4th Manfred Lachs Conference on
27th – 28th May 2016
McGill University, Montreal, Canada
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GNSS AND CONFLICT: INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
SANAT KAUL
CHAIRMAN
IFFAAD (INDIA CHAPTER)
GNSS and Conflict: Indian Perspective
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 GNSS, is perhaps the biggest achievement after the
internet which is impacting our daily lives.
 Our dependence on GNSS is increasing by the day
without realizing its vulnerability.
 This technology is dual use and can be used to items
like precision bombing.
 It has been claimed by European Commission that 67% of GDP in western countries i.e. Euro 800 million
in EU is dependent upon GNSS
Vulnerabilities of GNSS
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 The main problem with GNSS is that its signals are
weak.
 Transmitted from a distance of 20,000-25,000 kms
when received on the surface of earth they are less
than 100 watts.
 Ionospheric, especially ionospheric storms and
tropospheric disturbances also take place and then
the signals need correction.
 Augmentation systems like WAAS, EGNOS, GAGAN
and M-SAT are correcting it.
State interference in GNSS
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 GNSS is also vulnerable to human interference. In a
recent news item it was stated that North Korea tried
to jam GPS signals from South Korea. While it did
not lead any major disturbance but over 30
fishermen reported problem with their navigation
systems. This is a dangerous event especially if it
state sponsored.
Ionospheric Disturbances
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 It is noted ionospheric scintillation impacts are
significantly worsened by intentional or accidental
jamming. Navigation loss can be mitigated by deeply
integrated GNSS-INTERTIAL Navigation System.
 Resilience to ionopheric effects can be somewhat
improved through use of signals from multiple
constellations.
 Therefore receivers that are inter-operable between
GPS, GLONASS and in future GALILEO, have
already become available in the market.
Atomic Clock
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 Another aspect of vulnerability of GNSS, especially
in the space segment, is the Atomic Clock.
 GNSS is highly dependent upon the predictable
performance of the atomic clock carried on board the
satellites.
 Occasionally these clocks produce errors and behave
unpredictably leading to huge errors.
 While Atomic Clock can be repaired and replaced on
ground, it is not possible on a satellite.
Radiation impact on Satellites
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 Radiation impact on satellites can be yet another
cause of defect. While passing through a radiation
belt around earth especially during solar storm,
unpredictable behaviour can take place leading to
errors.
Ground Vulnerability
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 GPS ground stations are designed to withstand
military attacks.
 But they are still vulnerable to cyber attacks.
 As more GPS ground stations are created, more
targets would become vulnerable.
User Section Vulnerability
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 GNSS user section is extremely divert and vulnerable.
Different manufacturing designs provide different level
of receivers. Some receivers are embedded in mass
market products like mobile phones. There are also good
receivers like military receivers capable of decryption and
certified safe receivers like those for aviation purposes.
 Diversity of receivers means that vulnerability will not
effect all equally but could effect the weaker one.
 There is no oversight of GNSS signals vulnerability as the
range of services increase day by day. No one can predict
the reliability as a consequence of interference.
Non-deliberate interference
(at ground level)
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 Multi-path vulnerability: GNSS signals are
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subject to getting
reflected off relatively different objects i.e. buildings and can
cause gross error in position activities.
More subtle errors are caused when direct and reflective signals
merge together causing lower precision code and carrier phase
measurement.
Multi-path errors, can at time, cause errors of ten to hundred of
meters.
GNSS receivers have come out with antennas, filtering and
processing techniques to overcome multi-path variations with
only some degree of success.
Spoofing (false signals) and Meacoing (delay and rebroadcast)
both of which are reloaded erroneous satellites ephemerals are
currently less common in jamming.
Ionospheric disturbances, especially over equator, can cause
scintillation which in turn disrupt signals. India’s augmentation
satellite GAGAN is supposed to take care of this.
Deliberate Interference
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 Three types of deliberate interferences: jamming,
spoofing and meacoing.
 Jamming is a deliberate act. Cheap jammers costing
around 10 dollars can be plugged in car socket. Their
most popular use is to bypass police speed radars but
can interfere with GNSS signals. Jammers are also
used by terrorists.
 Automatic Identification System (AIS) is used on
ships for identification based on GNSS. However,
poachers and smugglers can bypass by jamming it.
Government Reaction to GNSS Interference
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 Some governments have woken up to this issue.
