Asse ssing the Eff e c tive ne ss of L e
ade rship De c apitation in C ounte rinsurge
nc y C am paigns
Pa t r i ck B . J o h n s t o
n*
Sept emb er 24, 2010
Abstract
Is ki l l i n g o r ca p tu ri n g en emy l ea d ers a n e ff ecti ve m i l i ta ry
ta cti c?
P revi o u s res ea rch o n i nters ta te wa r a n d co u nterterro ri s m h a
s s u g g es ted th a t ta rg eti n g en emy l ea d ers d o es n o t wo rk. D
rawi n g o n n ewl y co l l ected
d a ta o n co u nteri n s u rg en cy ca m p a i g n s , n ew a n a l ys i s o n th
e e ff ecti ven es s o f l ea d ers h i p d eca p i ta ti o n i s p res ented i n th i s p a p er.
Th e res u l ts
s u g g es t th a t l ea d ers h i p d eca p i ta ti o n is m o re e ff ecti ve th a n
th e co nven ti o n a l wi s d o m s u g g es ts . Th e p a p er co nta i n s th ree s i g ni fica
nt fin d i n g s .
Fi rs t, ca m p a i g n s a re m o re l i kel y to en d qu i ckl y wh en co u nteri
n s u rg ents
s u cces s fu l l y ta rg et en emy l ea ders . S eco n d , co u nteri n s u rg
ents wh o s u cces s fu l l y ca p tu re o r ki l l in s u rg ent l ea d ers a re s i g n i fica ntl y m
o re l i kel y
to d efea t i n s u rg enci es th a n th o s e wh o fa i l . Th i rd , co n fli ct i
nten s i ty i s
m o re l i kel y to d ecrea s e fo l l owi n g s u cces s fu l l ea d ers h i p rem
ova l s th a n
a fter fa i l ed a ttem p ts . Th e i m p l i ca tio n s o f th es e res u l ts fo r a
ca d em i c
res ea rch , m i l i ta ry o p era ti o n s , a n d p o l i cy a re exp l o red i n th e
co n cl u s i o n .
*Pos
t- Do c toral Re s e arch Fe llow, B e lf e r Ce nte r f or S c ie n c e an d Inte rn ation
al A ff ai rs ,
Harvard Un ive rs ity. Email: Patrick_Johnston@hks.harvard.edu.
1
1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
Ta rg eting insurg ent an d terro rist lea ders is centra l to ma ny sta tes’ co
unterterrorism p olicies, but do es it work? Academic researchers have long b een
dismissive o f lea dership deca pita tio n a s a ca use o f milita ry e
ffectiveness. Altho ug h a g rowing b o dy o f inte rna tio na l re la tio ns s cho la rs hip de mo
ns tra te s
the imp o rta nc e o f le a de rs (e .g ., Chio z z a a nd G o e man s 2 0 0 4 ; I
qba l a nd Z o rn
2 0 0 8 ; Jo ne s a nd O lke n 2 0 0 9 ; Cro nin (2 0 0 6 )), s o c ia l s c ie ntis
ts have pa id a lmo st no a ttentio n to insurg ent lea ders in co unterinsurg ency ca mpa ig
ns. By
f o c us ing ins te a d o n s truc tura l va ria ble s th at c o rre la te with o utc o
me s s uch
as campaign success or levels of insurgent violence, schlolars have implicitly
rejected the la rgely untested hyp o thesi s tha t insurg ent lea ders ca n have
a
significant influence on key outcomes.
Mo s t s cho la rs who have writte n o n le a de rs hip de c a pita tio n c o
nc lude tha t
it is ine ff ective and that it can have counterpro ductive eff ects on military
e ff ectiveness (Pap e 1996;2003; Hosmer 2001; Staniland 2005; Jordan
2009).1
Drawing f ro m his re s e arch o n s uic ide te rro ris m, R o b e rt Pa p e a rg
ue s tha t le a de rs hip de c a pita tio n, “ ha s me t with me a g e r s uc c e s
s ” (Pa p e (2 0 0 3 , 1 4 )). Pa p e a rg ues tha t lea dership ta rg eting is no t
likely to co erce a dversa ries because (1) it is hard to find individuals and kill
them; (2) the death of lea ders during wa r of ten bring s less p o licy cha ng
e tha n is exp ected ; a nd
(3 ) successio n is unpredicta ble i n ma ny sta tes, esp ecia lly during wa r ((1
996,
79-80)). Jenna Jordan (2009) extends these insights to the counterterrorism
lite ra ture . Jo rda n, who re c e ntly publis he d a le a ding s tudy o n le a de
rs hip
deca pita tio n in co u nterterro rism in the jo urna l Secur ity
Studies,argues that
“going after the leader may strengthen a group’ s resolve, result in retaliatory
attacks, increase public sympathy for the organization, or pro duce more
lethal attacks.” Jordan concludes that high-value targeting is “a misguided
strategy” and that “we need to rethink current counterterrorism p olicies”
(Jordan (2009,
e (1996, 79- 80) re j e c ts Col. Joh n Ward e n I I I’s ((1992, 65)) as s e rtion th at le
ad e rs h i p
decapitation often has a decisive impact in co ercive b ombing campaigns.
1Pap
2
753-755)).
This c o ns e ns us is pre ma ture . Pre vio us s tudie s provide va lua ble
the o re tic a l
insig hts tha t expla in pa rticula r imp o rta nt his to rica l ca ses, but o ur g
enera l
knowle dg e a b o ut the e ff ectiveness of leadership decapitation in war is li
mi ted due to a co mmo n set o f metho do lo g ica l a nd co nceptu al cha
lleng es tha t include
2selection bias, limited empirical data, and insuffi cient attention to causal
identifi catio n.Ne w a na lys is , with g re a te r a tte ntio n to re s e a rch de s
ig n, is
needed to increa se o ur understa nding o f the impa ct o f lea dership deca
pita tio n.3
Such resea rch is presented in this pa p er.
1. 1 Identi fy i ng the Effects of L eader shi p Decapi tati on
My a ppro a ch de pa rts s ig nific a ntly f ro m pre vio us s tudie s o f c o unte
rins urg e nc y
and counterterrorism. Whereas most previous studies are theory-driven and
are fo cused on the fit of rival theoretical explanations to a small numb er
of imp ortant historical cases, my approach is data-driven and is fo cused on
identifying ca usa l eff ects across large numb er of cases. I analyze a large
numb er
2Recent
stu d ies h ave b egu n to accou nt f or th ese ch allen ges, p articu larly in stu d
ies of h ow
n ation al le ad e rs in fl u e n c e e c on om ic growth , d e m o c ratiz ation , an d war. Jon e
s an d Olke n
((2009), in th e ir s tu d y of th e as s as s in ation of n ation al le ad e rs , u s e a s imilar id e
ntifi c ation
strategy to that us ed here, and find that changes in national leadership can increase the
probability of war termination in high-intensity wars but can also increase the probability
th at n e w, low- inte n s ity c on fl ic ts will b re ak ou t. P ric e (2009) u s e s e ve nt h is tory
an alys is to mo del how l eadership decapitation aff ects the lifespan of terrorist
organizations. Although
th is ap p roach d o e s n ot f u lly ad d re s s th e is s u e of u n ob s e rve d h e te roge n e
ity ac ros s th e s amp le
of terrorist camp aign s u n d er examin ation , it o ffers a more p recise measu rement of th
e correlation b etween leadership decapitation and organizational decline than the ordinal
measure in the descriptive statistics presented in (Jordan 2009).
3Jame s D. Fe aron an d David D. Laitin make a s imilar argu me nt in an u n p u b lis h e
d
m anu s c rip t on c ivil war te rm in ation . Th e y write th at “ a . . . f ac tor th at c om e s ou t
c le arly
from the random set of cases (that we examine) is that change in governme nt or reb el
le ad e rs h ip c an in fl u e n c e war te rmin ation .” Howe ve r, th e y n ote th e d i fficulties
of id entifying th e c au s al eff e c ts of le ad e rs h ip re m oval: “ Ch an ge in le ad e rs h ip
c an of c ou rs e b e e n d oge n ou s
to th e war–in d e e d , ch an gin g th e le ad e rs h ip of th e oth e r s id e is ge n e rally th e
p oi nt of th e
war!” Yet b as ed on their inte rpre tation s of randomly-selected case studies, they conclude,
“Still, in each case we think that the leadership change had an indep endent causal e ff ect
on
te rmin ation as we ll.” S e e Fe aron an d Laitin 2008, 39- 42,
3
o f c a s e s in whi ch g ove rnme nts a tte mpte d, s uc c e s s f ully o r uns
uc c e s s f u lly, to
remove to p insurg ent lea ders. I n a na lyzing the su ccess o r fa ilure o f a
ttempts
to deca pita te insu rgen ci es , I use insta nces o f fa ilure a s co ntro ls fo r
ca ses o f
succes 4
s.
My re s e a rch de s ig n thus re s e mble s a na tura l e xp e rime nt. The
prima ry identifyin g a ssumptio n is tha t co nditio na l o n a ttempts to ca ptu
re o r kill insurg ent lea ders, the o utco mes o f deca pita tio n a ttempts a re
pla usibly exo g e no us (Jo ne s an d O lke n 2 0 0 9 , 5 6 ). As I de mo ns tra te b e low,
a ltho ug h the
timing of decapitation strikes is not plausibly exogenous –leaders are often ta
rg e te d a t ke y mome nts o f c a mpa ig ns whe n a g ove rnme nt is mo re
like ly
e ithe r to win o r to lo s e – whe the r o r no t a tte mpts to de c a pita te ins
urg e nc ie s
5are successful is plausibly
The e xo g e ne ity o f s uc c es s f
exogenous.
ul a nd f a ile d
bids to remove ins urg ent lea ders is explo ited to identify the ca usa l eff ec
t s o f lea dership d eca pita tio n.
1. 2 Tar geti ng Insur gent L eader s: “ Near Mi sses” and “ Bad
Luck ”
Ac c o u nt s o f “ n e a r m i s s e s ” a n d “ b a d l u ck ” a r e c o m m o n i n h i s t
o r i c a l a c c o u nt s
o f hig h- va lue ta rg e ting . The firs t known a s s a s s ina tio n plo t a utho
riz e d by U .S. o ffic ia ls a g a ins t a no n- s ta te a c to r, f o r e xa mple , ta
rg e te d Me xic a n re b e l Pa ncho
Villa during the 1 9 1 6 Punitive Exp e ditio n. While the Exp e ditio n s o ug
ht to
eliminate Villa for the threat his bands’ deadly raids p osed to Americans
b o rde r towns in Te xa s , Ne w Me xic o , a nd Ariz o na . I nitia l a nti- Villa
o p e ra tio ns
in no rthe rn Me xic o we re uns uc c e s s f ul , as V illa ’s mo bility a nd e lus
ive ne s s ma de it difficult fo r America n fo rces to lo cate him. After U.S. fo
rces ha d
re p e a te dly f a ile d to find V illa , G e ne ra l Jo hn Pe rs hing , who c o
mma nde d the
4Fo r a s i m i l a r i d e n t i fi c a t i o n s t r a t e g y o f t h e i m p a c t o f a s s a s s i n a t i o n s o f n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s
on e c on om ic growth , re gim e typ e , an d war, s e e Jon e s an d Olke n 2009.
