Asian Philosophy
Lecture 9
The Nyaya – Vaisheshika School
Nyaya and Vaisheshika are two independent schools of classical
Indian philosophy that at some point in time merged together.
Nyaya focuses on epistemology and logic.
Vaisheshika focuses on metaphysics and ontology
However,
Nyaya accepts a lot of Vaisheshika metaphysics and ontology.
&
Vaisheshika accepts a lot of Nyaya epistemology and logic.
Maharishi Kanada is the
main founder of the
Vaisheshika school. It was
founded between 200BCE
and CE.
The core text which is
commented upon is the
Vaisheshika Sutras.
The school is focused on
understanding reality and its
plurality. It is focused on
metaphysics and ontology. It
offers a different
metaphysics from that of
Sankhya.
The ontology offered by the
school is strongly in
opposition to that of
Buddhism and Vedanta.
The Ontological Question
The ontological question is short and simple: What is there?
However,
We don’t mean the simple question: what is there?
Rather,
We mean the exclusionary question: what must be there?
Or
What is fundamentally there that explains everything non-basic?
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Categories)
Padarthas or categories are fundamental groupings of basic components of
reality. Categories contain fundamentally distinct kinds of entities.
Dravya: Substance
Gunas: Quality
Karma: Motion
Samanya: Universal
Visesa: Particularity
Samavaya: Inherence
Abhava: Negation
Cross-Cultural Comparison of Category Theory
Vaisheshika (7)
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Dravya: Substance
Gunas: Quality
Karma: Motion
Samanya: Universal
Visesa: Particularity
Samavaya: Inherence
Abhava: Negation
Aristotelian (10)
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•
•
•
•
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Substance
Quantity
Quality
Relatives
Somewhere
Sometime
Being in a position
Having
Acting
Being affected
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Substance)
Substance is what exists independently of anything else. In Vaisheshika
substance is different from what one finds in Aristotle, Locke, or Kant in the
West.
In the West substance typically means that which is permanent and
underlies change through out time whether or not one accepts substance
or rejects it.
In Vaisheshika dravya does not mean that which is permanent. Rather it
means locus of properties, for dravya can undergo change.
There are nine kinds of substances: Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time,
Space, Self, and Mind.
Each of these are independently existing loci of other dependent kinds of
entities, such as qualities.
Vaisheshika: Space, Time, and Mind
It is important to note that the list contains: Space, Time, and Mind as
substances.
Some would hold that space is not a substance, since it is dependent
on the objects that it relates.
Some would hold that time is not a substance, since it is merely a
function of our conscious experience.
Some would hold that mind as a separate entity is not a substance,
since only the brain exists. If the mind is dependent on the brain, it
cannot be a substance.
Vaisheshika: Notes on Substance
Vaisheshika Atomism ≠ Greek Atomism
Vaisheshika Atomism
Greek Atomism
Atoms lack motion
Atoms do not lack motion
Differentiated both
quantitatively and quality
Differentiated only
quantitatively
In later classical Indian philosophy there is a debate over whether
there are 9, 7, or 5 distinct kinds of substance.
Just as in later Western philosophy there is a debate about whether
Aristotle’s ontology is correct.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Qualities)
Quality is a distinct category from substance. Qualities are
modifications or attributes of a substance.
Qualities don’t exist without substances, and substances do not exist
without qualities. There is a mutual inter-dependence, though the
two are distinct. And substance are in some sense are superior since
they are non – dependent entities. There existence does not depend
on anything else, while a qualities existence does depend on there
being substances.
Qualities allow us to distinguish things. It is because two entities
don’t have the same qualities that we can be in a position to know
that the two things are separate. Differentiation by qualities accounts
for differences between things.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Qualities)
Qualities by definition are in a substance.
As a consequence,
Qualities cannot have qualities themselves.
Examples of qualities: Color, odor, contact, sound, number, measure,
difference, connection, separation..
Qualities are attributes of substances that allow us to characterize the
substance.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Motion)
Karma = Motion = displacement of position in space.
There are different kinds of motion:
Upward, Downward, Contraction, Expansion, and Locomotion.
These different kinds of motion account for the kinds of changes that
a substance can undergo and how atoms interact.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Universals)
Universals are that which allow for commonality between particulars
that are different. Two inscriptions of ‘A’ count as two instances of the
letter ‘A’ because they share the universal A-ness.
Two cows share the universal of being cows.
Two red plates share the universals of being plates and being red.
Two farms share the universal of being farms.
In general universals are posited to help explain how different entities
can be of the same type. Vaisheshika maintains that universals are
real, as opposed to the Buddhist schools which think of them as
mental constructions.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Universals)
Vaisheshika also maintains that the universal is in the substance.
That is the universal is in the thing that has the universal. Cowness is
in the particular cow.
Cowness does not float free of its instances.
A given cow that is born and eventually dies, goes through a change
in virtue of cowness. However, the universal is not effected by the
change of the particular.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Universals)
Vaisheshika also maintains that not every piece of language picks out
a universal.
