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Stewart Kincaid
Dr. Michael Turner
Europe Since 1715: A Political and Social History
6 December 2010
The origins of the two World Wars are complicated. Students of various ages,
nationalities, ethnicities, and grade levels are familiar with these complicated origins as they are
taught social studies in today’s modern schools. Depending on the institution, interests, and
curiosities of the students, these doses they receive in social studies can be of endlessly varying
quantities. Some students will learn only what is introduced in the opening statement. Other
students will go further and seek more knowledge. Ask an overwhelming majority of people in
the world what it is they know about the origins of either of the two World Wars and they will
likely respond with an answer stating the explanation is complicated. It is only when one
engages with the appropriate literature and scholars that they will truly find more appropriate
answers to such complicated subjects. What follows is not a presentation of research concerning
the percentage of people who know the causes of the World Wars. What will be found is an
appreciation of several scholars’ interpretations of how the First World War and Second World
Wars originated by examining two reputable books: The Origins of the First World War, Third
Edition by James Joll and Gordon Martel and The Origins of World War Two; The Debate
Continues, edited by Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo.
The Origins of the First World War, Third Edition, published in 2007, first appeared in
print in Great Britain in its first edition in 1984. In the introduction, Joll and Martel give credit
to many different scholars who have placed emphases on different causes of the war. One of the
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most noted in the earlier studies of World War One’s origins was Fritz Fischer. Fischer, a
German, placed much of the blame for the first war upon Germany, and took a position that
created much controversy by explaining that Germany went to war in 1914 to annex other lands
in and out of Europe (Joll 5). It is made clear in their own words in the introduction that in this
book, Joll and Martel seek a middle ground or moderate approach more comparable to Samuel
Williamson’s Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War that points fingers away
from people, like the Germans, that would take offense in a blame game. What Joll and Martel
do in presenting their middle ground approach is create a fair balance of issues dealing with the
alliance system and its numerous flaws; the arms race and war planning games; the problems
created by the political ambitions of certain leaders in control of prideful countries. They present
two separate chapters that address topics that naturally complement each other: economies and
empires. The topics are woven together with engaging opening and closing sections labeled,
“The July crisis,” explaining how the stage had been set years before for Europe to collapse, and
“The Mood of 1914,” which recognizes the voices of many of the smaller figures in history that
are often overlooked when studying such an intricate topic just before the book’s conclusion.
In the opening chapter, “The July crisis, 1914,” Joll and Martel present a trend that will
remain throughout the book: Germany as the aggressor and Britain as the defender of Europe.
After the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary delivered a stringent
list of demands that Serbia was to agree on to avoid war. This list of demands, designed to be
rejected, was supported by the German leaders. Germany was chomping at the bit. They could
not wait for war; this was their chance, “the German government was pressing for immediate
Austrian military operations against Serbia because ‘any delay in commencing military
operations is regarded... as a great danger because of the interference of other powers’”(Joll 21).
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Britain expresses its concern through Sir Edward Grey’s excerpt provided on page twenty; he
foresees a dark future for Europe.
Keith Robbins has pointed out in his excerpt published in The English Historical Review,
that it is “not a diplomatic history in a narrow sense, though there is a sound assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of the alliance system and the ‘old diplomacy’.” The diplomacy of
Europe was conducted by the elites and was done secretly, hence the label of being old. A small,
but important detail of the old diplomacy was spying. Espionage had become a normal practice,
which led to heightened anxieties among the leaders of rival nations. Interestingly, Joll and
Martel point in their last chapter, “The Mood of 1914,” that even novelists in Europe like
Britain’s William Le Queux were gaining popularity with works like England’s Peril, published
in 1899 “which focused on French espionage in London” (Joll 289). A larger theme of this
chapter, one that provides less entertainment than the previously mentioned, is the alliance
system generally. Joll and Martel state that the “two treaties of alliance that were of central
importance in the July crisis of 1914 were the German-Austrian treaty of 1879 and the FrancoRussian alliance of 1893” (Joll 54). The chapter does a good job explaining how alliances had
been designed to balance power in Europe, but instead they did just the opposite (Joll 51-71).
In the chapter titled, “Militarism, Armaments, and Strategy,” the immediate blame for
war focuses on Germany, acting aggressively, building up its navy to challenge the strength of
Britain. The best summary of the arms race factor of war is presented on page 115. Joll and
Martel profess that Germany - joined by Austria-Hungary and Serbia - paved the way for an
offensive war in what would be labeled by most countries a defensive one. “Each government
reacted to the military and naval preparations of its neighbors... regardless of their political
system” (Joll 115). If not for Germany setting the standards for this military competition and the
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feeling by Britain that it had to check and balance the situation, war may have been avoided.
