TRUE AUTONOMY OR HIDDEN CONTROL:
DOES CONGRESS ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL WATCHDOGS?
Rebecca J Mac Donald
B.S., California State University, Sacramento, 2004
THESIS
Submitted in partial satisfaction of
the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
GOVERNMENT
at
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO
FALL
2010
© 2010
Rebecca J Mac Donald
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii
TRUE AUTONOMY OR HIDDEN CONTROL:
DOES CONGRESS ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL WATCHDOGS?
A Thesis
by
Rebecca J Mac Donald
Approved by:
__________________________________, Committee Chair
James H. Cox, Ph.D
__________________________________, Second Reader
Wesley Hussey, Ph.D
____________________________
Date
iii
Student: Rebecca J Mac Donald
I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University
format manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to
be awarded for the thesis.
__________________________, Department Chair
Bahman Fozouni, Ph.D
Department of Government
iv
___________________
Date
Abstract
of
TRUE AUTONOMY OR HIDDEN CONTROL:
DOES CONGRESS ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL WATCHDOGS?
by
Rebecca J Mac Donald
Academia has argued that Congress has a vested interest in controlling the
agencies of the federal government. While most of these agencies are not considered
apolitical, the Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs) are distinctly required to remain
independent and apolitical. However, the Inspectors General (IGs) still operate within a
political system and are not immune to political interference. This research looked at
whether Congress employs subtle methods for attempting control of the IGs or whether
Congress recognizes the importance of autonomous IGs for the public trust and
generally resists the temptation to attempt control. The research focused on the
testimonial process, OIG appropriations, and the results of interviews of IGs and
congressional staff. Results show that attempts at control or influence do occur; the
extent of which varies. Control may be attempted through the confirmation process,
hearings, appropriations, press, letters, and direct communication.
_______________________, Committee Chair
James H. Cox, Ph.D
_______________________
Date
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have always been amused by lengthy acknowledgements that take up multiple
pages in a manuscript, thinking them frivolous. That is, until now. Though this thesis
by no means matches the breadth of a complete work, I now understand the need to
thank the many sources of assistance and encouragement upon which all work depends.
For all the following, and many others who I am unable to mention, I publicly
thank and recognize the value you have added to my research. First, for planting the
seed of Inspector General independence as a thesis idea and for supporting me
throughout this process, Kim Elmore; for granting the permission and funding to
conduct my interviews, Mary Kendall; and for taking time out of retirement to provide
the best editing job, Sandra Marquiss. Thanks to both my advisors, Dr.’s James Cox and
Wesley Hussey, for humoring me in so many discussions when I waxed passionate
about my research, and for spending the hours necessary to make sure my thesis made
sense. Without the graciousness of all the IGs and congressional staffers who let me
impose on their busy schedules in order to interview them, this thesis would be
substantially less effective. And finally, to my husband and partner, Stuart Mac Donald,
if not for you there would be no thesis and I would not be half the person I am today.
There are always so many more that I could thank and I hope they know they
were not forgotten. Many helped me in some aspect of my work, but only I can be held
responsible for any errors, misstatements, and other lapses found in this document. I
hope you find it as interesting to read as it was for me to research and write.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................. vi
List of Tables.......................................................................................................................... ix
List of Charts ........................................................................................................................... x
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
The Problem.................................................................................................................. 1
Purpose of the Study .................................................................................................... 2
2. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................. 5
Offices of Inspectors General ...................................................................................... 5
3. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ................................................................................... 8
Existing Theoretical Insight ......................................................................................... 8
Public Spiritedness ........................................................................................................ 9
Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy ................................................................ 12
Interest Group Access to Congress ............................................................................ 18
4. METHODOLOGY.................................................................................................... 23
Theory and Hypotheses ............................................................................................. 23
5. THE DATA ..................................................................................................................... 29
Data and Analysis ...................................................................................................... 29
6. FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS ....................................................................... 37
Confirmations and Contributions ............................................................................... 37
Appropriations ........................................................................................................... 44
Inspectors General Testimony ................................................................................... 55
Interviews – Inspectors General and Congressional Staff ......................................... 61
7. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 72
Appendix A. Trends and Changes in OIG Appropriations for Sitting IGs ............................ 78
Appendix B. Consent to Participate in Research .................................................................. 89
Appendix C. Interview Questions – Inspectors General ....................................................... 90
vii
Appendix D. Interview Questions – Congressional Staff ..................................................... 92
Appendix E. C-SPAN Hearing Data Selected....................................................................... 94
Appendix F. Congressional Information Service Testimony Data ....................................... 95
Appendix G. Office of Inspector General Webpage and Google Search Testimony Data ... 96
Appendix H. C-SPAN Hearings of Presidentially Appointed IG Testimony ....................... 97
References ........................................................................................................................... 118
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Page
1.
Table 1 Congressional Response to IG Testimony – Evaluation Matrix…………….32
2.
Table 2 Political Contributions by IGs Prior to Appointment……………………….38
3.
Table 3 Presidentially Appointed IGs and Determination of Political Appointment...40
4.
Table 4 Political Influence or Unexplained Variance in IG Appropriations…………45
5.
Table 5 Percentage Change in OIG Appropriations Over Time: 1997-2003...............47
6.
Table 6 Percentage Change in OIG Appropriations Over Time: 2003-2010...............48
7.
Table 7 Political vs. Non-Political Appointment: Consistent Majority Party………..50
8.
Table 8 Political vs. Non-Political Appointment: Major Transitions Across Parties.. 52
9.
Table 9 Political vs. Non-Political Appointment: Democratic Presidents…………...53
10.
Table 10 Political vs. Non-Political Appointment: Republican President...................54
11.
Table 11 Congressional Response to IG Testimony…………………………………57
12.
Table 12 Comparison of Frequency of IG Testimonies to Value of OIG
Appropriations……………………………………………………….…….60
ix
LIST OF CHARTS
Page
1.
Chart 1 Comparison – No. of Testimonies by IG for Each Data Source………………..31
2.
Chart 2 Presidentially Appointed IGs and Appropriations Across Political Parties…….79
3.
Chart 3 OIG Appropriations – Office of Personnel Management……………………….81
4.
Chart 4 OIG Appropriations – Railroad Retirement Board……………………………..81
5.
Chart 5 OIG Appropriations – Nuclear Regulatory Commission……………………….82
6.
Chart 6 OIG Appropriations – Department of Energy…………………………………..82
7.
Chart 7 OIG Appropriations – Department of the Interior................................................83
8.
Chart 8 OIG Appropriations – Department of Justice…………………………………...84
9.
Chart 9 OIG Appropriations – Department of Agriculture.…………….…….…….…...84
10.
Chart 10 OIG Appropriations – Department of Housing and Urban Development.….…84
11.
Chart 11 OIG Appropriations – Tennessee Valley Authority..……….………….……...85
12.
Chart 12 OIG Appropriations – Department of Health and Human Services…….……. 86
13.
Chart 13 OIG Appropriations – Social Security Administration……………….………. 86
14.
Chart 14 OIG Appropriations – Treasury IG for Tax Administration………….………. 86
15.
Chart 15 OIG Appropriations – General Services Administration.…………….………. 86
16.
Chart 16 OIG Appropriations – Department of Homeland Security…………………….86
17.
Chart 17 OIG Appropriations – Department of Veterans Affairs…….…………..……. 87
18.
Chart 18 OIG Appropriations – Agency for International Development.……………… 87
19.
Chart 19 OIG Appropriations – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation………………. 87
20.
Chart 20 OIG Appropriations – Department of Transportation……………………….... 87
21.
Chart 21 OIG Appropriations – Department of Commerce…….………………………. 87
x
22.
Chart 22 OIG Appropriations – Department of the Treasury.….………………………. 87
23.
Chart 23 OIG Appropriations – Department of Defense……….………………………. 88
24.
Chart 24 OIG Appropriations – Small Business Administration.………………………. 88
25.
Chart 25 OIG Appropriations – National Aeronautics and Space Administration..……. 88
26.
Chart 26 OIG Appropriations – Department of Education.…….………………………. 88
xi
1
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
The Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs) are, in effect, federal “watchdogs,”
created by the 1978 Inspector General Act to help oversee the departments and agencies
of the Executive Branch. Under the 1978 Act, the OIGs are independent and
autonomous and therefore not subject to the political agenda of either of the federal
departments and agencies they oversee or of the Congress which funds them. The
degree to which the OIGs are truly independent and autonomous is subject to debate and
is the subject of this paper.
A commonly accepted assumption, one that is supported by the research presented
herein, is that Congress does indeed attempt to control the federal bureaucracy,1 of
which the OIGs are a part. Any attempt by Congress to control the OIGs, however,
cannot be overt because of negative public opinion. As the federal “watchdogs,” the
Inspectors General (IGs) represent the entity that advocates on behalf of taxpayers and
presents a trustworthy link between the public and the bureaucracy and Congress. As
part of this representation, IGs are not allowed to be appointed with respect to political
affiliation, thus Congress must find other ways to influence the work of the IGs. Two
potential ways are through the budget, the only means of direct control outside of
1
Most bureaucracy are not structured to be independent or apolitical. In fact, it is common for heads of
agencies to espouse specific political philosophies and gain appointment by the President and Congress
in light of these very opinions. One main exception would be the General Accountability Office (GAO)
which, while it is still an oversighting/watchdog agency, is directly responsive to Congressional requests.
2
legislative mandates,2 and through the use of IG testimony in public hearings, which air
approval or disapproval of an issue.
Purpose of the Study
This paper presents the results of research conducted to determine whether
Congress uses the budget process and/or testimony to control the IGs. Because the two
methods are unlikely to be the only means of control, this research also considered the
possibility of other methods for control. In an environment of heightened competition
for federal dollars and greater partisan separation,3 determining the degree of IG
autonomy is of high importance. Specifically, whether IGs are allowed the political
freedom to focus on ensuring taxpayer monies are spent appropriately or IGs are
required to promote and defend themselves to Congress as an important element of the
government remaining fiscally healthy and accountable to the public.
Academics have studied Congress and posited numerous theories and models to
explain its political environment. These studies do not attempt to explain the broad
political environment; rather, they take one aspect and attempt to define particular
relationships within the environment. Often, the fundamental question is related to
federal policy. Specifically, who influences policy and by what means is policy
influenced? This paper focuses on three areas within this research: (1) public
spiritedness, (2) congressional control of the federal bureaucracy, and (3) interest group
2
Through either displays of encouragement increasing the perceived authority of the IG or accusations
of incompetence meant to embarrass the IG. Even budgets are codified into legislation; this refers to
non-monetary requirements written into legislation.
3
Partisan separation would, theoretically, heighten the tug-of-war for control of the bureaucracy
between the parties and also between the President and Congress, especially when the majority party
and the executive are of opposing sides.
3
access to Congress. The first two are used to test the data while the latter two present
the framework by which to understand the structure of OIGs.
As formulated by Congress, the OIGs have a unique structure, with attributes
related to both congressional control of the bureaucracy and interest group access to
Congress. For example, the OIGs are located within the Executive Branch and as such
are semi- or quasi-bureaucratic in purpose and structure. The IGs can conduct
investigations on the programs and activities of their agencies without approval of
agency heads, publish reports, and recommend changes to agency officials to improve
performance. They are also required to report to Congress and provide Congress with
indirect link to the inner workings of the bureaucracy (Light, 1993).4 This congressional
reporting requirement is similar to the function of interest groups. That is, in
independently reporting on issues of concern to Congress and the public, IGs can be
termed as semi- or quasi-advocacy groups in purpose and structure.
Given the IGs unique5 position within the Executive Branch of the government,
these two areas of research seem to provide the closest avenues of academic review by
which to frame this office, and the third area of research related to public spiritedness
helps identify what is important for testing. This paper examines these theories against
the backdrop of this specialized area which has heretofore not been pursued. The
4
Reporting to Congress can generally occur in two different ways. One way is in the form of a mandated
semi-annual report to Congress which lists a brief summary of the reports issued in the previous six
months. The second way is by looking into an issue specially requested by a member, committee, or
subcommittee and reporting back the results of that review.
5
This author asserts that this type of structure is unique in comparison to the typical bureaucratic entity
commonly used in academic research. This author is unaware of any other executive agency that is
required by law to report to Congress as an equal counterpart to the executive. Further, the IGs are the
only political appointees who do not acquire Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval before
appearing before Congress (Light, 1993).
4
findings of this unique research will add a new dimension of knowledge to multiple
theories within the existing literature.
5
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
The Offices of Inspectors General
Selecting and understanding the theories that may explain the relationship
between Congress and the IGs first requires knowledge of the unique position of the
OIGs within the government structure. Congress created the OIGs in part to restore
public trust in government (Light, 1993). “Since the early 1970s, rising budget deficits
and highly visible scandals – from Watergate to the savings and loan debacle – have
made the war on fraud, waste, and abuse a national priority” (p.vii). Creation of
independent IGs would help oversee the executive branch agencies. In the decade
following the creation of the OIGs, they become “one of the fastest growing elements of
the federal government. Even as personnel freezes limited growth in many agencies,
OIGs expanded, gaining new staff and additional dollars” (p.vii). Given this
information, it would seem that Congress created OIGs for its own benefit; however, a
closer look at the OIGs provides a more complex picture.
Even though OIGs were formed to be a semi-right arm of the Congress, in the
1978 Act,6 Congress recognized the inherent executive branch nature of the OIGs.
Under the Act, the President appoints the IGs, who are then confirmed by the Senate, but
the President can dismiss an IG without consent from Congress. Further, while IGs can
audit, investigate, and report on agencies, they do not have any enforcement or
6
This is the most recent amendment to the Inspectors General Act of 1978. A new amendment currently
is moving through the Congress. Among other things, this new amendment is slated to give IGs increased
subpoena authority.
6
management abilities over them. Instead, the IGs must rely on Congress, the agencies,
and the executive office to implement their findings (Light, 1993). Therefore, while
Congress created the OIGs, in part, to gain access to the executive branch bureaucracy, it
also recognized the need for the IGs to maintain a position outside the political arena.
To address concerns raised over the true independence of the 30 statutory IGs,
Congress passed the Inspector General Reform Act in 2008 mentioned above to increase
the authority and autonomy of these IGs. The Act specifically states that “each
Inspector General shall be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on
the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis,
law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.”7 The Act also
gives IGs additional independence from the agencies they oversee by requiring agency
heads to submit their annual budgets to Congress exactly as the respective IGs had
submitted to the agencies.
In addition to the 30 statutory IGs, there are four special non-permanent,
presidentially appointed IGs.8 Thirty-four non-statutory9 IGs, who are appointed by the
heads of their agencies, do not have the same level of structural independence that the
statutory IGs share. Because of this lack of stated and assumed independence, the
research conducted for this paper does not include the non-statutory IGs.
7
Public Law 110-409, Section 2
These IGs are established for a particular purpose then are disbanded after the need is ended. As such,
the numbers of these IGs are always subject to change. For example, the Special IG for Iraq
Reconstruction will be dissolved once the war activity in Iraq is completed or terminated.
9
The term non-statutory is somewhat misleading as all IGs are authorized in some statute; however,
within the IG community the term non-statutory quickly distinguishes the agency appointed, less
independent IGs from the presidentially appointed IGs, who have greater independence. Non-statutory
is interchangeable with agency appointed and statutory is interchangeable with presidentially appointed.
8
7
The thirty federal agencies with assigned OIGs include the Departments of the
Interior, Treasury, Justice, State, and Defense, and agencies such as the Export-Import
Bank, General Services Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency.10
10
The remaining Departments and Agencies with statutory IGs assigned to them are: Department of
Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of
Agriculture, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Labor, Department of
Transportation, Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Commerce, Agency for International Development, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration,
Corporation for National and Community Service, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Railroad Retirement Board, Small
Business Administration, Tennessee Valley Authority, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Social Security Administration. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
and Resolution Trust Corporation were also included, but have since been dissolved.
8
Chapter 3
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Existing Theoretical Insight
Three different theories were identified in order to effectively conduct this
research, each of which is applied to the research uniquely from the others. The first is
public spiritedness, which asserts that political actors engage in certain behavior for the
good of society. Rational choice is the broad category of the second theory, which
argues that political actors are self-interested seekers of some goal and all actions can be
explained by understanding that goal. Because this theory is so broad, this paper
ultimately focuses on one subset of this theory, that of congressional control of the
bureaucracy. This focused theory posits that Congress has a vested interest in
attempting control of the executive branch bureaucracy. Finally, interest group access to
Congress is the third theory. Interest group access to Congress generally focuses on
how and why interest groups seem to have a high degree of access to Congress, and to
what degree some interest groups have more access to Congress more than other interest
groups. The first two theories are used to assess and test the research data, while the
second and third theories frame the subject matter itself.
Now that the basic structure of the test subject has been established, it is
important to more thoroughly understand the theories that may explain the relationship
between the Congress and the IGs. Thus, the following theories are analyzed to help
determine what should be tested in the endeavor to determine their theoretical adequacy.
9
Public Spiritedness
The theoretical framework on public spiritedness asserts that the employees who
make up the bureaucracy are not solely pursuers of self-interested outcomes; rather,
because of personal commitment and a high sense of ethics, they act to benefit the
public. Applying the public spiritedness theory to this research could indicate that IGs
are structured to be above politics and have at the fore the notion of existing for the
benefit of good government. Some IGs even directly promote this position. For
instance, the former seal for the OIG of the Department of the Interior claimed the title
of “Agents of Positive Change,” and the IG’s task is to detect fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement and to promote efficiency and effectiveness in government.
Kenneth Ruscio (1996) in his article, “Trust, Democracy, and Public
Management: A Theoretical Argument,” discusses the concept of trust within and
among governmental systems by stating, “Trust does mean more than simply
cooperation. It seems at least somewhat dependent on the system of values in a society.
