b))
and by an English transposition:
(79)
9
If John were insensitive, he wouldn't have said something.
That is why, as pointed out by a reviewer, the following exchange is acceptable:
– I'm sure John would remember if he talked to someone in the area at that hour.
– Well, John didn't see someone he could talk to.
since the subordinate picks up the predicate talk activated in the antecedent sequence.
18
where contextual connection between sensitivity to a situation and a verbal reaction
concerning that situation activates the proposition that John said something. More
examples of propositions activated through relations between events are provided below,
compared to examples where there are no such relations:
(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
He didn't see something and stumbled.
% He didn't see something and turned left.
He didn't say something(,) because he didn't know what.
% He didn't say something(,) because he's a married man.
If John were heartless, he wouldn't have done something for Jane.
% If John were a linguist, he wouldn't have done something for Jane.
He is a bit lazy, so he didn't do something for Jane.
% He is a bit blonde, so he didn't do something for Jane.
That the infelicity of the (b) examples depends on the absence of activation that is
supposed by the cooccurrence of some and not is shown by the acceptability that results
from removing either:
(84)
(85)
(86)
(87)
He saw something and turned left.
He said something(,) because he's a married man.
If John were a linguist, he would have done something for Jane.
He is a bit blonde, so he did something for Jane.
(88)
(89)
(90)
(91)
He didn't see anything and turned left.
He didn't say anything(,) because he's a married man.
If John was a linguist, he wouldn't have done anything for Jane.
He is a bit blonde, so he didn't do anything for Jane.
Inferences can along with accommodating constructions produce the assumption of
discourse-old information that will be treated as accessible to the hearer like explicit
antecedent propositions are10.
Activation is the property of propositions in which some can be found under the
scope of clause-mate negation. After a presentation of the notion, a distinction was made
of three types of activation, depending on whether it is induced by explicit mention of the
proposition in the antecedent discourse, by a construction that accommodates the
presupposition of the proposition, or by discourse relations that leads to the inference of a
presupposed proposition. Going beyond the practice that relies on intuition, tests are
10
Each configuration may of course have different conditions of intervention, as pointed
out by a reviewer of an earlier version of this work. That is why, in the scenario
suggested to us where a lady having her morning stroll in the park and seeing a man wake
up and starting to drink, the out of the blue statement If you don't eat something, you will
get very drunk is felicitous, much more so than % You haven't eaten something. You will
get very drunk. The conditional accommodates activation, in the absence of which the
first sequence cannot rely on antecedent discourse for explicit or inferred activation. This
predicts that You will get very drunk, you haven't eaten something is better, as indeed it is.
19
proposed to ascertain the activated status of a sequence. These have to do with the
predicted ability to validate old information, as well as by the felicity of (nonaccommodated) sequences where some or negation are removed.
5. Conclusions
This paper has considered the question of PPI some under the scope of a clause-mate
negation. The use is of interest because it seems to muddy the neat distinction between
NPIs licensed by negation and PPIs anti-licensed by it. The proposal by Szabolcsi (2004)
to analyse PPIs as a type of NPIs requiring dual licensing served as our starting point. We
showed that some can come under the scope of a single negative clause-mate licenser,
and asked whether these are driven by a common factor with dual-licensing
environments. That common factor was suggested to be activated propositions.
Propositions that are accessible to the hearer were shown through discussion and tests to
characterise all the environments in which some comes under negative scope.
Several novel contributions are proposed in this paper. A solution is proposed to the
old problem of atypical sequences with negation scoping over clause-mate PPIs: they
occur in activated propositions. This is why out of the blue sequences like John didn't say
something are judged ill-formed, and why such sequences are considered marked, which
they are. The distribution of PPIs with clause-mate negation thus can be used as a criteria
to recognise activation, and diagnostics are proposed for what was before an essentially
intuitive notion of presupposition. Activated status can be demonstrated by the ability to
validate old information, as well as by the felicity of (non-accommodated) sequences
where some or negation are removed. Such a demonstration can be applied to now that P
environments, which allow PPI some under the scope of clause-mate negation:
(92)
Now that John hasn't said something, I'll have to step in, won't I?
as established by the comparison with the infelicity of the now P contexts:
(93)
?? Now, John hasn't said something, I'll have to step in, won't I?
which can be restored to acceptability by removing either some or negation:
(94)
(95)
Now, John hasn't said anything, I'll have to step in, won't I?