5I p re s e nt s u b s tantiary e vid e n c e b e low. To give a p re vie w of th is e vid e n c e ,
th e d ata show that decapitation strikes result in failure more often than in success, and
neith er
s u c c e s s f u l n or f aile d atte m p ts ap p e ar to b e c orre late d with ob s e rvab le
variab le s .
4
Exp e di tio n, re s o rte d to hiring a lo c a l te a m to infiltra te Villa ’s c a mp
a nd kill
the re b e l le a de r. The te a m s uc c e s s f ully p e ne tra te d the c a mp.
O ne mo rning
ove r b r e a k f a s t , Pe r s h i n g ’ s o p e r a t i ve s m a n a g e d t o s l i p p o i
s o n i nt o t h e r e b e l lea der’s co ffee. Villa rep ortedly drank more than half of
the laced cup of
co ff ee but did not die. Villa lived to fight until he was assassinated in 1923
(Kno tt 1 9 9 6 , 17 1 ; quo te d in Tho ma s 2 0 0 0 , 1 1 2 ).
The f a ile d 1 9 1 6 a tte mpt to kill Villa f o re s ha dowe d the cha lle ng e
s th at s ta te s wo uld c o nf ro nt in de a ling with unc o nve ntio na l thre a ts
in the f uture .
Co ns ide r a n e xa mple f ro m the Firs t R us s o - Che che n Wa r.
B o g g e d down i n a blo o dy s ta le ma te with Che che n s e pa ra tis ts
a nd I s la mis ts , the R ussia n g overnment sp o nso red multiple a ssa
ssina tio n plo ts a g a inst senio r Che che n o fficials in 1994 and 1995. In
July 1996, Ru ssian intelligence o fficials
we re inf o rme d tha t Che che n le a de r Dz ho ka r Dudaye v wo uld b e
cha uff eured
to a n u p c o ming c o nf e re nc e in Mos cow by a drive r na me d Kha ma d
Kurba nov.
Arme d with this inf o rma tio n, R us s ia n a g e nts c la nde s ti ne ly de ve
lo p e d a n
intric a te pla n to as s a s s ina te Dudaye v during hi s trip to Mo s c ow. The
pla n
wa s put in mo tio n weeks b efo re th e a ssa ssina tio n wa s to ta ke pla ce.
It b eg a n
whe n R us s ia n p o lic e ma de wha t a pp e a re d to b e a ro utine s to p
Kurba nov’s
ve hic le a t a R us s ia n- ma nne d che ckp o int ins ide o f Che chnya .
Kurba nov wa s
briefly ta ken inside a nea rby o ffic e f o r que s tio ning . While Ku rba nov
wa s being questioned by the police, a team of Russian agents quickly
planted explosives un der the seats of his car. Once the explosi ves were in
p lace, the R us s ia ns re le a s e d him Kurba nov f ro m que s tio ning . Fo r
we e ks b e f o re Dudaye v’s Mo s c ow trip, Kurba nov unwittin gl y drove
the e xplo s ive - pa cke d
ve hic le witho ut inc id e nt. Me a nwhile , R us s ia n o p era tive s mad e pre
pa ra tio ns
to deto na te the explo sives o nce they co uld co nfi rm Dudayev’s presence
in the ve hic le . Howe ve r, s ho rtly b e f o re he wa s to ride with Kurba nov,
a nd
witho ut a ny a ppa re nt knowle dg e o f the a s s a s s ina tio n plo t, Dudaye
v’s itine ra ry
wa s cha ng e d a nd he wa s f o rc e d to ride with a no the r drive r. The plo t
wa s
foiled, but had Dudayev’s schedule not b een changed unexp ectedly, he
almost
5
certainly would h ave b een
killed.
6
1. 3 P r ev i ew of the Re sul
ts
To execture the empirica l s tra teg y
describ ed a b ove, I co llected da ta
o n publicly rep o rted a ttempts to
deca pita te insurg encies in ca mpa
ig ns tha t b eg a n b etween 1 9 7 4
a nd 2 0 0 3 . The ke y ide ntif ying a
s s umptio n o f my e mpiric a l s tra
te g y is tha t
the success a nd fai lure o f a ttempts
to deca pita te insurg encies is, o n
avera g e,
exogenous from b oth obs erved and
unobserved covariates. Accordingly,
I
re s tric t my a na lys is to “ ne a r
mis s ” c a s e s —ins ta nc e s whe
re ins urg e nt le a de rs
na rrowly e s c a p e d c a pture o r
de a th. Fo r e xa mp le , a tte mpts
in which ins urg e nt lea ders fled
their ba se ca mps well a hea d o f co
unterinsurg ent milita ry o p era tio ns
are not included in the analysis.
Since insurgent leaders were likely
tipp ed off
ab out imp ending op erations b efore
any meaningful attempt could take
place,
no credible a ssertio n tha t th ese “
fa ilures” were pla us ibly exo g eno
us ca n b e
ma de . This pro c e s s re s ulte d i
n a s a mple o f 1 1 8 de c a pita tio
n a tte mpts ag a ins t
Out of these 118 attempts, a total of 46 (39 p
to p insurg ent lea
ercent)
ders.7
were successful.
The e mpiric a l a na lys is s tro
ng ly s ug g e s ts tha t s uc c e s
s f ully re moving in s urgent leaders enhances military e ffe
c tive ne s s in c o unte rins urg e nc
y. The re s ults
indica te tha t deca pita ting insurg
encies (1 ) increa ses the cha nces o
f sp eedy wa r termina tio ns; (2 )
enha nces th e pro ba bility of ca
mpa ig n o utco mes tha t
favor the counterinsurgent; (3)
reduces the intensity of violent
conflict; and (4)
reduces insurg ent- initia ted
incidents, such a s a rmed a tta cks a
nd kidna pping s,
tho ug h this la st finding finds less
supp o rt in the da ta tha n do the first
three.
6On
e p ie c e of e vid e n c e s u p p ortin g
th e hyp oth e s is th at Du d aye v was u n
aware of th e as s as s in ation p lot wh e n h
e op te d to rid e with th e oth e r d rive is th
at th e e xp los ive s in
Ku rb an ov’s c ar we re n ot f ou n d u ntil
we e ks late r. Ku rb an ov c ontinu e d d
rivin g th e ve h ic le
d u rin g th is p e rio d , ap p are ntly u n
aware of th e c argo h e was c arryin g on b
oard . ITAR -TAS S
Ne ws Age n c y, "Du d aye v’s Aid e Claim
s As s as s in ation Atte m p t on Du d aye
v’s Lif e ", B B C
Summary of World Broadcasts, April 14,
1995.
7A l i s t
o f
i n s u r g e n t l
e a d e r s h i p
r e m o v a l s
c a n b e
f o u n d i n
T a b l e 9 .
6
1. 4 P l an of the Pap er
This pa p e r pro c e e ds a s f o llows . Firs t, I dis c us s my e mpiric a l a
ppro a ch. I
describ e the co nceptua liza tio n a nd mea surement o f key va ria bles a nd
provide additional information on the leadership decapitation data that are
used in the a na lys is . This s e c tio n a ls o c o nta ins a n e mpiric a l a s s
e s s me nt o f the pl au s ibility
o f my id e ntific a tio n s tra te g y. This a s s e s s me nt s ug g e s ts tha t it
is inde e d
pla usible tha t, o n avera g e, successful a ttempts to deca pita te insurg
encies a re
exogenous conditional on an attempt taking place. I conclude this section by
discussing my estima tio n stra teg y. Sectio n 3 co nta ins a deta iled
discussio n
o f my ma in re s ults . The re s ults s ug g e s t tha t le a de rs hip de c a pita
tio n do e s indeed have a ca usa l eff ect. Section 4 prob es these results,
testing a rival
interpreta tio n o f the resul ts presented in Sectio n 3 . I co nclude the pa p er
by
reca pitula ting the ma in finding s an d discussing their implica tio ns fo r p o
licy.
2 E m p i r i c a l S t r a t e g
y
2. 1 Op er ati onal i zati on
Mo s t e mpiric a l a na lys e s o f “ c ivil wa r” a re b as e d o n da ta s e ts tha
t p o ol to g e the r
a ll c o nflic ts tha t o c c urre d within s ta te b o rde rs a nd me e t a de s ig
na te d ba ttle
dea th thresho ld. Altho ug h these studies h ave ha d a tremendo us impa ct
o n o ur knowle dg e o f ma c ro - le ve l tre nds , the y a re no t de s ig ne d to
a ns we r questio ns a b o ut pa rticula r typ es o f p o litica l vio len ce, such a
s insu rg en cy,
terro rism, o r pro - sta te militia . To g et levera g e o n these questio ns,
scho la rs o f political violence have recently developed
theoretically-motivated concepts to
guide data collection and analyses appropriate for these questions. Stathis N.
Ka lyva s , f o r e xa mple , de ve lo ps a typ o lo g y tha t s ug g e s ts a t le a
s t thre e
dis tinc t s ub- typ e s o f wa rf a re c a n o c c ur within the bro a de r c a te g
o ry o f c ivil
wa r. He uses the co ncept o f irreg ula r wa rfa re– a clo se a na lo g ue o f a
symmetric guerrilla war–as a p oint of departure in developing a theory of
violence in civil
7
wa r (Ka lyva s 2 0 0 6 ). La ia B a lc e lls e xte nds Ka lyva s ’ c o nc e ptua l f
ra me wo rk to c o nve ntio na l c ivil wa rs , e xpla ining why the s ymme tric
a nd c o nve ntio na l
asp ects of warfare itself generate distinct predictions ab out patterns of
violence.
The e vide nc e pre s e nte d in he r e mpiric a l e xa mina tio n o f c ivilia n
vic timiz a tio n
in the Spa nis h Civil Wa r is c o ns is te nt with this a ppro a ch (B a lc e lls 2
0 0 9 ). Using these precepts o f irreg ula r wa rfa re, Lya ll a nd Wilso n I I I (2
0 0 9 ) a nd Jo hnsto n (2 0 0 9 b) co mpile n ew da ta sets restricted to co
unterinsurg ency
campaigns–as opp osed to internal wars or civil conflicts–for analysis of
success
a nd f a ilure in CO I N.
In this study, I adopt a similar ap proach. Four criteria are used to
identify a ppro pria te ca mpa ig ns fo r a na lysis. F irst, p ower must b e a
symmetri c.
Powe r a s ymme trie s c a n b e o bs e rve d whe n the re la tive s o phis tic
a tio n a nd
letha lity o f co unterinsurg ent fo rces’ wea p o ns o r oth er warfi ghting
techno lo g ies
are more sophisticated than those used by insurgents. Second, in irregular
wa rf a re , vio le nt no n- s ta te a c to rs mus t a ttemp t to win c ivilia n s upp
o rt f ro m
at least some segment of the p opulation. Because it is imp ossible to directly
observe militants’ motivations and desires, militant organizations are co ded
as
meeting thi s criterio n if they imp lant themselves i nto th e civilia n p o pula
tio n
are likely to seek p opular supp ort. Because civilian b etrayal can mean the
de mis e o f a n ins urg e nc y, ins u rg en c ie s tha t e mb e d the ms e lve s
within the
p o pula tio n mus t a tte mpt to win its s upp o rt. Third, the mili tant o rg a niz
a tio n
mu s t r e l y p r i m a r i l y o n u n c o n ve nt i o n a l t a c t i c s . I n t h e s e c a s
es,rebelunits
mu s t u s e v i o l e nt t a c t i c s a g a i n s t g o ve r n m e n t t a r g e t s , s u c h h
i t - a n d - r u n a t t a ck s
a nd a mbus he s , while g e ne ra lly avo iding dire c t ba ttle . The fina l o p e
ra tio na l
c rite rio n is a minimu m o ne - mo nth dura tio n rule . The s e c rite ria he lp
to
ensure that all campaigns in the data set were sustained, asymmetric violent
conflicts b etween organized military actors and not brief, disorganized bursts
of violence or instances of rioting.
