Understanding and Mitigating the Impact of RF Interference on 802.11 Networks

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Understanding and Mitigating the
Impact of RF Interference on
802.11 Networks
Ramki Gummadi (MIT), David Wetherall (UW)
Ben Greenstein (IRS), Srinivasan Seshan (CMU)
1
Growing interference in
unlicensed bands
• Anecdotal evidence of problems,
but how severe?
• Characterize how 802.11 operates
under interference in practice
Other 802.11
2
• Throughput to decrease
linearly with interference
• There to be lots of options
for 802.11 devices to
tolerate interference
–
–
–
–
–
–
Bit-rate adaptation
Power control
FEC
Packet size variation
Spread-spectrum processing
Transmission and reception
diversity
Throughput (linear)
What do we expect?
Interferer power
(log-scale)
3
Key questions for this talk
– How damaging can a low-power and/or
narrow-band interferer be?
– How can today’s hardware tolerate
interference well?
• What 802.11 options work well, and why?
4
• Effects of interference
more severe in practice
• Caused by hardware
limitations of commodity
cards, which theory
doesn’t model
Throughput (linear)
What we see
Interferer power
(log-scale)
5
Talk organization
• Characterizing the impact of interference
• Tolerating interference today
6
Experimental setup
Access
Point
UDP flow
802.11 Interferer
802.11
Client
7
802.11 receiver path
PHY
To RF Amplifiers
Amplifier
control
RF
AnalogSignal ADC
signal
Timing
Recovery
6-bit
samples
PHY
MAC
MAC
AGC
Barker
Correlator
Demodulator
Descrambler
Data
(includes
beacons)
Preamble Detector/
Header CRC-16 Checker
Receiver
SYNC
SFD
CRC Payload
PHY header
Extend SINR model (in paper) to capture these vulnerabilities
Interested in worst-case natural or adversarial interference
8
Timing recovery interference
• Interferer sends continuous SYNC pattern
– Interferes with packet acquisition (PHY reception errors)
1000
100
1200
Weak interferer
Moderate
interferer
1000
800
Throughput
Log-scale
600
10
400
Latency
1
Latency
(microseconds)
Throughput (kbps)
10000
200
0.1
0
−∞ -20 -12
-2
0
8
12
15
Interferer Power (dBm)
20
9
Dynamic range selection
• Interferer sends on-off random patterns (5ms/1ms)
– AGC selects a low-gain amplifier that has high
processing noise (packet CRC errors)
900
Narrow-band interferer
1000
100
700
Throughput
10
500
300
Latency
1
100
0.1
Latency
(microseconds)
Throughput (kbps)
10000
-100
−∞ -20 -12
-2
0
8
12
15
Interferer Power (dBm)
20
10
Header processing interference
• Interferer sends continuous 16-bit Start Frame Delimiters
• Affects PHY header processing (header CRC errors)
Unsynchronized interferer
1000
1000
800
100
600
Throughput
10
400
Latency
1
200
0.1
Latency
(microseconds)
Throughput (kbps)
10000
0
−∞
-20
-12
0
8
12
15
Interferer Power (dBm)
20
11
Interference mitigation options
•
•
•
•
•
Lower the bit rate
Decrease the packet size
Choose a different modulation scheme
Leverage multipath (802.11n)
Move to a clear channel
12
Impact of 802.11 parameters
• Rate adaptation, packet sizes, FEC, and
varying CCA parameters do not help
Throughput (kbps)
10000
With and
Changing CCA
without FEC
mode
Rate adaptation
1000
100
10
11Mbps, PBCC
1Mbps
11Mbps
CCA Mode 1,
11Mbps
2Mbps
5.5Mbps,
5.5Mbps
Changing
PBCC
100-byte packets,
11Mbps
1
packet size
0.1
−∞
-20
-12
-2
8
12
Interferer Power (dBm)
15
20
13
Impact of 802.11g/n
Throughput (kbps)
100000
High throughputs 1000
without
interference
Significant
drops with
802.11n
Throughput
weak interferer 800
10000
1000
100
10
600
802.11g
Throughput
400
802.11g Latency
200
1
Latency
(microseconds)
• No significant performance improvement
802.11n Latency
0.1
0
−∞
-20
-12
0
8
12
15
Interferer Power (dBm)
20
14
Impact of frequency separation
• But, even small frequency separation (i.e.,
adjacent 802.11 channel) helps
– Channel hopping to mitigate interference?
Throughput (kbps)
10000
15MHz separation
1000
10MHz separation
5MHz separation
(good performance)
Same channel
(poor performance)
100
10
1
0.1
−∞
-20
-12
0
8
12
Interferer Power (dBm)
15
20
15
Talk organization
• Characterizing the impact of interference
• Tolerating interference today
16
Rapid channel hopping
• Use existing hardware
– Design dictated by radio PHY and MAC properties
(synchronization, scanning, and switching latencies)
• Design must accommodate adversarial and
natural interference  channel hopping
– Test with an oracle-based adversary
• Design overview
– Packet loss during switching + adversary’s search
speed  10ms dwell period
– Next hop is determined using a secure hash chain
– Triggered only when heavy packet loss is detected
17
Evaluation of channel hopping
• Good TCP & UDP performance, low loss rate
Throughput (kbps)
10000
CH, UDP traffic
1000
CH, TCP traffic
Weak interference,
Moderate interference,
17% degradation 1Mbps throughput
100
No CH, UDP traffic
10
1
No CH, TCP traffic
0.1
0
5
10
15
20
Interferer Power (dBm)
18
Evaluation of channel hopping
• Acceptable throughput even with multiple interferers
Throughput (kbps)
1600
Three orthogonal
802.11 interferers
450
400
1400
350
1200
300
1000
250
800
200
600
150
Linear scale
400
100
200
50
Interferers
0
Latency (microseconds)
1800
19
0
Conclusions
• Lot of previous work on RF interference
– We show 802.11 NICs have additional PHY
and MAC fragilities
• Interference causes substantial
degradation in commodity NICs
– Even weak and narrow-band interferers are
surprisingly effective
• Changing 802.11 parameters does not
mitigate interference, but rapid channel
hopping can
20
Thanks!
Questions?
ramki@csail.mit.edu
21
Channel hopping performance
breakdown
• Few losses, low multiple retransmits
100%
Losse
250
80%
200
20%
150
100
Average Latency
(microseconds)
40%
Single retransmits
60%
Latenc
No retransmits
Fraction of Transmissions by
Type
Multiple
retransmits
50
0%
0
0
4
8
12
16
20
PRISM Interferer Power (dBm)
22
Related work
• RF interference and jamming (narrow-band
jamming, demodulator interference)
– We expose additional vulnerabilities in receive path
• 802.11 DoS (e.g., CCA, association, and
authentication attacks)
– We target PHY instead of MAC
• Slow channel hopping (e.g., SSCH, MAXchop,
802.11 FH)
– Rapid channel hopping uses both direct-sequence
and frequency hopping to tolerate agile adversaries
23
Evaluation Setup
CP
P3
C3
AP
Z
P2
C2
C1
J
P1
24
25
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