Contrast there view with the Platonic View that every thing has a
form. That is there is both a form for socially constructed objects,
such as a spoon, but also natural kinds, such as cows.
Vaisheshika, by contrast, appears to only forward a view of universals
for natural kinds. It proposes a theory on which there is a way to say
that some linguistic constructions do not pick out a universal.
They have a sparse conception of universals, rather than an abundant
conception, where there are many many universals.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Particularity)
Particularity is used to explain how two things that share all of the
same qualities can nevertheless be distinct.
Not every entity has particularity. Ordinary things do not. Only
partless eternal entities have particularity. Atoms for example.
A whole has particularity because of the parts and or atoms that
make it up.
However, what makes the atoms the individual particulars they are?
Particularity is posited to account for how eternal and partless
substances can be particular, yet similar.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Inherence)
A whole consists of parts. A substance has qualities. Yet substances and
qualities are different kinds of things, just as parts and wholes are.
How do parts and wholes come together? How do substances and qualities
bind together?
Inherence is the mechanism by which parts come together to make a
whole.
Inherence cannot be reduced to another thing that explains it. If we did, we
would have to ask: how do those things come together to form a whole?
Inherence is a fundamental aspect of reality not reducible to something
else.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Non-existence)
There are various types of negation. Some views deny that reality
contains absence in addition to presence. Vaisheshika believes in the
reality of what is negated. There must be absence and presence.
Negation
Absence
Antecedent
Subsequent
Difference
Absolute
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Non-existence)
Negations:
“A is not in B.” Absence;
The absence of A in B. A is not in B.
“A is not B.” Difference;
When two things are not the same thing.
“A is not yet B.” Antecedent;
The absence of a house in the bricks.
“A is no more B.” Subsequent,
The absence of a house after destruction.
“A is not here now.” Absolute
The absence across all times of two things being connected.
Vaisheshika Padarthas (Non-existence)
Some schools deny that fundamental ontology contains both absences and
presences.
Some schools prefer the view that fundamental ontology only contains presences,
and that everything that is absent is merely inferred from that which is present.
Vaisheshika posits absences and says that we can come to know of them.
The Nyaya school also accepts absences. And both schools engage other schools in
a debate about whether we must posit absences and how we could come to know
of them.
Gautama Aksapada is the
main founder of the
traditional Nyaya school.
The core text is the Nyaya
Sutra from around 250CE.
The new school of Nyaya,
known as Navya Nyaya
begins after the 10 century
CE.
The main proponents of
the new school are
Gangesa and Raghunath.
The school is strongly
interested in how we
acquire knowledge, and
the nature of logic.
Nyaya Epistemology
The Problem of Knowledge:
Of the many ways in which we could come to know something, which of the ways are
actually good ways for coming to know something?
The issue concerns the basic sources of knowledge. Our options are:
Perception
Extra-ordinary Perception
Inference
Testimony
Comparison
It is important to note cross-culturally: that the notion of comparison does not show up
as a potential source of basic knowledge in the Western context. In addition, extraordinary perception can be viewed in a lot of different ways, and thus might show up in
the Western context depending on what kind of extra ordinary perception we are
talking about.
Nyaya Epistemology
The Nyaya Approach Requires Distinguishing Between:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
The knowing subject.
The object to be known
The object as known.
The means of how the object is known.
In classical Indian philosophy there are two kinds of views about the objects of
knowledge and means of knowing them.
One means for each kind: For each kind of object there is a unique way of coming
to know the object. The Buddhist held this view, maintaining that perception is of
particulars, and inference is of non-particulars.
Many means for each kind: One and the same object can be known through many
different means of knowing. The Nyaya school held this view, maintaining that one
and the same thing could be known by perception and by inference.
Nyaya: Perception
The Nyaya school defines perception as:
Cognition arising from sense contact with an object where the result is non-verbal,
determinate, non-erroneous, and well-ascertained.
The standard two stage account is that
First, we have a non-conceptual perception by way of contact between our sense
organs and an external object.
Second, we have a conceptual perception generated by the deployment of
concepts which generates a conscious level perception.
We infer the existence of a non-conceptual perception as an antecedent to our
conceptual perceptions. We don’t actually consciously engage the non-conceptual
perception.
Nyaya: Perceptual Error
How do we distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perceptions?
All non-conceptual perception is veridical. There is no possibility of error in the case
of a non-conceptual perception. And it makes no sense to talk of a mistake in the
case of non-conceptual perception.
Some conceptual perceptions are non-veridical because there is a foul up between
the first stage of perceptual processing and the second stage of perceptual
processing.
Somehow the conceptual content of the second stage of processing imputes
something that does not track reality. Memory is one possible explanation for error
in some cases.
Something indeterminate at stage 1, leads to the imputation of a concept at stage 2
perception, this in turn leads to a conceptual perception that has an error in it.
Nyaya: The Criterion of True Perception
The Nyaya maintain that mistaken knowledge is eventually brought out because of
success in practice.