I n a ll, 9 0 c a mpa ig ns b e twe e n 1 9 7 4 a nd 2 0 0 3 s a tis fie d the s
e c rite ria . Cas es
tha t did no t me e t the s e c rite ria a re e xc lude d f ro m the a na lys is .
The da ta
8
set contains a total of 928 campaign-years and is large enough to identify
8statistical trends.
2. 2 Dep endent Var i abl e s
To e s t i m a t e t h e e ffect of leadership decapitation on counterinsurgency effective ne s s , two s e ts o f d ep e nde nt va ria ble s a re us e d. The firs t invo
lve s c a mpa ig n o utc o me s . My firs t o utc o me va ria ble is te rmina tio
n. Te rmina tio n is me a s ure d a s a dummy va ria ble whe re “ 1 ” indic a te
s tha t the c a mpa ig n e nde d o r dro pp e d
b e low a minima l thre s ho ld o f vio le nc e in a g ive n c a mpa ig n- ye a r.
My s e c o nd
o utc o me va riab le is s uc c e s s . Suc c e s s is a ls o me a s ure d a s a
dummy whe re “ 1 ” indica tes tha t a ca mpa ig n end ed o n terms favo ra
ble to the co unterin surg ent
in a g ive n c a mpa ig n- ye a r a nd “ 0 ” indic a te s tha t it did no t. The s e
va ria ble s
a re f ro m the Co rre la te s o f Wa r (COW) Pro j e
c t.9
The s e c o nd s e t o f de p e nde nt va ria ble s invo lve s c o nflic t dyna
mic s a nd
insurg ent b ehavio r. Two o utco mes a re a g a in exa mined. Bo th co me
fro m the
G lo ba l Te rro ris m Da ta ba s e . The firs t is c o nflic t 10 This va ria
inte ns ity.
ble
mea sures the to tal numb er o f co nfirmed fa ta lities, by g ro up, in ea ch ca
mpa ig nye a r . S i n c e t h i s va r i a b l e i n c l u d e s g o ve r n m e nt , c i v i l i a n , a n
d i n s u r g e nt d e a t h s ,
it is no t a direct mea sure o f insurg ent vio lence. While we sho uld exp ect
tha t
the c o nflic t inte ns ity va ria ble will b e no is y, it s ho uld provide ins ig ht
into
whe the r re moving ins urg e nt le a de rs ha s a c a us a l e ff ect on conflict
escalation or
de- esca la tio n b eca use su cces sful an d fa iled a ttempts sho uld no t b e
co rrela ted
with o bs e rve d o r uno bs e rve d varia b le s . The s e c o nd ins urg e nt b
e havio r va ria ble
8I
limit my analysis to campaigns b etween 1974 and 2003 b ecause extending the
analysis
as f ar b ack as 1945–th e stan d ard “ start d ate” of many civil war an alyses–wou ld likely
pro duce undercounts of the “ failure” variable b ecause less inform ation is available for this
period.
9For c am p aign s n ot in th e COW P ro j e c t d ata, Lyall an d Wils on ’s (2009) “ Corre
late s
of In s u rge n c y” d ata s e t, th e Glob al Te rroris m Datab as e or oth e r s e c on d ary s
ou rc e s we re
consulted.
10S e e p . 21 of th e GTD c o d e b o ok f or f u ll d o c u m e ntation :
http://www.start.umd.edu/ gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf .
9
is ins urg e nt- initia te d inc ide nts . This va ria ble me a s ure s the numb e r
o f a tta cks and other violent incidents, by group, aggregated to the
campaign-year level.11
This va ria ble s e rve s a s a proxy o f ins urg e nt g ro ups ’ le ve ls o f a c
tivity a nd
op erational temp os. Together, the insurgent b ehavior variables enable me
to
te s t whe the r le a de rs hip re mova l inc re a s e s o r de c re a s e s b o th
the le tha lity o f
conflict and the pace of insurgent activities.
2. 3 Indep endent Var i abl es
My prima ry inde p e nde nt va ria ble is le a de rs hip de c a pita tio n. I de
fine a
“leader” as the most powerf ul figu re in an insurgent
organization. I limit my
f o c us to to p le a de rs ; ide ntif ying the upp e r eche lo n, mid- tie r, an d
low- le ve l lea ders in cla ndestine o rg a niza tio ns is di fficult, a nd fo
cusing exlusively o n to p lea ders is do ne to minimize mea surement error.
To p lea ders a re the
mo st imp o rta nt memb ers o f insu rgent o rg a niza tio ns a nd the hig hestprio rity
ta rg e ts o f ta rg e ting o p e ra tio ns , s o this a ppro a ch ma ximiz e s a c c
ura c y while
directly ma inta ining a strict fo cus o n the mo st pressing co unterterrori sm
policy question.
Fo r re g re s s io ns whe re de c a pita tio n a tte mpts a re the uni ts o f a
na lys is , the
va r i a b l e i s a d u m m y c o d e d “ 1 ” i f t h e a t t e m p t w a s s u c c e s s f u l . Fo r r e
gressions
in which pro p e ns ity- s c ore ma tching is us e d to s e pa ra te the e ff ects
of success
and failure, the campaign-year is the unit of analysis. Separate dummies for
success and failure are b oth in cluded on the right-hand side of the
regression.
An o bserva tio n co ded “ 1 ” o n either o r b o th o f these varia bl es indica
tes tha t a
successful or failed attempt o ccu rred during that camp ai gn -year.
Before I collected the data necessary to execu te my empirical strategy,
my first ta sk wa s to identify ea ch o rg a niza tio n’s to p lea der o r lead ers.
I crea ted a
list o f insurg ent lea ders using da ta fro m the START Terro rist O rg a niza
tio n
11S
e e p . 42 of th e GTD c o d e b o ok f or f u ll d o c u m e ntation :
http://www.start.umd.edu/ gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf .
10
Pro file s (TO PS) da ta ba s e at the Univers ity o f Ma
Once the top
ryla nd.12
group leader or leaders were identified, data on leadership decapitation were
13collected from th e Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database.Ke ywo rd s
e a rche s we re p e rf o rme d on the e ntire c o lle c tio n o f Eng lis h- la ng
ua g e ne ws
s o urc e s . The s e s ea rche s re turne d re s ults th at we re re vie wed f o
r inf o rma tio n
o n le a de rs hip re mova ls an d a tte mpte d re mova ls . Ea ch a tte mpt re
turne d in
the sea rch resu lts wa s then cro ss- va li da ted by a t lea st o ne a dditio na
l so urce
before being tagged for inclusion in the data set.
As mentio ned a b ove, my da ta o n a ttempts to remove insurg ent lea
ders a re re s tric te d to a tte mpts in whi ch the o utc o me wa s pla us ibly e
xo g e no us . Exa mple s o f pla us ibly e xo g e no us de c a pita tio n e ve
nts inc lude a tte mpts to re move le a de rs thro ug h a s s a s s ina tio n plo
ts , in which b o mbs a re pla nte d o r s ho ts a re fire d; c o mba t o p e ra tio
ns in which fire fig hts o r a irs trike s dire c tly ta rg et lea ders’ units; a nd ra
ids o r sweeps o f lea ders’ co mp o unds o r ca mp
a re a s . R umo re d plo ts tha t ne ve r ma te ria liz e d, a nd o p e ra tio ns
in which le a de rs
escap ed b efore an attempt was made, are not plausi bly exogenous and
were
excluded. For each attempt that satisfied these criteria, the date, lo cation,
attmpt typ e, and outcome was co ded. After the data were filtered, 118
attempts could b e do cumented. 46 of the 118 attempts (39%) resulted in
the
successful removal of a top-level insurgent leader.
2. 4 Ex ogenei ty
My prima ry ide ntific a tio n a s s umptio n is tha t, c o nditio na l o n a de c a
pita tio n
s trike o c cu rring , its o utc o me wil l b e unc o rre la te d with the e rro r te
rms o f the reg ressio n equa tio ns u sed to estima te the e ffects of the
strikes. To test
this a ssumptio n, I put the indep endent va ria ble o n the left- ha nd side o f
the
12Th
e TOP S d atab as e c ontain s in f orm ation on th e top le ad e r or le ad e rs of alm os
t all of th e in s u rge n c ie s in my s am p le . Le ad e rs n ot id e ntifi e d in th e TOP S d
atab as e we re co ded using historical encyclop edias and secondary sources. See the
database online at
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/. 13Le xis - Ne xis ’ we b s
ite c an b e ac c e s s e d at http://www.lexisnexis.com/ .
11
re g re s s io n a nd e xa mine whe the r o bs e rva ble va ria ble s pre dic t s
uc c e s s e s . The
re s ults a re dis playe d in Ta ble 1 . I n Co lumn 1 , the me a n va lue s o f
the va ria ble s
a re pre s e nte d. The s e va lue s a re a ll ta ke n f ro m the ye a r b e f o re
de c a pita tio n
s trike s to o k pla c e . The me a ns of the s e va ria ble s in the ye a r b e f o
re f a ile d
a tte mpts ; Co lumn 3 dis plays the differences in the means for successful
and
uns uc c e s s f ul de c ap itati on s trike s ; Co lumn 4 pre s e nts the re s ults
o f two - s ide d
t- tests o f the equa lity o f these mea
ns.14
[TAB LE 1 AB O UT H ER E]
The ta ble illus tra te s tha t the s a mple o f s uc c e s s f ul a nd f a ile d a
s s a s s ina tio n attempts is balanced across key variables: regime typ e;
gross domestic pro duct
(G DP) p e r c a pita (lo g ); the to ta l p o pula tio n o f the c o unte rins urg e
nt s ta te ;
the co nflict thea ter’ s avera g e eleva tio n in meters (lo g ); a nd the dista
nce fro m
the co unterinsurg ent’s ca pita l city to the co nflict thea ter.
The o nly va ria ble f o r which the me a n diff erence is statistically si gn
ificant
is the co unte rins urg e nt na tio n’s to ta l p o p ula tio n. The diff erence in
means is
s ig nific a nt at the 1 0 p e rc e nt le ve l (p- va lue = 0 .0 7 ). This pre limina
ry a na lys is demo nstra tes tha t I ca nno t reject the p o ssibility tha t p o
pula tio n a nd dista nce
are confounding variables.15
This a na lys is i s e xte nde d in Ta ble 2 , which dis plays ma rg ina l e
ffects from
pro bit re g re s s io ns in which the s uc c e s s o r f a ilure o f de c a pita tio
n s trike s is
reg ressed o n the va ria bles exa min ed in Ta Sp ecifi cal ly, I estima te
ble 2 .16
the
14
f o llowing e qua tio
n:
15
Th e s e are re s u lts of t- te s ts th at d o n ot as s u m e e qu al varian c e .
Howe ve r, th is e vid e n c e is in c on c lu s ive ; give n th at fi ve variab le s are e
xamin e d , it is n ot
surprising that two sp ecifications were statistically significant.