It enables transactions to occur more easily and efficiently than if it were not present. It
is connected closely to citizens' perceptions of the motivations of public officials and
their fellow citizens” (p.463). According to Robert Goss (1996),
Since Watergate and Vietnam the schools of public administration have
introduced courses in ethics, texts for the field have been published, the
American Society for Public Administration and others have promulgated
or reissued their codes of ethics, and federal and state governments have
enacted ethics laws-but government official scandals have continued
(p.573).
Presented with this lack of trust, the level of scrutiny of public service conduct
has heightened substantially (Goss, 1996). According to a study referenced by Dr. Paul
10
Light in his book on IGs (1993), “Starting at 146 days of oversight in 1961, Congress
became increasingly committed to this task, giving 290 days in 1973, 459 in 1975, and
peaking at 587 in 1981” (p.51). These days of oversight were not just linked to scandals,
but reflected an overall growing discontent with the way the government was
functioning. Indeed, “far more important were general public concerns about an agency
or program, beliefs that programs were not being run effectively, commitments to
ongoing oversight of committee programs, and complaints by clientele or interest
groups” (p.53). During this same time period, IGs were being created across the federal
government. Meanwhile, the congressional staff remained stagnant. This created a
sense of congressional dependency on OIGs for inside information (Light, 1993).
Whether meant as a direct, rational response to this problem or not, the IGs represent the
entity that advocates on behalf the taxpayer and presents a trustworthy link between the
public, the bureaucracy, and Congress.
While Ruscio (also DiIulio, Jr, 1994) argues that true trust does exist within the
bureaucracy and that this real trust does not depend on rules and regulations and in fact
exists outside those constraints. IGs are an interesting twist on this definition and the
literature on public spiritedness as a whole because they are literally designed by statute
to be trustworthy and depend on those rules and regulations to maintain that image of
trust. When an IG has lost the perception of trust, both Congress and the President have
taken actions to remove him or her. For example, when the IG of NASA was portrayed
as having an improper relationship with the head of NASA, Congress made multiple,
and very public, attempts to pressure the IG to resign his post. While it took some time
11
for the IG to resign, Congress persisted in framing the fight against the IG as one of need
to maintain IG independence and integrity.
While this theory of public spiritedness may explain the structure of the OIGs and
provide some interesting insight into why the OIGs and their place within the federal
government is important, it does not appear to be sufficient if the data indicate that
Congress attempts to control the federal watchdogs. If the data do not show such
attempts at control, then it still leaves one to consider why Congress would have
structured the OIGs as it did and then left them alone in terms of control since so much
academic literature claims that Congress does attempt control for self-interested
purposes. Thus, other theories are needed to allow for a more complete explanation of
this complex relationship between the OIGs and Congress.
An extensive search of this theory focused on studies that could help explain how,
and if, Congress controlled the federal bureaucracy and what relevance the testimony
process might have in that control. Even more specifically, these studies were analyzed
to determine whether existing research could help explain the nature of the relationship
between Congress and the IGs. That is to say, what did this area of literature say about
public spiritedness that could answer why Congress would desire to control the IGs and
what might it be trying to control against or for? Conversely, how could this theory add
to the reader’s understanding if the data indicated that Congress does not attempt to
control the IGs? Or how might the research clarify the benefit Congress may receive in
allowing the IGs significant autonomy and authority?
12
Authority as used here does not mean the wielding of formal powers since the IGs
cannot make or force the agencies they oversee to adhere to or comply with any IG
recommendations. Authority here refers to the ability that IGs are given to control what
the IG investigates and how they report on the results, regardless of the implications to
Congress, the agency, or interest groups that do business with the agency (i.e., Lockheed
Martin for the Department of Defense).
The two areas of research that frame these questions relate to congressional
control of the federal bureaucracy and the manner by which interest groups acquire
access to Congress and provide input or information to Congress in the process.
Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy
The research presented in this section relates to some aspect of bureaucratic
control, and all the articles reviewed attempt to explain some facet of the relationship
between legislators and bureaucratic agencies. Collectively, however, the articles do not
agree on an overarching theory, and testing of the theories espoused by the articles is
limited. For example, 8 of the 13 articles construct new theoretical models with no
empirical testing of those models. Over the 13 articles, 12 theories are presented,
though several are nearly identical in underlying meaning, essentially following the
overarching theory of rational choice. In addition, two studies are included that focus on
the power of the committees to look at how Congress attains its ability to control.
Although the structure of IGs, as formed and funded by Congress is bureaucratic,
to view them only as extensions of the agencies they are part of would be incomplete
and short sighted. Based on the articles, the two primary forms of oversight used by
13
legislators to control bureaucracies are ex ante or statutory, which uses administrative
processes that seek to control and agency before uncertainty occurs, and ex post or
active oversight, which attempts control after an agency has strayed. Two other
commonly used terms to describe congressional oversight are police patrol and fire
alarm. Fire alarm oversight refers to when Congress uses outside entities, such as
interest groups, to notify them when the bureaucracy is in need of correcting. Police
patrol is considered more of the traditional approach to oversight through which
Congress appears actively involved in monitoring the agencies (e.g., the commissioning
of scientific studies or holding hearings). This research paper posits that OIGs were
designed to be a part of both methods of oversight, looking at agencies from both inside
and outside the bureaucracy.
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1989) developed a model showing ex ante
administrative processes as the preferred avenue of bureaucratic control. Ex ante
controls are built into the agency’s policy, which help deter the agency from drifting
from the legislators’ desired direction. By designing a cumbersome sequence of
restrictions on agency decision making, such as constructing the agency policy to
require public notices and comment periods, Congress builds an early warning system
allowing it to alter the agency’s course before action is taken. While a single case study
was used to support the analysis of positive political theory, principal-agent theory,
perfect equilibrium, and structure-induced equilibrium used for this argument, Robinson
(1989), however, disagreed, stating he found no evidence that Congress ever specified
the internal structure of an agency and thus argued that the model was not supported.
14
Dr. Light applies the two types of oversight methods directly to the work of OIGs,
comparing audits to police patrols and investigations to fire alarms (1993, p.42).
On the one hand, the OIGs gave new visibility and resources to longneglected audit offices, and represented a very real Congressional
investment in police-patrol oversight, although delegated to executive
branch officials under the dual reporting requirement. On the other hand,
the OIGs provided occasional opportunities for sounding fire alarms.
According to McCubbins and Schwartz, ‘a fire-alarm policy enables
congressmen to spend less time on oversight, leaving more time for other
profitable activities, or to spend the same time on more personally
profitable oversight activities – on addressing complaints by potential
supporters. Justly or unjustly, time spent putting out visible fires gains one
more credit than the same time spent sniffing out smoke.’
For Moran and Weingast (1983), active oversight is the more effective approach
in times of political stability. They used the assumptions of statutory control to support
their arguments of congressional dominance. The findings of the article show that
legislators use the committee system to control the agency policy. While claiming an
argument different from McCubbins, et al (1989), Moran essentially also concludes that
Congress uses both statutory and active oversight controls.
Balla (1998) used empirical testing to look at the merits of statutory control to
determine how well it functioned. He found when Congress instructed the Health Care
Financing Administration to alter the rates paid to medical establishments under
Medicare and to use feedback by the industry to set those rates, the benefit intended by
Congress was not realized. Although Congress’s attempt at statutory controls seemed to
have failed, Bella recommended additional research to verify this conclusion.
Even though McCubbins (1989) must have refined his position to assert that
statutory controls were preferred by Congress, five years earlier (1984), he and Schwartz
15
looked at control in terms of the type of oversight practiced by legislators over
bureaucracies, called active oversight. According to these authors, when it looks as
though there is a lack of congressional oversight, Congress is actually choosing a less
visible form of oversight.
As these statutory controls and active oversight are generally perceived to be the
two primary forms of oversight, other researchers have looked at them in terms of how
frequently one or both are employed and by whom. Bawn (1997) and Bender, Taylor,
and Van Gaalen (1987) argued that legislators, in fact, used a balance of statutory and
active oversight controls, depending on political need. Bawn claims further that
statutory controls are preferred by those legislators who lack the authority of the
overseeing committee and who desire to protect their interests to the greatest degree
possible. While all the above studies looked at congressional influence, Ferejohn and
Shipan (1990) and Hammond and Knott (1996) claimed that each of the studies just
discussed were inherently limited as none considered the additional political influences
of the President and the courts, which also have a stake in controlling the federal
bureaucracies. These studies were correct to incorporate the other two branches of
American authority, as these branches can directly impact OIG operations. However,
this paper deals with only the vast, but single branch perspective of Congress and its
actions. Furthermore, while Ferejohn used several best case or utopian assumptions to
create a theoretical model to prove his assertions, like several of the other theories
posited, he did not test his theory. Without empirical tests to validate the model, this
theory, with its limitations and restrictions, may not be viable using real data and is not
16
usable for testing the data in this paper. It is possible that the lack of research in this
area explains why so many of these studies created statistical models, yet did not test the
models outside the structured statistical setting.
Other studies focused on when and under what conditions legislators used
statutory controls (Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001) or how the competing entities
became influential in the first place. The study analyzed state legislatures to show that
under divided political systems, a Democratic legislature with a Republican governor,
for example, legislators more commonly used statutory controls to oversee the
bureaucracies. Miller (2004) analyzed bureaucracies while Shepsle and Weingast
(1987) looked at congressional committee control. Miller used a longitudinal study to
show how a government agency reacted once Congress creates an opportunity for the
agency to participate in an area related to its own mission or to a congressional purpose.
Miller showed that the agency spent resources to situate itself in the problem-defining
and policy-making process, thereby asserting itself as the standing authority in the topic
area at the expense of interest groups and other grass-root or neighborhood
organizations. It would seem safe to assert, and data presented later support, that OIGs
fit this category quite well. They are designed to be standing authorities in the area of
oversight, but the degree of such authority appears to be related to the degree of effort
each individual OIG makes to assert itself as such.
Continuing on Miller’s theme, once congressional committees were given power
to control information, create bills, and most importantly veto, they used the power to
control issues presented outside their individual committees, such as on the floor of the
17
House (Shepsle, 1987). It is in this very complexity of the committee power system
with overlapping jurisdictions, that politicians can attempt to shape the direction of
committee influence, specifically through the creation of policy, although the success of
these attempts is varied (Sheingate, 2006).
Like Ferejohn (1990) and Hammond (1996), the last two studies looking into
control of bureaucracy create new theories, but do not offer any empirical testing of
those theories (Bawn 1995 and Banks, 1989). Under these studies, instead of
unilaterally controlling bureaucracies, Congress and the agencies played a balancing
game of how much control was asserted and how much information bureaucracies
provided. The essential theoretical difference between these studies is why the agency is
playing the game, either trading for additional agency independence (Bawn, 1995) or
pushing for a larger agency budget (Banks, 1989). An important assumption to this
research, and found in studies advocating ex ante oversight, is that Congress shows its
displeasure or attempts to control the bureaucracy by reducing agency budgets (Banks
1989, Bawn 1997).
Each of these studies provides a unique twist, or looks at a specific angle as to
how and who controls the bureaucracy. All offer very reasoned arguments to support
their claims; however, the biggest shortfall is the lack of empirical testing to substantiate
the theories posited. Less than half offer any testing of the highly stylized models, and
those studies with testing, mostly do so with very restricted data sets and limited
generalizability. Nevertheless, each of these arguments fits a perspective on the
overarching concept of rational choice, which asserts that actions are undertaken based
18
on self-interest. According to Barbara Geddes, “a variety of rational choice arguments
have shown that the relationship of election-oriented politicians to self-interested
bureaucrats affects legislative oversight, policy implementation, and the supply of both
public goods and constituency services” (2003, p.202). Therefore, even though there
may be differences in the approaches and development of the various arguments, the
most important element of the articles researched for this paper is the agreement that
Congress does in some measure attempt to control bureaucracies.
Interest Group Access to Congress
The research in interest group access as related to this paper is limited. Existing
research studies are generally too broad in focus or lacked relevance. Further,
disappointingly little research relates to the specific aspect of testimony, suggesting an
area available for future research. As was stated previously, OIGs were formed in a
manner resembling quasi-interest groups, albeit, insider interest groups.
The intent in using research related to interest group access to Congress is
twofold. First, to determine whether interest groups, including advocacy groups, are
perceived to have access to Congress and secondly, how interest groups access
Congress, specifically, whether the testimony process indicates access. For this paper,
testimony is related to three questions: can attempts to control the IGs be seen through
the testimony process; are the appointments of IGs, as viewed by confirmation hearings,
political or apolitical in nature; and how does the Congress use IG testimony in formal,
public hearings?
19
Some of the studies reviewed were more narrowly focused (Gordon, 2001;
Kollman, 1997), while others took a more holistic approach to addressing the question
of access (Burstein and Linton, 2002). Still others used their study to review other work
(Andrews and Edwards, 2004; Smith, 1995). Only four looked specifically at the
testimony process (Burstein and Hirsh, 2007; Grossman, unpublished; Leydon, 1995;
and Mattei, 1998).
Gorden (2001) looked at how interest group pressure, in the form of contributions,
influenced policy. When the outcome was important to the interest group, Congress was
influenced in varying degrees, depending on amount of pressure and access. Kollman
(1997) took this analysis a step further and argued that interest groups appeared to have
such influence because the ideology of special interest groups were fundamentally
similar to the committees they were attempting to influence. In other words, interest
groups affected policy because they, and the respective congressional committees,
desired the same outcome, not because the interest group was able to change the minds
of the committee members. Since IGs are required to be apolitical, they cannot overtly
attempt to buy access to congressional members. However, it would be useful to see
what kinds of political contributions, if any, IGs have made to either of the political
parties and whether there appears to be any correlation to the majority party in Congress
at the time of his or her confirmation as IG.
20
In an unusual approach of using existing research as the data set,11 Burstein and
Linton (2002) looked at how various types of interest groups influenced policy, as
evidenced by the findings of published studies. They discovered a “striking gap
between theory and research” and found that, while the combined findings were
statistically significant, there was a wide inconsistency in how much impact interest
groups had on policy (2002, p.395). Burstein was not the only researcher to notice
weaknesses in existing studies. Other studies found existing research to be fragmented
(Andrews and Edwards, 2004) and lacking in empirical support (Smith, 1995). Andrews
attempted to create a new theoretical framework to explain access to Congress based on
opposing viewpoints of the prior research, ultimately arguing the nonspecific finding
that various aspects of the policy process were shaped by diverse explanatory factors
and would vary in magnitude and form depending on which component was used.
Smith neither offered a new theory nor performed empirical analysis, but suggested
future research could benefit from cohesive thought and more statistical testing of
assumptions. Regardless of the potential weaknesses, these studies presented valid
concepts to consider while attempting to answer the questions of this thesis.
The last four studies attempted to explain various aspects of the testimony
process. Linking access to Congress with testimony, Leydon (1995) looked at the
resources of advocacy groups and the degree to which the amount and type of resources
indicated access. Most interesting in terms of this thesis, access was shown by how
11
Similar to a literature review except the ultimate end purpose of this research was to analyze and
summarize the findings and shortcomings of published research, where a traditional literature review is
only one part of the development of one’s research.
21
often an advocacy organization testified in hearings. Grossman (unpublished) and
Burstein (2007) also argued that resources were important when accessing Congress and
used testimony to test their hypothesis. Grossman used frequency of testimony to
measure the access, but Burstein focused on if, and what kind of, testimony influenced
policy, based on the assumption that access had already been attained. Mattei (1998)
took a different approach from that found in other studies, showing that gender played
an important role in testimony. She argued that the authority of women was undermined
by male legislators, thereby limiting the effectiveness of women’s testimony.
Overall, similar to the consensus that Congress attempted to control
bureaucracies, there was reasonable agreement in this area of research that interest
groups made a concerted effort to gain access to Congress [in order] to influence policy.
Yet the studies disagreed as to how much this access truly influenced policy. Further,
the studies often assumed that testimony indicated access, and those studies that focused
on testimony did so to use testimony as a measure of the argument posited.
Some researchers studied multiple aspects of how, when, and why Congress tried
to control bureaucracies; however, few studies dealt with advocacy group access to
Congress, specifically in the area of testimony. Over one third of these studies posited
theories not tested empirically, while most of the multiple aspect studies developed or
asserted differing theories, although several shared similar attributes. Notwithstanding
the limitations of the studies, all offer at least some insight into the environment
surrounding this thesis.
22
Because the research area of this paper has not heretofore been studied, this paper
presents the unique opportunity to combine three different areas of study, offering an
analysis of the relationship between Congress and the quasi-advocacy/quasi-bureaucratic
IGs. Although not as broad an area as most of the studies included in this literature
review, and not following any of the numerous suggestions for future research
mentioned in any of the studies, the narrow focus of this research has the opportunity to
offer a distinctive contribution to the existing body of knowledge.
23
Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY
Theory and Hypotheses
Given the unique area of review for this study, neither a traditional interest group
access theory nor a congressional control theory is sufficient to describe completely the
causality or correlation within the relationships to be tested. Most of the existing
research on advocacy group access to Congress was focused on the amount or type of
resource as the causal connection to access. However, one important element in two of
the researched theories, group-power and organizational influence, asserted the
importance of testimony as an indicator of access (Grossman, unpublished; Leydon,
1995). Because of the distinctive characteristics of the quasi-advocacy entity, it was
important to determine whether Congress used the visible, yet subtle, platform of the
testimonial process to indicate pleasure or displeasure with the IGs. Further, the
political confirmation hearings of the IGs could show whether IGs were confirmed
based on political affiliations, which would indicate likely party control and/or potential
preferential treatment for special interest groups.12 Conversely, the confirmation
hearings may support the public spiritedness theory that good government is necessary
over self-interest, at which time the hearings should show that only apolitical, technical
competence requirements were used as confirmation justification. This role of
12
Catering to special interest groups could fairly easily occur by the decisions of the IG not to look into
certain activities of the agencies they oversee, or look only into activities of special interest groups not
affiliated with the political party that appointed and confirmed the IG. The IG can also “water down”
reports before they are publicly issued.
