INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
IR531/Fall 2006
Dr Caner Bakir
Seminar: Wednesday : 9.30-12.15
Office: CAS154
Office hours: Tuesday: 11.00-12.15
Phone:338 1674
e-mail: cbakir@ku.edu.tr
Course Description
Objectives
This seminar explores the international system, and the interaction between domestic
politics and world political economy. It has two main objectives. First, it focuses on
gaining a greater understanding of the main works in the field of IPE. The student should
understand the major debates in the field and the IPE perspectives on key questions. We
will benefit from an interdisciplinary perspective. Second objective is to prepare students
to carry out empirically informed theoretical research at the cutting edge of the IPE.
Thus, each student should produce a significant piece of research in the form of articlelength research paper.
Requirements
Review of an Article. “Peer review of journal articles and other technical reports is a key
element in the maintenance of academic integrity” (see
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/Buildings/ALAN/PUBLICATIONS/how.to.review.html ) You will
be assigned to the review of an article (10%). Each one of you will be asked to review
one chapter of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World
Investment Report 2006. Alternatively, you can propose a journal paper that you would
like to review subject to my approval. The review should be about maximum 6 pages in
double space excluding references. Due date is 15 November 2006.
Class Participation. Reading material has been assigned for each week and must be
completed before class. All students will be asked to present and discuss allocated
questions noted on this syllabus in italics. These questions will be discussed using the
assigned literature during that week. The student will present the paper orally during the
seminar. This will serve as a basis for discussion. The rest of the class is expected to
contribute discussions significantly. Thus, students will be graded by class participation
(20%).
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Research Paper. Each student will be responsible for writing a research paper of 5,0006,000 words (excluding footnotes). The paper should apply one or more of the theories or
approaches discussed in class to a case or a problem in IPE of the student’s choosing. It
should be written in a form that could be submitted for publication in a professional
journal, with appropriate revisions.
You are required to meet with Dr Bakir on an individual basis to discuss topics for the
article-length paper. Topic proposals for the research paper must be approved and
submitted on or before December 15. You are strongly encouraged to meet with him
earlier to discuss possible topics. Papers are due on December 27. Thus students will be
graded by research paper (70%).
Plagiarism and Collusion
Plagiarism is the presentation of work which has been copied in whole or in part from
another person’s work, or from any other source such as the internet, published books or
periodicals without due acknowledgement given in the text.
Collusion is the presentation of work, which is the result in whole or in part of
unauthorized collaboration with another person or persons.
Both Plagiarism and Collusion are methods of cheating. Students must observe academic
honesty and integrity in order not to face disciplinary actions.
Suggested Reading Materials
Books*
Susan Strange. 1994. States and Markets. (2nd ed.). London: Pinter Publishers.
Robert Gilpin, 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Robert Gilpin. 2001. Global political economy: understanding the international
economic order / with the assistance of Jean M. Gilpin. Princeton University Press.
Stephen Gill & David Law. 1987. The Global Political Economy: Perspectives,
Problems, and Politics.
Jeffrey A. Frieden & David A. Lake. 1997. International political economy: perspectives
on global power and wealth 3th ed. London: Routledge.
Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey R. D. Underhill. 1994. Political economy and the changing
global order / edited by.2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Joan E. Spero & Jeffrey A. Hart. 1997. The politics of international economic relations,
5th ed. New York : St. Martin's Press.
George T. Crane & Abla Amawi. 1991. The theoretical evolution of international
political economy, a reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomas Lawton, James Rosenau & Amy Verdun. 2001. Strange power: shaping the
parameters of international relations and international political economy. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
* There is no prescribed text book for this MA course.
Journals
If you plan to take preliminary examinations in this field, it is crucial that you read the
leading IPE journals including International Organization (IO), World Politics, Review of
International Political Economy (RIPE) as well as International Studies Quarterly,
Comparative Politics, Public Administration, Policy Studies, and many others.
Required readings are available on the library reserve.
Topics, Readings and Questions
Week 1. Introduction
Lecture by Caner Bakir
Week 2. Introduction to International Political Economy
Lecture by Caner Bakir
Core readings:
Susan Strange, 1994. prologue, chs.1-2
Gill & Law, 1987. ch.1.
Gilpin, 1987. ch.1.
Stubbs & Underhill. 1994. Introduction (pp.1-24), ch.1, ch.2, ch.6.
Frieden & Lake. 1995. introduction
Supplementary Readings:
Polanyi. 1944. The great transformation, Beacon Press, chs.3-6, 12, 21.
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Questions: What is IPE? What is the relationship between economics and politics in
IPE? Why IPE perspective is needed in IR? What difference IPE makes in understanding
global and domestic political economy? Why ‘structural’ and ‘relational’ dimensions of
power are important in understanding global political economy?
Week 3. Mercantilism and Liberalism
Core readings:
Gilpin. 1987. ch.2.
Crane and Amawi, 1992, chs, 1-2.
Questions: How do you compare mercantilism and liberalism? Discuss the contribution
of classical economic theories and approaches to the development of IPE? What are the
main tenets of liberal IPE?