16Th e re gre s s ors are in c lu d e d e ith e r b e c au s e th e y we re s tatis tic ally s ign
ifi c ant in Tab le
2 o r b e c a u s e s c h o l a r s h a v e s u g g e s t e d
t h e y a r e k e y d e t e r m i n a n t s o f
c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y
e ff e c tive n e s s . Th e s e variab le s are u s e d as c ontrols in th e re gre s s ion s u s
e d to e s tim ate th e
imp ac t of s u c c e s s f u l d e c ap itation s trike s on c ou nte rin s u rge n c y s u c c e s
s p re s e nte d i n S e c tion
4.
12
P ( SU C C C E SS a
)=F ( y 1
Th
e pro
ba
bility o
fas
uc c e
s s f ul
le a de
rs hip
re
mova l
in a g
ive n c
a mpa
ig nye a r
is o
nly
likely
to b e
exo g
eno us
co
nditio
na l o
n the
numb
er o f
decap
itati on
strikes
tha t o
ccurre
d in th
eg
iven
ca
mpa ig
n- yea
r, so
fixed e
+ y2Xa)
ff ects
for the
numb
er of
the
a tte
mpts
to re
move
ins urg
e nt le
a de
rs a re
inc
lude d
in a ll
spec
ific a
tio ns
s
hown
in Ta
ble 3 .
Deca
de
fixed
effects
are
also in
cl
uded
in all of
the
regres
si on s.
Fixed
eff
ects for
attempt
typ e
are
inclu
ded in
some
sp
ecificati
ons to
control
for uno
bserve
d timeinva ria
nt diff
erence
sb
etween
metho
ds
used to
target
lead
ers–b
ombing
s, sho
otings,
combat
op
eration
s, and
capture
/raid op
eration
s.
Fixed
effe
c ts f o
r the
re g io
nof
th e
wo rld
whe re
e a ch
a tte
mpt to
o k pla
ce-–
Ea s
te rn
Euro p
e , La
tin
Ame
ric a ,
No rth
Af ric
a , the
Middle
Ea s t,
a nd
So uth
As ia – a re
a
l
s
o
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
i
n
s
e
l
e
c
t
s
p
e
c
i
fi
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
s
.
1
7
[
T
A
B
L
E
2
A
B
O
U
T
H
E
R
E
]
Th
e
pro
bit
re
g
re
ss
io
ns
d is
pla
ye
d
in
Ta
ble
2s
ug
ge
st
tha
t
the
s
uc
ce
ss
of
deca
pita tio
n
strikes
is
indeed
pla
usibly
exo g
eno
us.
Two o
f the
estima
tes a
re
s ta tis
tic a lly
s ig
nific a
nt, but
ne ithe
r re s
ult a
pp e a
rs to b
e ro
bus t.
The
firs t,
s
hown i
n Co
lumn 1
, s ug
ges
ts the
na tio
na l p
o pula
tio n o
f the c
o unte
rin s
urg e
nt
is sig
nifica
nt a t
the
five p
ercent
level
(p - va
lue = 0
.0 1 1
). This
spec
ific a
tio n
includ
es
neither
a
ttempt
typ e
no r
reg io
n fixed
effe c
ts .
This
va ria
ble is
no t
signific
ant in
any of
the
fixed
effe c
ts s p
e c ific
a tio
ns .
The
dis ta
nc e f
ro m
the
counte
rinsu
rgent’s
capital
city to
the
conflic
t
theate
r is
also
signific
ant at
17As
ia
was d
rop p
ed
as a
re f e
re n c
ec
ate
gory.
North
Ame
ric a
an d
We s
te rn
Eu
rop e
are
also
omitted
b ecau
se n o d
ecap
itation
attemp
ts o ccu
rred in
eith er
region d
u rin g
th e p
erio d
under
study.
13
the five p ercent level ( p - va lue = 0 .0 2 3 ) a s s hown in Co lumn 3 , ye t it
is no t
s ig nific a nt in a ny o the r s p e c ific a tio n. Fina lly, I te s te d whe the r the
va ria ble s
in Ta ble 2 a re j oi ntly s ig nific a nt pre dic to rs o f s uc c e s s f ul a tte
mpts . The y a re
no t: Dep ending o n the co mbina tio n o f fixed effects that are included, the
joint p - va lue s o f the va ria ble s ra ng e f ro m 0 .1 9 to 0 .4 6 . The unpre
dic ta bility
of success supp orts the plausibility of my identification assumption.
2. 5 Identi ficati on
To i d e n t i f y t h e e ffect of leadership decapitation on counterins urgency
effectiveness, I exploit the in herent randomness in the success and failure o f
de c a pita tio n a tte mpts . My e s tima tio n s tra te g y is to us e s imple O LS
re g re s s io ns tha t ta ke the f o llowing f o rm
yi = ß SU C C E + γXi + ei
SS i
whe re i inde xe s a c a mpa ig n- ye a r in which th e re is a n de c a
pita tio n a tte mpt,
is
yi the d ep endent va ria ble (ca mpa ig n termina tio n; ca mpa ig n o
utco me;
insurg ent vio lence; o r in surg ent a tta cks), SU is a dummy va ria
C C E SSi
ble
equal to one if a leader is kill ed in th at campaign-year and zero if the leader
survives any attempts, an d X is a vecto r o f o ther reg resso rs.
The ke y ide ntific a tio n a s s umptio n is tha t c o nditio na l o n o bs e rva
ble s ,
SU C C E i s e x o g e n o u s . T h e n , E [ e | S U C C E S S , X ]
=0,andtheaverage
SS i
14
trea tment e ffe c t c a n b e writte n a s the f o llowing :
ß = E [ y | SU C C C E SS =1,X] - E [ y | SU C C C E SS =0,X]
This s hows tha t the e s tima te s f ro m the O LS re g re s s io n e qu ati
on writte n
ab ove identify the di fference b etween successful and fai led decapitation attempts. I f the reg res sio ns reject tha t ß is zero , then the o utco mes o f b
ids to
deca pita te insurg encies have a ca usa l e ff ect.
Since a ssa ssina tio n a ttempts do no t o ccur ra ndo mly, th is empirica l
stra teg y
c a nno t c o nc lus ive ly de mo ns tra te whe the r a n o bs e rve d e ff ect is
caused by
success, failure, or b oth success and failure. Addressing this question requi
res a di ff e re nt e mpiric a l s tra te g y. My s tra te g y is to us e pro p e ns
ity- s c o re matching to pa rse the e ff e c ts o f s uc c e s s f ul an d uns uc c
e s s f ul le a de rs hip ta rg e ting . Ma tching
is my preferred ap pro a ch b eca use it ca n ensure sa mple ba la nce o n o
bserved
covariates. To previ ew the results, it app ears that most of the eff ects can b
e
attributed to successful targeting.18Since ma tching ca nno t ensure ba la nce
o n uno bserved cova ria tes, however, these results a re ad mi tted ly mo re
sp ecula tive
tha n tho se presented in the next sectio n.
3 R e s u l t s
This s e c tio n c o nta ins a pre s e nta tio n o f the ma in re s ults o f my a na
lys is . To
identify the effects of leadership d ecap itati on , b oth parametric and
nonpa ra metric sp ecifica tio ns a re co nsidered. I b eg in by using O LS
reg ressio n. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the
campaign level, are
rep o
All reg ressio ns include fixed e ff ects for the numb er of
rted.19
attempts
18
Th e s e re s u lts are d is c u s s e d at le n gth in S e c tion 4.
Rob u s t s tan d ard e rrors ac c ou nt f or p os s ib le s e rial c orre lation of th e e rror
1 te rm wh e n
9
m ore th an on e d e c ap itation atte m p t o c c u rre d with in a s in gle c am p aign . Jos
hu a D. An gris t s h ows th at wh e n th e re s e arch e r’s e m p iric al s trate gy is to e s
tim ate c au s al e ff ects rather than structural mo dels, linear mo dels s uch as OLS
regressions are more effi cient than non-linear
mo dels b ecause structural mo del s have to b e converted into caus al eff ects.
Estimating
causal eff ects is not fundamentally di ff e re nt wh e n workin g with lim ite d d e p e n d e
nt variab le s ;
th e main d ifferences are the in creased likeliho o d of interest in distributional outcomes
anwith ou t c ovariate s , c onve ntion al OLS
d estimates capture b oth distributional eff ects and eff ects on means. Hence OLS is
thsuitable
e for
in most of my analysis. See Angrist (2000, 29)) for more discussion of this.
h 15
ere
nt
n
on
-lin
ear
ity
of
th
e
con
d
itio
n al
exp
e
ctat
ion
fu
n
ctio
ns
f or
th
ed
ep
en
d
ent
vari
ab l
es
in
m
od
e ls
wit
hc
ova
riat
es
. In
m
od
e ls
tha t o c c urre d in a c a mpa ig n- ye a r a nd f o r th e de c a de during
which ea ch
attempt o ccurred. I also include fixed e ff ects sp ecifi cations for the attempt
typ e , i.e ., the ta rg e ting me tho d tha t wa s us e d, a nd the re g io n in
which e a ch
attempt to ok place. Fixed e ffects sp ecifications are lab eled in each table.
The re s ults o f no npa ra me tric te s ts a re a ls o re p o rte d. Fo llowing
Jo ne s a nd
Olken ((2009, 68)), I use Fisher exact tests. Fisher exact tests have exact
s ma ll s a mple pro p e rtie s . The y ta ke the ma rg ina l dis tributio n o f e a
ch va ria ble
as given and calculate the probability that the obs erved asso ciation, or a tig
hter a sso cia tio n, co uld b e pro d uced by cha nce (Fisher 1 93 5 ; Jo nes a
nd
O lke n 2 0 0 9 , 6 8 ). Th e e xa c t pro ba bility o f e a ch p e rmuta tio n o f
the finite s e t
of variables is calculated.
3. 1 C am pai gn Outcom es
3.1.1 Termination
Ta b l e 3 d i s p l a y s e s t i m a t e s o f l e a d e r s h i p d e c a p i t a t i o n ’ s e ffect on
counterinsu rgency campaign termination.
The de p e nde nt va ria ble is c a mpa ig n te rmina tio n; it is a dummy c
o de d “ 1 ”
if the c a mpa ig n e nde d in the ye a r in which a de c a pita tio n s trike to o
k pla c e .
Ca mpa ig n te rmina tio n da ta we re c o mpile d f ro m Lya ll a nd Wils o n I
I I ’s (2 0 0 9 )
“ Co rre la te s o f I ns urg e nc y” da ta s e t a nd the PR IO - U pps a la Arme
d Con flic t
da ta set (Gleditsch et a l. 2 0 0 2 ). All reg ressio ns inclu de fixed e ff ects
for the
numb e r o f a tte mpts in a c a mpa ig n- ye a r a nd an d f o r the de c a de
in which e a ch
a tte mpt o c c urre d. The firs t c o lumn pre s e nts the re s ults witho ut a
dditio na l
fixed e ff ects; the second column includes fixed eff ects for attempt typ e; the
third co lumn includes fixed e ff ects for region; the fourth column includes
fixed
e ffects for b oth attempt typ e and region.
[TAB LE 3 AB O UT H ER E]
16
In each regression, campaign termination was regressed on decapitation
attempts’ success or failure; the results are estimates of the average eff ect
of
s uc c e s s f ul de c a pita tio n s trike s c o mpa re d with f a ile d a tte mpts .
