Posted 03Dec2005
Appendix to Bernard Trujillo, “Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical Study of Valuation in
Business Bankruptcy Cases” 53 UCLA L. Rev. 357 (2005).
Appendix #6
Note #65 of the UCLA article states “Descriptive statistics (frequency charts and tables
reporting mean and standard deviation) for the CVS and DVS variables are maintained
on the author’s website.”
Appendix Table A
Frequency of Debtor’s Valuation Standard
Value
Frequency
Percentage
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
21
35
46
20
8
13
6
12
13.04
21.74
28.57
12.42
4.97
8.07
3.73
7.45
TOTAL
1611
100.00
Appendix Table B
Frequency of Creditor’s Valuation Standard
1
2
Value
Frequency
Percentage
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
18
37
24
11
12
4
8
8.06
14.52
29.84
19.35
8.87
9.68
3.23
6.45
TOTAL
1242
100.00
Data did not support assigning a code in 19 observations.
Data did not support assigning a code in 56 observations.
1
Appendix Table C shows the distribution of CVS (mean and standard deviation)
for every value of DVS.
Appendix Table C
Creditor Valuation Standard for each value of Debtor Valuation Standard
Debtor Valuation
Standard
CVS
Mean
CVS
Standard Deviation
Frequency
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.92
4.00
3.83
3.81
3.20
3.30
4.83
5.67
1.50
1.95
1.18
0.83
1.10
1.64
2.04
2.83
13
30
30
16
5
10
6
9
TOTAL
3.78
1.82
1193
For example, when Debtors’ valuation argument was based on an extreme common
theory of value (coded as “1”), Creditors’ valuation argument was at 1.92.
3
61 observations have the Creditors’, Debtors’ or both valuation standards missing.
2
Appendix Table D shows the distribution of DVS (mean and standard deviation)
for every value of CVS.
Appendix Table D
Debtor Valuation Standard for each value of Creditor Valuation Standard
Creditor Valuation
Standard
DVS
Mean
DVS
Standard Deviation
Frequency
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1.60
3.41
3.91
3.50
2.55
3.73
4.50
6.29
1.58
2.32
1.74
1.41
1.13
1.80
2.89
2.93
10
17
35
24
11
11
4
7
TOTAL
3.58
2.04
1194
For example, when Creditors’ valuation argument was based on an extreme common
theory of value (coded as “1”), Debtors’ valuation argument was at 1.60.
4
61 observations have the Creditors’, Debtors’ or both valuation standards missing.
3
Appendix Table E shows the CtVS for every value of the Creditor Valuation
Standard (“CVS”) and the Debtor Valuation Standard (“DVS”).
Appendix Table E
Court Valuation Standard (“CtVS”) for each value of
Debtor Valuation Standard (“DVS”) and Creditor Valuation Standard (“CVS”)
Offered
DVS
Offered
CVS
1
2
1.5
1 (.756) 1 (0)
2.13
2 2 (0) (.354)
2.5
3 2 (0) (.577)
3.14
(.9)
4 3
4
5 (2.83) (1.73)
4.33
(1.15)
6 2.5
(.707)
7 3 (0)
8 -
3
4
5
-
-
-
3 (0)
3
(.730)
3.75
(.5)
3.4
(1.14)
3.25
(.5)
4 (0)
3.67
(.577)
3 (0)
-
6
7
8
4
(2.83)
4 (0)
5 (0) 4.5
(2.12) 2
(1.15) 3 (0)
4 (0)
-
3 (0)
-
8 (0)
-
5 (0)
-
-
-
6 (0)
-
6 (0)
6 (0)
-
-
-
-
7 (0)
-
8 (0)
3 (0)
The value in each cell is the mean of the CtVS (with the standard deviation in
parentheses) for every DVS and CVS offered by the respective parties. Appendix Table
E summarizes Court outcomes, given the valuation strategies executed by the parties.
For example, when the Debtor and Creditor valuations were both coded at “1” (i.e.
extreme “common”), the mean CtVS was 1.5.
4