This is a powerful but plausible argument.
Politics and Economics are well presented as origins that merit recognition. However,
they do not occupy the same importance placed on the military building of the countries, the old
diplomacy and alliance system, or the imperialistic nature of the war. Joll and Martel do present
the politics and economics of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and Britain as contributing
factors to the military and imperial competition among them. German Weltpolitik is emphasized.
Weltpolitik was used to support the naval build up and arms race that squashed internal political
rivalries and drove national attention in a direction that encouraged patriotism and unity in
Germany (Joll 144). The Kaiser and General Tirpitz used their powerful positions of authority to
silence Bethmann Hollweg who believed war would destroy the status quo. Neither the Kaiser
nor General would allow such dissent (Joll 144-151). Economically, German encirclement was
forwarded as French and Russian economic links presented a cause for concern in Germany.
German, despite numerous attempts, could not secure any financial agreements with Russia.
Austro-Hungarian politics followed similar policies of Germany: stomp the opposition by using
foreign policy to sweep domestic problems under the rug, which in one instance was done by
denying Slavic autonomy (Joll 155). France and Britain, like Germany and Austria-Hungary had
domestic problems as well. They however tended to be more maturely willing to deal with their
domestic problems directly (Joll 169, 172).
Imperialism is credited by Joll and Martel as one of the most important causes of the war.
Without directly admitting it, imperialism stands out as the leader. Keith Robbins makes a
reference to this section of the book in his book review from 1987. Robbins criticizes Joll and
Martel for not providing simple explanations of how imperialism applied to the war, but it is a
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difficult cause of the war to be simplified. In contrast, certain pages do adequately summarize
the conflicts occurring among Germany, France, Britain, and Russia. Page 220 explains how
Germany did not have colonial holdings during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
In order to keep up with their European neighbors, the Germans pursued policies in the early
twentieth century that aimed at aggressively acquiring colonies to purposefully boost their
international prestige. As a developing country, Germany - unlike France and Britain - did not
have long term, organized plans for what purposes their colonies should serve. Thus, they were
unsurprisingly destined to clash with the established status quo, which additionally had made
ententes that excluded Germany. Encirclement yet again is the psychological result in Germany.
By 1907, the hatchet had been buried between the Great Powers, referring specifically to the
agreements between Britain, France, and Russia; Britain and Russia signed the Anglo-Russian
entente in 1907 and 1904 saw the initiation of the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain
(Joll 224). Germany did not fit in with this group and thus became the lonely, dangerous
outsider (Joll 220, 224, 236).
In 2003, The Penguin Group published a book by Hew Strachan simply titled, The First
World War. His publication differs from that of Joll and Martel’s in that it focuses more on the
course of the war and its military history as opposed to its longer term causes. Using the
influences of Wilfred Owen’s and Rupert Brooke’s poetry that popularized the war’s study in
Western Europe, Strachan creatively explains how the Ottoman Empire was inspired to fight in
the war through the use of propaganda that reflected the messages of Owen and Brooke. The
Ottoman Empire was inspired to some extent by messages like the one included in the
introduction to chapter four labeled, “Jihad.”
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“O Muslims, who are the obedient servants of God! Of those who go to the Jihad for the
sake of happiness and salvation of the believers of God’s victory... those who sacrifice
their lives to give life to the truth will have honor in this world, and their latter end is
paradise” (Strachan, 99).
The Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary shortly after
the Sheikh-ul-Islam claimed that holy war should be waged. All Muslims must fight against the
forces of Great Britain and her allies and eventually the Russians as well - another
geographically threatening imperial force. This is an interesting angle that Joll and Martel do not
take in explaining the origins of the war. Joll and Martel do not focus on the religious influences
that played a somewhat minor role in initiating the war; however, they do recognize, just as
Strachan, that the Ottoman Empire was a key German ally that was meant to help cripple the
British through breaking its ties with their strongest colonial possession: India. Their
complementing views on this topic are undoubtedly demonstrated in both works. Strachan uses
the following quote on page 101 of his work while Joll and Martel use it on page 247 of theirs to
explain this: “Our consuls in Turkey and India, our agents, etc. must rouse the whole Muslim
world into wild rebellion against this hateful, mendacious, unprincipled nation of shopkeepers; if
we are going to shed our blood, England must at least lose India.” Minus the religious element
and the focus on the Eastern origins of war, the two works are complementary for the most part,
focusing the origins of the war as imperial concerns more than any other. Strachan’s book is
more suitable for students that seek to further understand the course of the war and it would
make for an excellent reading to follow after reading Joll and Martel.