24
testimony was inherently important to this research and provided a missing explanatory
component to be combined with the use of rational choice theory.
Rational choice theory, with its assumption that control would be a logical adjunct
of self-interest, provides a basic explanation for congressional control attempts to
influence bureaucratic behavior (Huber, et al., 2001); however, it was insufficient to
explain the complex relationship between IGs and Congress. While rational choice
theory was often applied to single actors, it could also reasonably be applied “to
organizations that can plausibly be expected to behave as unitary rational actors”
(Geddes, 2003, p.191). Because this paper looks at the whole of Congress as being a
single actor as well as the Republican and Democratic parties as distinct actors, use of
some derivative of rational choice theory seems appropriate. Further, rational choice,
often in combination with other theories, can allow for a better explanation of the data as
a whole (Geddes, 2003). Using a combination of theories also fits the approach of this
research and allows for a more complete analysis.
The theory of congressional choice, which is essentially a subset of rational
choice theory, provides a little more clarification into how Congress attempts to control
bureaucracies and is the primary theory used for this thesis. This theory states that
legislators use a variety of either statutory or active oversight controls or a combination
to manage the direction of the agencies (Bawn, 1997, Moran, and Weingast, 1983; and
McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). As the IGs are structured to be relatively independent,
the consistent use of statutory controls would not be perceived as a favorable and could
not be masked as well as could oversight controls. However, that is not to say that
25
Congress has not created statutory controls within the framework of the OIGs; in fact,
Congress has several times amended the IG Act to input statutory controls. However,
often these controls are not for the IG, but rather give the IGs additional tools to assist in
overseeing the bureaucracy.
One mechanism for active oversight control is budget increases or reductions
(Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast, 1989) and is one mechanism pertinent to attempted control of IGs. While
it may seem unusual to think of a budget increase as a method of oversight, such an
increase would make sense as an attempt to encourage an advocacy-type entity. For the
purposes of this review and under the supposition that all parties involved (i.e.,
Congress, public, media, and IGs) intend on maintaining the independence of OIGs,
which is supported by the IG Act amendment of 2008 that increased the independence of
IGs, the use of oversight controls as part of the congressional choice theory provides an
adequate framework from which to present hypotheses.
H1: If the IG is confirmed as using political criteria instead of technical
competence criteria, then the appropriations of the OIGs will increase or
decrease based on the political party in control of Congress.
This hypothesis assumes that if a Democratically-controlled Congress confirms an
IG based on political reasons, one should see the appropriations of this OIG increase
when Democrats control Congress and decrease when Republicans control Congress.
The converse would also hold true. Testing this hypothesis will determine what
26
percentage of the IGs included in the sample were appointed by a political or apolitical
process.
H2: If the IG is confirmed using political criteria instead of technical competence
criteria, then the frequency of positive responses to general IG testimony should
increase when the party in control of the committee is the same party who
confirmed the IG. Conversely, when the party in control of the committee is not
the same party who confirmed the IG, one should see greater/more frequent
negative responses (or less positive) to the testimony.
While each of these hypothesis looks at one aspect of congressional control and
the theories presented above provide suggestions for how to best test the data, one of the
most important elements of data for this research is not quantitative, but rather
qualitative. A more direct and complete understanding of the overarching question
posed by this paper requires that Congress and the IGs themselves be consulted.
Though both of the first two hypotheses are more quantitative in nature, an equally if not
more important aspect of this thesis is the qualitative responses by both IGs and
congressional staff to the following two assumptions. Consequently, the analysis of the
results from testing these two assumptions is, and should be, more heavily emphasized
in the results.
Because the literature indicates support/agreement that Congress attempts to
control the bureaucracy and, as previously stated, Congress designed the IGs to have
special access into the workings of the bureaucracy, and has repeatedly provided
additional controls to IGs through statutory means, this paper did not emphasize a test of
27
statutory controls. Rather, this paper used interviews to asses not only whether
Congress attempts to control IGs, but also how it might attempt that control. Consistent
with the literature, it is assumed that Congress should logically attempt to control the
IGs as part of the bureaucracy as well as desire to control IG access to oversighting the
bureaucracy. Following the above stated assumption, since Congress awarded greater
independence to the IGs through statutory methods, it should attempt to control the
behavior or actions of the IGs through other means. Thus, the interviews were also used
to investigate what these other means included and which of those means have been
attempted on IGs. Essentially, the first assumption looked at whether Congress
controlled IGs and the second assumption looked at how that may have occurred.
These assumptions are quite broad, but frame the research in a manner which
allows one to shed as great an initial light as possible on the subject. Further, too
detailed hypotheses would severely limit the ability to gain a sufficient understanding of
this topic during initial research. Thus a more focused view is justifiably sacrificed to
establish a more general and applicable knowledge base in this untested area.
Determination of any of the hypotheses or assumptions to be false could indicate
a much stronger degree of independence on the part of the IGs; either that Congress is
unable to manipulate the IGs or it acknowledges the importance of the autonomous role
of the IGs, consistent with the theory of public spiritedness. Unfortunately, if
determination that the hypotheses or assumptions are true, it indicates that the real
autonomy of the IGs is inconsistent with the statutes that form them. Such a
determination would seem more consistent with the theory of rational choice.
28
Congress is largely a reactive force. When dealing with issues in which the input
of IGs would be most requested, Congress often is responding to outside influences,
such as constituents, special interests, fellow Congress persons, congressional staffers,13
and media. These outside forces inform Congress of issues they desire to be addressed.
When these issues involve oversight, Congress would logically request the testimony of
the IG involved with the issue in question. That is to say, Congress responds to outside
influences with short bursts of attention until other influences redirects its focus. For
example, a recently issued IG report resulted in the constituents of a particular
Congressman to ask him to immediately address the IG report. The Congressman
promptly contacted the IG with a promise of additional questions, but never followed
through. This is not uncommon and is but one example of the reactive nature of
Congress.14 Unless a particular Congressperson was working on an issue-specific
agenda that may involve IG testimony, Congress would not reasonably establish a yearlong plan to control any particular IG. Rather, it is more logical that a particular party
would attempt to control an IG, such as Republicans wanting to prevent the Department
of Defense IG from not publishing unfavorable reports on defense contractors.
Conversely, IGs could be largely ignored by the whims of any individual member of
Congress.15
13
Congressional staffers are the individuals who interact with the public and filter information they feel
is important back up to the politician.
14
This is not a judgment against the Congress; rather, it is awareness that issues take varying levels of
importance at various times, depending on unknown/unstated factors. This example was experienced
by the author of this paper in her official position with an OIG.
15
For example, one specific non-statutory OIG comprised the IG and a single investigator. Due to its
small size and relative lack of political impact, it would be surprising if this OIG saw major fluctuations in
29
Chapter 5
THE DATA
Data and Analysis16
Tests of hypothesis used three forms of data. The dependent variables were (1)
OIG appropriations in a given federal fiscal year and (2) congressional response to
general IG testimony. The independent variable was the political or apolitical
confirmation of IGs. The third part of data analysis focused on interviews of IGs and
congressional staff.
Confirmation data to test the first and second hypothesis were limited to
presidentially appointed IGs currently in place. No database for former IGs exists, so a
systematic selection from all past and present IGs is not feasible. Thus, the selection of
sitting IGs ensured a current analysis of the research question and allowed for
interviewing a larger sample of IGs as almost all the sitting IGs are located in the
Washington, D.C. area. The diversity of selected IGs should be fairly representative of
the IG population and minimized selection bias; although, without interviewing all IGs it
would be impossible to state generalizability of interview results with complete surety.
The appropriations data for the first hypothesis covered all the years each
respective IG has been in office. The population period for the second hypotheses
covered the years 2000 through 2009 and was determined from the Congressional
funding or even frequent requests to testify. It is essentially unimportant in terms of political attempts
to control.
16
This author is an evaluator within one of these OIGs and understands that her experience can add an
important measure of insider knowledge and experience, but can also be biased and so will attempt to
ensure that all views presented are balanced and the data used are fairly presented.
30
Information Service (CIS), the authoritative body that collects data on congressional
testimony. This timeframe allowed for variations in political agendas within the
Presidency and Congress by covering both a Republican and Democratic President and
for changes in congressional (party) influence. If only one political view was in control
during the entire time of data testing, it could hide variation in the data, potentially
causing the data to appear to have a strong relationship when none existed. Using data
during a time of political change increased the chance for falsifiability of the results. It
also allows inclusion of former IGs to establish the tenor of an OIG for those IGs
appointed during the ten year timeframe. For the same reason, the sample for the second
hypothesis included both appointed and acting IGs. While somewhat out of the strict
purview of sitting IGs, the sample will allow one to analyze whether any congressional
response is towards an individual IG or towards the reputation of the position IGs
represent. Gender has affected congressional response to testimony (Mattei, 1998);
therefore, the use of both female and male IGs should help determine whether IG gender
reflected congressional response.
Testing of the second hypothesis included the use of the official transcripts17
and/or video from C-SPAN online video archives for each selected testimony. Video
was used whenever possible to maximize the verbal and non-verbal analysis of the
congressional response to the testimony. Although the official database for
congressional testimony, the CIS does not include the entire population of hearings that
actually occurred; therefore, comparison of CIS data with data provided by OIG
17
Transcripts are a verbatim recording of the testimony, including the official testimony, congressional
responses, and responses by the testifier; however, these transcripts are not always complete.
31
websites helped ensure that CIS data were reasonably adequate. For consistency of nonverbal analysis, only the data available through the C-SPAN video archives were used,
even though this sample set was the smallest data set.
Chart 1
The number of testimonies by each data source is illustrated by Chart 1 above.
Specifically, the population of the CIS testimony was 469 individual IG testimonies,18
while the OIG self-reported data, which may have included formal statements submitted
for a hearing when no verbal testimony was given,19 totaled 518. The C-SPAN
18
This number does not represent the number of hearings since several hearings had multiple IGs
testifying.
19
The OIG websites do not always differentiate between actual testimony and submitted statements for
the record. Also, it was not always possible to determine whether the IG testified or OIG staff. In these
32
congressional hearing population totaled 123,20 significantly below the totals of the other
two data sets. However, there is still a broad distribution of testimonies across IGs and
years, which should sufficiently meet the needs of this research. An analysis of a
sample of 28 testimonies over 23 hearings represented 23 percent of all available CSPAN data, 5 percent of OIG self-reported data, and 6 percent of CIS data. The
hearings covered different administrations, Congress’s, IGs, and time.
The following matrix (Table 1) facilitated a consistent interpretation of
congressional response to testimony. This matrix allowed for broad examination of
various elements to ascertain the overall response to testimony.
Congressional Response to IG Testimony – Evaluation Matrix
Questions
Times/Nature of
Interruptions
Times/Nature of
Clarifications
Tone of Overall
Response
Length of Testimony
(Standard testimony is 5 min.)
Nature of Questions
Positive/Supportive
Inquisitive
Negative/Challenging
# of
# of
# of Inquisitive
Positive/Supportive
Negative/Challenging
Interruptions
Interruptions
Interruptions
# of
# of
# of Inquisitive
Positive/Supportive
Negative/Challenging
Clarifications
Clarifications
Clarifications
Mark if
Mark if
Mark if
Positive/Supportive
Inquisitive
Negative/Challenging
Check if Short
Check if Medium
Check if Long
(1:00-4:00 min)
(4:01-7:00 min)
(Over 7:01)
Mark if Questions or
Mark if Questions or
Clarifications are Directly
Clarifications are
Related to Topic
Off Topic / Wandering
Table 1
To test the hypothesis for congressional response to testimony, the categories of
Inquisitive and Positive were combined in the results analysis. This combination
situations, if it looked normal for staff to testify on behalf the OIG, the testimony data was excluded from
the total count, but some may still be included erroneously if it could not be determined.
20
This number also includes two IG confirmation hearings, the only two available through the data
source.
33
assumed that the decision of Congress to respond in an inquisitive manner was itself a
reaction that indicated deference, or at least acknowledgement, and could be interpreted
as positive. The length of testimony (Mattei, 1998), while not directly telling of a
positive or negative response, could show a hidden relationship with the type of
response (i.e., whether a short testimony is related to a positive response) and will be
analyzed to see if such a relationship appeared to exist. The nature of congressional
questions was expected to be directly related to the type of overall response to the
testimony. For example, if an IG is presumed to be an expert witness, it seemed
reasonable to assume that the questions would be directly related to the topic being
covered as an indication of respect for the witness. Conversely, if an IG was presumed
to be an ally, then the questions might be either, or both, on and off topic to establish
respect and friendliness. The results of each question were collectively determined to
indicate a positive or negative overall response and codified as such for summary
analysis. For example, if the nature of congressional questions were frequently off-topic
from the testimony, the testimony was considered negative for that element.
The nomination hearings data came from exhaustive searches of the congressional
database GPO Access (Government Printing Office) and congressional committee
websites. As the hearing data were incomplete, only the 18 IGs appointed between 2000
and 2009 could be analyzed. Appropriations for the selected IGs were from the publicly
accessible database provided by Thomas online Library of Congress and the only
appropriations used were those codified into public law. OIG budget documents
provided appropriations data not available from the Library of Congress database. Any
34
discrepancies between these two sources were resolved by using the appropriations
codified in public law was used as they better represented the intent of Congress at the
signing of the law, and the factors causing the OIG data to be different were unknown.
As this thesis focuses on the direct relationship between the Congress and the IGs,
only presidentially appointed IGs were interviewed. Although there are 30 such IGs, 6
agencies do not have a confirmed IG in place; thus only 24 IGs were available for this
sample. Ten, or 30 percent, of all presidentially appointed IGs, were interviewed. A
retired IG was also interviewed to ascertain whether responses would vary once an IG
was out of office and away from congressional oversight. These 11 IGs represented
differences in IG office size, gender, professional background,21 and political
affiliations; IGs confirmed by one controlling party and still serving as IG under a
different controlling party; and appointments and confirmations from both political
parties. While this approach focuses on individual IGs rather than the IGs as an
institution, individual IGs determine the immediate direction of their office and are the
most connected to Congress through initial confirmation and later testimony
appearances.
Interviews with congressional staff provided the perspective of the Congress.
Because staff are the backbone of Congress and the source of congressional action, it
was appropriate to interview them in place of congressional members, who may be
tempted to present a spin or agenda-based response. Similar to the IGs, the eight
congressional staff interviewed covered a broad spectrum of variables, including both
21
This includes lawyers, law enforcement, and auditors/accountants. But it also covers the type of entity
worked for, including: executive government, legislative government, private industry, and military.
35
current and former staff, male and female, Republican and Democrat, Senate and House,
authorizers and appropriators, senior and junior level, committee and subcommittee. In
addition, all had worked specifically with the OIG community during 2000 to 2009.
Unfortunately, no database exists for which and how IGs staffers worked for any time
period, so the selection of staffers was designed to best reflect multiple experiences.
While perhaps not ideal for establishing statistical representation, the selection still
allowed a congressional perspective and was sufficient for a first look into this research
area.
Because of cost and time constraints, two variables were not addressed. These
variables, which could affect fluctuations in appropriations or help explain whether
Congress attempts control of IGs, would be excellent areas for future research. The first
variable is congressional favor or disfavor with the secretary of the department affiliated
with each IG. If Congress wanted corrective action of a particular department, one
method could be increasing the IG appropriations for additional audits/investigations of
the department. Conversely, if the department was engaging in behaviors favorable to
the constituents of the influencing committee, the IG appropriations could be reduced to
minimize ‘interference’ with those activities.
The second variable is media attention. Assuming that Congress is influenced by
issues presented in the media, Congress could manipulate the appropriations of an IG in
any given year the IG had been highlighted in the press more than typical or if the
agency overseen by the IG had received undue media attention. For example, negative
coverage could stimulate larger appropriations for IG oversight. However, attempting to
36
measure or quantify this media relationship is beyond the scope of this paper. Further,
as Congress’s attention span is often short in duration and attention to any given issue
may be limited, it is also possible that neither of these two variables could have much if
any impact on IG appropriations over time or show congressional attempts to control,
but applicability should still be determined by additional research. While the choice to
not assess these potential variables may affect the ability to more completely assess the
question posited in this paper, it should not negatively affect or minimize the
significance of the research conclusions.
Because of the small n size of the various data samples and the admitted
inconsistency in some of the data sources, statistical tests may have skewed results and
were, therefore, not conducted. At such time that the databases could be determined to
be more complete, a more in-depth search should be conducted,22 and the data
statistically tested for causality. This paper does not presume to present findings that
indicate causality; rather, it presents initial relationships that should be further parsed
and tested in future work. Such future testing would require establishing a base, which
is the intent of this thesis. A combination of tables and graphs facilitated conveyance of
results in a clear and balanced manner. Some variables were controlled to reduce the
possibility of spuriousness (gender and political party in majority control) and others
were noted for future research (media attention and congressional relationship with
agency heads).
22
A search of this extent would require intense resources and is beyond the scope of this thesis. It
would, however, be a natural extension of dissertation work.
37
Chapter 6
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS
The analysis yielded both expected and unexpected results. Even though both the
hypotheses were proven to be false, the analysis revealed useful information. Analyses
of the two assumption statements proved to be more important to determining the
outcome of the thesis question. Also important to reaching an understanding of the
thesis question were definitions of key terms, specifically “control” and “influence,”
teased out of the interviews of the IGs and staffers. First, however, the data with which
to assess the two hypotheses must be elucidated.
Confirmations and Contributions
Of the sitting 24 IGs, confirmation transcripts and/or video were available for 18.
