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Sihyun Kim
Dr. J. Elizabeth Clark
English 101.2651
12 December 2005
Solidarity: The New Face of Anti-Communism
The birth of Solidarity in 1980 in Poland is frequently credited as the staging point of the
eventually successful anticommunist movement that would sweep the entire Eastern Bloc during
the late 1980’s. Given that popular uprising against the communist regime was far from being a
novel ordeal—Poland was thrown into turmoil by major workers’ protests in 1956, 1970, and
1976—what exactly about Solidarity made it so revolutionary? It was only when the seemingly
disparate forces of popular discontent—the working class, the intelligentsia, and the Catholic
Church—came together to form a common front against the incompetence of the communist
government, which was proven repeatedly over time, that real substantial economic and political
reforms materialized. United, these people were able to focus a coordinated political movement
against a regime that had failed to establish legitimacy in the hearts and minds of the Polish
people.
Poland emerged as a ruined country by the end of World War II. Almost 40 percent of the
nation’s entire productive capacity of the country lay in ruins, and its basic infrastructures
remained virtually inoperable. Roads, bridges, and rail lines were devastated by warfare, and
some of the nation’s major cities had been virtually leveled, (Biskupski 123). In addition,
population losses were tremendous—over seven million deaths have been estimated, (Biskupski
123). It was in these dire circumstances that the communists—with key support from the Soviet
Union—rose to form the first postwar Polish government. Opposition to the communist party
was limited to Stanislaw Mikolajczyk’s Peasant Party, but the government-controlled elections
of 1947 gave the communists an overwhelming majority, (Crampton 219-220). The victorious
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communists promptly elected Bolesaw Bierut as the president of Poland, (Encyclopedia
Britannica Volume 25, 954-955). Under Bierut, the Sovietization of Poland was greatly
accelerated. The communist quickly consolidated their monopoly on power by brutally
suppressing the main organizations of political dissent: opposition parties were denounced as
illegal, subdued by terror, or neutralized and absorbed, (Biskupski 126-127). Furthermore, the
presence of a powerful military force became ubiquitous in Poland—by late 1946, 300,000
Soviet troops were menacingly stationed in the country, (Biskupski 127). The Poles found
themselves helpless to resist the increasing Stalinization of the nation’s basic infrastructures. By
the 1950’s, the Bierut regime closely followed the Stalinist model in politics (adopting the
Soviet-style 1952 constitution), and in economics (emphasizing heavy industry and forced
collectivization of agriculture), (Encyclopedia Britannica Volume 25, 955). Nevertheless, despite
these restraints on political freedom, most Poles were willing to accept the rule of the
communists if “the resulting civil order would allow them to reconstruct their devastated
country,” (Biskupski 127).
With the death of Josef Stalin on March 5, 1953, the Poles were given the hope that an
“evolution” of communism was possible, (Encyclopedia Britannica Volume 25, 955). Indeed,
with Stalin’s death, the Polish intelligentsia was allowed to enjoy the relaxation of censorship by
the government. The youth in particular were exposed to various publications such as Adam
Wazyk’s poem, “Poemat dla Doroslych” (Poem for Adults), whose bitter sarcasm and mockery
directed at the duplicity of Polish communism were widely quoted:
It's true,
when the brass trumpets of boredom
jam the great educational aim,
when vultures of abstraction eat out of our brains,
when students are shut off in textbooks without windows,
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when our language is reduced to thirty magic formulas,
when the lamp of imagination dies out,
when the good people from the moon
refuse us the right to have taste,
it's true,
then we are in danger of becoming ignorant and dull. (Livezeanu)
Wazyk’s penetrating observations were whole-heartedly received by the intelligentsia, who was
growing increasingly disillusioned by the failures of both the Soviet and the Polish governments
to “build a new world based on proletarian justice and equality,” (Crampton 284). By the
summer of 1956, the intelligentsia was fully equipped for discussions of new ideas, many of
which sought not the rejection but the perfection of socialism—a socialism with a Polish face.
These ideas were thoroughly explored in discussion groups such as the National Center for
Intellectual Cooperation, or the Krzyawe Kolo, (Crampton 284). Initially started as a forum for
discussion among intellectuals, the Krzyawe Kolo promoted passionate debates over
contemporary problems in Poland because of its willingness to discredit the failures of the
communist regime. In turn, many of the ideas formed in these discussions among intelligentsia
found their way into mainstream publications, such as Po Prostu, one of the major academic
journals that helped fuel public pressure against the communist regime, (Crampton 284).