The re s ults displayed in Ta ble 3 sug g est tha t ca mpa ig ns a re mo re
likely to en d a fter
s uc c e s s f ul a tte mpts tha n a f te r f a ile d a tte mpts . The e s tima te s
hown in Co lumn 1 sug g ests tha t lea dership deca pita tio n increa ses the pro ba bility o
f war
te rmina tio n by 2 7 p erc e nta g e p o ints , with a s ta nda rd e rro r of 0 .0 7
9 . This
re s ult is s ig nific a nt a t the on e p e rc e nt le ve l. This re s ult a pp e a rs
to b e ro bus t: the e s tima te s dis playe d in Co lumns 2 , 3 , a nd 4 ra ng e f
ro m 0 .2 4 9 to 0 .2 9 0 , a nd all of the sp ecifications are significant at the
one p ercent level. Also, the lower
bound of the 95 percent confidence interval of the estimate is above
zero in
e a ch s p e c ific a tio n. The re s ults cha ng e little whe n a tte mpt typ e o r
re g io n fixe d e ff e c ts a re inc lude d. The s e re s ults a re a ls o ro bus t to
no n- pa ra me tric mo de lin g .
In each of the non-parametric sp ecifications, the results are significant at the
one p ercent level.
3.1.2 Victory
Ta b l e 4 d i s p l a y s t h e a v e r a g e e ff ect of leadership decapitation on
counterinsurg e nc y c a mpa ig n s uc c e s s . The de p e nde nt va ria ble is c ou
nte rins urg e nc y s uc c e s s
o r “ vic to ry. ” This va riab le is a d ummy c o de d “ 1 ” if the inc umb e nt de
f e a te d
the i nsurg ency in th e year a deca pita tio n strike o ccurred. As in Ta ble 3 ,
the
rig ht- h an d si de va ria ble in the reg ressio ns presented in Ta ble 4 is the
success
or failure of leadership targeting events.
The re s ults s hown in Ta ble 4 s u g ge s t tha t c a mpa ig n s uc c e s s
is a ls o mo re
like ly f o llowing s uc c e s s f ul le a de rs hip re mova ls . The e s tima te in
the firs t column suggests that incumb ents are 32 p ercentage p oints more
likely to de f e a t ins urg e nc ie s in ye ars whe re c ou nte rins urg e nts re
move to p ins urg e nt
le a de rs tha n in ye a rs whe re s imila r a tte mpts f a il– a s iz a ble a dva
nta g e . This
estimate is s ignificant at the one p ercent level. Like the results rep orted
17
in the ca mpa ig n termina tio n a na lysis in Ta ble 3 , th e avera g e ca usa l
effect of leadership decapitation is robust. Decapitation is significant at the
one
percent level in each of the four specifications; this holds in each of the
Fisher
exact tests. In each sp ecification, the lower b ound estimate of the 95 p
ercent
confidence interval is ab ove zero. Including fixed eff ects do es not
significantly
influence th e results.
I n a ll, the e vide nc e a llows us to re j e c t the hyp o the s is tha t le a de
rs hip
deca pita tio n is ine ff ectual or h as a counterp ro ductive effect on
counterinsurgency campaign outcomes. To the contrary, the data strongly suggest that
lea dership deca pita tio n ha s imp o rta nt cau sa l eff ects; namely,
removing mil ita nt lea ders en ha nces co unterinsurg ents’ pro sp ects fo r b
o th quick ca mpa ig n
termina tio ns a nd fo r o p era tio na l- level
success .
[TAB LE 4 AB O UT H ER E]
3. 2 C onfli ct Dy nam i cs
3.2.1 Intensity
Ta b l e 5 d i s p l a y s t h e e s t i m a t e d c a u s a l e ffect of leadership decapitation on the
inte ns ity o f vio le nc e in c o unte rins urg e nc y. Co ns is te nt with the e
vide nc e tha t
lea dership deca pita tio n increa ses the likeliho o d o f wa r termina tio n a
nd co unterinsurg ent victo ry, the evidence a lso sug - g ests tha t lea dership deca
pita tio n
re duc e s ins urg e nt vio le nc e . This finding ho lds whe n e xa mine d in
multiple
ways . Co lumns 1 a nd 2 s how the re s ults o f ne g a tive bino mia l re g re
s s io ns . The dep endent va ria ble is the numb er o f p eo ple killed by a n
insurg ency in a g iven
campaign-year as measured by the Global Terroris m Database. As exp
ected,
the s ig n o f the p o int e s tima te pre s e nte d in Co lumn 1 is in the e xp e
c te d
ne g a tive dire c tio n; howe ve r, it is no t s ta tis tic a lly s ig nific a nt. The s
p e c ific a tio n
18
s hown in Co lumn 2 pro b e s the re s ult s hown in Co lumn 1 . The s a me
ne g a tive
bino mia l re g re s s io n is e s tima te d, but the Co lumn 2 s p e c ific a tio n
inc lude s
reg io n a nd a ttempt typ e fixed e ff e c ts . This re g re s s io n is s i gn ific a
nt a t the o ne p e rc e nt le ve ,l a nd the p o int e s tima te is rou gh ly twic e
the s iz e o f the c o e fficient
dis playe d in Co lumn 1 , s ug g e s ting tha t o nc e time - inva ria nt a tte
mpt typ e and regional e ffects are accounted for, the null hyp othesis–-that
leadership
20deca pita tio n do es no t have a vio lence- reducing eff ect–-can b e
rejected.
The re s ults s hown in Co lu mn s 3 an d 4 provide a dditio na l e vide nc
e tha t
tha t le a de rs hip de c a pita tio n re duc e s ins urg e nt vio le nc e . Th e s e
s p e c ific a tio ns
pre s e nt the s a me ne g a tive bino mia l re g re s s io ns a s Co lu mn s 1 a
nd 2 , but include the la g g ed dep endent va ria ble– -the numb er o f p eo
ple killed by a n insurg ency in the ca mpa ig n-yea r b efo re ea ch a ttempt–
-o n the rig ht-ha nd
side. By accounting for the numb er of p eople killed by insurgencies at time
t - 1
,thelaggeddependentvariablecontrolsforcross-sect
ionaldiff erences in insurg ent vio lence tha t wo uld
co nfo un d identifica tio n if my identifying
assumption were untrue.
The re s ults s hown in Co lumns 3 a nd 4 s ug g e s t th at la g g ing the
le f t- ha nd
side variable do es not change the i nitial results. On the contrary, they
provide
additional confidence that the relationship b etween successful leadership
ta rg eting an d insurg ent vio lence is neg a tive. Dep ending o n the co
mbina tio n
of fixed eff ects included in the sp ecifications, the p oint estimates range
from
- 0 .9 1 5 in Co lumn 3 to - 0 .9 7 5 in Co lumn 4 . The s e re s ults a re s ig
nific a nt a t the five a nd te n p e rc e nt le ve ls , re s p e c tivel y. This evid e
nc e s ug g e s ts tha t re moving
lea ders ha s a vio lence-reducing effect. In the next section, I discuss the
effect
of leadership removal on rates of insurgent attacks.
20As
b e f ore , all re gre s s ion s in c lu d e fi xe d eff e c ts f or th e d e c ad e in wh ich e
ach d e c ap itation
attemp t o ccu rred an d f or th e nu mb er of attemp ts th at were carried ou t d u rin g each
c am - p aign - ye ar with at le as t on e atte m p t. Th is e n s u re s th at any viole n c e - re d
u c in g e ff ect
ob served in th e regression resu lts can n ot b e attrib u ted to u nu su ally aggress ive
targetin g
op e ration s or te m p oral tre n d s d u rin g th e Cold War, f or e xam p le , wh e n th e re
was le s s stigma attached to targeted killing programs that aimed to eliminate enemy
leaders in
c ove rt op e ration s , a tre n d wh ich was at le as t te m p orarily re ve rs e d d u rin g th e
1990s .
19
3.2.2 Insurgent Attacks
In this section I examine the impact of leadership decapitation on ins urgent
atta cks. Levels o f vio lence a nd numb ers o f a tta cks a re useful to lo o k a
t sepa ra tely
because they are believed to capture different conflict dynamics.
Whereas
levels o f vio lence usu all y ca ptures the qua lity o f milita nt o p era tio ns–
-i.e., wa s
the insurg ency a ble to inflict l os ses o n g overnment a cto rs a nd civilia ns? –
nu m b e r s o f a t t a ck s m e a s u r e t h e q u a n t i ty o f i n s u r g e n c i e s ’
o ve r a l l a c t i v i t i e s
and reveal information ab out insurgencies’ op erational temp o.21
At t a ck s a r e d e fi n e d a s t h e nu mb e r o f i n s u r g e nt - i n i t i a t e d v
i o l e nt i n c i d e nt s
in a g ive n c a mpa ig n- ye a r. The da ta c o me f rom th e G TD. My s tra te
gy f o r
estimating the eff ect of decapitation on i nsurgent attacks is similar to that
us e d to in the pre vio us s e c tion . My ba s e line s p e c ific a tio ns a re ne
g a tive
bino mia l re g re s s io ns , s p e c ifie d b o th with a nd witho ut fixe d e ff ec
t s . To t e s t
the ro bustness o f the in itia l estima tes, a la g o f the dep endent va ria ble
is
included on the rig ht-ha nd sid e.
Ta ble 6 dis plays the re s ults . I t s hows tha t while the re is s o me e
vide nc e to
suggest that leadership decapitation red uces insurgent attacks, these
results
a re no t c o nc lus i ve . To b e s u re , the re s ults s hown in Ta ble 6 a re
much le s s
c o nc lus ive tha n tho s e pre s e nte d in the pre c e din g s e c tio ns . The
re s ults o f the
fixed e ff e c ts s p e c ific a tio ns in Co lumns 2 an d 4, f o r e xa mple , a re
n eg a tive a nd
s ta tis tic a lly s ig nific a nt a t the five a nd o ne p e rc e nt le ve ls , re s p
ec tive ly. The
e s tima te s hown in Co lumn 3 is a ls o ne g a tive , but it is s ma ll a nd s
tatis tic al ly
indis ting uis ha ble f ro m z e ro . As with the re s ults pre s e nte d in the pre
vio us
s e c tio n, the re s ults s hown he re s ug g e s t tha t o nc e time - inva ri ant
a tte mpt a nd
21Ju
s t as c ou nte rin s u rge nts ’ le ad e rs h ip d e c ap itation atte mp ts c an f ai l, in s
u rge nt attacks
c an als o f ail. Th e y c an als o b e u n p ro d u c ti ve an d in e ffi cient. Yet even an
insurgency that
perp etrates a high volume of unproductive attacks is likely to (1) b e feared by people
living
under constant threat of violence and (2) have a su ffi cient le vel of capabilities to co ordin ate an d e xe c u te th e attacks . Con s e qu e ntly, wh e n rate s of in s u rge nt attack are
low or
d e c re as in g, it ge n e rally m e an s th at th e y p os e a le s s e r th re at to th e p op u
lation s with wh ich
th e y inte rmin gle an d h ave a l owe r le ve l of c ap ab ility to in fl ic t h arm on c ou nte rin
s u rge nts ,
govern ment o fficials, an d civilian loyalists.
20
reg io na l e ffects are accounted for, the null hyp othesis can b e rejected.
Yet at first glance, we cannot b e sure of the finding’s robustness; indeed, the
p o int e s tima te in Co lumn 1 , which do e s no t inc lude fixe d e ff ects or
the lagged
dep endent va ria ble, is unexp ectedly p osi tive.
Given the estimate’s small size and large p -value, it is likely that this
positive result o ccurred by chance due to random measurement error in
the
insurg ent atta cks da ta . If this is true, detecting deca pita tio n’s effect on
attacks would b e more di fficult than detecting an effe c t o n vio le nc e .