Also viewed were confirmation hearings of six former IGs and one IG nominee who was
not confirmed. According to OpenSecrets.org, a website that catalogs political
contributions and the available biographical data attached to 4 of the nomination hearing
transcripts, of the 24 sitting IGs, 8 contributed to at least one partisan presidential
campaign or national committee. Each of the eight was nominated by the party
contributed to and six of those confirmed by the same political party, which was the
majority party in the Senate. The remaining two had already been active in the OIG
community and had apparently established certain reputations that appear to have
transcended their political affiliations. However, the retired IG and 8 of the 10 sitting
IGs interviewed stated their political affiliation as independent or none; even the two
38
IGs registered with a political party emphasized that the position itself was apolitical and
partisanship played no part in the administration of the position.
Political Contributions by IGs Prior to Appointment
IG
Gregory Friedman
Earl Devaney
Patrick McFarland
Martin Dickman
Hubert Bell
Glenn Fine
Phyllis Fong
Kenneth Donohue
Richard Moore
Daniel Levinson
Patrick O'Carroll, Jr
J. Russell George
Brian Miller
Richard Skinner
George Opfer
Donald Gambatesa
Jon Rymer
Calvin Scovel III
Todd Zinser
Eric Thorson
Gordon Heddell
Peggy Gustafson
Paul Martin
Kathleen Tighe
OIG
Appointed
Energy
1998
Interior
1999
OPM
1990
RRB
1994
NRC
1996
Justice
2000
$
USDA
2002
HUD
2002
TVA
2003
HHS
2004
$
SSA
2004
$
TIGTA
2004
$
GSA
2005
DHS
2005
VA
2005
USAID
2006
$
FDIC
2006
$
DOT
2006
Commerce
2007
Treasury
2008
$
DOD
2008
SBA
2009
NASA
2009
$
Education
2010
Contributions
Party
None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
500.00
None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
1,000.00
400.00
4,550.00
None Identified
None Identified
None Identified
1,500.00
5,565.00
None Identified
None Identified
2,000.00
None Identified
None Identified
300.00
None Identified
D
R
R
R
R
R
R
D
Table 2
Table 2 lists all the sitting presidentially appointed IGs, year of appointment, the
OIG they were appointed and confirmed to head, any political contributions identified
on OpenSecrets.org or within the IG’s confirmation documents (if available), and what
party the contributions benefitted. The highlighted IGs were determined to be
39
associated with the political party they contributed to for purposes of this paper and are
shown in the colors of the party (red - Republican, blue – Democrat). Further, all but
two of the highlighted IGs (Fine and Thorson) were appointed and confirmed by the
same party. Mr. Fine was nominated by a Democratic President and confirmed by a
Republican Senate, while Mr. Thorson was appointed by a Republican President and
confirmed by a Democratic Senate.23 The remaining IGs were not identified as having
made any political contributions as could be determined through public sources.
When interviewed, several congressional staffers stated that unless the nominee
was overtly political, party affiliation or political activities would raise only minimal
flags, and that even overtly political nominees have been confirmed. Furthermore,
within the last few years, a number of nominees with political backgrounds have been
confirmed and perceived to have done a good job, so political background itself does not
necessarily negatively affect the position.
Assessment of confirmation hearings further helped determine whether an IG was
appointed and/or confirmed for political reasons. The results were mixed and
inconsistent. In addition to highlighting the political contributions made by any sitting
IG for a political party, Table 3 includes the former presidentially appointed IGs to
determine whether they appeared to be politically appointed, and whether the
confirmation process appeared any different than those of sitting IGs. They did not.
Where identifiable, the table shows which party the IG is affiliated with (as per
contributions) and what contributions were discovered through public sources. It also
23
Prior to his current IG position, Mr. Thorson was appointed IG of the Small Business Administration by
President Bush and confirmed by a Republican Senate.
40
lists for all IGs which party confirmed the IG, and if politically affiliated, how often the
party the IG was affiliated with was the same as the confirming party. Lastly, the table
presents a brief summary of congressional responses to the IG nominee during the
confirmation hearings and whether the hearings appeared political or not.
Unfortunately, not all IG confirmation hearings were located, as confirmations prior to
1998 and those from 2010 are not available, and are depicted as dashes.
Table 3
41
Of the eight who monetarily contributed to partisan campaigns, six participated in
hearings that had some measure of partisan politics or member agendas involved. The
remaining two, one of which appears to have made the most in political contributions
and was appointed to a mid-size OIG, were minimally interviewed and made only
technical comments or answered only technical questions.24 Two of the six nominees
faced minority party members who took a more negative and challenging approach to
questioning the nominees, although the nominees were still confirmed. Of the two
nominees appointed and confirmed by different political parties, the Bush appointee
faced a Democratic Senator, who brought up a negative past experience to caution the
nominee, and the Clinton appointee faced Republican Senators, who made unusual
efforts to point out the nominee’s non-partisanship and his success in working with
Republican administrations. The remaining two political contributor nominees were
largely asked position-related questions; however, each faced members who took the
opportunity to make comments or requests related to personal agendas or special
interests.
The confirmation hearings of the remaining 10 IGs were a mix of mainly
technical focus, with the occasional comment or question related to a special interest or
agenda item. Both of the female nominees faced more direct questions or comments
related to the need to be aggressive and vocal as an IG. Only one male IG nominee
faced the same emphasis in this area, although three others had members who
emphasized the need for IGs to ally with Congress in its oversight responsibility. Of
24
During all of the confirmation hearings, the concept of IG independence was mentioned. Since that
was consistent, it is included as part of the technical aspect of the position.
42
these 10 IGs, only one was subject to a fairly partisan confirmation hearing. This IG
was appointed by a Republican President, but was criticized by the Republican Senators
and supported by Democratic Senators. Of the 18 sitting IGs, only 5 were publicly
interviewed with a more technical-only approach. This does not mean that the
remaining 13 were politically appointed, but shows that potential nominees are likely to
experience the agendas of various Senators before being confirmed for the non-partisan
position.
The six former IG confirmation hearings showed essentially the same mix as the
18 described above, and the one nominee who was not confirmed was challenged in a
very partisan manner. As shown in Table 3, the findings indicate inconsistency across
political contributors as wells as across those with no known political contributions.
Further, there was no consistency with the appointments of former IGs, some of which
were later pressured out of office under negative circumstances. Overall, even with
those that made political contributions, the confirmations were largely not partisan. So
of the 18 IGs with available confirmation hearings, using the most liberal interpretation,
half at most could be considered politically confirmed.
Even though all the interviewed IGs stated that no personal political preferences
impacted how they performed the apolitical IG position, for the purposes of testing the
hypothesis, the eight IGs who made political contributions and the additional one IG
who faced a partisan confirmation hearing were considered politically appointed. The
determination of what constitutes a "political" appointee is construed at its most liberal
interpretation and does not indicate that any IG operated politically. Casting such a
43
wide proverbial net to allow the findings to be most broadly construed is appropriate for
a first look. If political confirmation and congressional control are determined to be
correlated, then future research should establish a definition of what is considered
“political” in a more restricted and rigorous manner.
Democratic Congressman Henry Waxman also prepared a report looking at IG
appointments during the Clinton and Bush first terms and noted that more partisan IGs
were appointed during the Bush administration than during the Clinton administration.
However, this does not necessarily mean that these IGs were political or partisan as IGs.
In fact, the report must be filtered for its own political agenda,25 but it might help
explain what was important in an IG to the respective administrations and the Senate.
Further, since Congress must confirm presidentially appointed IGs, the Waxman report
does not offer much beyond stating that both branches of government are being
complicit in these political appointments. However, a trend toward Congress wanting
more political appointees to IG positions would be inconsistent with the responses of all
the staffers interviewed. The apolitical nature of the IG position does not necessarily
mean that the members who confirm or work closely with IGs put aside their politics at
any time.
To determine what percentage of the IGs included in the sample were appointed
by a political or apolitical process, certain assumptions were made. What constitutes a
political appointment could, and most likely would, be argued based on different
25
The report highlights two IGs appointed under Clinton, who were later pressured by Congress to resign
because of their actions as IGs. Johnnie Frazier was investigated by the House Committee of Energy and
Commerce and held up as an example of bad IGs to his successors. Valerie Lau was highlighted by an
interviewee as an overtly political IG who was later forced out.
44
perspectives. The interviews showed that every political player interpreted the interview
questions somewhat differently based on their perspective. None of the IGs interviewed
felt that anything other than experience, reputation, and/or a lack of political affiliation
affected their appointments. That being said, for the purposes of this paper, only 17
percent had public hearings that focused only on competence or qualifications, and the
nominees were not identified as having made any political contributions. That leaves 83
percent exposed to some measure of politics during his or her non-partisan confirmation
hearing. Further, some IGs and staffers explained that nominees usually have personal
meetings with at least the chair and ranking member of the Senate committee of
jurisdiction prior to the confirmation hearing. It is therefore likely that the hearings
represent the more conservative presentation of agendas and political views by the
members.
Appropriations
The second half of the first hypothesis related to OIG appropriations, specifically,
whether a connection existed between who appointed and confirmed an IG and what
then happened with that IGs annual appropriations. Do IGs appointed and confirmed by
the same party face decreases in annual appropriations when the majority party in
Congress changes? Are there any changes in annual appropriations when opposing
parties nominate and confirm an IG and the majority party in Congress then changes?
45
Tables 5-9, on the following pages, show the trends and changes for each of the
OIGs since the appointment of each of the 23 sitting presidentially appointed IGs26
across administrations and majority Senates. The IGs previously considered
Democratically affiliated are highlighted in blue, the Republican affiliated IGs in red,
and the IG whose confirmation hearing was political and partisan is shown as grey. The
remaining IGs are not considered political under the criteria set forth in this paper and
are not highlighted in color. The headings on the top of the chart show the party of the
President and the party in majority control of the Senate for each year, and are also
shown in the respective party colors of blue and red. One anomaly is shown for the
Senate majority for 2001 as the majority party flipped between Republican and
Democrat and thus is indicated in purple (mix of blue and red).
Political Influence or Unexplained Variance in IG Appropriations:
A Snapshot
Average Change in Appropriations
--Politically Appointed IGs
Average Change in Appropriations
--Politically Appointed IGs
--Non-Politically Appointed IGs
President
Same Party as IG
Different Party as IG
3.1 %
9.9 %
Senate
Same Party as IG
Different Party as IG
6.1 %
6.8 %
1997 through 2010
4.1 %
Table 4
To quickly assess whether changes in OIG appropriations is impacted by the party
in control of the White House or Senate, Table 4 presents the aggregated percent change
in OIG appropriations since each IG was confirmed for the position. This data presents
26
The sitting Department of Education IG was not appointed until 2010 and so is not included in these
tables.
46
percentages for politically appointed IGs against non-politically appointed IGs, in years
when the politically appointed IGs are the same, and different, party as the President or
Senate majority. Based on this summary data, political manipulations cannot explain the
variations in IG appropriations and does not appear to be a direct method of IG control.
In fact, the data is opposite that which one would expect to find in a politicized
environment, since the largest changes are found with the party in control opposite that
of the politically affiliated IG. However, looking at the data in greater detail allows one
to appreciate the nuances of the changes for each IG, which would be consistent with the
feedback from congressional staffers who stated that attempts to influence or control
would be based on congressional relationships with individual IGs.
Table 5 presents the data for the years 1997 through 2003, and Table 6 displays
the data for the more recent years of 2003 through 2010. For the earlier time period,
which covers the latter years of Democratic President Clinton and the early years of
Republican President Bush, there does not appear to be many political appointees still in
position. Whether there were indeed fewer political appointees under Clinton or
whether political IGs were appointed but are just are no longer serving (for whatever
reason) is unknown for this thesis, but would be interesting to assess in future research.
For a graphical depiction of the trends in appropriations, see Appendix A.
47
Percentage Change in OIG Appropriations Over Time
1997-2003
Agency
DOJ
Energy
Interior
OPM
RRB
NRC
USDA
HUD
Average
Median
President President President President President President President President President President President President
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
3.2%
22.0%
14.2%
5.5%
1.7%
6.8%
3.0%
16.2%
2.4%
6.7%
23.2%
12.9%
-2.8%
4.9%
4.7%
3.7%
7.7%
--3.3%
-3.6%
5.6%
9.8%
1.6%
-4.0%
0.0%
4.2%
10.0%
12.4%
10.0%
4.6%
3.8%
-4.0%
-4.0%
Average: Politically
Appointed
- Republican
- Democratic
Ave: Non-Polit Apptd
-4.0%
1.2%
1.4%
1.2%
1.9%
2.4%
1.9%
6.2%
6.2%
12.3%
11.1%
8.9%
8.9%
3.2%
22.0%
14.2%
3.2%
6.8%
22.0%
10.4%
14.2%
8.1%
Table 5
At the bottoms of Tables 5 and 6 are the averages and means for the changes over
each two year segment (the changes from one year to the next) and the averages for each
two year segment parsed by politically appointed IGs and non-politically appointed IGs,
with the politically appointed IGs further separated between Democratically affiliated or
Republican affiliated. For example, for the years 2009-2010, with both the Presidency
and Senate majority being of the Democratic party, the average change in OIG
appropriations for all 23 OIGs was 7.5 percent with a mean of 4.8 percent. The changes
for politically appointed and non-politically appointed are 11.2 percent and 4.9 percent,
respectively, with the Democratically affiliated IG changes of 9.9 percent and
Republican affiliated IG changes of 9.7 percent. This appears to indicate support for
political influencing of the OIG appropriations; however, the years 2008-2009, which
switched from a Republican President to a Democratic President, show an opposite
48
outcome with non-politically appointed IGs with greater changes in appropriations over
politically appointed and Republican affiliated over Democratically affiliated IGs.
Percentage Change in OIG Appropriations Over Time
2003-2010
Agency
DOJ
NASA
HHS
SSA
TIGTA
USAID
FDIC
Treasury
VA
Energy
Interior
OPM
RRB
NRC
USDA
HUD
TVA
GSA
DHS
DOT
DOC
DOD
SBA
Average
Median
Average: Politically
Appointed
- Republican
- Democratic
Ave: Non-Polit Apptd
President President President President President President President President President President President President President President
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-2009
2009-2010
5.0%
4.9%
7.8%
1.9%
6.4%
1.4%
11.5%
8.3%
0.4%
12.5%
4.1%
1.8%
22.5%
-3.1%
3.3%
1.4%
-0.4%
1.6%
4.9%
4.6%
0.9%
3.2%
-0.3%
5.8%
3.9%
4.1%
2.5%
13.4%
5.8%
2.2%
-15.2%
2.1%
2.4%
38.0%
35.4%
12.5%
0.7%
19.0%
-3.6%
10.3%
22.7%
4.1%
5.8%
0.2%
0.6%
10.1%
12.7%
0.0%
0.0%
-2.4%
3.5%
-0.7%
14.8%
3.1%
5.7%
28.4%
13.6%
1.7%
-3.5%
4.7%
10.7%
18.4%
3.7%
9.9%
-0.8%
-100.0%
-8.8%
4.9%
7.4%
3.0%
10.6%
-2.1%
7.4%
24.2%
0.0%
4.3%
1.3%
2.6%
-0.4%
0.1%
7.1%
3.5%
3.6%
3.0%
1.9%
-0.4%
6.0%
7.1%
4.2%
-------2.5%
20.5%
-7.5%
11.6%
9.3%
0.9%
18.9%
-6.1%
23.5%
-0.6%
1.8%
4.3%
10.5%
5.1%
10.7%
3.1%
4.7%
6.0%
3.3%
7.1%
4.2%
4.0%
3.0%
3.5%
2.2%
-3.2%
-0.3%
4.2%
4.7%
11.0%
8.8%
7.5%
4.8%
5.0%
2.4%
5.1%
1.7%
3.9%
10.8%
11.2%
5.0%
7.4%
1.5%
4.9%
4.9%
5.7%
7.8%
2.6%
-1.8%
1.9%
-6.5%
4.9%
6.4%
4.5%
12.5%
1.4%
11.1%
9.7%
9.9%
4.9%
Table 6
In terms of trends or patterns, two things were noticeable across most of the OIGs.
First, fiscal year 2007 saw a drop in appropriations across much of the federal
government, and OIGs were no exception. Second, the trend for OIG appropriations
was upward and appeared to have no correlation to when an IG was appointed or what
party was in control of either the White House or Congress. To verify this seeming
conclusion, the change in annual appropriations was calculated for all the sitting IGs for
the time frame of 2000-2009, consistent with the other appropriations testing. As shown
in Tables 5 and 6 there was no consistency in trends for any category type. The
49
variations are not explained by whether an IG was deemed to have been appointed
politically or not, and in fact, are inconsistent for every IG. That is to say, some years an
IG received above average appropriations compared to other IGs while other years
received less than average appropriations allocated to that IG. Further, contrary to
expectations, the data showed that at least one Democratically appointed IG received
consistently greater increases in appropriations during a Republican President and
Senate than did most of the Republican appointed IGs. Conversely, a Republican
appointed IG received the highest increase in appropriations for one year under a
Democratically controlled Senate and presidency.
Tables 7 through 10, on the following pages, show that the make-up of the Senate
majority and President (that is, who was in power) also do not explain the inconsistency
in the data. As the focus is on the effects of political appointment, only the IGs listed as
politically appointed are highlighted. However, the averages for the non-politically
appointed IGs and the average for all the IGs are also shown. Further, for ease of
comparison, the same color scheme as Tables 5 and 6 was used to indicate IGs in red as
Republican affiliated, blue as Democratically affiliated, and grey as the IG whose
confirmation hearing was political and partisan. Also, the headings indicate what party
was in power of the Presidency and Senate for each year represented by the data. What
was indicated by the data was the appearance that specific IGs were funded more
regularly at higher than average levels, which was consistent with the interview data
assertions that relations between Congress and the IGs are unique to each IG, regardless
of any political affiliation of the IG.