It is because we do succeed on acting on the perception as conceptualized in a
certain way that one can come to have knowledge on the basis of the perception,
or know that the content of the perception was true.
True knowledge is what corresponds to reality.
And
The test for true knowledge is success in practice.
However,
True knowledge ≠ what is successful in practice.
Nyaya: Inference
The classic example of an inference in Nyaya and in Indian Philosophy is:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
There is a fire on the hill over there.
Because there is smoke coming from the hill over there.
Whatever has smoke has fire, for example, a stove in a kitchen.
The hill has smoke just as the stove in the kitchen has smoke.
So, there is fire on the hill over there.
Critical Questions About the Structure of the Argument:
Why are there five steps?
Can we reduce the number of steps?
Why is the first step the same as the last step?
Why do we need an example?
Aristotle’s Inference for Comparison
The classic example of a valid inference in Aristotle’s Syllogistic is:
1.
2.
3.
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
So, Socrates is mortal.
Can we model the Nyaya Inference on the Aristotelian Model:
1.
2.
3.
Wherever there is smoke there is fire. Both are co-present and co-absent.
There is smoke on the hill over there.
So, there is fire on the hill over there.
Compare the first premise of each argument. Are they the same in nature? ‘All men
are mortal’ appears to be true by definition, while ‘Wherever there is smoke there
is fire’ appears to be not true by definition.
Nyaya: Inference – Main Questions
How can we come to know that A and B are universally and necessarily connected
simply by observation?
First part: given that we often cannot observe all the instances of A, how can we
know that A and B are always connected?
Second part: given that we can observe only that event A and event B are such that
they follow one another in some temporal ordering, how can we know that A and B
are necessarily connected?
Nyaya maintains that for some universal claims, given the kinds in question we can
know from seeing A and B connected in one instance, that in all cases they are
connected. Our question is for which kinds does this hold, and why?
Why in some cases does a finite sample of As and Bs justify a belief that All As are
Bs?
Nyaya: Comparison
Nyaya recognizes that you can come to know something through comparison based
on objective similarity. Here is the Indian scholar J.N. Mohanty offering an example:
“Let us suppose a person wants to know what is meant by the word “gavaya.” She
learns, from another, that a gavaya resembles a cow. Now on another occasion she
sees an animal resembling a cow and recalls the instruction “gavaya is like a cow”.
So, she concludes –knows– that it is this animal that is meant by “gavaya.” She thus
is able to determine a meaning relation between a word and a thing. It is
knowledge of similarity – at first verbal, then perceptual and finally memory –
which is the cause of the cognition and so is the upamana as a pramana”
The idea: comparison based on objective similarity between a cow and another
animal is the ultimate ground of how the cognition is brought about, and why it is a
case of knowledge.
Nyaya: Comparison
Critical Questions About Comparison
Why doesn’t comparison just reduce to a combination of inferential, perceptual,
and testimonial knowledge as follows:
1.
2.
3.
A Gavaya resembles a cow. Knowledge by Testimony.
This resembles a cow. Knowledge by Perception.
So, this is a gavaya. Knowledge by Inference from (1) and (2).
One argument against this account is that it does not work because at the
perceptual stage you actually have to look at what you see and engage in a
comparison via memory and your current perceptual state observing the ‘this’ in
order to arrive at the conclusion that what is before you resembles a cow.
Perception alone doesn’t tell you that two things resemble each other you must
compare.
Nyaya: Perception of Absence
Perception of absence occurs when a person perceives the absence of something.
For example, you leave your keys on the coffee table, while you are gone someone
takes them without you knowing. Upon your return, you perceive the absence of
the keys.
What is going on in this perception of absence?
Three accounts:
Cognitive account: you perceive what is present, and infer what is absent.
Affective account: you perceive what is present, and feel surprised by the absence.
Perceptual account: you perceive what is absent directly. You do not infer what is
absent, and although you may have an affective response the affective response is
not necessary and is not what explains the perception of absence.
Nyaya: Perception of Absence
Nyaya Account: we perceive what is absent, but we don’t perceive it through some
additional source. We perceive it through our normal visual faculty.
The rule that maintains that perception of presence and absence have the same
conditions for their generation is denied by the Nyaya.
Critical Questions:
Do we need to maintain that we perceive absences?
Is the locus of an absence distinct from the absence itself or are they identical?
Is there anything outside of perception we can appeal to that can help us settle the
debate over the perception of absences.
Nyaya: Testimony
Knowledge by testimony from another person requires three criteria:
1.
The person speaking must be absolutely honest and reliable.
2.
The person speaking must actually know that which is communicated.
3.
The hearer must understand exactly what is being heard.
Core Idea: Knowledge by testimony requires not only that a knowledgeable person
tell another something, but also that the person that hears what is said actually
understands it.
Reporting what someone else said, doesn’t mean that you know the content, just
because it is true, you believe it, and it came from an honest and reliable source.