This wo uld b e th e c a s e b ec a us e the G TD’s a tta cks va ria ble (1 ) is
inc lus ive o f a
ra ng e o f ins urg e nt ta c tic s a nd (2 ) c o unts inc ide nts in which ins urg e
nts in flic t
no c a s ua ltie s , while its vio le nc e va ria ble is re s tric te d to inc ide nts in
which
ins urg e nts inflic t c a s ua ltie s . O f c o urs e , this is e xa c tly wha t we s e
e - –th e re s ults
from the violence regressions are more consistently negative and statistically
significant than results of the attacks regressions. Despite this evidence, b
etter
da ta wi ll b e ne e de d b e f o re a p e rs ua s ive a rg ume nt c a n b e ma
de a b o ut the
e ffect of decapitation on insurgent attacks.
4 S u c c e s s a n d F a i l u r
e
Ta rg e ting ins urg e nt le a de rs is a g a me o f cha nc e . Mo re bids to c a
pture o r kill ins urg e nt le a de rs f a il tha n s uc c e e d. B ut wha t a re the c
o ns e que nc e s o f f a ilure ? The e le me nt o f cha nc e in le a de rs hip ta
rg e ting e na ble s c a us a l
ide ntific a tio n. The e vide nc e pre s e nte d a b ove s ug g e s ts tha t the s
e o utc o me s – successful versus failed decapitation strikes–-have a significant impact on
the dyna mics a nd o utco mes o f co unterinsu rg ency ca mpa ig ns. Like
previo us
studies of leadership decapitation in war, the purp ose of this study is to
explain the impact of removing enemy leaders on military eff ectiveness in
wa r . W h i l e i t i s t e m p t i n g t o a t t r i b u t e t h e c a u s a l e ff ects
identified ab ove to
successful leadership targeting, doing so would b e misleading. Because my
identifica tio n stra teg y do es no t include a n untrea ted co ntro l g ro up-– it
in stead
21
uses exo g eno us va ria tio n in successful a nd fa iled a ttempts- – the p o
ssibility tha t
failed attempts are driving the observed rel ation ships cannot b e ruled out.
Sp ecifica lly, the puta tive neg a tive externa lities o f fa iled d eca pi tatio n
strikes
could underlie the identified effe c ts . Tha t is , whe n the ta c tic s c o mmo
nly used in deca pita tio n strikes, such a s b o mbing s a nd ra ids, fa il to
elimina te
insurg ent lea ders but incite ma ss res entment, fa iled a ttempts co uld
decreas e
the cha nces o f wa r termina tio n a nd co unterinsurg ent victo ry a nd increa
se the
ch a n c e s o f e s c a l a t e d l e ve l s o f i n s u r g e nt v i o l e n c e .
To a ddress this p o tentia l is sue, I a ssess the impa cts o f b o th
successful a nd
failed decapitation strikes on counterinsurgency outcomes. Identifying the
indep endent e ff ects of success and failure alone is more difficult than
identifying
the di ffe re nc e b e twe e n the m b e c a us e while the e vide nc e s ug g e
s ts tha t the
success of decapitation strikes is exogenous conditional on an attempt taking
pla ce, deca pita tio n strikes themselves do no t o ccur a t ra ndo m. Trea tin
g them
as if they do risks conflating the e ff ects of successful and failed decapitation
s trike s with cha ng e tha t wo uld have o c c urre d re g a rdle s s . Fo r e xa
mple , if
de c a pita tio n s trike s a re mo re like ly to o c c ur whe n c o unte rins urg e
nts b e lie ve
tha t ins urg e nts a re g rowing , o r a re g o ing to g row, in s tre ng th a nd le
th ali ty,
they have a n i ncentive to strike a t the insurg ency’s lea dership fro m a p o
sitio n
o f re la tive we a kne s s . This dyna mi c a pp e a rs to b e mo tiva ting the
U.S .’
escalation of high-value targeting in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal
Are a s (FATA). This c o uld le a d a na lys ts to e rro ne o us ly a ttribute a ny
o bs e rve d g rowth in milita nc y to hig h- va lue ta rg e ting a tte mpts , e ve
n th ou g h hig h- va lue
ta rg eting mig ht have ha d no impa ct o n the insurg ency’s ca pa
bilities.22
Pro p e ns ity- s c o re ma tching is the b e s t to o l ava ila ble f o r a ddre
s s ing this
cha lle ng e . Pro p e ns ity- s c o re ma tching us e s o bs e rva b le cha ra c
te ris tic s to pre dic t deca pita tio n strikes a nd uses th is info rma tio n to
stra tify th e sa mple into simila r
22Ale
xan d e r Down e s (2008) c onvin c in gly m ake s an an alogou s argu m e nt ab ou t
s tate s ’
decisions to use force against civilians d uring desp erate moments of inters tate wars. For
a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f l e a d e r s ’ d e c i s i o n s t o “ g a m b l e
f o r r e s u r r e c t i o n ” i n w a r , s e e ( G o e m a n s
2000).
22
23control
and treatment
Stra tifying the sa mple in this way ena
groups.
bles
me to c o mpa re s imila r ye a rs with a nd witho ut de c a pita tio n s trike s
a s if the y
we re s imila r tre a tme nt a nd c o ntro l g ro ups . Co mpa re d with e xp e
rime nta l
and quasi-exp erimental approaches, the ma jor weakness of matching is
that
assignment to treated and control groups is based on observables. Without
f ull knowle dg e o f the da ta - ge n era tin g pro c e s s , it re ma ins p o s s
ible tha t my
e s tima te s will b e bia s e d due to s e le c tio n o n uno bs e rva bl es .
While s e le c tio n bia s
is a p o te ntia l c o nc e rn whe n us ing a ny ma tching e s tima to r, ma
tching re ma ins
ausefultechniqueforscholarsseekingtoiden
tifycausaleff ects b ecause it
ensures sample balance on obs ervables an d excludes extreme
counterfactu als
(King a nd Z e ng 2 0 0 6 ).
To implement this ap pro ach, fo r a ll co untries c engaged in
counterinsurgency campaigns in all years t , I us e the f o llowing e qua
tio n:
P ( AT T E M P T c t )=F ( pX ct )
This e s tima to r is us e d to pre dic t a tte mpts c o nditio na l o n o bs e
rva ble s .
Based on the predicted probabilities estimated from
this equation, I form four blo cks, deno ted by b
,forvaryinglevelsofthepropensityscoreandthencheck
the ba la nce o n the trea tment a nd co ntro l cova ria tes in ea ch blo ck. O
nce the
sample is stratified and balanced, I estimate regressions using the
equation:
yi = aßSU C C E + ß F AI L U R + yib + eib
b SS ib
Eib
Fo r m o r e o n p r o p e n s i t y - s c o r e m a t c h i n g , s e e , e . g . , H o e t a l . ( 2 0 0 7 ) ; C a l i e n d o a n d
Ko p e i n i g 2 0 0 5 ; a n d R u b i n 2 0 0 6 .
23
whe
re a b
indica
tes
fixed
eff
ects
for
each
prop
ensity
score
blo
ck.
2
3
4. 1 P r edi cti ng Attem pts
Before estimating the e ffects of s ucces sful and failed decapitation strikes, I
e xa mine whe the r pre - tre a tme nt c ova ria te s in my da ta s e t c a n pre
dic t the
o bs e rve d de c a pita tio n s trike s . Ta ble 7 s hows ma rg ina l e ffects of
probit regress io ns tha t inc lude the s a me va ria ble s u s e d in Ta ble 2 . The re s ults
dis p laye d
in Co lumns 2 a nd 6 o f Ta ble 7 s how tha t inc umb e nt G DPPC is a s ig
nific a nt
pre dic to r o f de c a pita tio n a tte mpts . This is intuitive ; we a lthie r g ove
rnme nts
are more likely than p o orer governments of have the material capabilities
ne c e s s a ry to a g g re s s ive ly ta rg e t ins urg ent le a de rs . It is like ly
tha t G DPPC
proxies no t o nly co nventio na l milita ry ca pa bilities, but tha t g overnments of
rich countries are more likely to have the necessary resources to develop
sophisticated surveillance technology and to acquire other intelligence adva n t a g
esthatcanbedeployedselectivelyagainstinsurgentlea
ders.When
avariablemeasuringcounterinsurgents’total
numberofmilitarypersonnel
in the yea r b efo re deca pita tio n a ttempts– a proxy o f co untries’ co
nventio na l
milita ry p ower– is included o n the left- ha nd side o f the regress io n sp
ecified in
Co lumn 6 , the e s tima te d ma rg ina l e ff e c t o f G DPPC de c re a s e s o
nly s lig htly,
f ro m 0 .0 4 9 to 0 .0 3 9 . The s ta nda rd e rro r o f the e s tima te in Co
lumn 6 re ma ins
consistent, at 0.019, and the res ult is significant at the five p ercent level
(p -value = 0.027).24
[TAB LE 7 AB O UT H ER E]
24Th
is s p e c ifi c ation is s im p ly to illu s trate th at th e ob s e rve d re lation s h ip b e twe
e n GDP P C an d d e c ap itation atte m p ts d o e s n ot ch an ge wh e n a d ire c t m e as u
re of c onve ntion al m ilitary
p owe r is in c lu d e d . In th e inte re s t of s p ac e , th e s e re s u lts are n ot p re s e nte
d in Tab le 6.
24
4. 2 The Im pacts of Successful and Fai l ed Decapi tati on Str i
kes
Ta ble 8 s hows s e pa ra te e s tima te s o f the e ffects of successful and
failed decapitation attempts on campaign termination and success. For each of these
two de p e nde nt va ria ble s , thre e s p e c ific a tio ns a re pre s e nte d.
The re s ults o f a n
O LS re g re s s io n witho ut c o ntro ls , fixe d e ffects, or prop en sity score
matching
a re dis playe d in Co lu mn 1 . The s p e c ific a tio n s h own in Co lumn 2
inc lude s
control variables and attempt typ e and region fixed eff ects; and the
estimates in Co lumn 3 inc lude a ll o f the s e re g re s s o rs a nd us e pro p
e n s ity- s c o re ma tching .
Altho ug h the cavea t a b o ut identifi ca tio n ba sed o n ma tching is
releva nt,
the results in Ta ble 7 sug g est rea so n to b elieve tha t successful deca pita
tio n
strikes, not failed attempts, drive the effects observed in the previous section.
The e s tima te s the ms e lve s a re c o ns is te nt with tho s e dis playe d in
Ta ble s 3 a nd
4. Sp ecifically, the e ff ect of successful decapitation strikes remains similar
in
s iz e ; a s uc c e s s f ul de c a pita tio n s trike is a s s o c ia te d with a 2 7 p e rc e nta g e p o int
increa se (sta nda rd erro r = 0 .0 7 3 ) in the pro ba bility o f termina tio n
during
the ye a r in which the de c a pita tio n a tte mpt o c c urre d. Like wis e , a s
uc c e s s f ul
de c a pita tio n s trike is a s s o c ia te d with a 2 9 - p e rc e nta g e p o int
inc re a s e (s ta nda rd
error = 0.070) in the probabili ty of counterinsurgent victory during the year
in which the de c a pita tio n s tri ke o c c urre d. B o th re s ults a re s ig nific
a nt a t the
one p ercent level.
In contrast, the e ff e c t o f f a ilure is indis ting uis ha ble f ro m z ero .