Now, John has said something, I'll have to step in, won't I?
Another contribution made by this paper is the distinction between explicit,
accommodated and inferred activation, which provides the opportunity for a finer-grained
approach of such manifestations.
The proposal made here has the advantage of simplicity, relying on no elaborate
theory-dependent mechanism. Indeed, as several phenomena are concerned by activation,
its use to account for the distribution of PPIs with negation effectively comes for free.
Activated propositions seem required to license the odd NPI found in positive
environments: the following from Larrivée (2007) provide a case of negative polarity
idiom and a strict negative polarity pronoun used in a positive proposition that has been
activated in the immediately antecedent context (see also Lee 2006):
20
(96)
People don’t give a damn about Indians, but they give a damn about the
advantages that come with being an Indian. (Radio-Canada, 16.5.1996.
Larrivée 2007: 93, example (20))
(97)
Ça ne change pas grand chose à mon analyse, ce qui change grand chose, c’est
que […]. (Oral exchange, 5.1997. Larrivée 2007: 94, example (25a))
Apart from negation, the well-known infraction to the alleged default lower-bound
reading of numerals seems to emerge in activated propositions:
(98)
– You need three children to qualify for family support. Do you have three
children?
– I've got three children all right, in fact, I've got four.
That observation is reinforced by the use of the discourse particle all right, which is
apparently related to activated contexts and finds equivalents in the German ja
(Kauffman 2004, Kratzer 1999; positive and negative particles in Portuguese, Italian,
Finnish and West Flemish apparently amenable to an activation analysis are cited by
Breitbarth and Haegeman 2008). Echo questions, metalinguistic conditionals and other
objects of wonders can be approached through the notion of activation and can benefit
from the diagnostics proposed by this paper. The markedness of such environments
means that the empirical generalisations that outside activated propositions, NPIs are
licensed and PPIs anti-licensed by negation can be maintained, and any difficulties raised
by compounding the two categories doesn't arise.
One point that must be speculated upon is the reason why PPIs might require an
activated context to come under the scope of negation. Negation it has been observed by
Horn (2001: 392, 397) is in such contexts not at the same level as the propositional
contents. This could be illustrated by NPIs that are not easily in this case licensed by
negatives; these however validate NPIs that are not part of the activated proposition, and
the exchange John talked to my wife apparently. – He never talked to your wife at all! is
perfectly acceptable with a NPI at all that is patently proposed by the speaker rather than
reproduced from the antecedent assertion. The activated proposition is thus treated as a
whole, to which the negative applies to reject it entirely. The negative thus scopes over
the entire proposition rather than any of its parts. As it is the entire proposition that is
concerned by negation, the latter does not have to interact directly with the PPI. Because
activated context suspends the unproductive relation between the negative and the PPI
that does not lend itself to a scalar or focus reading (Larrivée 2005), it offers possibilities
of cooccurrence. The consequence is that the cooccurrence is something possible rather
than something necessary. This is considerably more economical than the view that
somehow the PPIs with negatives are rescued, as in Szabolcsi's treatment. The question
that rescuing raises is that of learnability and efficacy. Why would a language bother to
have PPIs that by definition are not used in the direct scope of negatives, and then have a
rescuing process to allow them to be distributed in that environment? How could such a
process be learned, and on the basis of what evidence? Why should fairly atypical uses
drive the learning of PPIs? None of these questions are raised by the perspective
proposed here, according to which PPIs can find themselves in an activated proposition
21
that is negated because the negation will not interact with them to produce uncertain
semantic results. All that is needed to know is that it is the activated proposition as a
whole that falls under the scope of negation, and it simply follows that the proposition
may contain PPIs but obviously need not to. Necessity is not the only source of
grammatical manifestations.
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