Week 4. Marxism & Critical Approaches to IPE
Core readings for Marxism:
Crane & Amawi, 1992, ch. 3
Gill & Law, chs. 4, 5, 7.
Questions: What are the weaknesses and strengths of Lenin’s theory linking capitalism to
imperialism? How do Marxian theorists differ on state behavior?
Core readings for Critical Approaches to IPE
Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair. 1996. Approaches to world order. Cambridge:
Cambridge university press, ch.1.
Gill & Law. 1988. “Global hegemony and structural power of capital” International
Studies Quarterly, 33, 475-99.
John Halloway. 1994. “Global Capital and Nation State”, Capital and Class 52, 23-43.
Peter Burnham. 2001.`Marx, IPE and globalisation', Capital and Class, 75, 103-112.
Peter Burnham. 1994. “Open Marxism and vulgar international political economy,” RIPE
1, 2.
Crane & Amawi. 1992, ch.5 (pp.236-244).
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Questions: Some argue that ‘Gramscian historical materialism is alternative to realist
and liberal perspectives of the IPE’ Do you agree or disagree, why? Who depends on
whom, and for what? How do compare ‘world system’ approach to dependency theory?
What is ‘hegemony’ in critical approaches to IPE? Discuss the contribution of critical
theories and approaches to the development of IPE; Do they have anything important to
say in 21st century?
Week 5 & Week 6. Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), Regime Theory and Realism
(note: presenter and discussant of W-5 will mainly focus on HST)
Core readings:
Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-39, ch 14, "An Explanation of the
1929 Depression," (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 291-308
Crane & Amawi. 1992, chs. 8-9.
David Held. 2004. Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the
Washington Consensus.” Polity Press, ch.4.
Robert Keohane. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Economy. NJ: Princeton University Press, ch.1.
Susan Strange. 1987. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," IO 41:551-74
Stephen Krasner. 1976. “State power and structure of international trade”, World Politics
28, 317-46.
Robert Keohane, 1997. “Problematic lucidity” Stephen Krasner’s “state power and the
structure of international trade”, World Politics 50(1), 150-70.
Susan Strange. 1994. "Wake Up Krasner! The World Has Changed," RIPE, 1:2, 208-20.
John Gerard Ruggie. 1982. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” IO 36(2): 379-415.
Kemal Dervis 2005. A better globalization: legitimacy, governance, and reform Washington:
Center for Global development. Ch.2. (pp.21-42).
Susan Strange. 1982. “Cave! Hic Dragones: Critiqe of regime analysis” International
organization 36 2, 479-97.
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Questions for W5: What is the idea of the HST? What is hegemony in the HST? what are
the main attributes of and role of a hegemonic power? What are the realist critiques of
regime theory? How regime theorists responded such critiques? Do you agree that
cooperation in international economic issues depends on the existence of a single
hegemonic power? What are international public goods, who provides them, why?
Questions for W6: What are regimes and how do they encourage cooperation? What is
the difference between an institution and organization? Are there certain conditions
under which international institutions will be most effective at promoting international
economic cooperation? Does multilateralism matter?
Week 7. Neorealism and Neoliberalism
Peter Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen Krasner. 1998. “International
organization and the study of world politics”, IO, 52(4): 645-685.
Joseph Nye. 1988. “Neorealism and Neoliberalism” World Politics 40, 235-51.
Robert Keohane. 1986. “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” 1-26 in
Neorealism and its Critics, edited by Robert Keohane. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Robert Keohane. 1989. International Institutions and State power, Boulder: Westview
Press, ch.1.
Kenneth Waltz.1990. “Realist thought and neorealist theory” Journal of International
Affairs vol. 44, 21-37.
Stubbs and Underhill. 1994. ch.3.
Questions: How do ‘neorealism’ and ‘neoliberalism’ portray international relations?
What is meant by ‘sensitivities’ and ‘vulnerabilities’ of actors in specific issue-areas in
global politics? What are the contribution of ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ to realist and
neorealist debate?
Week 8. Economic Power, Domestic and international interactions in IPE
Core readings:
William D Coleman. 1996. Financial Services, Globalization, and Domestic Policy
Change: A Comparison of North America and the European Union. Basingstoke:
Macmillan, chs.1,2,3.
Crane & Amawi. 1992, ch.6.
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J. Frieden. 1991. “Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world
of global finance.” IO 45(2): 425-451.
Frieden & Lake. 1997, ch.1
J.A. Scholte. 2000. Globalization: Critical Introduction. London:Mcmillan. ch.2.
Questions: How do you compare society-centered and state-centered approaches in IPE
to study of domestic & foreign economic policy outcomes? How do they differ from
international (system-centered) approaches? (refer to the readings in week 5 for systemcentered approaches)
Week 9. States Capacity, Ideas and Policy Networks: IPE meets Comparative
Political Economy & Public Policy 1.
Readings:
Susan Strange.1996. Retreat of State, ch.1.