50
Table 7
When looking at changes in appropriations over years where neither the President
nor the Senate majority switched parties, and both the President and Senate majority
were of the same party, it would seem reasonable to expect greater changes in
appropriations of the IGs who are affiliated with the party in power. This was not found
to be the case. For example, Table 7 shows that for the last two years (2009-2010), the
IG with the largest appropriations increase (38 percent) was a Republican affiliated IG
even though the political power rested with the Democrats. Conversely, across 20042005, which was controlled by the Republican party, the highest change in
appropriations went to a Democratically affiliated IG (Department of Justice).
Table 8 shows that fluctuations in IG appropriations are also not explained by
changes in power structure. One would reasonably expect that if attempts at control
were occurring through the budgetary process, it would likely be seen in changes of
51
majority parties. Specifically, when the control of the Senate changes from Democrat to
Republican, the appropriations for Democratically appointed IGs should be lower than
previously. Conversely, the same would seem to hold true for changes from Republican
to Democratic Senates with respect to Republican appointed IGs. However, the data
does not support those assumptions. The table (8) presents the percent change in
appropriations across years that either the Presidency changed party and/or the Senate
majority changed party. As mentioned previously, the one anomaly with the Senate data
is seen with the purple color highlighting the Senate for the year 2001. This represents a
mixed blue and red party affiliation as the majority party in the Senate flipped between
the parties and thus both parties were in power at different times for that year. As can be
seen by the data, the expected impacts of changes in party control and fluctuations in
politically affiliated IG appropriations cannot be firmly established. For example, when
the Senate majority switched from Republican to Democrat in 2007, instead of the
Justice IG experiencing the highest increase (or the lowest decrease) in appropriations,
the IG for Veterans Affairs, who’s confirmation hearing was very partisan, saw the
greatest increase. Further, a Republican affiliated IG (Health and Human Services)
experienced the second highest increase for that period.
52
Table 8
Like the preceding tables, tables 9 and 10, which show IG changes in
appropriations across different parties in the White House, also do not provide answers
to what causes the changes in IG appropriations over time. Table 9 presents data only
across years where a Democratic President was in office, so it can be seen whether
changes in the Senate majority impact IG appropriations holding the presidential party
constant. Again, no consistency in the data is apparent. Within the years under both
Presidents Clinton and Obama (limited to the years since 1997), the Senate did not
experience the same changes as it did under President Bush. As such, for the years of
President Clinton’s time in office covered by this data, the Senate was held by the
Republican party. However, for President Obama’s first two years in office, the Senate
was held by the Democratic party. Only the total average and non-political average is
showing for the years 1997 through 2000 since none of the IGs appointed during that
time was identified as political (except for the Justice IG who was appointed in 2000).
53
As such, only the data under President Obama’s administration shows specific changes
for politically appointed IGs. This data indicates no pattern of political control or
manipulation of IG appropriations. Even though the total averages are slightly higher
for Democratically affiliated IGs over Republican affiliated IGs and the average for
politically appointed is substantially higher than non-politically appointed, the changes
of each specific IG appropriations causes one to question the veracity of whether the
total averages indicate politicization of the appropriations process or not.
Table 9
The last of these tables (Table 10) presents the data while the Presidency was held
by a Republican (Bush), regardless of the majority party in control of the Senate. Like
Table 9, there is no apparent bias in the appropriations process as is depicted by Table
10. For example, for all the years covered in this table, the average change in
appropriations for the Democratically affiliated IG over Justice was higher than or equal
to the average for Republican affiliated IGs, and only lower than the total average for
54
each year only once, regardless of the party in control of the Senate. Further, since this
is the only Democratically affiliated IG represented during the periods presented by the
table, the total average is skewed and not comparable with the other averages.
Nevertheless, it conflicts with the notion of party-based favoritism or opposing-party
retribution.
Table 10
Even though the first hypothesis appears to be negated, unexplained variations
across OIG appropriations still exist. One potential explanation relates to the executive
agencies the IGs oversee. It remains to be determined whether the changes in IG
appropriations follows closely to the changes in the agencies themselves which should
be assessed further in future work.
55
Inspectors General Testimony
The dependent variable of the second hypothesis relates to the congressional
response to IG testimony. The concept being tested is whether congressional members
respond to the non-partisan IG position in a partisan manner.
Based on C-SPAN videos of IG testimony at congressional hearings, Congress
asked only one IG to testify at a time until September 2005, when multiple IGs were
brought onto the same panel to testify on post-Katrina fraud. Two hearings with multiple
presidentially appointed IGs occurred in 2005, two in 2006, and two in 2009. This may
represent a shift in how IGs were being used (more frequently as a community and not
just as autonomous IGs) and also coincides with a modest increase in IG testimonies
each year from 2000 to 2009. A decrease occurred in 2009, which may be a temporary
drop or possibly the start of a new trend. See appendices E-G for the population of
testimonies per CIS, C-SPAN, and the OIG websites and Google. Appendix H contains
the list of testimonies available and the testimonies selected.
Table 11 presents a summary analysis of the 26 hearings reviewed. As
mentioned previously, the 26 hearings include both currently sitting IGs and former IGs.
For consistency with previously presented data, the IGs who were determined to be
politically appointed are highlighted in the color of their respective party affiliations. If
those IGs had hearings which were reviewed, the data pertaining to those hearings are
also highlighted; otherwise, only the IG’s name is highlighted. The Democratically
affiliated IG, along with the analysis of two hearings, is highlighted in blue, while two
Republican affiliated IGs, with the testimonies reviewed for each, are highlighted in red.
56
The analytical coding includes the categories of inquisitive, supportive or positive,
respectful, challenging, negative, partisan, and split (which means the parties were split
along the lines of supportive and challenging).
As can be seen, like the appropriations data presented earlier, the congressional
response to testimony does not appear to be impacted with any consistency by the
political affiliation of the IG or whether or not the IG is politically affiliated. For
example, the politically affiliated IG of the Department of Justice experienced a
response of inquisitive respect for one of his testimonies, but in another he faced
partisanship and challenging responses by members of the Democratic party. Similarly,
the non-politically affiliated IG of the Department of Defense faced a supportive panel at
one hearing and a negative panel at another hearing. The only shift that might be noted
within this set of reviewed hearings, although many other unknown influences might
readily explain the variations, is that former IGs as a whole seem to have not
experienced as many negative and challenging hearings as the currently sitting IGs. If
not explainable by other factors, this could potentially indicate a shift in the direction of
more partisan behavior by Congress towards IGs.
Table 11
Department of Energy
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Agriculture
Department of Housing and Urban
Development
Social Security Administration
General Services Administration
Department of Homeland Security
Agency for International Development
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Department of Defense
National Aeronautics & Space
Administration
Department of Education
Department of State
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Office of Inspector General
1
# of
Testimonies
Reviewed
Kathleen Tighe
Paul Martin
Gordon Heddell
Eric Thorson
Calvin Scovel III
Jon Rymer
Donald Gambatesa
Richard Skinner
Brian Miller
Patrick O'Carroll, Jr
Kenneth Donohue
Phyllis Fong
Glenn Fine
Earl Devaney
Gregory Friedman
Sitting IG
2010
2009
2008
2008
2006
2006
2006
2005
2005
2004
2002
2002
2000
1999
1998
Appointed
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
Supp/Inqu/Resp
Inqu/Neg
Supp/Inqu/Resp
Inqu/Neg
Sup/Inqu/Resp
Sup/Inqu/Resp
Sup/Inqu/Resp
Part/Inqu/Split
Supp/Inqu/Resp
Inqu
Inqu/Resp
Part/Chall
Part/Inqu/Neg
Inqu/Supp
# of Sitting IG
Hearings
Overall Analysis
Reviewed
Congressional Response to IG Testimony
1
2
3
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
# Former IG
Hearings
Reviewed
Inqu/Neg
Inquisitive
Part/Inqu/Split
Supp/Inqu
Supp/Inqu
Semi-Part/Neg
Supp/Inqu
Supp/Inqu
Supp/Inqu
Supp/Inqu
Supp/Inqu
Supp/Inqu
Overall
Analysis
57
58
Overall, out of the 26 testimonies analyzed, congressional response to18 showed
respect for the position, support for the work, and an overall positive tone. In two
hearings to investigate IGs congressional responses were both inquisitive and negative.
One of those hearings was so partisan that the IG’s testimony and answers were
ancillary to the position taking of the majority members. Still others hearings reflected a
congressional response that was critical of the amount of work the IG performed, which
was apparently not up to member standards. Another hearing centered around the
findings of an investigation into the agency head. This hearing was also completely
partisan, with one party taking the side of the IG and the other party taking the side of
the administrator.
This one example falsifies the second hypothesis since the party that appointed
and confirmed the IG was the same party that took the opposing side during this hearing.
According to statements made during the hearing the head of the agency had contributed
a substantial amount of money to the party defending her, which indicated that who
appointed or confirmed the IG did not inherently mean anything once it came to the
overt game of politics. Essentially, members were willing to sacrifice the minor player
(the IG) in favor of the major player (the agency head). This is consistent with the
statements of several staffers, who said that IGs were minimally important in the broad
scheme of congressional oversight, unless they were actively assisting in congressional
oversight. One of the staffers explained that IGs were not important to most members
because IGs could not give constituents jobs, contracts, or money, and overall could not
help the members.
59
Even when the congressional response was supportive or simply inquisitive, it
was common for the testimony to play a role in member agendas, whether, for example,
an IG responded to a leading question or added credibility to an issue important to
members. As mentioned previously, analyzing prior IG testimony allowed one to view
whether the responses to testimony were position related to the IGs position or to a
specific IG. Responses were diverse across sitting and former IGs and across individual
IGs themselves. In addition, the responses to female IGs appeared no different overall
from responses to male IGs. In one hearing members deferred more to the male Deputy
IG than to the female Acting IG; conversely, in another hearing the male Assistant IG
was asked more questions than the male IG. Moreover, congressional response to
politically appointed IGs was no different than the response to non-politically appointed
IGs.
It did appear as if some of the politically appointed, or more contentiously
appointed, IGs were not called, or did not appear, before Congress as frequently as did
other IGs. However, some of the non-contentiously appointed IGs did not appear
frequently either. The only consistency in the data were that use of, and response to, IG
testimony appeared to depend on member agendas, and that IGs were often used to
frame or support hearing agendas against the agencies they oversaw.
Although not part of the hypothesis directly, presented in Table 11 on the
following page is a look at whether the numbers of times an IG testified in comparison
to other IGs relates to the amount of his or her office appropriations compared to other
IGs. What the relationship is between these two types of data is unknown, but there
60
does appear to be some association between how often an IG testifies and how large the
size of that IGs appropriations is compared to other IGs. After the number of IG
testimonies is established for each IG and ranked in terms of frequency as compared to
Comparison of Frequency of IG Testimonies to Value of OIG Appropriations
Office of Inspector General
Department of Energy
Department of the Interior
Office of Personnel Management
Railroad Retirement Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Department of Justice
Department of Agriculture
Department of Housing and Urban Devl’t
Tennessee Valley Authority
Department of Health and Human Services
Social Security Administration
Treasury IG for Tax Admin
General Services Administration
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Veterans Affairs
Agency for International Development
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp
Department of Transportation
Department of Commerce
Department of Treasury
Department of Defense
Small Business Administration
National Aeronautics and Space Admin
Education
Table 12
CIS # of
Hearings Rank
8
9
20
23
22
4
6
12
24
10
2
7
21
3
11
15
16
1
14
17
5
19
18
13
Appropriations
Rank
13
14
20
23
22
9
8
4
24
2
7
3
12
5
6
15
16
10
19
17
1
21
18
11
= Same Ranking
= Within 5 Units
Separation
Difference
5
5
0
0
0
5
2
8
0
8
5
4
9
2
5
0
0
9
5
0
4
2
0
2
= Greater than
5 Units
Separation
other IGs and the same is done for the size of the IG’s appropriations,27 it is worth
noting that of the 24 IGs ranked, 8 (fully one-third) hold the exact same rank position for
27
In order to include as many IGs as possible for this comparison, the appropriations for fiscal year 2010
were used. The ranking could change if other year’s data were to be used, but should not change
substantially.
61
testimony and appropriations. Another 12 IGs have a ranking within 5 places between
the categories of number of testimony and appropriations. This paper does not attempt
to determine whether the size of the appropriations demands more testimony, if
testifying helps increase the size of the appropriations, or if some other explanation can
be found to explain the results as noted in the table, but such results are very interesting
and further inquiry should be part of future research.
Interviews – Inspectors General and Congressional Staff
According to interviewed IGs, the intricate relationship between Congress and
IGs depended on the IG, member, staffer, and committees. Most IGs emphasized the
dual reporting requirement that IGs have to both the Executive Branch and Congress and
saw themselves as the executive window into the agencies they oversaw. Also
important was the relationship that each IG developed with Congress and the
maximization of oversight responsibility that Congress has given IGs. Because
members do have political agendas, and several of the IGs responded that they were
used as tools or pawns28 in various agendas, virtually all IGs stated that they made
concerted efforts to maintain an equal relationship between the majority and minority
parties. One IG supported the public spiritedness theory with the assertion that the
relationship was a positive one, as IGs and Congress have the same mutual interest of
good government.
Interviews with staffers provided the qualities Congress looked for in potential
IGs: technical competence in the areas mandated by the IG Act; integrity, discretion, and
28
One IG specifically stated that IGs are not pawns between the agency and the Congress; however,
most recognized the middle position IGs occupy between those two entities.
62
good judgment; ability to be apolitical and an honest broker; straightforwardness,
independence, aggressiveness, candor, and a willingness to build a relationship with
Congress. The importance of each quality was varied by staffers. However, staff
working for the House of Representatives frankly stated that if they were involved in the
confirmation process, they would select different IGs, and a Senate staffer admitted that
IGs tend to get pushed through the system in deference to the administration. Another
staffer explained that IGs do not garner much notice and get about the same amount of
attention as a lesser agency nominee. The remaining responses split on the sides of
confidence in existing IGs and less-than-flattering interpretations of the quality of IGs
selected. Since these are the persons who write and directly influence the work of
members, these views are important as they relate to how Congress views and uses the
IG positions.
Somewhat different from the perspective of the IGs, staffers viewed the
congressional/IG relationship as one of oversight on the part of Congress with an eye
over the office it views as its eyes and ears into the agencies and part of the
congressional investigative and oversight team. In other words, Congress watches the
watcher to make sure IGs do not exhibit improper indications of loyalty to the
administration or executive. Staffers also readily admitted that they used IGs to get
inside access into the entities the IGs oversaw. How active this relationship is depends
on the IG, member, and staffers and ranges from “benign neglect” to frequent use of
IGs.
63
When asked whether they felt Congress attempts to control them as IGs, all 11
IGs responded in the negative. However, when the term influence was substituted for
“control,” 10 of the IGs replied that members have agendas and did attempt to impose
those agendas on the work of the IGs. Consistently, the IGs clarified that it is up to each
IG to determine if and how this affected their work. Several explained that members
would ask for audits or investigations on a particular topic and as long as the request
could be accomplished without concern for the outcome, then most would accommodate
the requests. As a part of influencing, one IG even mentioned that members have asked
the President to remove IGs that were considered unacceptable. The IGs recognize that
members had their own interests and would attempt to use the work of the IGs to address
those interests, but that IGs “should be used to that” and that “politics is where you
are.”29
When staffers were asked this same question, over half responded that in some
capacity Congress attempted to control or influence the work of the IGs. Some opined
that this happens only in times of dealing with IGs, who were not doing their job
because they had become so accustomed to their statutory independence that they started
“squawking” to sympathetic members for support. Other responses clearly conveyed the
acceptability of using IG work to further the agendas or preferences of members, with
one response stating that “if IGs are smart, they will acquiesce to what the authorizers
and appropriators are asking them to do.” A minority number of staff, however, saw
their role as the supporting arm to the IGs and were against actions to attempt control.
29
As all the interviews were conducted with the agreement of anonymity, none of the quotes are
attributed to any specific interviewee.
64
Again, the responses appeared to depend on how aggressive the member and staff were
and how pliable the IG was, but most staff viewed the basic relationship as one based on
political agendas for the members, leaving the outcome dependent on how the IG
responded. In essence, there is a bell curve, at one end there are members who are
underachievers and do not desire to become engaged in oversight; at the other end are
overachievers, who are very active in oversight; and in the middle are the majority of
members, who engage only in what is immediately important. Any and all of these
positions of engagement could be interpreted as attempts to control the bureaucracy.
Specifically, the highly active members may be involved for the sole purpose of using
the IG, those who do not interact with the IG may be doing so as a manner of resistance
to the work of IGs,30 and those who may interact infrequently with IGs may be doing so
only when it is perceived to be convenient for the member’s agenda needs.
Conversely, all staffers responded that most members made a conscious effort not
to control the IGs in some measure. According to multiple interviewees, members
understood that IGs needed to maintain their independence to be most effective, and
many members respected the work of the IGs and let them conduct the work as the IG
deemed appropriate. Congress also desired to ensure only that IGS were doing a “hard”
job and recognized that IGs performed work Congress did not have the resources or
access to. One respondent disagreed, however, and said that unless an attempt to control
30
The more likely explanation for why members do not engage with IGs, and was supported by staffer
interviews, was that members are uniformed about the purpose and usefulness of OIGs in overseeing
the bureaucracy.
65
would be potentially embarrassing, Congress would have no qualms attempting such
control.