Generally speaking, Joll and Martel’s book is beautifully written, easy to read and
understand, and has few, if any, true shortcomings. But of the shortcomings that can be found,
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the book is more on the side of being Eurocentric, favoring the countries of western Europe.
Readers who wish to find origins of the war that are rooted in the previous years of the Eastern
powers involved will not find many answers to questions related therein. The Balkan Wars, for
example, are mentioned, but not much depth is given to the causes of the problems that created
them. Most of the book focuses on the actions of the Western powers in Europe, with Russia
being a slight exception, though Russia still receives less explanation than Germany, AustriaHungary, Britain, and France. However, when the reader refers back to the introduction of the
book after reading its entirety, he realizes that the authors stayed true to their promise which can
be relatively understood: “This list is by no means exhaustive... we may begin to form, not a
complete picture of the causes of the First World War, but at least a sketch of the complex and
multifarious factors that contributed to it” (Joll 9). Joll and Martel have admitted that with such
a vastly complex event, one concise volume cannot cover every cause leading up to the war.
Thus, to further the words of Keith Robbins in his book review which appeared after the
publication of the first addition, Joll and Martel in the third edition have “succeeded admirably.”
Similar to the First World War, there are numerous explanations for the Second World
War. The majority of the world understands that on the most basic level, there was a conflict
that involved Germany and Europe. Additionally, most American students are well aware of the
significance of the date December 7, pointing that something happened here that needs to be
remembered. On a more mature level, we know that the war was indeed complex and was
created because of a collision of several opposing forces across the globe. Most significantly,
those forces in the second war were also involved in its predecessor revealing that there is some
connection to the two great world conflicts of the twentieth century’s first half. The book under
review, The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues, edited by Robert Boyce and
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Joseph A. Maiolo, is a diversified volume. A conglomerate of historians’ essays has been placed
in a textbook fashion that provides all-embracing explanations for the war.
Boyce and Maiolo express their intentions of what purpose the book should serve in their
introduction and the chapters they themselves have submitted. “The purpose of this book is to
provide an up-to-date comparative textbook on the origins of the Second World War in Europe,
Asia, and the Pacific” (Boyce 4). Because the book is presented as such, there is not an
admittedly strong thesis that is attempted to be defended in its pages. Of course to deny that
there is no existence of any thesis is false. One could argue that a comparative work such as this
presents its thesis in its format - a book of multiple authors and vantage points demonstrates a
theme of complexity and multifactoralism. Boyce and Maiolo admit the complexities of origins
of World War Two by bringing together the entries of nineteen different historians.
Boyce and Maiolo both contribute their own writings in the work as two of the contributors to
the volume. Boyce’s chapter seeks to deal with the economic roots of the war, while he says are
fatally given too little attention to in the historiography that has been published about the origins
of the war (Boyce 249). Maiolo’s chapter deals with the armaments build up that occurred
between rival countries during the inter-war years. He explains that the Second World War’s
armaments build up encompassed more than just having strong armies and navies. It also
encompasses the infrastructure that could sustain industrialization during a long war. This was a
lesson learned during the First World War that was adopted by many countries, mostly by the
losers of the first war (Boyce 290), ensuring that the same mistakes would not be made twice.
Maiolo reinforces his co-editor’s words by chiming that “the war’s origins are far more complex
and contingent than any mono-causal explanation would permit” (Boyce, 287).
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R.A.C. Parker’s book, The Second World War: A Short History, touches on three topics
that are also prevalent in Boyce and Maiolo’s. These topics are titled, “Hitler, Germany, and the
origins of the European war,” “The United States enters the war: the origins of the Japanese
attack,” and “Economies at war.” Here the German and Japanese participation is discussed with
economics intertwined into both.