The p oi nt
estimate of failed attempts is negative in four of the six regressions, s ugges
ting tha t fa iled deca pita tio n strikes co uld have a cou nterpro ductive e ff
ect. However,
the p o int estimates o f fa iled a ttempts a re s ma ll, a nd the p - va lue s ,
which
ra ng e fro m 0 .3 5 6 to 0 .7 8 8 , do no t a ppro a ch the sta nda rds o f so
cia l scientific
inference. Beca use the p o int estima tes a re sma ll a nd sta tistica lly insig
nifica nt, the i mp act o f fa iled a ttempts– if o ne exists– ca nno t b e distin gu
ished fro m zero . The re s ults a re s imila r whe n e xa mining b o th the
unma tche d a nd the ma tche d sample and are robust to the inclu sion of
fixed eff ects and controls, suggesting
25
tha t it is s u cc e s s f ul ta rg e ting o f ins urg e nt le a de rs ra the r tha n
blowba ck f ro m
failed attempts that underlies the effects identified ab ove.
[TAB LE 8 AB O UT H ER E]
5 C o n c l u s i o n
This s tudy us e d a ne w e mpiric a l a ppro a ch to inve s tig a te the e mpiric
a l e ff ects
of leadership decapitation. Sp ecifically, failed decapitation attempts were
us e d a s c o ntro ls f o r s uc c e s s f ul le a de rs hip re mova ls . Th is a
ppro a ch minimiz e s
uno bserved hetero g eneity; imp o rta ntly, th e exo g eneity o f lea dership
remova ls,
conditional on attempts to remove leaders taking place, helps to avert any
s ys te ma tic re ve rs e c a us a lity in the a na lys is . This is imp o rta nt, a s
pre viou s
s tudie s have b e e n una ble to de mo ns tra te whe the r o bs e rve d e
ffects reflect
deca pita tio n’s indep endent impa ct o n wa rtime e ff ectiveness or if they
reflect
counterinsurgents’ previous mili tary effectivenes s.
Pre vio us s cho la rly re s e a rch o n le a de rs hip de c a pita tio n s ug g
e s ts tha t re moving enemy lea ders is a t b est ine ff ective and at worst counterpro
ductive,
R e g a rdle s s o f whe the r the a dve rs a ry is a s ta te , a te rro ris t o rg a
niz a tio n, o r a
guerrilla insurgency, scholars suggest that p olicies of leadership
decapitation
and high-value targeting have little military value. Implicit in these claims is
the premise tha t lea dershi p plays a seco nda ry ro le in determining wa
rtime
outcomes. As a result, diverting scarce resources from more pro ductive e ff
orts is b o th distra cting a nd inefficient (Pap e 1996; David 2002; Pap e
2003; Ho ff ma n 2 0 0 6 ). R e c e nt s cho la rly tre a tme nt pus he s this p e
rs p e c tive a s te p f urthe r. The
author of a prominent 2009 study claims that leadership decapitation is not
just ineffectual, but that it is counterpro ductive to eff ective counterterrorism
26
(Jo rda n 20 0 9 , 7 5 3 - 7 5 4 ). She a rg ues tha t deca pita tio n stra teg ies
a re pa rticula rly c o unte rpro duc tive whe n us e d a g a ins t la rg e r a nd o lde r o rg
an iz ati on s or
o rg a niz a tio ns with re lig io us a nd/ o r s e pa ra tis t a ims .
All o f these studies provide insig htful theo retica l expla na tio ns o f lea
dership
deca pita tio n’s puta tive in e ff ectiveness, but each suff ers from the
inferential
is s ue s de s c rib e d a b ove . The ke y c o nc e rn is s e le c tio n bia s . Un
like this pa p e r,
which us e s pro b e s the re la tio ns hip b e twe e n a tte mpts to re move le
a de rs a nd
observed conditions prior to the attempts, previous studies fail to systema tic a lly inve s tig a te whe the r o the r co mmo n f a c to rs a re co rre la te
d with b o th
lea dership remova l a nd milita ry ineff ectiveness. While the observable eff
ects of
lea dership deca pita tio n certa inly ca n a nd do va ry fro m ca se-to -ca se,
scho la rs’
neg lect o f these issu es ma kes it difficult to tra nsla te the finding s o f
existing
studies into a general u nderstanding of the eff ects of removing enemy
leaders.
The finding s o f this s tudy c a s t do ubt on e a rlie r c la ims tha t le a de
rs hip
deca pita tio n do es no t wo rk.
On the contrary, the evidence presented in this pap er suggests that (1)
killing o r ca pturing insurg ent lea ders is neither i ne ffective nor
counterproductive a nd (2 ) the e ffect of removing insurgent leaders is not
endogenous
to pre - e xis ting ba ttle fie ld a dva nta g e s . The s e re s ults a re c o ns is
te nt with the
re s ults o f o the r s tud ie s in which s cho la rs h ave a tte mpte d to us e a
ppro pria te
counterfactuals to i dentify the causal eff ects of leadership decapitation
(Jones
a nd O lke n 2 0 0 9 ; Pric e 2 0 0 9 ). All thre e s tudie s find e vide nc e , f o r
e xa mple ,
tha t le a de rs h ip de c a pita tio n ma ke s the te rmina tio n o f low- inte ns
ity c o nflic ts
mo re likely.
Ano ther imp o rta nt co ntributio n o f this stud y is th at it credibl y demo
nstrates that battlefield advantages do not drive observed p ositive effects of
de c a pita tio n (s e e a ls o Jo ne s a nd O lke n 2 0 0 9 ). Put differently,
leadersh ip
deca pita tio n in co unterinsurg ency is o n avera g e a ca use, no t a n co
nsequence,
of military e ff e c tive ne s s . This s ug g e s ts th at ins urg e nt le a de rs a
re c ritic a lly imp o rta nt in determining the fa tes o f their o rg a niza tio ns.
Altho u gh fa iled
27
de c a pita tio n s trike s a re no t with ou t c o s ts , f a ile d a tte mpts a pp e
a r to have
few negative consequences in terms of the outcomes that are most imp
ortant
to p o licyma kers- – reducing insurg ent vio lence a nd a chieving quick, favo
ra ble
campaign resolutions.
Whether b eca us e o f their mo biliza tio n ca pa city, cha risma , o r o p
era tio na l
skills and exp ertise, leaders matter. We can profit by paying more attention
to how, whe n, a nd whe re the y ma tte r mo s t. Fo r s tude nts o f s e c urity
s tu die s ,
additional study is needed on how variations in the ways insurgent leaders
a re re move d– tha t is , whe the r le a de rs a re c ap ture d o r kille d– impa
c t c o unte rinsurgency eff e c tive ne s s . Pre limina ry a na lys is o f this que s tio n, in b o
th la rg e - N
and case study research, comes to varying conclusions. While some
scholars
do no t find e vide nc e tha t the way in which le a de rs a re re move d ma tte
rs
(Jo hnsto n 2 0 0 9 a ; Sta eheli 2 0 1 0 ), o thers sug g est tha t ca pturing
enemy lea ders
ha s more stra teg ic va lue d ue to the p o tentia l intellig ence dividend s tha
t
c a n b e g a ine d in p o s t- c a pture inte rro g a tio ns (Cro nin 2 0 0 6 ). Mo
re re s e a rch
is a lso n eed ed to test a no ther co mmo n, but l arg ely untested, a
ssumptio n ab out leadership decapitation: that terrorist organization’s
organizational
s truc ture s , pa rtic ula rly the e xte nt to which the ir c o mma nd is de c e
ntra liz e d
or networked, can a ffe c t the pro ba bility tha t le a de rs hip de c a pita tio n
will
wo rk. Jo rda n (2 0 0 9 ) pro b e s this que s tio n by e xa mining g ro ups
with diff ering
aims, but b etter measurement of organization itself is needed to advance
this
resea rch pro g ra m.
The s e finding s have implic a tio ns f o r p o lic y. The pre va iling vie w in
the United Sta tes is tha t “ deca pita ting ” milita nt o rg a niza tio ns is a t b
est inef-
f e c tua l a nd a t wo rs t c o unte rpro duc tive . Pro p o ne nts o f this vie w a
rg ue tha t
irreg ula r threa ts a re b etter a ddressed thro ug h co mprehensive stra teg
ies o f
“ c o unte rins urg e nc y,” in which o p e ra tio ns a re c o nduc te d with the
multif a c e te d
aims of building capable central governments, loyal and sustainable security
apparatuses, improving governance and decreasing corruption, and fostering
e c o no mic d e ve lo pme nt. Pro p o ne nts o f this vie w a rg ue , e ithe r e
xplic itly o r
28
implic itly, tha t “ c o unte rte rro ris m” s tra te gi es , in which milita ry o p e
ra tio ns
are fo cused on direct action against militant networks, are unlikely to work
against insurgencies b ecause they do not target the p opulation, a key
source
o f ins urg e nt re s o urc e s . The y s ug g e s t tha t dire c t a c tio n a g a ins
t ins urg e nt
lea ders ca n ina dvertently a id insurg encies by a liena tin g civilia ns a nd
sipho ning
reso urces fro m “ p o pula tio n- centric” initia tives.
While p o pula r supp o rt ca n certa inly play a n imp o rta nt ro le in
insurg ency
and counterinsurgency, the present study finds no evidence that targeting
milita nt lea ders undermines e ffectiveness in irregular war. Strictly from a
strategic p ersp ective, the evidence presented here s uggests that
dismissing
lea dership deca pita tio n fro m co untermili tan cy p o licy o n the ba sis o f e
ffica cy
alone would b e a mistake. Yet the only ma jor finding of this study is that the
ava i l a b l e e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t l e a d e r s h i p d e c a p i t a t i o n
c a n h e l p t o a ch i e ve
milita ry a nd p o litica l g o a ls; it do es n o t investig a te the rela tive eff
ectiveness
of high-value targeting versus alternatives that are available to p olicymakers,
no r d o es it a ddress the no rma tive co nsidera tio ns invo lved in targ eted
killing
pro g ra ms . Co ns e que ntly, us ing this s tudy a s th e ba s is f o r s e le c
ting o ne
set of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism tactics over another would b e
ina ppro pria te.
Tha t s a id, the e vide nc e do e s de mo ns tra te tha t ta rg e ting milita
nts d ire c tly
can play an indep endent role in disrupting and defeating insurgencies. While
p o lic y s ho uld b e ma de o n a c a s e - by- c a s e ba s is , the e vide nc e
s howing tha t
removing insurg ent lea ders ha s o n averag e a dva nced to p o licy g o a ls
impl ies
tha t direct a ctio n a ppro a ches ca n wo rk a nd tha t la rg e na tion bu ilding
eff orts
mig ht no t b e ne c e s s a ry f o r c o unte ring milita nc y s uc c e s s f ully.
Th e re is little
general evidence that “light fo otprint” approaches, such as that prop osed for
the Afg ha nista n Wa r by Austin Lo ng (Lo ng 2 0 1 0 ), ca nn o t lea d to
successful
o utc o me s while a ls o re duc ing th e c o s ts o f c ou nte ring unc o nve ntio
na l thre a ts .
The implic a tio ns o f this p e rs p e c tive a re s ig nific a nt. The Unite d
Sta te s ’
wa rs in Afg ha nista n a nd Iraq wa rs have stretched U.S. tro o ps to nea
r-ca pa city
29
and, as of Summer 2009, had cost the U.S. more than $750 billion in direct
milita ry exp enditures. America n p o licyma kers a re now lo o king fo r a
lterna tive approaches to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism that can
yield e ff ective
and sustainable results. Approaches that target militants directly, using
both persuasion and coercion, are currently being discussed in
Washington as
via ble a lterna tives to p o pula tio n- centric a ppro a ches. Additio na l a na
lysis of
how these ta ctics a ffect militancy is a pre-requisite to informed p olicy.