This raised the first issue with the definition or intended use of the terms used in
academia versus industry. The literature of congressional control of the bureaucracy
emphasized a fairly active attempt by political actors to direct or restrict the actions of
the bureaucracy, but in the world of Washington D.C. operations, interviewees
expressed concern that this was a loaded, or “bad,” term. For IGs, the concept of
influence had more validity as it allowed each actor the ability to allow or disallow to
whatever extent, the attempts at influence by Congress. Staffers varied in comfort level
with using the term “control,” but seemed completely comfortable with the term
influence. The significance of this difference between Washington and the academics is
debated later, but the difference is important to note while reading the interview
responses.
In light of the fact that Congress has repeatedly added new authority to the IG Act
over the past 32 years, interviewees were asked if Congress, in the spirit of maintaining
apolitical, independent IGs, refrained from imposing political agendas on the IGs. The
responses generally asserted that most members recognized and appreciated the
importance of IG independence, but that it varies from member to member and that IGs
must “guard that ferociously.” Staffers provided additional information by explaining
that many members have little to no interaction with IGs and thus do not understand the
role or responsibilities of these offices. One IG defended the legal right of Congress to
peer into IG offices, but most stated that IGs are created to be fact-finders and members
66
allow that. Members usually do not attempt to push IGs towards reporting a particular
assignment outcome as long as the issue itself is reviewed/investigated, but IGs said that
they can sense what direction the member is interested in going and the political
preference, but reiterated that most members accepted the objective findings of the IG.
This is consistent with the responses from congressional staffers as well. IGs stated that
they have to play it down the middle in the “big P” world and be apolitical in their work,
but members will take what the IG “is foolish enough to give.” Given this, one IG
provided a succinct way of analyzing the give and take of this relationship for IGs: “IGs
are highly suspicious, highly cautious – they don’t trust anybody – it is a fiercely
independent community.”
The amount of time an IG spends developing and maintaining a relationship with
the Congress ranged from very rarely (maybe once a year) to frequently (as much as
once a week). But, according to the IGs, this contact does not emphasize any political
party and is related more to the committees of jurisdiction. But what this does say is that
IGs intentionally spend time, in whatever capacity, attempting to stay in the good graces
of Congress, a part of which is providing testimony when requested. While the IGs
stated the purpose of their testimony was presenting the facts, shedding light on an issue,
alerting the Congress as to problems, and requesting assistance or resources, the hearing
results shown earlier and responses from some of the staffers interviewed show that
however IGs see their role, members use IGs strategically when they think the statement
of the IG will fit the agenda needs of the members. This is essentially consistent with
the concern some IGs had that Congress used them as pawns in the bigger political
67
game. It is also consistent with the congressional perspective that interaction depended
on the IGs efforts to establish a relationship with staffers and members, and staffer
perception as to the utility of using the work of the IG. According to a staffer, “some
IGs are known for doing good work and being able to produce products and reports that
fit into hearings, or understand how to work with Congress and what information is
valuable to the Congress.”
Public hearings also provides a logical platform to assess other methods Congress
might use to attempt to control or influence IGs. In determining whether members used
hearings to publicly provide feedback, positive or negative, to IGs, most of the
interviewees responded that anything other than positive and respectful responses to IG
testimony was abnormal. For Congress, IG testimony adds credibility, weight,
transparency, and visibility to member issues, but the IG itself is little more than an
afterthought as long as the IG conveys what the member wants conveyed. In other
words, if there is no utility to an IG the IG is non-essential, but even when the IG can
benefit a member’s agenda, the IG is still only as important as the time it takes to lend
credibility, as such time the IG is again non-essential. This concept of IGs as political
tools is consistent with the testimony analysis presented in a previous section.
Several IGs, however, mentioned examples of hearings where members were not
complimentary to them or another IG. One IG assumed this had more to do with the
member’s desire to position-take rather than an ad hominem attack on the IG. This
assumption is likely, given the responses from staffers, although some staffers asserted
that they had no qualms with taking an IG to task if the staffers felt the IG was not doing
68
his or her job. When a staffer feels an IG is not doing his job, if significant enough,
Congress uses the hearing process to pressure the IG to resign. So while typically used
purely for member agendas, hearings are also used to compliment, chastise, and exert
extreme pressure on IGs. In other words, hearings are settings for IGs being pawns,
receiving positive and negative reinforcement, and perhaps, being kicked around a bit;
all of which could be reasonably interpreted as psychological methods of control or
influence.
Another method the Congress could use to attempt control or influence is through
the budgetary process. Most IGs and staffers agreed that use of the budget would be a
logical means of control, but only a few IGs or staffers stated that they had seen or
experienced such manipulation in a negative fashion. Most IGs said that they have been
the beneficiaries of positive impacts on OIG appropriations, which corroborates the
upward trend in OIG funding, shown graphically in a previous section of this report.
Staffers explained that one reason greater fluctuations may not occur, besides approval
of existing IG work, is that the funding arm of the Congress is a separate function from
the arm of Congress that may be using IGs as part of oversight tools. An appropriations
staffer agreed that the oversight side of Congress had little impact on the funding side
and that IGs play more of a technical assistance role for appropriators than the political
role they may play for authorizers. For the OIG appropriations themselves, the
appropriations staffer admitted that IGs are relatively inconsequential and receive little
attention. Further, to manipulate an IG’s funding, a majority of members would have to
69
agree to the reduction, and there are few instances a member would become so vested in
an IG as to expend that time and energy.
The essence of the interest group literature is that Congress uses outside interest
groups to oversight the bureaucracy, so the interview questions looked to see if IGs were
the outside interest groups or whether outside interest groups attempted to get involved
with IG oversight. Consistently, the IGs stated that while no outside groups had the
access necessary to attempt inappropriate influence, some had tried. One IG mentioned
that certain interest groups have strong ties to members and have been very vocal about
IG reports. Also cited was the GAO, which is directly beholden to Congress, as an
oversight agency of the OIGs.
The IGs stated that Congress also tried to influence them through member letters
to the media, speeches on the floor referring to IGs in a positive or negative manner,
direct contact of IGs, or congressional investigations. The first of these is an area of
study in and of itself in academic literature, and the second was the least mentioned and
correspondingly probably the least effective. The latter two appear to be the most
common and most effective means of conveying member interests: direct
communication for standard issues, questions, and concerns; and investigations when
Congress is attempting to force IGs to resign. This last device has been used many
times over the years and has been proven successful in removing IGs deemed by
Congress to be toxic for the office. Staffers also stated that, aside from hearings and
budgets, using the press would be the next most effective means at communicating
pleasure or displeasure with an IG, as would direct contact and official letters.
70
One example of how Congress uses a variety of tools to exert influence was
evidenced by a former IG, who became so controversial that Congress threatened to cut
the IG’s budget and transfer the funds to the agency the IG was overseeing. More recent
removals include the former NASA IG “Moose” Cobb, State IG Howard Krongard, and
Commerce IG Johnnie Frazier, all of whom were accused of interfering with staff work
and creating a negative environment. The former two’s investigative hearings are in the
hearings analyses presented earlier. IGs appointed for purely partisan reasons, have
been removed after they later damaged the reputation of the offices they managed.
These include former IGs Valerie Lau (Treasury) and Janet Rehnquist (Health and
Human Services), who were both accused of using the office for political or personal
purposes. EPA IG Nikki Tinsley was also pressured out, after gaining a reputation of
issuing politically contentious reports that went against the agenda of the sitting
administration (Russakoff, 2005). Her confirmation hearing was flattering, but the
hearing of one potential successor highlighted this IG as one who did shoddy and
partisan work (GPO Access, 2006).
Even given this string of examples where the Congress used its full weight to
“influence” IGs, these overt attempts at control appear to be the exception to the rule and
appear to be used most often on IGs who are considered either incompetent, fraudulent,
or too political. This is consistent with the responses of congressional staffers. While it
appears that most of these IGs have not upheld the intent of their position, it would be
difficult to determine whether Congress frames these hearings or attempts to push IGs
out legitimately or whether competent and good IGs are sometimes portrayed negatively
71
in order for Congress to force out IGs they do not like or who do not benefit member
agendas.
One of the IGs provided a succinct summary answer for both assumptions being
tested in this thesis, which is that in the broad scheme, Congress is more worried about
the tension between OIGs and their agencies, so Congress makes sure that IGs are
independent within their agencies more than they worry about controlling the IGs
directly. Staffers are more concerned with IGs understanding the balance necessary to
do their jobs effectively, than in directing day-to-day operations. One staffer stated that
if IGs are too independent of Congress, they cannot have the impact they should have,
and if they are too independent of their own agencies, they cannot have the impact they
should have, so members are most concerned with the IGs maintaining the proper
balance.
72
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
Congress has a vested interest in controlling the agencies of the federal
government. While most of these agencies are not considered independent and overt
attempts of congressional control would generally be acceptable, the IGs are distinctly
different in the formative requirement to remain independent and apolitical. However,
the OIGs still operate within a political system and are not immune to political
interference. The research presented in this paper looked at whether Congress employs
less obvious methods for attempting control of the IGs, namely through the budgetary
and testimonial processes, or whether Congress recognizes the importance of
autonomous IGs for the public trust and generally resists the temptation to attempt
control. The research looked at the testimonial process to see if it is a platform that
allows Congress to communicate with fellow legislators and the public its pleasure or
displeasure with the entities tasked with overseeing the massive bureaucracies of the
federal government. Further, this paper also looked to see if Congress uses the budget
system as a reward or punishment mechanism that can control the power or potency of
the IGs. Finally, this research importantly steps away from a purely numbers approach
and ascertains from IGs and congressional staffers directly the intent and existence (or
lack thereof) of control, which cannot be found in the impersonal world of statistical
data.
Testing of the two hypotheses and two assumptions yielded mixed results. Both
the hypotheses were falsified, but presented new information that warrants further
73
investigation. Once the terms control and influence were defined, and the second term
added to the assumptions, the first assumption was found to be positive. While the
extent of influence or control varied with each member, staffer, committee, and IG,
attempts at such control or influence do occur. The second assumption was also
determined to be positive. Some of the identified means by which Congress asserts
influence or control were the confirmation process, hearings, appropriations, press,
letters, and direct communication. Again, as in the first assumption, the degree of use of
the means varied.
Each of the academic theories examined explained some part of the thesis;
however, none were sufficient by itself. The theory of public spiritedness helps explain
the basic function of an OIG. These offices were created, and continue to be modified,
to continually try to improve the operations of the federal government. And the rational
choice theory and the sub-theory of congressional control of the bureaucracy explain
why Congress involves itself in oversight of the watchdogs. But the interest group
access to Congress theory adds the third element of analysis and applies to the
framework of OIGs in that they function in police patrol and fire alarm capacities on
behalf of the Congress.
While the results of this research are specific and accordingly somewhat limited
in generalizability, the outcome could have important effects on both the public
spiritedness and rational choice theories. In a practical sense, the outcomes of this
research could have important consequences for all federal IGs, for state audit agencies
and for any other advocate entity that depends on government funding to fulfill
74
oversight responsibilities, while as the same time maintaining the requisite level of
autonomy necessary to ensure program integrity. The original thought of academic
applicability for this thesis was twofold. If Congress did indeed attempt to control the
IGs, the most highly touted independent agency within the federal government, all while
continuing to give the IGs the appearance of statutorily mandated independence and
autonomy, the theory of public spiritedness would see a significant defeat. Conversely,
if Congress recognized the importance of IG autonomy and independence, the school of
rational choice theory would suffer a loss to credibility. But neither of these outcomes
materialized so clearly.
In effect, Congress has not had to directly control or influence the IGs. Staffers
presented the unflattering assertion that IGs were inconsequential in the broad scheme of
control, other than as a congressional tool to control the bureaucracy. So giving IGs
more independence is related less to forming good government than it is to inherently
giving OIG the incentive for increased separation from the agencies they oversight.
Such separation conceptually encourages IGs to be “harder” on the bureaucracy, while
still allowing IGs to show independence from both the legislative and executive entities
to which they are required to report. This paper does not assess whether the IGs are just
another means for Congress to promote good government as that extends beyond the
scope of this thesis. Rather, these findings just asserts that the structure of OIGs was not
conceived purely for good government in the sense of the academic theories. But pure
rational choice does not quite fit either since the IGs are not the end of Congress’
75
attempts to control. Rather, IGs are part of the means to an end, a go-between, which in
this sense is rational and consistent with the framework of the basic theory.
The relationship between Congress, IGs, and the agencies is metaphorically like
the game of Tug-O-War. This thesis presumed the two ends of the rope were held by
Congress on one side and the IGs on the other. But what the data indicate as more
accurate is a game between Congress on one side and the bureaucracy on the other.
Because both these entities are strong, and though interrelated through funding and
legislation they are authoritatively separate, Congress needed a way to gain legitimate
access to that bureaucracy. So the Congress created the OIGs, which is the equivalent to
adding a new piece of rope added to the center of the existing rope creating a T-type of
an arrangement. According to the interview responses, the concerns of Congress are
that IGs will, and do, decide to become lapdogs of the agencies they oversee, thereby
defeating Congress in the game. So the Congress provided IGs with increasingly greater
authority with which to audit and investigate the agencies, creating a more tense or
formal relationship between the agencies and IGs. However, when creating this
incentive for greater separation, staffers said that IGs who bull-doggedly side with
Congress will lose their credibility in terms of dealing with the bureaucracy and having a
bureaucracy more willing to accept the findings of IG work. While this ganging up of
Congress and the IGs will allow Congress to “win” the game in terms of pushing for a
more functional bureaucracy, all it leaves is mud and animosity on the face of the
bureaucracy. The third concern of the Congress, and why staffers opined that the
Congress does attempt to influence IGs, is that IGs will stay centered between the two
76
entities, but add little to the process. So the structure of the game is always evolving in
order to reach the goal of the perfect game. Based on an interpolation of the data and
interviews, this perfect game would be made up of a rope knotted in the middle with
three equidistant lines. One extending to the bureaucracy, one to Congress, and one to
the IGs. Each entity would be pulling, keeping the rope taut so as to keep the other
players on their proverbial toes, maximizing efficiency and maintaining proper balance.
Such an arrangement would give the bureaucracy the comfort of knowing the IGs truly
are objective and independent and would provide Congress with some additional access
to the bureaucracy, which it desires. Until Congress determines that is has found this
perfect balance, it will logically continue to attempt to control, or influence, the federal
watchdogs. This is the political game.
77
APPENDICES
78
APPENDIX A
Trends and Changes in OIG Appropriations for Sitting IGs
The graphs presented in this appendix all are designed to provide additional
presentation of the data concerning the trends and changes in OIG appropriations for the
years the currently sitting IGs have been in position. The earliest data presented is for
fiscal years 1990 through 2010. At what point the data line starts within the graphs
depends upon the year in which the IG was confirmed, so the data lines vary in length.
The top headings indicate in the colors of each political party what party was in control
of the Presidency and which party was the majority in the Senate for each of the years
covered. One anomaly is evident for 2001 where the Senate majority is shown as purple
in order to represent the shifting between the parties which occurred during the year.
Within the body of the graphic, the colors were extended to enable the viewer to quickly
see where the parties shifted and whether any corresponding change in IG appropriations
appears to have occurred. Blue within the body of the graph conveys both a Democratic
President and Senate majority in Congress, red represents a Republican President and
Senate majority in Congress, and purple indicates a mix of power between the
President’s party and the party in control of the Senate.
In terms of trends or patterns, two things were noticeable across most of the OIGs.
First, fiscal year 2007 saw a drop in appropriations across much of the federal
government, and OIGs were no exception. Second, the trend for OIG appropriations
was upward and appeared to have no correlation to when an IG was appointed or what
party was in control of either the White House or Congress.
Chart 2
Legend of Controlling Parties – President and Senate
(Shown as Blue and Red for Democrats and Republicans, Respectively. Purple Indicates Mix of Power)
1990: Republican President, Democratic Senate (Mixed Control)
1994: Democratic President and Senate (Single Party Control)
1996-2000: Democratic President, Republican Senate (Mixed Control)
2001: Republican President, Mixed Majority in Senate (Mixed Control)
2002: Republican President, Democratic Senate (Mixed Control)
2003-2006: Republican President and Senate (Single Party Control)
2007-2008: Republican President, Democratic Senate (Mixed Control)
2009-2010: Democratic President and Senate (Single Party Control)
79
80
Even though the global look at the IG’s appropriations most evidently indicates a
trend upwards, on closer observation, there exist inconsistencies in the trend lines. It is
not known what may be causing the fluctuations within each IG’s appropriations, but is
does signify that some variable is influencing IG appropriations. These variables could
be related to the appropriations of the department or agency the IG oversees (i.e. the
IG’s appropriations decreased because the agency’s overall appropriations decreased),
increasing or decreasing interest in a particular agency’s programs which creates
additional oversight needs by the IG (i.e. FEMA activity after Hurricane Katrina),
feedback on activity in which the IG is engaged (i.e. Congress does not like the outcome
of particular investigations), an activity being shifted in or out of the IG’s purview (i.e.
shifting the responsibility for the annual audits to a contractor funded by the agency
instead of the IG), or some other influencing factor. The following charts for individual
OIG appropriations highlight the variations that have, or have not, occurred for each.
Due to the difficulty acquiring appropriations data for years prior to 1998, some of the
data for the earlier appointed IGs starts some years after the IG was confirmed.
For the Office of Personnel Management (Chart 3), the shift in political parties
does not appear to have had a clear impact on this IG’s appropriations There does,
however, appear to be a slight drop in 2003, followed by a significant increase over the
next few years, before dropping again in 2007 (this drop was related to economic issues
and affected most of the federal government), and rising sharply again in 2008. Again,
the increases and decreases, both, have occurred under both parties.
81
Chart 3
In addition to the missing data prior to 1998, data was not found for fiscal year
2007 for the Railroad Retirement Board. The Missing appropriations data was
requested, but not provided, from the Office of Personnel Management OIG for fiscal
years 1990-1997 and the Railroad Retirement Board for fiscal years 1994-1997 and
2007. However, even without this data, the same general pattern emerges for the
Railroad Retirement Board (Chart 4); only the specific increases or decreases may differ.
