CPB: Role and position CPB: Role and position Bucharest 10-4-08 in policy preparation in the Netherlands Johan Verbruggen CPB: Role and position Content CPB in headlines Independency is crucial CPB’s role in budgetary process Ideal position of forecasting authority? How to remain independent? Bucharest 10-4-08 CPB: Role and position ‘Stylized facts’ about CPB Bucharest 10-4-08 Founded in 1945 (by Tinbergen) ± 150 employees (100 economists) Formally part of Ministry of Economic Affairs ...... .... though completely independent Legal basis for making forecasts CPB: Role and position Illustrations of CPB’s unique position Bucharest 10-4-08 All political parties ask CPB to analyse the economic effects of their election programmes (results are published before election) Consensus about taking CPB’s shortterm forecast as basis for: 1) Budget Proposal 2) Wage negotiations Central Planning Bureau? CPB: Role and position No planning in strict sense Independent analyses relevant for economic policy Official name: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis Customers: ► Government, ministries Bucharest 10-4-08 ► Parliament, political parties ► Trade unions, employers’ associations ► Public debate CPB: Role and position Tasks of CPB Bucharest 10-4-08 Short-term economic forecasting (4 times a year) Medium- and long-term economic scenarios Economic analysis of policy proposals (short-term & long-term, CBA) Economic research (policy relevant) Position of CPB Part of Ministry of Economic Affairs CPB: Role and position ► Budget, personnel policy Bucharest 10-4-08 ► Outside requests need Minister’s approval ► Insight in confidential reports and plans No political interference with models, methods and analyses No paid assignments from third parties (all publications free of charge) CPB: Role and position Most GDP forecasts are biased Bucharest 10-4-08 EC (2004) analysed forecasting errors of GDP growth in EU countries (Econ. Papers No 210) Conclusion: optimism bias GDP growth projections used in budgetary process => negative effect on fiscal performance Reason: Ministries have incentives to paint a rosy picture (they appear successful; down playing unpopular measures) Official GDP growth T+1, projections, 1987 - 2004 CPB: Role and position Average error Bucharest 10-4-08 RMSE Germany 0.61 * 1.91 France 0.42 * 1.45 Italy 0.76 * 1.39 Belgium 0.30 1.23 Austria 0.10 1.24 Netherlands 0.18 1.41 * significantly different from 0 at 10 % source: EC (2004), Economic Papers No 210 CPB: Role and position Independent forecasts? Bucharest 10-4-08 3 countries with ‘unbiased’ GDP growth forecasts: Netherlands, Belgium, Austria In these 3 countries independent institutes, in other countries forecasts made by ministries Advice: forecasting in budgetary process done by independent authority CPB: Role and position IMF (2006) about CPB: Bucharest 10-4-08 “The CPB occupies a unique position in fiscal policy making in the Netherlands. (....) In such a situation, its independence and credibility are essential, and the IMF-mission fully supports the continuation of the current institutional set up.” (ROSC Report, p. 9) CPB: Role and position Budget Plan and CPB forecast Bucharest 10-4-08 Budget Plan always published on 3rd Tuesday in September CPB’s short-term forecast published on same day CPB’s economic forecast includes Budget Plan; Budget Plan includes CPB’s economic forecast Only possible for forecast institute that is part of government Headlines of Budget process CPB: Role and position MoF (May) prel. budget plan CPB (June) macro forecast MoF (Aug) CPB budget forecast adapted budget plan final macro forecast final budget forecast (Sept) Bucharest 10-4-08 MoF (Sept) final budget CPB: Role and position Budget influenced by plans and economy Bucharest 10-4-08 Expenditures: largely driven by policy measures partly endogeneous (wages civil servants, unemployment benefits, ...) Taxes, premiums: largely endogenous (econ. growth, wages ...) partly driven by policy measures CPB: Role and position Several budget forecasts Bucharest 10-4-08 EMU budget balance = taxes -/- expenditures Structural budget balance: taking account of business cycle Robust budget balance: taking account of business cycle, temporary receipts (gas revenues) and net interest payments Long term perspective (ageing) CPB: Role and position Actual and robust budget balance Bucharest 10-4-08 CPB: Role and position Ideal position of forecasting authority Bucharest 10-4-08 Independent Ministry institute -------------------¦-------------------------¦------------------------Public sector unbiased biased confidential info confidential info -------------------¦-------------------------¦------------------------Private sector unbiased n.a. no confidential information -------------------¦--------------------------¦------------------------ How to remain independent? CPB: Role and position Scientific basis Bucharest 10-4-08 Total transparancy (results, assumptions, instruments) No revenues from clients Organise your own criticism (national and international visitations) Large risk of harming good reputation (organise internal checks and balances) CPB: Role and position More information? Bucharest 10-4-08 Look at: www.cpb.nl