While the intelligentsia in Poland was taking full advantage of the greater degree of
political freedom, the working class witnessed a rapid deterioration of living standards.
Immediately after the war, only a few had expected to see rapid economic progress in the
country; most tolerated and accepted austerity while the country’s basic infrastructure was being
recreated. Nevertheless, by the early 1950’s, the country’s economy was obviously stagnating, if
not regressing, (Biskupski 137). Food rationing was introduced in 1951, though not for the last
time; and by 1955 real earnings were 36 percent below the 1949 level, (Crampton 284). Despite
the regime’s desperate effort to convince its people that their continuing sacrifices were “for the
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sake of constructing socialism or starving off rapacious imperialism,” it was obvious to most
Poles that the communist control of the economy had been characterized by bureaucratization,
waste, and mismanagement of capital, (Crampton, 284). By the summer of 1956, the country
began experiencing sporadic outbreaks of worker protest over economic conditions, notably in
Poznan, (Bromke 133).
Factory unrest had been growing for months in Poznan, and the Communist party’s
obviously fabricated projections of Poland’s economic progresses had exacerbated the brewing
discontent among workers, (Biskupski 138). In late June 1956, a workers’ committee organized a
Security forces responding to the workers’ riots in Poznan
Fig 1. VideoFact International Documentary Archives. “Poznan 1956.”
general strike and a mass demonstration. On June 28, 1956, tens of thousands of workers
gathered around the city center demanding for economic changes. The demonstration was at first
peaceful, but it soon became uncontrollable and transformed into a violent force, (Bromke 133).
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When the riot broke into the city prison, 257 prisoners were released and the weapons were taken
over, (Bromke 134). Security forces promptly responded with water cannons, then small arms,
(Biskupski 138). The police action that was labeled as a “response to pro-German riot” by the
government led to massive casualties: by the next day 75 dead and 800 wounded were
confirmed. By placing the blame on “imperialist agents,” the communist regime further discredit
itself in the eyes of many who were already sickened by government’s brutal response,
(Biskupski 138).
Despite the government’s desperate attempts to quell these sporadic and isolated
demonstrations, popular dissent was quickly spreading across the nation. The rapidly
deteriorating popular support placed the Polish United Workers’ Party in a crisis—the
government was now faced with increasing scrutiny from not only the home front, but from the
international community as well (the most important being the Soviet Union), (Biskupski 139).
As a result, Wladysla Gomulka, a man who had long been hailed by reformers as uniquely
placed within the party to ease public distrust, replaced the indecisive Edward Ochab (who had
occupied the presidency following Bierut’s sudden death in February 1956), (Biskupski 139).
Upon his rise into the presidency, Gomulka immediately responded to the growing
intelligentsia’s discontent by expelling some of the worst Stalinists from the government. In
addition, Gomulka publicly denounced the abuses and excesses of the former regime and
promised many reforms. As a result, one-hundred thousand Polish political prisoners were
promptly allowed to return home from Siberia, to where they had been banished since World
War II, (Biskupski 139). The Soviet economic exploitation of Poland was brought to its end, and
the regime’s open persecution of the Catholic Church was ceased. No longer on the defensive,
the Church increasingly became a powerful force for change over the next few decades,
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(Crampton 287). In addition, the collectivization of agriculture was brought to an end, never to
be resumed, (Biskupski 139). Socialism thus was never allowed to establish itself among the
farmers in the countryside, individuals who are deemed vital to the formation of communism
under Marxism. For this reason, Gomulka was initially received with popular support among
Poles for his notion of a “Polish road to socialism,” (Biskupski, 140). His reforms essentially
ended the increasing Sovietization and Russification that had been under way in Poland. The
removal of Russians from many official posts—the most notable figure being Rokossovsky—
was a symbol of this change, (Biskupski, 140).