No overt political manipulation across parties appears evident, although, a significant
decrease in 2000 and a minor drop in 2003 could warrant additional inquiry.
Chart 4
82
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was the only agency pre-1998 data could be
acquired, which was provided by the OIG itself. The most interesting aspect to this data
is the relatively flat level of appropriations awarded it under Democratic Presidencies,
although large increases occurred under Democratic Senate majority in 2002 and again
under the first year of the Obama administration and Democratic Senate majority.
Chart 5
The Department of Energy (Chart 6) also experienced small increases and
decreases over the years, with the most notable occurring in 2002 (drop), 2003
(increase), and 2009-2010 (which has been flat).
Chart 6
83
This OIG (Chart 7) experienced several drops and some large increases since its
IG was confirmed, even though this IG was favorably known to congressional staffers.
Most notably are the years from 2003 to 2007 when the budget was fairly flat or
dropping. Based on personal knowledge, one explanation, which does support the idea
of congressional influence is that during this time investigations were being conducted
on a high level Republican appointed departmental official for improper actions which
was not in favor with Republican members of Congress or the President.
Chart 7
Of most note for this OIG (Chart 8 on the following page) is the fairly consistent,
and dramatically upward, trend to the OIG’s appropriations across political parties. This
fits with the responses of congressional staff who stated that responses to IGs are unique
to each IG and that IGs who are perceived to be good are noticed. Within the OIG
community and with the congressional staffers, this IG had a positive reputation. Even
though this IG was determined to be politically affiliated for purposes of this paper, no
such political impact can be seen.
84
Chart 8
The following two IGs (Charts 9 and 10) both faced appropriations decreases
during 2007 to 2008, most likely due to the federal-wide trend down in appropriations,
but generally saw moderate increases to their respective appropriations.
Chart 9
Chart 10
85
Of all the presidentially appointed IG offices, the TVA is the only OIG to operate
off agency generated revenue. Although Congress reviews and approves the TVA
budget, it does not make any general fund allocations to this OIG.
Chart 11
While not covering as long a time span as many of the previous OIGs, the
following five charts (Charts 12 through 16 on the following page) show somewhat
erratic movements in their respective appropriations. All faced a decrease in
appropriations between 2007 or 2008 (although the Department of Homeland Security
OIG, Chart 16, saw a large increase in appropriations for 2007), but all five also saw
substantial upward trends for much of the time period. Two OIGs, the Departments of
Health and Human Services and Homeland Security saw drops or stagnation,
respectively, in their appropriations from 2009 to 2010.
86
Chart 12
Chart 13
Chart 14
Chart 15
Chart 16
The following charts of OIG appropriations (Charts 17 through 26 on the
following pages) contain less information than those presented thus far because of the
shortened timeframe since the appointment of the sitting IGs, but they still show the
consistent upward trend of OIG appropriations overall. These charts also show
87
unexplained variations other than what may be explained generally in the results of IG
and staffer interviews.
Chart 17
Chart 18
Chart 19
Chart 20
Chart 21
Chart 22
88
Chart 23
Chart 24
Chart 25
Chart 26
89
APPENDIX B
Consent to Participate in Research
You are being asked to participate in research which will be conducted by Rebecca
Booth in the Government Department at California State University, Sacramento. The
purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between Congress and Offices of
Inspectors General, specifically as it relates to whether Congress uses subtle means of
attempting control of this apolitical Office. This information is important because of its
implications for evaluating one aspect of IG autonomy and will contribute to the fields
of government and political science.
You will be asked a series of questions in a standard interview format. Most of these
questions will be in an open-ended style and thus will be banded only by your response
and given time constraints. The risks associated with this research are limited.
Specifically, due to the political nature of the research, the results of the interview-based
data may or may not be favorably accepted by outside readers, including Congress, the
IG community, and the press. That is, if such readers are made aware of this research.
There will be no personal benefit from participating in this research aside from the
contribution of knowledge you will add to the field. This study will help us to better
understand the relationship between IGs and Congress.
Your participation in the study will be kept confidential, and there will be no way to
track your identity to your interview responses.
There will be no compensation for participation.
If you have any questions about this research, you may contact Rebecca Booth at
916.978.6107, or by email at rebecca_booth@doioig.gov.
You may decline to be a participant in this study without any consequences. Your
signature below indicates that you have read this page and agree to participate in the
research with the recognition that the results of your interview may appear, without
identifying information, in the final research report.
Signature of Participant
Date
90
APPENDIX C
Interview Questions – Inspectors General31
1.
What is your professional background?
2.
How many years have you been involved in the IG community?
3.
How many years have you been involved in the political community?
4.
If, and how many years were you involved in the non-governmental/federal
sector?
5.
What is your political affiliation?
6.
Do you believe your political affiliation had any impact on your appointment?
7.
Why do you believe you were appointed?
8.
What do you think is the relationship between Congress and the IG?
9.
Do you think Congress attempts to control IGs?
10.
Do you think Congress makes intentional efforts NOT to control IGs?
11.
Do you ever face political pressure to conduct audits/investigations (or not
conduct them) in a certain way or towards a particular outcome?
12.
How often do you communicate with members of Congress?
13.
Do you communicate with one party more the other?
14.
How often do you testify before Congress?
15.
What do you think is your role as a testifier?
16.
Do you think Congress shows you approval or disapproval during the testimony
process?
31
Additional questions may, or may not, have been asked depending on the interview answers provided.
Questions may also have been rephrased during the interview to add clarity.
91
17.
Do you think that Congress manipulates IG budgets as a control mechanism?
18.
Do you feel any outside pressure to do your job in a certain way?
19.
If Congress does try to control/influence IGs, what other ways does this happen?
92
APPENDIX D
Interview Questions – Congressional Staff32
1.
When were you hired as a staff member?
2.
What is your professional background?
3.
How many years have you been involved in overseeing the IG community?
4.
How many years have you been involved in the political community?
5.
How many years were you involved in the non-governmental/federal sector?
6.
What is your political affiliation?
7.
What criteria are used to select/confirm IGs?
8.
Do past political actions/behaviors have any impact on IG confirmation?
9.
Does current political affiliation have any impact on IG confirmation?
10.
From the perspective of Congress, what is the relationship between Congress and
IGs?
11.
Does Congress attempt to control or influence IGs?
12.
Does Congress intentionally make efforts to NOT control/influence IGs?
13.
Are IGs pressured to conduct (or not conduct) audits/investigations in a certain
way or for a particular outcome?
14.
How often does Congress interact directly with specific IGs (as opposed to the
entire IG community)?
32
Additional questions may have been asked depending on the interview answers each staffer and/or IG
provided. Questions may also have been rephrased during the interview to add clarity.
93
15.
Do certain political members or committees interact more frequently with specific
IGs?
16.
Why does Congress request IGs to testify in the public forum?
17.
Does Congress use the public forum to show approval or disapproval of the
testifying IG?
18.
Does Congress attempt to manipulate IG budgets?
19.
Does Congress use other means to control/influence IGs?
20.
If Congress does attempt to control/influence IGs and the above ways are not
explanatory, how does Congress attempt to control or influence IGs?
94
APPENDIX E
C-SPAN Hearing Data Selected
95
APPENDIX F
Congressional Information Service (CIS) Testimony Data
96
APPENDIX G
Office of Inspector General Webpage and Google Search Testimony Data
97
APPENDIX H
C-SPAN Hearings of Presidentially Appointed IG Testimony
(Includes 2 Confirmation Hearings)
Hearings shaded in this color represent
the hearings reviewed for congressional
response to IG testimony. A variety of
hearings were selected in order to
encompass various years, IGs, political
majorities, and committees.
1
First-Time
Homebuyer Tax
Credit
Hearings shaded in this color represent IG
nomination hearings reviewed for
determination of political IG
appointment. Both nomination hearings
were reviewed.
House
Witnesses testified about a
J. Russell George,
Committee
$8,000 dollar tax credit for first-
IG, Treasury: Tax
Oct 22,
time home buyers, which
Administration
2009
Congress is considering
extending beyond the end of the
current year.
2
2010 Census Data
Senate
Officials testified about
Todd Zinser, IG,
Committee
preparations for and the conduct
Commerce
Oct 7, 2009
of the 2010 census. Among the
topics addressed were concerns
about the return of census forms,
the use of information technology
during the census, and other
issues.
3
Fraud and Waste
in Afghanistan
and Pakistan
House
Witnesses testified about
Gordon S. Heddell,
Committee
oversight of aid programs and on
Acting IG, DOD
Sep 9, 2009
detecting fraud and waste in
Donald Gambatesa,
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
IG, USAID
Harold W. Geisel,
IG, State
4
Aviation Industry
Safety Oversight
Senate
Witnesses testified about air
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
safety and the role of the Federal
IG, DOT
Jun 10,
Aviation Administration (FAA) in
2009
oversight of the airline industry.
98
5
Federal
Contracting Fraud
Senate
Federal inspectors general
Brian Miller, IG,
Committee
testified about preventing,
GSA
Apr 21,
detecting, and prosecuting
Richard Skinner,
2009
contract fraud in the solicitation
IG, DHS
and oversight of government
contracts.
6
Afghan Security
Forces
House
A hearing was held titled "Training
Thomas F. Gimble,
Committee
and Equipping Afghan Security
IG, DOD
Feb 11,
Forces: Unaccounted Weapons
2009
and Strategic Challenges."
Witnesses testified about U.S.
training of Afghan security forces
and readiness levels.
7
U.S. Attorney
Hiring and
Dismissals
House
The House Judiciary Committee
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
held a hearing on the
DOJ
Oct 3, 2008
investigation into the firing of the
U.S. Attorneys in 2006.
8
Misconduct
Involving Oil and
Gas Royalty
Collections
House
A hearing was held on reports
Earl E. Devaney,
Committee
from the Interior Department
IG, Interior
Sep 18,
inspector general on misconduct
2008
involving oil and gas royalty
collections.
9
Justice
Department Hiring
Practices
Senate
Inspector General Glenn Fine
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
testified about his report on
DOJ
Jul 30, 2008
improper political influence in the
hiring of attorneys for the
Department of Justice under the
leadership of Former Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales.
10
Electrocution
Deaths in Iraq
House
Witnesses testified about 16 U.S.
Gordon S. Heddell,
Committee
soldiers that died in Iraq after
IG, DOD
Jul 30, 2008
being electrocuted, as well as
electrical systems operations in
various regions of Iraq.
99
11
Defense
Contracts in Iraq
and Afghanistan
Senate
Military officials testified about
Gordon S. Heddell,
Committee
Defense Department contracts
IG, DOD
Jul 23, 2008
awarded for reconstruction and
support operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
12
Privacy of
Passport Files
Senate
Witnesses testified about privacy
Harold W. Geisel,
Committee
issues related to an incident in
IG, State
Jul 10, 2008
which government employees
had accessed several visa
applications and passport files.
13
Pipeline Safety
House
A hearing was held on
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
coordinating the oversight by the
IG, DOT
Jun 25,
Departments of Transportation
2008
and Homeland Security of
pipelines that carry natural gas
and hazardous materials.
14
Detention at
Guantanamo Bay
House
The International Organizations,
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
Human Rights and Oversight
DOJ
Jun 4, 2008
Subcommittee of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee held a
third hearing to examine errors
made in prisoner treatment and
interrogations at Guantanamo
Bay.
15
Federal Aviation
Administration
Oversight
Senate
Officials testified at an oversight
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
hearing on the safety and
IG, DOT
Apr 17,
modernization performance of the
2008
Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).
16
Internal Revenue
Service and
Identity Theft
Senate
A hearing was held on the
J. Russell George,
Committee
consequences for victims of tax-
IG, Treasury: Tax
Apr 10,
related identity theft, how the
Administration
2008
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
processes attempt to manage the
issue, and what immediate steps
the agency can take.
100
17
Aviation Delays
and Consumer
Issues
House
A hearing was held on aviation
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
delays and consumer issues.
IG, DOT
Apr 9, 2008
Department of Transportation
Inspector General Scovel
reported his findings on the
massive airline delays in the
summer of 2007 and the progress
that's being made.
18
Airline Safety
Oversight, Part 1
House
Federal Aviation Administration
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
safety inspectors and others
IG, DOT
Apr 3, 2008
testified about critical lapses in
FAA safety oversight of airlines
and abuses.
19
Waste, Fraud, and
Abuse of Funds in
Iraq
Senate
Witnesses testified about alleged
Claude M. 'Mick'
Committee
waste, fraud and abuse in the
Kicklighter, IG,
Mar 11,
spending of U.S. funds in Iraq.
DOD
2008
Topics included current efforts to
combat corruption in the Iraqi
government and trafficking of
U.S.-supplied weapons.
20
21
Mexican Trucking
Program
DNA Testing
Program
Senate
Transportation Department
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
officials testified in an oversight
IG, DOT
Mar 11,
hearing about the current Cross-
2008
Border Truck Pilot Program.
Senate
A hearing was held titled
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
"Oversight of the Justice for All
DOJ
Jan 23,
Act PL 108-405: Has the Justice
2008
Department Effectively
Administered the Bloodsworth
program and protected the
innocent.
101
22
State Department
Inspector General
House
Inspector General Krongard
Howard J.
Committee
testified about accusations of
Krongard, IG, State
Nov 14,
insufficient oversight and
2007
interference with State
Department investigations for
political reasons. In a contentious
hearing, the inspector general
denied the accusations.
23
Small Business
Loan Fraud
Senate
Witnesses testified about alleged
Eric Thorson, IG,
Committee
small business loan fraud. Small
SBA
Nov 13,
Business Administration officials
2007
were questioned about oversight
activities. The chief executive
officer of Business Loan Express
and others...
24
Food Supply
Safety
House
Witnesses testified about
Eric Thorson, IG,
Committee
operations of the Food and Drug
SBA
Nov 13,
Administration and its ability to
2007
assure the safety and security of
the food supply.
25
Terrorist Watch
List
House
A portion of the House Committee
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
on Homeland Security was
DOJ
Nov 8, 2007
shown. The hearing focused on
the progress and pitfalls of the
Terror Watch List (TWL).
26
Federal Terrorist
Watch List
Senate
Witnesses testified in continuing
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
oversight hearings on Department
DOJ
Oct 24,
of Homeland Security programs
2007
created since the September 11
attacks, in this case the Federal
Terrorist Watch List.
102
27
Airline Delays and
Consumer Issues
House
Transportation officials and
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
industry representatives testified
IG, DOT
Sep 26,
at a hearing on airline delays and
2007
consumer issues. A record
number of delays have occurred
in the past year.
28
Bridge Safety,
Part 1
House
The House Transportation and
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
Infrastructure Committee held a
IG, DOT
Sep 5, 2007
hearing on structurally deficient
bridges in the United States.
29
Baghdad
Embassy
Construction
House
The House Oversight and
Howard Krongard,
Committee
Government Reform Committee
IG, State
Jul 26, 2007
held a hearing on construction
delays and problems plaguing the
U.S. Embassy construction
project in Baghdad.
30
NASA Oversight
Investigation
Joint
The Senate Commerce, Science
Robert W. Cobb,
Meeting
and Transportation Subcommittee
IG, NASA
Jun 7, 2007
on Space, Aeronautics, and
Related Sciences and the House
Science and Technology on the
investigation of complaints
against NASA Inspector General
Robert Cobb.
31
Fiscal Year 2008
Housing and
Urban
Development
Budget
Senate
Witnesses testified at a hearing
Kenneth M.
Committee
on the fiscal year 2008 budget for
Donohue Sr., IG,
May 3, 2007
the Department of Housing and
HUD
Urban Development. Discussed
were funding levels for various
department programs, urban
issues, and other.
103
32
Accuracy of
Battlefield
Information
House
Witnesses testified about U.S.
Thomas F. Gimble,
Committee
Army reports and media accounts
IG, DOD
Apr 24,
of two incidents involving
2007
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
in the early years of military
combat in the region.
33
Reading First
Program
Oversight, Part 1
House
The House Education and Labor
John P. Higgins Jr.,
Committee
Committee held an investigative
IG, Education
Apr 20,
hearing into alleged
2007
mismanagement of the Reading
First program and conflicts with
authors and publishers. Topics
included the inspector general's
report, scientific research, and
other issues.
34
Reading First
Program
Oversight, Part 2
House
The House Education and Labor
John P. Higgins Jr.,
Committee
Committee held an investigative
IG, Education
Apr 20,
hearing into alleged
2007
mismanagement of the Reading
First program and conflicts with
authors and publishers. Topics
included the inspector general's
report, scientific research, and
other issues.
35
Aviation
Consumer Issues
House
Industry executives and
Calvin L. Scovel III,
Committee
consumer advocates in the
IG, DOT
Apr 20,
second and third panels testified
2007
about aviation consumer issues,
including extended ground delays
for passengers.
104
36
Allegations of
Misconduct at the
General Services
Administration
House
General Services Administration
Brian Miller, IG,
Committee
officials testified about allegations
GSA
Mar 28,
of misconduct in the agency.
2007
Witnesses testified about partisan
political activities by appointees at
the GSA, use of nonpartisan
resources for personal purposes.
37
Defense
Department
Nominations
Senate
Testimony was heard on the
Claude Kicklighter,
Committee
nomination of Claude Kicklighter
DOD IG Nominee
Mar 27,
to be the Defense Department
2007
inspector general and on other
nominations.
38
FBI Use of
National Security
Letters
House
The House Judiciary Committee
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
held a hearing on an independent
DOJ
Mar 20,
report of the inspector general on
2007
the use of national security letters
by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
39
Federal Housing
Administration
Senate
The Subcommittee on
Kenneth M.
Committee
Transportation, Housing and
Donohue Sr., IG,
Mar 15,
Urban Development, and Related
HUD
2007
Agencies held a hearing on the
solvency and reform proposals for
the Federal Housing
Administration.
