Intergovernmental Relations and
Policy Innovation: Comparing
Canada, the US, and the EU
Kathryn Harrison
University of British Columbia
Is Federalism “good” or “bad” for
climate policy innovation?
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Good news in EU
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Shifting leadership among member states
Burden sharing
“best of both worlds”
Good news in US
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Despite fed inaction, states taking matters into
own hands
Is Federalism “good” or “bad” for
climate policy?
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Good news and bad news in Canada:
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Why the difference?
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Fed-prov stalemate for almost 20 years
Recent dynamic of provincial innovation and diffusion
Constitutional authority
Magnitude and distribution of costs
Public opinion as switch
Does it matter?
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Impact on climate policy
Canada
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Background:
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Relative decentralizaton
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Provinces own both sources and sinks
Fed authority largely untested
Uneven distribution of costs!
CO2e t/person,
2004
Emissions growth,
1990-2004
AB
73
40%
SK
69
62%
ON
16
15%
MB
17
4%
QC
12
11%
Canada
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Background:
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Relative decentralizaton
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Provinces own both sources and sinks
Fed authority still largely untested
Uneven distribution of costs
Cyclical public attention
What happened?
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Pre-2006
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Fed-prov: “joint decision trap”
Prov-prov: “stuck at the bottom”
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Post-2006
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Fed-prov: feds increasingly irrelevant
Prov-prov: innovation and diffusion
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Rabe: policy capacity, “show us the money”
BC leading
Policy outputs:
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Fed level: lots of promises and plans, still no regulations
Provincial level: C&T in AB, C tax in BC, commitments to WCI
US
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Background:
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Relative centralization
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Interstate commerce power, conditional grants
 “everything airborne, from frisbees to flatulence”
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Big states are relatively green!
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“The California Effect”
 Wealthy
 Green
 Special authority under Clean Air Act
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Public inattention, even after 2006
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Variation at state level?
What happened?
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Fed-state: feds mostly irrelevant
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State-state: innovation and diffusion
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Some fed obstruction on tailpipe standards
State lawsuits against EPA
Led by NY, CA
Policy outputs:
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At fed level: $ and voluntary
At state level:
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renewable portfolio stds
RGGI, WCI
Not all states joining the parade
EU (Tiberghien and Schreurs)
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Background:
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Relative centralization:
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Greater public concern, esp in key member states
Big players had BAU windfalls!
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qualified majority (though not for taxes)
Environment as unifying issue for EC
Germany + UK account for >100% of EU reductions
Without Germany and UK, per capita increases in rest of EU
15 comparable to Canada, Australia (8%, 1990-2004)
EU had easier target rel to BAU:
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-3 to -9% vs. -29% for Canada, -31% for US
What happened?
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State-state dynamic:
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EU-state dynamic:
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Early leaders held to commitments
Shifting leadership
Burden-sharing
Reinforcement of leaders by EP and EC
Oversight by EC
Policy Outputs:
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C taxes
ETS
Intergovernmental dynamics
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Depends on fed constitutional authority
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Depends on distribution of costs
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No expectation of consensus in EU (or US)
“Big players” were green and keen in US, EU, but not in
Canada
Depends on public opinion
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Like switch in Canada (also several EU member states),
but has it turned off again?
Policy Outputs
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Federalism has facilitated stronger EU policy, partially filled
void in US and (more recently) Canada, but still obstructive
force in Canada
It’s not all about federalism:
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Concentration of authority in legislative institutions
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Electoral systems:
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Veto points can be activated by opponents (US)
Ability for leaders to pursue normative commitments (UK, Canada,
BC vs. US)
PR reinforces (and perhaps amplifies?) electoral pressure, esp
when majority of voters inattentive
Lock-in effects
Electoral incentives
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window opened and closed without federal action?