However, the truth was that most of the concessions made by the Gomulka regime proved
short-lived. The promised overhaul of the economy never materialized, and the political
relaxation of Gromulka’s regime regarding censorship was quickly overturned. Gromulka was
ultimately exposed as a narrow-minded anti-Semite who somehow managed to maintain absolute
control of the country, (Biskupski 140). The fact that Gomulka’s regime became more
authoritarian as his tenure in office grew greatly compromised the political and economic victory
won by the intelligentsia and the working-class, (Biskupski 140). Nevertheless, what one has to
realize is that the widespread popular uprisings that shook Poland in 1956 were, for the most
part, unfocused and disorganized, (Biskupski 140). While the intellectuals took advantage of the
relaxation of censorship to express their unhappiness over the political constraints that were
brought about by communism, the working-class rose up in demonstrations to fight for the better
living conditions that the communist party had repeatedly failed to fulfill. Meanwhile, the
church, an organization that had “traditionally regarded itself as the defender of the national
heritage,” (and, therefore, vital in the fight against a government that had never been granted
sovereignty from its people) played no significant role in the movement because of the
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government’s heavy repression, (Biskupski 135-136). In other words, the various forces of
discontent could not yet be focused into a coordinated movement of resistance against the
communist government. It was only when the intelligentsia, the working-class, and the church
coalesced into the unified social movement of Solidarity during the 1980’s that the shackles of
communism were finally being unraveled, (Biskupski 145).
For the time being, Gomulka’s regime managed to stay in power until 1970, when it
finally met its end after a series of insensitive economic measures. On December 12, 1970,
Gomulka announced heavy increases on the price of basic consumer goods—for instance, the
prices of meat and meat products were increased by 17.6 percent—just when the public could be
assumed to be in the midst of major holiday purchases, (Bromke 148-149). Weary by the
seemingly endless privation that was clearly felt in the quality of life, the working-class erupted.
The first to rise up in protest were the workers of Gdansk, who threatened to interrupt work
should the government fail to gain control over the nation’s economic problems, (Bromke 149).
On December 14, several thousands of workers entered the city’s shipyards in protest. However,
the workers, for the most part, lacked discipline and coordination—issues that the intelligentsia
and the Church would skillfully help resolve for the workers later on in Solidarity—and the
initially peaceful demonstrations quickly turned into a destructive riot. Public buildings were
vandalized; newspaper kiosks and buses were burned and destroyed; the Provincial Committee
building was set on fire; and the railroad station was devastated, halting national commute,
(Bromke 150). The local communist officials were unable to defuse the situation, and the riots
quickly spread along the Baltic coast; the violence reached Elblag, and eventually as far as
Szczecin, (Biskupski 145). In response to the growing chaos that was engulfing the nation in an
alarming scale, Gomulka ordered a team of high-level officials to the region and sealed off
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communication. In addition, the regime declared a state of emergency and sent the army into the
area to reestablish government control, (Biskupski 145). Gomulka, whose control of the nation
had grown increasingly totalitarian over time, denounced the workers as counterrevolutionaries
and downright refused to initiate negotiations. On the contrary, Gomulka decided to use force,
rather than politics to restore order. By this time, however, the politburo declared that Gomulka
had lost control of the situation and subsequently removed him from his post, replacing him with
Edward Gierek, a Silesian miner with a reputation for “toughness and managerial competence”
as first secretary, (Biskupski 146).
The spontaneous workers’ uprising of 1970 brought a new regime into power, and under
Gierek, the future of Poland initially seemed very promising. Upon his rise to power, Gierek
promptly “blamed all Poland’s woes upon the Gomulka regime’s having ‘lost touch with the
masses,’ which was undoubtedly true,” (Biskupski 152). To gain public support, Gierek made
numerous direct visits to the striking factories at the Baltic cities to relieve workers’ tensions
with promises of improved conditions and stirring pleas for cooperation and trust, (Crampton
359). Gierek’s daring approaches were surprisingly successful and helped him consolidate his
position within the communist party, (Biskupski 153). By the end of 1971, Gierek had
successfully quelled the popular discontent that had ultimately brought down his predecessor.
Nevertheless, the truth was that Gierek was in a more precarious position as president in 1971
than Gomulka had been when he came to power in 1956—the public was far more disillusioned
with the promises of the government than it had been years before, (Biskupski 153). Hence,
Gierek’s early accomplishments as president would be quickly forgotten unless he could
somehow devise sweeping reforms to help Poland escape from its deepening economic
problems.