30
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Tab le 1 : A re S ucces s f ul and Fai led Attem pts S i m i lar? Pai rwi s e T - T e sts of S am ple B alance
DV : S u c c e s s S u c c e s s Fa i l u r e D i fference p -Val ue
De mo c ra c y 0 .5 9 0 .5 3 0 .05 0 .4 2
(0 .0 5 ) (0 .0 4 ) (0 .0 7 ) G DPPC 7 .6
9 7. 70 - 0 .0 1 0 .9 5
(0 .1 3 ) (0 .1 5 ) (0 .2 ) Po pula tio n 1
1 .1 3 1 0 .3 6 0 .7 7 0 .07
(0 .3 2 ) (0 .2 7 ) (0 .4 2 ) Milita ry Pe rs
o nne l 5 .2 4 4 .9 5 0 .2 9 0 .4 5
(0 .2 9 ) (0 .2 5 ) (0 .3 8 ) Ele va tio n 5
.8 7 6 .0 9 - 0 .2 3 0 .41
(0 .2 4 ) (0 .1 4 ) (0 .2 7 ) Dis ta nc e 5
.1 5 5 .3 5 - 0 .1 9 0 .7 1
(0 .3 8 ) (0 .3 4 ) (0 .5 1 )
Observations 45 58
34
Tab le 2 : A re S ucces s f ul and Fai led Attem pts S i m i lar? Evi d ence f rom M ulti vari ate Reg res s i ons
DV : S u c c e s s ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) De mo c ra c y - 0
.1 0 1 0 .0 0 2 - 0 .3 5 1 - 0 .1 8 6
(0 .2 6 0 ) (0 .2 54 ) (0 .2 9 4 ) (0 .3 2 8
) G DPPC - 0.0 2 6 0 .0 7 9 0 .0 82 0 .1 1 4
(0 .0 8 6 ) (0 .0 89 ) (0 .1 0 7 ) (0 .1 1 4
) Po pula tio n 0.1 3 2 * * 0 .0 6 8 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 4 3
(0 .0 5 2 ) (0 .0 54 ) (0 .0 7 2 ) (0 .0 8 1
) Ele va tio n - 0 .0 1 4 - 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 5 1 - 0 .0 3 4
(0 .0 4 1 ) (0 .0 4 3) (0 .0 6 1 ) (0 .0 6 5
) Dis ta nc e - 0 .0 5 5 - 0 .0 2 2 - 0 .1 04 * * - 0 .0 2 9
(0 .0 3 7 ) (0 .0 3 5) (0 .0 4 6 ) (0 .0 5 1
) Typ e FE No Yes No Yes Region FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 72 72 71 71
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
35
3
6
Tab le 3 : L ead ers hi p Decapi tati on and C am pai g n T erm i nati on
DV : Te r m i n a t i o n ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) Success 0.2 7 3 * * * 0
.2 9 0 * * * 0 .2 4 9 * * * 0 .2 6 0 * * *
(0 .0 7 9 ) (0 .0 8 1 ) (0 .0 8 8 ) (0 .09 1 )
Co ns ta nt - 0 .1 4 0 * * - 0 .3 1 9 * * - 0 .2 5 9 * * - 0 .4 2 7 * *
(0 .0 6 8 ) (0 .1 2 6 ) (0 .1 1 2 ) (0 .17 9 )
Typ e FE No Yes No Yes Region FE No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.154 0.202 0.211 0.265 Observations 103 103
103 103
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Tab le 4 : L ead ers hi p Decapi tati on and C am pai g n S ucces s
DV : V i c t o r y ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) Success 0 .3 2 1 * * * 0 .3
3 8 * * * 0 .2 8 7 * ** 0 .3 10 * * *
(0 .0 7 3 ) (0 .0 7 5 ) (0 .0 8 0 ) (0 .0 8 4 ) Co
ns ta nt - 0 .1 7 3 * * - 0 .4 1 6 * * * - 0 .2 5 5 * * - 0. 50 5 * * *
(0 .0 7 5 ) (0 .1 2 9 ) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0 .1 7 1 )
Typ e FE No Yes No Yes Region FE No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.210 0.318 0.261 0.384 Observations 103 103
103 103
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
37
Tab le 5 : L ead ers hi p Decapi tati on and C onf li ct I ntens i ty
DV : I nt e n s i ty ( 1 ) ( 3 ) ( 5 ) ( 7 ) Success - 0 .7 7 4 - 1 .9
9 4 * * * - 0 .8 9 8 * * - 1 .6 3 7 * * *
(0 .4 9 4 ) (0 .4 2 6 ) (0 .4 3 2 ) (0 .4 2 0)
Co ns ta nt - 1 .6 7 7 * - 1 .6 4 0 * - 1 .3 2 8 - 1 .3 0 8
(0 .8 9 0 ) (0 .8 6 8 ) (0 .8 9 9 ) (0 .9 5 0)
Typ e FE No Yes No Yes Region FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 102 102 90 90
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Tab le 6 : L ead ers hi p Decapi tati on and I ns urg ent Attacks
DV : At t a c k s ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) Success 0 .2 1 2 - 0 .7
2 8 * * - 0 .0 9 2 - 1 .6 8 5 * * *
(0 .4 8 0 ) (0 .3 2 8 ) (0 .3 2 5 ) (0 .4 4 4
) Co ns ta nt - 0 .9 2 5 * - 1 .4 2 0 * - 0 .51 4 - 1 .3 9 2 *
(0 .5 5 2 ) (0 .8 6 0 ) (0 .3 9 9 ) (0 .8 1 1
) Typ e FE No Yes No Yes Region FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 102 102 90 90
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
38
Tab le 7 : Pred i cti ng Decapi tati on Atte m pts
DV : At t e m p t ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
De mo c ra c y 0. 03 1 0 .0 2 2 (0 .0 4 1 ) (0 .0 4 6 )
G DPPC 0 .0 4 9 * * * 0 .0 3 9* * (0 .0 1 7 ) (0 .0 1 9 )
Po pula tio n -0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 8 (0 .0 0 7 ) (0 .0 1 0 )
Ele va tio n - 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 (0 .0 0 7 ) (0 .0 0 6 )
Dis ta nc e - 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 (0 .0 0 4 ) (0 .0 0 5)
Observations 833 790 747 926 926 741 Robust standard errors in
parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
39
Tab le 8 : T he I m pact of S ucces s f ul vs . Fai led Attem pts
DV Te r m i n a t i o n V i c t o r y (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 )
Success 0 .2 8 2 * * * 0 .2 8 4 * * * 0 .2 8 4 * * * 0 .2 9 6* * * 0 .2 8 9 * * * 0 .2 8 8 * *
* (0 .0 7 2 ) (0 .0 7 3 ) (0 .0 7 4 ) (0 .0 69 ) (0 .0 7 0 ) (0 .0 7 0 )
Fa i l u r e - 0 . 0 1 0 - 0 . 0 2 2 - 0 . 0 3 0 - 0 . 0 1 6 - 0 . 0 2 2 - 0 . 0 2 1 (0 .0 3 7 ) (0 .0 3 7 ) (0
.0 3 3 ) (0 .0 27 ) (0 .0 2 8 ) (0 .0 2 8 )
Co ns ta nt 0.0 3 9 0 .1 5 5 0 .0 2 8 0 .0 2 0 0 .01 2 - 0 .2 2 0 (0 .0 3 2 ) (0 .1 1 2 )
(0 .2 5 0 ) (0 .0 27 ) (0 .0 7 0 ) (0 .1 9 3 )
Co ntro ls No Y Y No Y Y Ma tching No No Y No N o Y Pa rm p-Success 0 .0 0 0
1 7 5 0 .0 0 0 1 8 6 0 .0 0 0 2 1 0 4 .8 0 e-0 5 7 .9 7 e-05 8 .7 1 e-0 5 Pa rm p-Fa
ilure 0 .7 8 8 0 .5 6 0 0 .3 5 6 0 .5 55 0 .4 2 4 0 .4 5 0 R-squared 0.064 0.090
0.093 0.094 0.101 0.102 Observations 932 932 932 932 932 932
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1
40
Tab le 9 : S ucces s f ul Rem ovals of I ns urg ent L ead ers
Government Insurgency Lea der Ye a r Mo ro c c o Po lisa rio El- O
ua li Mus ta ph a Saye d 1976
41Indonesia Fr e t i l i n Nico la u Lo ba to 1978 Mo z a mbique
Renamo Andre Ma ts a ng a is s a 1979 Nig eria Ma ita ts ine s Mo
ha mma du Ma rwa 1980 India PLA N. Bish es wa r Sing h 1981
India PLA Tho unda m Ku nj a b e ha ri 1982 Co lo mbia M- 1 9 Ca
rlo s To le do Pla ta 1984 So ma lia SSDF Ab dulla hi Yusuf Ahmed
1984 India PR EPAK R .K. Tula cha ndra 1985 Ye m e n YSP Ab
dul Fa tta h Isma il 1986 Pa kista n MQ M Alta f Hus sai n 1986
India KCF Ma nbir Sing h Cha he ru 1986 India KLF Aro o r Si ng h
1988 India KLM Av t a r S i n g h B r a h m a 1988 India KCF La bh
Sing h 1988 Sri La nka JVP Rohana Wijeweera 1989 Pa kista n MQ
M Alta f Hus sai n 1991 Peru Shining Pa th Abima el Guzma n 1992
Cha d MDD Goukouni Guet 1992 Alg eria GIA Ma ns o uri Me lia ni
1992 India B KI Sukhdev Sing h 1992 Indonesia Fr e t i l i n Xa na
na Gusma o 1992 India KLF Gurjant Singh Budhsinghwala 1992
Cha d CNR Abba s Ko ty 1993 Alg eria GIA Ab delha k Laya da
1993 Indonesia Fr e t i l i n Anto nio G o me s da Co s ta 1993 Alg
eria GIA Che rif G o us mi 1994 Alg eria GIA Mo ura d Sid Ahme d
1994 India B TFK G urba cha n Sing h Ma no cha ha l 1994 Russia
Che che ns Dz ho kha r Dudaye v 1996 Sierra Leo ne RU F Fo d a y
S a n k o h 1997 Cha d FDR La o kein B a rde 1998 Philippine s
ASG Ab dura jik Abuba ka r Ja nja la ni 1998 Peru Shining Pa th
Oscar Ramirez 1999 Ang o la FLEC- R Anto nio Bento Bemb e
1999 Turkey PKK Ab dulla h O ca la n 1999 Sierra Leo ne RU F Fo
d a y S a n k o h 2000 India UNLF Sa ma rendra Sing h 2001 Cha d
MDJT Yo u s s o u f To g o i m i 2002 Ang o la UNITA Jo na s
Savimbi 2002 Alg eria GIA Anta r Zo ua bri 2002 Alg eria G SPC Na
bil Sa h ra o ui 2004 Russia Che che n As la n Ma s kha dov 2005
USA/ Ira q AQ I Abu Mus ab a l- Z a rqawi 2006 Philippine s ASG
Kha da ffyJanjalani 2006 Sri La nka LTTE Ve lup illa i Pra bha kara
n 2009