Parker makes points in his chapter, “The Origins of the European War,” that support
further claims naming Hitler as the leading causal factor of the war. Parker comments on the
weakness of leadership that was demonstrated through the policies of appeasement sustained by
Neville Chamberlain. The combination of aggressive leadership in Germany and the lenient
policies of appeasement in Britain created an opportunistic situation conducive to Hitler’s gains
across Europe. Page nine of Parker’s work explains that Hitler was focused on expanding
German living space through the continuation of a constant struggle. The British, like the people
of Germany, favored a strong Germany that would become prosperous and helpful in sustaining
European prosperity. Neville Chamberlain demonstrated the wrong leadership qualities that
Britain needed during this time. Parker explains this in his statement that even after the Munich
Conference of 1938, Chamberlain still “did not fully share the rising skepticism that followed...
about the possibility of peace with Nazi Germany” (Parker 13). Boyce and Maiolo mention and
support this thought in their chapter concerning the United States. “The British prime minister,
Neville Chamberlain, set an absolutely self-defeating test for US intentions...Chamberlain’s test
for Hitler was not nearly as rigorous. All the German leader had to do was make vague promises
and declaim his desire for peace” (Boyce 138). As presentism may suggest, many historians
have likely thought that had Churchill been able to win enough popular support to defeat
Chamberlain in the 1930’s, the entire war itself could have been avoided. But Gordon Martell
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points out that we should caution ourselves when tempted to place the blame of the war on a
couple of vilified figures like Chamberlain and Hitler.
Explaining Japan’s involvement in the war, Parker gives attention to how economic
policies that rippled across the Pacific as a result of the US Great Depression helped sour
peaceful relations between the two competing empires. Japanese emigration to the US had been
prohibited in the 1920‘s which strained the population’s ability to expand. Japanese farmers
were badly hit with falling food prices, and had begun to look at the career opportunities the
military provided. More military recruits well suiting the government’s desire to strengthen the
armed forces in order to spread ther empire. With their interests turned towards colonial
opportunities that China could provide, the Japanese strategically favored siding with Germany,
as its aggression would conveniently draw attention of the allied powers and away from their
own colonial interests in Asia. Again, the theme of Hitler being the one at fault is present in the
Japanese-American situation; had Hitler not initiated the conflict in Europe, Japan would not
have used force in China, and the United States would not have placed embargos upon Japan
because of their actions in China (Parker 73-74, Boyce 149).
Criticisms to this book are very few because the book includes the writings of respected
historians. The Origins of World War Two includes explanations for the wars’ causes by
examining countries that are rarely given attention and suffered significantly during world war
two; namingly the section of the book containing the four chapters on Poland, Czechoslovakia,
the Neutral Powers, and China. Their perspective is overlooked when studying the “big man”
history.
Gordon Martell’s criticism of the book, The Origins of World War Two, is its
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interjections of subjective moralizing and vilification in the book. The book review specifically
refers to comments made on Hitler and Neville Chamberlain to illustrate this point. Martel
strikes a powerful chord in stating that it is dangerous for the students of history to simply blame
the war on Hitler. While Hitler is a leading figure to be faulted for creating the war, the origins
are more complex than blaming a single figure; the complexities should be recognized.
Martel also critiques the lack of debate in the book. Although The Origins of World War
Two comprises different authors and stories, Martel points out that no new material is presented,
and the presented material does not engage in debate, instead each writing is presented as a
separate entry.
The books reviewed, The Origins of the First World War and The Origins of World War
Two: The Debate Continues, are each worthy of being read by any student or individual
interested in the wars’ roots. In spite of these faults, these books give a reputable, concise
history of the two wars that accurately explain their complexities.
AP World Assignment:
Summarize the book review you’ve read above and adress the following issues:
What have historians said about the causes of WWI AND WWII? What were the major causes?
Where was most of the blame placed in both wars, is the blame placement supported, how well?
On a personal level, name some (two specifics) countries you were not aware of that were part of
WWI and explain their reason for involvement.
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Guidelines: Your response should first appear as an outline! (Why an outline? It organizes your
wrtiting) Your response is written in complete sentences that follow your outline. Your
response is cohesive, not just a list of facts (aka, it flows)
Works Cited
Boyce, Robert and Joseph Maiolo, eds. The Origins of the Secnod World War: The Debate
Continues. London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003. Print.
Joll, James and Gordon Martel. The Origins of the First World War. 3rd Ed. Great Britain:
Pearson Longman, 2007. Print.
Martel, Gordon. “The Origins of the Second World War: the Debate Continues.” The Australian
Journal of Politics and History 50.1 (2004):140 Academic One File. Web. 5 Dec 2010.
Robbins, Keith. Rev. of The Origins of the First World War, by James Joll and Gordon Martell.
The English Historical Review. April 1987: 529-530. Print.
Parker, R.A.C. The Second World War a short history. New York: Oxford University Press Inc,
1989. Print.
Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York: Penguin, 2005. Print.