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Gierek’s solution to ease the turmoil of his country reflected in many ways his
predecessor’s political philosophy: by improving the economy, the regime’s legitimacy as the
rightful government of its people can be bought, (Biskupski 153). In February 1971, Gierek
announced a daring new economic plan that forecasted increased government spending on
investments with rapid improvements in the standard of living. His plan was an extremely
ambitious one that would essentially do “everything at the same time and all in a big way,”
(Biskupski 153). Gierek envisioned that industry would expand its production by two-thirds;
national income would nearly double; and investment would increase by almost a quarter
annually. At the same time, Gierek held that Poland would experience major expansion and
renovation of its infrastructures, improvements in public education, and dramatic increases in the
supply of consumer goods, (Biskupski 153).
However, like Gomulka, Gierek proved to exhibit extremely poor managerial abilities as
the head of the Polish state. His entire ambitious project rested on an extremely insecure
foundation—the transformation of the Polish economy was made possible by money borrowed
from the West. In other word, communism would thus “mortgage itself to capitalism,”
(Biskupski 154). Ultimately, Gierek’s economic reforms were founded on a huge gamble that not
only depended on the continued flow of money from Western European and American banks but
also assumed the fact that Poland will inevitably penetrate Western markets successfully,
(Crampton 361). Unfortunately for Gierek, the Poland’s successful infiltration into the world
market never materialized; although exports had increased 66 percent by 1975, imports had
soared 104 percent during the same period of time, (Biskupski 154). In addition, borrowed
money was often squandered and wastefully invested, placing Poland in a catastrophic position
when the creditors began to press for repayment. The Polish economy once again sank under the
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same rigid practices that had doomed it during the regime of Gierek’s predecessor:
bureaucratization, irrational pricing of consumer goods and resource distribution, poor
productivity of industry, and inefficient use of capital, (Biskupski 154). The obvious failure of
Gierek’s economic agenda once again demonstrated the communist regime’s inability to secure
the welfare of the Polish people. Failure in the economic front left the government without any
justification for power for “they certainly had done nothing to legitimate their authority which
rested ultimately on coercion and inertia rather than on popular support,” (Biskupski 151). By the
mid 1970’s, communism was now a remnant of the past; the Poles now saw it as an ideology that
was plagued by unfulfilled promises and bureaucracy, (Biskupski 151).
Social discontent, which had receded in the initial years of Gierek’s presidency, had once
again returned. This time, however, the Church emerged as one of its constituent. In response to
the government’s obvious mismanagement of the economy, Cardinal Wyszynski, in his “Holy
Cross Sermons”, declared that the Polish people reserved the indissoluble right to “live in dignity
and justice” and condemned the “omnipotence of the state.” In addition, he reminded his fellow
Poles that “patriotism was the highest value, superseded only by faith in God,” (Biskupski 155).
In a country where 98% of the population was Catholic, the words of Cardinal Wyszynski
unsurprisingly struck a resonant chord, (Darnton. sec 1:1). But more importantly, the already
existing intelligentsia movement that pressed for human rights and the preservation of the Polish
identity in the midst of Sovietization began to find common ground with the Church, (Biskupski
155). Finally, as the Church and the intelligentsia were forming intellectual and personal links,
two of the three main forces of popular discontent were beginning to coalesce into a single social
movement of opposition against the communist regime.
The worsening economic situation and the united religious and intellectual front against
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Gierek’s government came together in 1976 to set stage for the eventual birth of the Solidarity
movement. On June 24, 1976, Gierek, who had obviously learned nothing from the mistakes of
his predecessor, announced huge price increases, ranging as high as 100 percent on consumer
goods, (Biskupski 156). As a result, Poland was once again thrown into turmoil by massive
mobilizations of workers throughout the country. When the first strikes emerged in Ursus, the
huge tractor factory district near Warsaw, the authorities promptly responded by cutting off the
city’s communications with the rest of the country. Confrontation between the workers and the
police ensued, leading to 300 arrests, (Biskupski 156). In similar fashion, 1,000 workers in
Radom seized the city’s Provincial Committee headquarters and essentially took control of the
city. The local authorities recaptured Radom only after the exertion of considerable police
brutality, (Bromke 169). Desperate to resolve the social turmoil among workers, Gierek
immediately withdrew the price increases that he had announced only days before. However,
Gierek, unable to forecast the possible consequences to his rash decisions, seized and sentenced
hundreds of strikers to lengthy jail terms without proper investigation or fair trials, (Biskupski
156). The apparent abandonment of basic legal practices wholly provoked the intellectuals and
the Church, groups that had become increasingly united since Cardinal Wyszynski’s sermon in
1975. As a result, several of the most prominent members of the intellectual and religious
coalition gathered to create the Committee of Workers’ Defense (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow,
or KOR), which was established from the contact initiated by the intellectuals with the relatives
of the workers who were brought to trial, (Biskupski 156-157). Originally formed to gather funds
for and to give legal assistance to the workers, the KOR eventually reformed itself into the
Committee for Social Self-Defense (Komitet Samoobrony Spolecznej/KOR, or KSS/KOR),
(Crampton 364). From care for the individual, the organization shifted to concern for the
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working class as a whole, effectively placing a critical blow on the Polish United Workers’ Party
that had been posing as the best defender of workers’ right from the onset, (Crampton 364).