40
Income Tax
Collection
House
Witnesses testified about the gap
J. Russell George,
Committee
between the amount of federal
IG, Treasury: Tax
Feb 16,
income tax that is owed and that
Administration
2007
collected. Internal Revenue
Service Commissioner Everson
testified on efforts to collect back
taxes.
105
41
Transformation of
the FBI
House
The House Appropriations
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
Subcommittee on Science, State,
DOJ
Sep 14,
Justice, and Commerce, and
2006
Related Agencies held a hearing
on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's efforts to improve
recruitment and retention.
42
Department of
Defense Audit
Senate
Witnesses testified about the
Thomas F. Gimble,
Committee
Financial Improvement and Audit
IG, DOD
Aug 3, 2006
Readiness (FIAR) Plan outlined
by the Department of Defense in
December 2005.
43
Cybersecurity at
the Department of
Energy
House
Witnesses testified about the
Gregory Friedman,
Committee
Department of Energy's efforts to
IG, Energy
Jun 9, 2006
improve the security of its
classified information and to
protect it from internal and
external hackers.
44
Veterans Data
Privacy Breach
Senate
Secretary Nicholson and other
George J. Opfer,
Committee
officials testified about a recent
IG, VA
May 25,
security breach at the Department
2006
of Veterans Affairs in which
computer records containing
personal information of 26.5
million veterans were stolen.
45
Hurricane Katrina
Response
House
The House Government Reform
Eric Thorson, IG,
Committee
Subcommittee on Government
SBA
May 10,
Management, Finance, and
Kenneth M.
2006
Accountability held a hearing on
Donohue Sr., IG,
prevention of fraud, waste, and
HUD
public corruption.
Thomas F. Gimble,
IG, DOD
46
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Oversight
Senate
Director Mueller and other
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
officials testified about Federal
DOJ
May 2, 2006
Bureau of Investigation
operations and programs.
106
47
Social Security
and Privacy
Issues
House
The Social Security
Patrick O'Carroll,
Committee
Subcommittee of the House Ways
IG, SSA
Mar 16,
and Means Committee held a
2006
hearing on privacy issues related
to protecting individual Social
Security numbers.
48
National Security
Whistleblowers
House
Witnesses testified about
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
retribution against whistleblowers
DOJ
Feb 14,
in national security areas. The
Gregory Friedman,
2006
second panel was made up of
IG, Energy
whistleblower advocates, various
Thomas F. Gimble,
departmental inspectors general,
IG, DOD
and Defense Department officials.
49
Waste, Fraud and
Abuse After
Hurricane Katrina
Senate
Officials testified about
Richard Skinner,
Committee
mismanagement, cost overruns,
IG, DHS
Feb 13,
and abuses of federal emergency
2006
funds for recovery, relief, and
reconstruction following the
disaster brought on Gulf Coast
regions by Hurricane Katrina.
50
Secure Border
Initiative
House
A hearing was held on the
Richard Skinner,
Committee
mismanagement of the border
IG, DHS
Dec 16,
surveillance system and lessons
2005
for the new Secure Border
Initiative (SBI) program.
51
52
Aviation Safety
Iraq
Reconstruction
Efforts
Senate
A hearing was held on aviation
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
safety from government officials
IG, DOT
Nov 17,
and from representatives of
2005
aviation employee associations.
House
Witnesses testified on the topic,
Howard Krongard,
Committee
"Iraq: Perceptions, Realities, and
IG, State
Oct 18,
Cost to Complete." Among the
Joseph Farinella,
2005
topics they addressed were U.S.
IG, USAID
efforts to support reconstruction,
Thomas F. Gimble,
governance, and development of
IG, DOD
security forces.
107
53
Preventing PostKatrina Waste and
Fraud
House
Government officials testified
Nikki Tinsley, IG,
Committee
about the initial activities of the
EPA
Sep 28,
Office of Inspector General (OIG)
H. Walker Feaster,
2005
of the U.S. Department of Health
IG, FCC
and Human Services (HHS) to
Johnnie E. Frazier,
guard against waste, fraud, and
IG, Commerce
abuse.
Gregory Friedman,
IG, Energy
Richard Skinner,
IG, DHS
Thomas F. Gimble,
IG, DOD
54
Transformation of
the FBI After
September 11
House
Justice Department officials
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
testified about the transformation
DOJ
Sep 14,
of the FBI since the September
2005
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Topics
included the role of the Science,
State, Judiciary, and Commerce
Subcommittee's role.
55
FBI Oversight
Senate
The Senate Judiciary Committee
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
held an oversight hearing on
DOJ
Jul 27, 2005
Federal Bureau of Investigation
operations and policy. Witnesses
testified about investigating
terrorist threats and activities and
other issues.
56
Energy
Department
Security
House
The subcommittee hears
Gregory Friedman,
Committee
testimony on efforts to improve
IG, Energy
Jul 26, 2005
security safeguards at nuclear
facilities operated by the Office of
Energy, Science and Environment
of the Energy Department.
108
57
Guantanamo
Detainees
Senate
Witnesses testified about the
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
treatment of detainees at
DOJ
Jun 15,
Guantanamo Bay detention
2005
facility, about investigations into
allegations of abuse by U.S.
officials stationed at the facility,
and recent media reports.
58
Transporting
Hazardous
Materials
House
The Highways, Transit, and
Todd Zinser,
Committee
Pipelines Subcommittee of the
Deputy IG, DOT
May 11,
House Transportation and
2005
Infrastructure Committee held a
hearing on the safety of
hazardous material
transportation.
59
Patriot Act
Reauthorization
House
Witnesses testified about the
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
reauthorization of the Patriot Act.
DOJ
May 10,
The hearing focused on Section
2005
805 of the Patriot Act, which
criminalizes any tangible or
intangible property or service
given to a named terrorist.
60
Financial
Management at
the Justice
Department
House
The Subcommittee on
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
Government Management,
DOJ
May 4, 2005
Finance, and Accountability of the
House Government Reform
Committee held a hearing on the
financial management challenges
at the Department of Justice.
61
Amtrak
Reauthorization
Senate
The Surface Transportation and
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
Merchant Marine Subcommittee
IG, DOT
Apr 21,
of the Senate Commerce,
2005
Science and Transportation
Committee held a hearing on
reauthorizing Amtrak funding of
$2 billion over the next three
years.
109
62
Mad Cow Disease
Detection
House
Witnesses testified regarding an
Phyllis K. Fong, IG,
Committee
expanded surveillance program
USDA
Jul 14, 2004
for determining the extent to
which Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy, more commonly
known as mad cow disease,
might be present in U.S. cattle.
63
64
Terrorists and
Stolen Passports
Passenger Rail
Transportation
House
Witnesses testified about stolen
Clark Kent Ervin,
Committee
passports and their use by
IG, DHS
Jun 23,
members of terrorist
2004
organizations.
Senate
Witnesses testified regarding
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
plans for the restructuring of
IG, DOT
Oct 2, 2003
Amtrak and the creation of inner
city passenger rail transportation
systems. Senators were at odds
over the amount of federal
funding that should be provided.
65
Social Security
Appeals
House
No Summary provided.
Committee
James Huse, IG,
SSA
Sep 25,
2003
66
Fraud and Abuse
in Federal
Programs
House
Witnesses testified about various
James Huse, IG,
Committee
government programs and
SSA
Jul 17, 2003
measures to prevent fraud, waste
and abuse. They also talked
about ways to modernize
programs to ensure greater fiscal
responsibility.
67
Use of Federal
Resources
House
Mr. Mead testified about an
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
incident in which Texas legislators
IG, DOT
Jul 15, 2003
requested help from agencies of
the federal government in trying
to find several state
representatives who had gone to
Oklahoma to prevent a vote.
110
68
Misuse of Social
Security Numbers
House
Witnesses testified about the use
James Huse, IG,
Committee
and misuse of social security
SSA
Jul 10, 2003
numbers and proposed legislation
to prevent identity theft.
69
IRS Budget and
Strategic Plan
Joint
A portion of a hearing on the
Pamela Gardiner,
Committee
Internal Revenue Service budget
IG, Treasury: Tax
May 20,
and proposed reforms of the IRS
Administration
2003
was shown. Among the topics
addressed were improving
productivity and enforcing
taxpayer compliance.
70
71
Bush
Administration
Management
Agenda
House
Foreign service officials testified
Anne Sigmund, IG,
Committee
about staffing levels and
State
Apr 7, 2003
maintaining security at U.S.
Monitoring
Foreign Students
House
Witnesses testified about a
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
system to monitor foreign
DOJ
Apr 2, 2003
students in the United States. The
embassies and missions abroad.
discovery that several of the
September 11 hijackers entered
the United States on student
visas prompted a re-examination
of this topic.
72
FAA
Reauthorization
Senate
Witnesses testified about
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
reauthorizing Federal Aviation
IG, DOT
Feb 11,
Administration programs. Among
2003
the issues they addressed were
the state of the aviation industry,
safety and security programs, and
data gathering.
73
Aviation Security
Senate
Witnesses testified about aviation
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
security, focusing on the efforts of
IG, DOT
Feb 5, 2003
the Department of Transportation
to comply with new aviation and
transportation security laws.
111
74
Border Security
Senate
Witnesses testified about the
Earl E. Devaney,
Committee
performance of various agencies
IG, Interior
Jan 30,
responsible for U.S. border
2003
security. Among the issues they
addressed were the illegal
transportation of money,
counterfeiting, and other issues.
75
Computer
Security
House
Officials testified about various
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
government agencies' computer
IG, DOT
Nov 19,
security and about their ability to
2002
protect systems from fraud,
misuse and cyberterrorism.
76
Nuclear Terrorism
at Ports and
Borders
House
Witnesses testified about the
Jeffrey Rush, IG,
Committee
threat of nuclear terrorism at U.S.
Treasury
Oct 17,
ports and borders. Among the
2002
topics they addressed were
radiation control efforts by port
authorities and border patrol, and
the lack of progress being made.
77
Implementation of
Anti-Terrorism
Laws
Senate
Witnesses testified about the
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
implementation and effectiveness
DOJ
Oct 9, 2002
of anti-terrorism measures, and
specifically about the USA Patriot
act and the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act.
78
Unconventional
Attack
Preparations
House
The witnesses testified about the
Joseph E. Schmitz,
Committee
preparedness of U.S. forces to
IG, DOD
Oct 1, 2002
face a chemical or biological
attack. They discussed supply
and quality control problems, as
well as other issues.
112
79
Foreign Student
Tracking
House
Witnesses testified about efforts
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
by the Immigration and
DOJ
Sep 18,
Naturalization Service to track
2002
foreign students as part of their
counterterrorism efforts.
80
81
Homeland
Security and
Identity Theft
CIA Inspector
General
Nomination
Joint
The Homeland Security risks
James Huse, IG,
Meeting
posed by identity fraud and theft
SSA
Jun 25,
were the topic of a hearing today
2002
on Capitol Hill.
Senate
Deputy Director Helgerson
John Helgerson,
Committee
testifies at a confirmation hearing
CIA IG Nominee
Apr 17,
about his nomination to be
2002
director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
82
Internal Revenue
Service Oversight
House
On the day taxes were due to be
Pamela Gardiner,
Committee
filed, witnesses testified about
IG, Treasury: Tax
Apr 15,
customer service and the
Administration
2002
oversight functions of the
committee.
83
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Reform
Senate
Witnesses testified about records-
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
Committee
keeping in the Oklahoma City
DOJ
Mar 21,
bombing investigation and about
2002
the belated disclosure by the FBI
of more than 1,000 documents
related to the trials of Timothy
McVeigh.
84
Implementation of
the TREAD Act
House
Government officials testified
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
about the tire recall law (TREAD)
IG, DOT
Feb 28,
passed in response to the
2002
Firestone tire recall investigation,
how the law has been
implemented, and whether the
industry is complying with the law.
113
85
Management of
Federal Agencies
House
Federal agency officials testified
Gaston Gianni, IG,
Committee
about the progress they have
FDIC
Feb 15,
made in implementing a list of
2002
priorities federal agencies should
use to improve efficiency.
86
Implementation of
Aviation Security
Act
House
The witnesses testified about the
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
implementation of the Aviation
IG, DOT
Jan 23,
Security Act, particularly the
2002
baggage inspection provision that
goes into effect on January 18.
87
Airline Security
Senate
Witnesses testified about the
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
state of airline and airport security
IG, DOT
Nov 14,
following September 11 terrorist
2001
attacks using hijacked planes.
Among the topics they addressed
were improvements implemented
on aircraft and in airports.
88
Social Security
Numbers Privacy
House
Witnesses testified about efforts
James Huse, IG,
Committee
to strengthen the privacy
SSA
Nov 1, 2001
safeguards for Americans' Social
Security numbers.
89
Airline Passenger
and Baggage
Screening
Joint
No Summary provided.
Meeting
Kenneth M. Mead,
IG, DOT
Sep 25,
2001
90
Aviation Security
Joint
Officials testified about security
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
on airlines and in U.S. airports.
IG, DOT
Sep 20,
Among the issues they addressed
2001
were new federal regulations
instituted following four hijackings
used to attack New York and
Washington, DC.
114
91
Misleading
Mailings to
Seniors
House
Witnesses testified about mailings
James Huse, IG,
Committee
that target senior citizens
SSA
Jul 26, 2001
soliciting personal information in
order to gain access to their
Social Security benefits.
92
93
Amtrak and High
Speed Rail
Financial Status
Education
Department
Financial
Management
House
Witnesses testified about the
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
future of Amtrak and the financial
IG, DOT
Jul 25, 2001
solvency of passenger rail travel.
House
Witnesses testified about the
Lorraine Lewis, IG,
Committee
progress of Education Secretary
Education
Jul 24, 2001
Paige's efforts to combat
departmental waste and fraud
through audit recommendations,
restricting government purchase
cards, and tightening control.
94
Airport Runway
Safety
House
No Summary provided.
Committee
Kenneth M. Mead,
IG, DOT
Jun 26,
2001
95
96
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Oversight
Airline Delays
Senate
Witnesses testified about the
Michael Bromwich,
Committee
status of the Federal Bureau of
IG, DOJ
Jun 20,
Investigation and its plans for the
Glenn A. Fine, IG,
2001
future.
DOJ
House
The witnesses, who also testified
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
before the subcommittee in March
IG, DOT
May 3, 2001
2001, reported on their promised
enhancements and the efforts by
airlines to curb the rising number
of flight delays and cancellations
at U.S airports.
97
Future of Amtrak
House
Witnesses testified about the
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
future operations of Amtrak,
IG, DOT
Mar 21,
federal subsidy levels, company
2001
profitability, and the possibility of
dividing the company in order to
meet federal mandates.
115
98
Airline Delays
House
Witnesses testified about airline
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
delays at several major airports
IG, DOT
Mar 15,
and how the airline industry could
2001
cope with increased airline traffic
and the growing number of
passenger complaints.
99
Air Traffic Control
System Oversight
House
Witnesses testified about the
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
state of the current air traffic
IG, DOT
Mar 14,
control system and about a
2001
proposed plan by the Defense
Department and Federal Aviation
Administration to modernize the
system.
100
Education
Department
Financial
Management
House
Witnesses testified about alleged
Lorraine Lewis, IG,
Committee
waste, fraud and theft in the U.S.
Education
Sep 19,
Education Department, and about
2000
failed audit reports for the
department for fiscal years 1998
and 1999.
101
Air Traffic Control
Delays and
Transportation
Nominations
Senate
The committee examined issues
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
relating to unacceptable airline
IG, DOT
Sep 14,
delays and cancellations and the
2000
customer service problems they
cause. Witnesses also talked
about safety issues.
102
Farming and Civil
Rights
Senate
Witnesses testified about the
Roger Viadero, IG,
Committee
operation of the Office of Civil
USDA
Sep 12,
Rights of the U.S. Department of
2000
Agriculture, and the role of the
Office of the General Counsel of
the USDA in addressing
discrimination complaints.
116
103
Aviation and the
Internet
Senate
Witnesses testified about a
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
proposed plan to establish a
IG, DOT
Jul 20, 2000
travel web site operated by five
major airlines that would allow
consumers to purchase tickets
directly from the airlines.
104
Mortgage Fraud
Day 2
Senate
Officials testified about the
Susan Gaffney, IG,
Committee
practice of mortgage "flipping,"
HUD
Jun 30,
where homebuyers are tricked
2000
into buying rundown houses at
greatly inflated prices.
105
State Department
Security
Challenges
House
Officials from the State
Jacquelyn Williams-
Committee
Department testified on
Bridgers, IG, State
May 11,
allegations of espionage by
2000
foreign correspondents. Officials
talked about previous security
breeches within the State
Department including the theft of
documents.
106
Identity Theft
Day 1
House
Witnesses testified about the
James Huse, IG,
Committee
increase of fraudulent activity and
SSA
May 9, 2000
identity theft through the illegal
use of Social Security numbers.
107
Security of
Federal
Information
Systems
Senate
Witnesses testified about the
Roberta Gross, IG,
Committee
vulnerabilities of the federal
NASA
Mar 2, 2000
government's computer systems,
how hackers could exploit these
vulnerabilities and on what federal
agencies should be doing to
strengthen the management of
these systems.
117
108
Amtrak Oversight
Senate
Senators examined the findings of
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
the Amtrak Reform Council
IG, DOT
Feb 23,
report, which outlined Amtrak
2000
organization and the performance
of the railroad. Amtrak officials
and senators debated the future
role of Amtrak.
109
Transportation
Appropriations
Senate
Senators heard testimony on the
Kenneth M. Mead,
Committee
fiscal 2001 appropriations for the
IG, DOT
Feb 3, 2000
Transportation Department,
primarily focusing on issues
involving air transportation.
118
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