Liquidity Effect in OTC Options Markets: Premium or Discount? Prachi Deuskar Anurag Gupta Marti G. Subrahmanyam Primary Objective How does illiquidity affect option prices? We study this question in the Euro OTC options markets (interest rate caps/floors) Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Related Literature – Equity Markets Illiquid / higher liquidity risk stocks have lower prices (higher expected returns) Amihud and Mendelsen (1986), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and many others Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Related Literature – Fixed Income Markets Illiquidity affects bond prices adversely Amihud and Mendelsen (1991), Krishnamurthy (2002), Longstaff (2004), and many others More recent papers include Chacko, Mahanti, Mallik, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam (2008) and Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam (2008) Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Related Literature – Derivative Markets Relatively little is known Vijh (1990), Mayhew (2002), Bollen and Whaley (2004) present some evidence from equity options Brenner, Eldor and Hauser (2001) report that nontradable currency options are discounted Longstaff (1995) and Constantinides (1997) present theoretical arguments why illiquid options should be discounted Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case How should illiquidity affect asset prices? Negatively, as per current literature Conventional wisdom: More illiquid assets must have higher returns, hence lower prices The buyer of the asset demands compensation for illiquidity, while the seller is no longer concerned about liquidity True for assets in positive net supply (like stocks) Is this true for assets that are in zero net supply, where the seller is concerned about illiquidity, and also about hedging costs? Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case How should liquidity affect derivative prices? Derivatives are generally in zero net supply Risk exposures of the short side and the long side may be different (as in the case of options) Both buyer and seller continue to have exposure even after the transaction The buyer would demand a reduction in price, while the seller would demand an increase in price If the payoffs are asymmetric, the seller may have higher risk exposures (as is the case with options) Net effect is determined in equilibrium, can go either way Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case How should illiquidity affect OTC option prices? Caps/floors are long dated OTC contracts Mostly institutional market Sellers are typically large banks, buyers are corporate clients and some smaller banks Customers are usually on the ask-side Buyers typically hold the options, as they may be hedging some underlying interest rate exposures Sellers are concerned about their risk exposures, so they may be more concerned about the liquidity of the options that they have sold Marginal investors likely to be net short Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Unhedgeable Risks in Options Long dated contracts (2-10 years), so enormous transactions costs if dynamically hedged using the underlying Deviations from Black-Scholes world (stochastic volatility including USV, jumps, discrete rebalancing, transactions costs) Limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Liu and Longstaff (2004)) Option dealers face model misspecification and biased paramater estimation risk (Figlewski (1989)) Some part of option risks is unhedgeable Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Upward Sloping Supply Curve Since some part of option risks is unhedgeable Option liquidity related to the slope of the supply curve Illiquidity makes it difficult for sellers to reverse trades – have to hold inventory (basis risk) Model risk – fewer option trades to calibrate models Hence supply curve is steeper when there is less liquidity Wider bid-ask spreads Higher prices, since dealers are net short in the aggregate Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Data Euro cap and floor prices from WestLB (top 5 German bank) Global Derivatives and Fixed Income Group (member of Totem) Daily bid/ask prices over 29 months (Jan 99-May01) – nearly 60,000 price quotes Nine maturities (2-10 years) across twelve strikes (2%-8%) – not all maturity strike combinations available each day Options on the 6-month Euribor with a 6-month reset Also obtained Euro swap rates and daily term structure data from WestLB Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Sample Data (basis point prices) Euro Caps/Floors Caps 2.00% 1 Jahr (vs 3M) 2 Jahre 3 Jahre 636-657 4 Jahre 933-964 5 Jahre 1228-1269 6 Jahre 7 Jahre 8 Jahre 9 Jahre 10 Jahre 2.50% 3.00% 281-291 211-220 521-540 409-425 777-805 627-649 1034-1072 847-877 1300-1345 1078-1116 1310-1356 Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case 4.00% 92-99 213-227 360-378 515-540 680-712 847-887 1021-1069 1187-1241 5.00% 6.00% 99-111 189-204 292-314 402-430 515-550 640-683 760-810 866-923 45-53 98-110 165-182 236-260 311-341 400-437 482-525 557-607 Data Transformation Strike to LMR (Log Moneyness Ratio) –logarithm of the ratio of the par swap rate to the strike rate of the option EIV (Excess Implied Volatility) – difference between the IV (based on mid-price) and a benchmark volatility using a panel GARCH model Using IV removes term structure effects Subtracting a benchmark volatility removes aggregate variations in volatility Hence it’s a measure of “expensiveness” of options Useful for examining factors other than term structure or interest rate uncertainty that may affect option prices Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Scaled bid-ask spreads (Table 2) Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Panel GARCH Model for Benchmark Volatility Panel version of GJR-GARCH(1,1) model with square root level dependence f t ,T 0 1 f t 1,T t ,T , t ,T ~ N 0, ht2,T ht ,T t ,T f t 1,T t2,T 0 1 t21,T 2 t21,T 3 t21,T I t1,T , I t1,T 1 if t-1,T 0 Two alternative benchmarks for robustness: Simple historical vol (s.d. of changes in log forward rates) Comparable ATM diagonal swaption volatility Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Liquidity Price Relationship 0.1 0.08 0.05 0 -0.05 -0.04 0.2 Rel BAS 0.3 0.4 0.04 0.04 0 0.1 0.09 EIV 0.12 EIV EIV 0.15 0 10 year caps/floors 5 year caps/floors 2 year caps/floors -0.01 -0.06 0 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0 0.04 Rel BAS Illiquid options appear to be more “expensive” Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case 0.08 Rel BAS 0.12 0.16 Liquidity Price Relationship Estimate a simultaneous equation model using 3-stage least squares (liquidity and price may be endogenous) EIV c1 c 2 * RelBAS c3 * LMR c 4 * LMR 2 c5 * 1LMR0.LMR c6SwpnVol c7 * DefSprd c8 * 6 Mrate c9 * Slope RelBAS d 1 d 2 * EIV d 3 * LMR d 4 * LMR 2 d 5 * 1LMR0.LMR d 6*SwpnVol d 7 * DefSprd d 8 * LiffeVol d 9 * CpTbSprd First consider only near-the-money options (LMR between -0.1 and 0.1) Instruments for both liquidity and price (Hausman tests to confirm that variables are exogenous) Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Liquidity Price Relationship c2 and d2 are positive and significant for all maturities (table 3) More liquid options are priced lower, while less liquid options are priced higher, controlling for other effects Results hold up to several robustness tests Bid and ask prices separately Two alternative volatility benchmarks Options across all strikes (include controls for skewness and kurtosis in the interest rate distribution) Changes in liquidity change option prices This result is the opposite of those reported for other asset classes! Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Economic Significance EIVs increase by 25-70 bp for every 1% increase in relative bid-ask spreads One s.d. shock to the liquidity of a cap/floor translates to an absolute price change of 4%-8% for the cap/floor Longer maturity options have a stronger liquidity effect Higher EIVs when: Interest rates are higher Interest rate uncertainty is higher Lower BAS when LIFFE futures volume is higher (more demand for hedging interest rate risk) Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case Contributions Contrary to existing findings for other assets, we document a negative relationship between liquidity and price – conventional intuition doesn’t always hold The pricing of liquidity risk in derivatives should account for the nature of relationship between liquidity and derivative prices Estimation of liquidity risk for fixed income option portfolios – GARCH models could be useful Anurag Gupta, NYU - Case