Finally, the various forces of social discontent coalesced into a coordinated movement of
resistance. The workers, the intellectuals, and the Church had come to the realization that their
economic, political, and nationalistic woes were all caused by the same ailment—the utter
incompetence of the communist regime. The beginnings of the Solidarity movement had now
been established.
The strength of the new union of the workers, the intellectuals, and the Church was
finally tested in 1980. On July 1, 1980, Gierek announced price increases, once again sending the
nation into political turmoil, (Biskupski 159). The new pricing system of consumer goods,
especially that of meat, provoked a series of strikes, the first being in the Ursus, (Crampton 367).
The authorities, fully aware of the possible consequences after having witnessed similar workers’
uprisings in the past, rushed more meat into the shops and agreed to a number of wage increases,
(Crampton 367). Despite the government’s efforts to prevent the spread of unrest through its
massive campaign of censorship, the KSS/KOR played a critical role in reporting the dynamic
developments through its networks of communication, (Biskupski 159). The strikes quickly
spread to Lublin where an eight-day general strike virtually paralyzed the rail link between the
Soviet Union and the Red Army garrisons in East Germany, (Crampton 367). By the first week
of August, the strike movement had spread throughout the country with the city of Gdansk as its
focal point, (Crampton 376). Gierek, alarmed by the disturbing repetition of the same political
and economic instability that had provoked the 1970 riots, flew back from his vacation hoping to
contain the unrest, (Crampton 367). When Gierek directly confronted the striking workers in his
attempt to initiate negotiations, he encountered a crowd that bore no resemblance to the one that
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greeted him eagerly a decade earlier. According to British historian R. J. Crampton, “[T]his time
[Gierek’s] opponents were of a different ilk: they were far more disciplined; they were not
committed to socialism or the party; they were determined not to be bought off with workers’
councils which were open to party subversion and they were artfully advised, though never
dominated, by leading members of the intelligentsia,” (Crampton 367). The workers’ movement
that Gierek encountered in 1980 was nothing like the earlier demonstrations that sparked violent
worker riots throughout Poland. The workers, aided by the legal advices from the intelligentsia
and the moral support from the Church, had a clear agenda and were not easily swayed by the
insincere display of compassion from the government, (Lewis sec 4:5). The communists now
found themselves confronted with an opponent that could not be placated with tactics used in
similar uprisings in the past, (Lewis sec 4: 5) And hence united the three elements that had
repeatedly troubled the communist regime throughout the years: the working class, the
intelligentsia, and the Church—now working together in solidarity.
Within a few days of strikes, the workers’ unrest in Gdansk encompassed 360 factories
and other enterprises, involving well over 150,000 workers, (Darnton sec 1:1). In order to
coordinate action and to maintain discipline and order, the main leaders of the factory strikes
(most notable being Lech Walesa, a moustached electrician who would rise in the movement to
become the first democratically elected president of Poland) convened to form the Inter-Factory
Strike Committees (Miedzyzakladowy Komitet Strajkowy, or MKS), nicknamed Solidarity
(Solidarnosc), (Biskupski 159-160). The Gdansk MKS patched together twenty-one demands
that they would propose to the authorities, the most important being the right to form an
independent union. Some of the major demands included: increases in income; relaxation of
political censorship; freeing of political prisoners; and a series of economic issues that insisted
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on the government’s honesty in regards to the nation’s economic conditions, (Crampton 367).