 Project GEMNET-UK was a collaborative effort by the
Satellite Application Catapult and Ordinance Survey in
UK to monitor GNSS radio spectrum at number of UK
locations. With the use of jammers and other
interference with the aim of setting up GEMNET near
critical national infrastructure. The result was that the
survey grade receivers were robust to about 33 DB
jammers. Therefore, in case common jammers become
1000 times more powerful than those operating today,
GNSS signals were considered safe in the existing sites.
Project Maritime
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 Project Maritime was carried out by Light House
Authorities of UK & Ireland with Ministry of Defence
and Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (DSPL)
to test GNSS signals for maritime activities, DSPL
provided a professional a low to medium power
jammer which was controlled remotely by two VHF
trans-receivers and transmitted a known pseudo
random noise code.
 When the ship Pole Star entered the jamming zone,
numerous alarms sounded on the bridge showing the
failure of different functions to acquire and calculate
their GPS position. This included vessels D-GPS
receivers, AIS transponders, the dynamic positioning
system, the ships gyro calibration system and the
digital selective calling system.
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 In US in 2005, in a military jamming exercise in
Idaho, caused disruption of life of truckers and
tractor drivers whose signals were disrupted was
reported.
State Responsibility
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 US government’s accountability office has tasked the
US Executive in 2014 to develop backup capability in
response potential both natural and manmade
threats to GPS system with a view to detect and
mitigate GPS interference.
 The Russian Ministry of Defence has launched a
project to secure GLONASS against enemies
destructive systems with a 300 million rubels grant
to two Russian institutions.
UN Response
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 The Russian Federation jointly with UN office of
Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) and Federation of
Space Agency co-organized a workshop with 21
countries to discuss the issue of possible networking
for joint efforts on issues of risk, mitigation and
corrections of GNSS signals from interference.
 They also discussed use of GNSS signals for disaster
monitoring and support.
 A proposal to set up an international education and
training centre with regional centres in Morocco,
India, Brazil, China has been approved.
ICAO and GNSS
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 According to ICAO, GNSS signals from satellites are very weak at
the receiver antenna and therefore are vulnerable to interference.
While services provided by conventional aides can also be disrupted
by interference, since GNSS serves more aircraft simultaneously the
interference will impact a wide geographic area.
 Therefore, GNSS receivers must meet specified performance
requirement as defined in Annex 10 of the Chicago Convention
along with ITU Recommendations.
 Avionics standards also require that such interference shall not
result in hazardous misleading information.
 Since current GNSS approvals use a single frequency band common
to GPS, GLONASS, it makes it easier to intentionally jam GNSS
signals as well as unintentional interference. With greater use of
ADS-B in the aviation, this vulnerability needs a greater study.
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 Another great potential user of GNSS is aviation.
With ADS-B becoming popular, a big challenge for
the aviation community will be the reliability of
GNSS signals. US FAA has mandated all aircrafts to
be equipped with ADS-B by January, 2020.
 ICAO has emphasized the states responsibility in
prohibiting all actions leading to disruptions in
GNSS signals.
Mitigating GNSS Vulnerability Indian
Perspective
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 Considering GNSS vulnerability and full dependence
on GPS at present, India has tried multi-GNSS
options between GPS and GLONASS signals. The
results show improvement in reliability.
Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System
(IRNSS)
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 In order to provide stronger and more reliable GNSS signals,
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India has setup its own seven satellite based regional navigation
satellite system showing an accuracy of 15 meters for 20 hours a
day in India. These signals use both single frequency L-5 and also
transmit in S-Band which experience minimal Ionospheric errors.
IRNSS is also designed to be compatible with other GNSS services
thereby providing improved accuracy covering the Indian land
mass and 1,500 kms beyond its boundary.
Between GAGAN and IRNSS, India is laying down its own GNSS
policy and is attempting to meet and mitigate deficiency of
service, vulnerability of existing GNSS and its need for selfreliance in satellite navigation.
It has also convened a GNSS users meet on the theme towards
self reliance in satellite navigation.
Further, as part of India’s Digital India Policy, India is keen to
involve IRNSS, GAGAN with India’s mapping service BHUVAN
with an acronym ‘BIG’.
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 Airports Authority of India is developing GAGAN
based approach procedures and conducting flight
tests at various airports to use GAGAN signals within
Indian Aerospace.
 GAGAN is also being used in surveying, road
transport, railways, precision farming, urban
development, forestry and other timing applications.
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Thank you