Unsurprising, Gierek downright refused to acquiesce to Solidarity’s demands and subsequently
ordered a wave of arrests to capture the prominent intellectuals, (Biskupski 160). Unfortunately
for the Polish president, his actions were futile; Gierek had ultimately little choice but to
concede. The strikes were rapidly spreading—they spread westward to Szczecin, where another
MKS that represented 86 factories and about 50,000 workers emerged—and the workers began
to go beyond the advice of their intellectual advisers, (Darnton sec 1:1) Despite his repeated
incompetence in economic affairs, Gierek wisely recognized that the last thing Poland could
endure was another disturbance of economic activity, (Crampton 368). For this reason, the
government’s negotiations with Solidarity began. On August 30, 1980, the communist
Lech Walesa concluding the negotiations in celebration
Fig 2. Lech Walesa Institute. “Photo Gallery.” 2004
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government of Poland capitulated to every single demand made by Solidarity—the first of
Solidarity’s many victories, (Biskupski 161).
Of course, much work was left to be done. The fight to win the right to form independent
unions was just one of many challenges Solidarity had to face. The movement would face its
greatest challenge upon the rise of Wojciech Jaruzelski, the last communist president of Poland
who tried to suppress the movement by declaring martial law on December 13, 1981, (Biskupski
164-165). Nevertheless, the communist regime had lost every bit of credibility by this time, and
the fact that the membership in Solidarity continued to grow even during the period of heavy
government suppression made it apparent that the movement had gained the popular support that
both Gomulka and Gierek tried desperately to garner during their terms as president, (Crampton
379-380). For more than seven years, Jaruzelski’s regime tried to resuscitate the nation’s
economy without having to negotiate with Solidarity and heeding to democratic reforms.
However, Jaruzelski was equally inept in economics as were his predecessors: “industrial
Lech Walesa in 1988, addressing striking workers at Gdansk
Fig 3. Academy of Achievement. “Lech Walesa” 5 February 2005
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production fell steadily, while the foreign debt climbed to $39.2 billion and inflation crept
toward 100%,” (Sancton). Unable to pacify another round of public discontent throughout the
nation in 1988, the communist regime abandoned its steadfast stance against reforms and agreed
to negotiate with Solidarity. The government promised that it would “not back away from the
road of democracy and reforms,” and appealed to Solidarity to accept “co-responsibility” for
running the nation, (Sancton). However, the legitimacy of the communist government was now
far from being redeemable. Solidarity, a movement that, at its height, encompassed ten million
members (almost half of the adult population of the country), emerged as the true authority of the
Polish people, (Crampton 368). The Poles were no longer interested in reforming the existing
economic and political system; Solidarity represented a clear alternative to the incompetent
communist government that had ruled the nation for nearly half a century. Indeed, when the first
truly democratic elections in Poland took place in June 1989, Solidarity-backed candidates won
92 of 100 seats in the newly created Senate and 160 of 161 seats in the Parliament, (Sancton). In
the end, a movement that had initially emerged as a free trade union became a movement of
national liberation, (Crampton 368). With the birth of the Solidarity, communism had finally met
its doom in the hearts and minds of the Poles; it would be a matter of few years before
communism would accept its defeat in Poland.
Ultimately, the birth of Solidarity was an unprecedented event not only in Poland, but
also in the entire Eastern bloc. Solidarity was a movement that encompassed the interests of three
seemingly disparate groups: the workers, the intellectuals, and the Church. Yet, the fact that
these groups with different agenda were able to realize that their toils were caused by the same
entity—the communist government that had miserably failed to ensure the economic stability of
the nation—gave Solidarity great longevity. The workers, the class that is theoretically in power
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in a communist society, had always been the key figures behind the major uprisings that had
consistently challenged the legitimacy of the communist regime under Gomulka, Gierek, and
eventually Wojciech Jaruzelski, the last president of the Polish People’s Republic. Nevertheless,
because the workers merely pressed for better living standards (In other words, the working class
had never developed the concept of overthrowing communism; they merely wanted to reform the
already existing economic system.), substantial gains from their protests never materialized. It
was only when the workers were joined by the intelligentsia, who provided the workers with
legal advices, and the Church, who provided the workers the sense of a “Polish identity”, that
real economic and political reforms of Polish society were possible.
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Annotated Bibliography
Academy of Achievement. “Lech Walesa” 5 February 2005
<http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/photocredit/achievers/wal1-011>
I used this website for the 3rd picture in my research paper.
Biskupski, M. B. The History of Poland. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000.
This has to be the most important source I have had during the process of writing the
research paper. The book discusses communism in Poland through a chronological approach, and
it has been especially helpful because of Biskupski’s constant analysis of history in regards to its
eventual outcome. The author repeatedly goes back and forth along the historical timeline, and
clearly explains why certain events have important repercussions later on.
This book is the source that helped me form my thesis—that the success of the Solidarity
movement was due to the strong coalition of the workers, the intelligentsia, and the Church.
Biskupski, while discussing the larger history that led to the formation of Solidarity, explains
how workers in previous protests were unable to achieve substantial reforms because they were
fighting for change by themselves.
Bromke, Adam. Eastern Europe in the Aftermath of Solidarity. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1985.
This book provides an extremely detailed explanation of the workers riots that sent
Poland into turmoil in 1956, 1970, and 1976. It meticulously outlines exactly what happened
during these riots. Bromke describes the disorder of the workers in full detail, and this book
ultimately has helped me understand why these uprisings failed to bring substantial reforms in
Poland. I have used this book to supplement the more general histories discussed in the other
sources that I have used for this research paper.
Crampton, R. J. Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century. New York: Routledge, 1997.
Along with Biskupski’s, Crampton’s book has to be one of the most useful sources I have
used for my research paper. This source discusses the history of Eastern Europe, so the history of
Poland is more abridged than it is in Biskupski’s The History of Poland. However, the one
advantage that Crampton’s book has over Biskupski’s is the fact that this book discusses not only
the history of Poland, but also that of other Eastern European nations. This source has helped me
understand the history of Poland through an international context, which has been an important
factor in my final discussion that the Solidarity movement was not revolutionary in Poland alone,
but in the entire Eastern bloc.
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Darnton, John. “Polish Government Agrees to Dealings with Strike Panel.” New York Times
24 August 1980, late ed., sec 1:1.
This New York Times article illustrates the birth of the Solidarity movement. Darnton
wrote this article as the first negotiations between Solidarity and the government were taking
place. The article was written in a world where the total collapse of communism was
unforeseeable. In other words, the article has helped me understand the dynamic changes that
were occurring in Poland in 1980 through the perspectives of those who had the chance to
witness them firsthand.
Lech Walesa Institute. “Photo Gallery.” 2004
<http://www.ilw.org.pl/english/gallery.html>
I used this website for the 2nd picture in my research paper.
Lewis, Flora. “Polish Strikes Give New (Red)Face to.” New York Times 27 July 1980, late ed.,
sec 4: 5.
This article was written before the first negotiations between Solidarity and the
government took place, so the author wrote it without the benefit of knowing the successes the
movement would enjoy later on. The article has helped me better understand how the coalition of
the working-class, the intelligentsia, and the Church in the form of Solidarity formed a body of
resistance that the government could not easily suppress.
Livezeanu, Irina. “East European History Readings.”
<http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/eehistory/H200Readings/Topic3-R3.html>
Because I had repeatedly encountered Adam Wazyk’s poem “Poemat dla Doroslych”
throughout my research, I decided to find a copy of it. Although it is short, the poem is filled
with numerous attacks directed against the fallacies of the Polish communist government. It has
helped me understand what the intelligentsia’s grievances were during the political crisis of
1956.
“Poland.” The New Encyclopedia Britannica (Macropedia: Knowledge in Depth). 2002 ed.
This was the first source I’ve used during my research. Because it is an encyclopedia, it
has helped me gain a very general understanding of Poland’s history from World War II to the
fall of communism in the nation. Through this source, I learned that there had been many
Kim 20
workers’ protests before the creation of Solidarity. It was because of this knowledge that I was
able to form my basic argument: just what about the Solidarity movement made it so
revolutionary? It was after reading this encyclopedia that I truly began my research.
Sancton, Thomas A., Kenneth W. Banta, John Borrell, and John Kohan. “Poland : A Humiliation
for the Party But Solidarity handles victory with clam and realism.” Time Magazine, 19
June 1989.
This article was written shortly after Poland’s first historic democratic elections. The
communists were swept away by the overwhelming popular support that was enjoyed by the
Solidarity-backed candidates. The eventual overthrow of communism was still unimaginable at
the time, but the writer wrote with the knowledge that the communists were rapidly losing
authority in the nation. What was especially useful about this article was its descriptions of how
Solidarity emerged as the “alternative” to communism. No longer were people interested in
reforming communism; people were now seeking other forms of political and economic
leadership to help them reverse the wrongs that the communist regime had created.
VideoFact International Documentary Archives. “Poznan 1956.”
<http://www.videofact.com/cold_war/poznan/poznan1956e.htm>
I used this website for the 1st picture on my research paper.