+Susan Strange. 1994. “Who governs? Networks of Power in World Society”,
Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics, Special Issue, pp.5-17
Peter Evans. 1997. "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of
Globalization," World Politics 50:62-87. OK
Peter Evans. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ch. 1, 2, (especially pp. 21-42)
Linda Weiss. 1997. “Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State.” New Left
Review 225: 3-27.
William D Coleman. 1996. Financial Services, Globalization, and Domestic Policy
Change: A Comparison of North America and the European Union. Basingstoke:
Macmillan, chs.1,2,3,4.
Anne-Marie Slaughter. 1997.’The Real New World Order”, Foreign Affairs 76, 5; 112122.
Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2003. “Everyday Global Governance”, Daedalus (Winter) 83-90.
Wolfgang Reinicke. 2000. “The other world wide web: Global public policy networks”
Foreign Policy, Winter 1999-2000, 44-57.
Questions:
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What are state capacity, autonomy, strength and weakness in a world of global finance?
How state’s ‘transformative capacity’ can be enhanced at local, national and global
levels? Can weak states act strong, if so how? Is governance without government myth or
reality? Can transgovernmentalism offer solutions to global problems?
Readings: Ideas and Policy networks
Peter Haas. 1992. “Introduction, epistemic communities and international policy
coordination” IO 46,1, 1-35.
Colin Hay. 2004. “Ideas, interests, and Institutions in the Comparative Political Economy
of Great Transformations”, RIPE 11, 1,
Craig Parsons. 2002. “Showing Ideas as the Causes: The Origins of EU” IO 56:1, 47-84.
William D. Coleman, & Perl, A. 1999. "Internationalised policy environments and
Policy network analysis." Political studies XLVII, 691-709.
Edward C. Page. 2000. “Future Governance and the Literature on Policy Transfer and
Lesson Drawing” ESRC Workshop.
Questions: Do international norms matter? Who learns what from whom, how, when and
why in a world of global finance? How international norms, rules, laws etc.,
institutionalized by international intergovernmental institutions penetrate into domestic
policymaking, why? How much of domestic policy change can be attributed to
extraterritorial sources of influence and how much to domestic forces? What determines
success and failure in policy outcomes?
Week 10. Trade, FDI and MNCs in the IPE
Core readings:
Joseph M. Grieco & G. John Ikenberry. 2003. State Power and World Markets: The
International Political Economy, ch.2.
Benjamin J. Cohen. 1990. “The political economy of international trade”, IO 44(2): 261281.
David Held. 2004. Global Covenant: The Social Democractis Alternative to the
Washington Consensus.” Polity Press, ch.1.
Kemal Dervis 2005. A better globalization: legitimacy, governance, and reform Washington:
Center for Global development. Ch.4.(pp.73-103)
Susan Strange. 1994. “Rethinking Structural Change in the IPE: States, Firms and
Diplomacy” in Stubbs & Underhill (eds.) ch.1
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Susan Strange. 1985. “Protectionism and world politics” IO 39(2): 233-59.
Kenneth P. Thomas. 2000. Competing for Capital: Europe and North America in a
Global Era Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. ch.1.
John H. Dunning. 2000. "The New Geography of Foreign Direct Investments" in Woods
Ngaire (ed.), The Political Economy of Globalization, Palgrave, pp.20-54
Nathan M. Jensen, 2003. “Democratic governance and multinational corporations:
political regimes and inflows of Foreign Direct Investment” IO 57, 587-596.
Nathan M. Jensen, 2006. Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A
Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, ch.1
Susan Strange. 1998. “Globaloney?”, RIPE 5,4, 704-711
Susan Strange. 1991. “Big Business and State”, Millennium 20,2, 245-50.
John Stopford & Sudan Strange. 1991. Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World
Market Shares, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1, 4.
Ronan Palan & Jason Abbott, 1996. State Strategies in the Global Political Economy.
ch.1.
Questions: Strategic trade theory suggests that governments can –and should- create
comparative advantage. Do you agree or disagree? Why countries differ in their ability
to attract FDI? What are country-specific factors that affect FDI? What is triangular
diplomacy? Who gets what in the bargaining relationship between states and firms, why?
How do firms interact with nation states to gain competitive advantages over their
rivals? How do nation states attract and/or help national firms to compete in the regional
and global marketplace?
Week 11. Globalization of Finance & Governance in Banking
Core readings:
Eric Helleiner. 1994. States and Re-emergence of Finance, ch.1-2.
Susan Strange.1998. Mad Money, ch.1
Cohen, Benjamin. 1996. "Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance," World
Politics 48:268-96.
Jane Kelsey, 2003. “The denationalization of money: embedded neo-liberalism and the
risks of implosion”, Social and Legal Studies 12(2), 155-76;
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George Pagoulatos. “European Banking: Five Modes of Governance”, West European
Politics, 22/1, January 1999, pp.68-94.
Caner Bakir. 'Governance by Supranational Interdependence: Domestic Policy Change in
the Turkish Financial Services Industry' in Jonathan Batten and Colm Kearney eds.,
Emerging European Financial Markets: Independence and Integration PostEnlargement . London: Elsevier (forthcoming, 2005).
Jonathan Kishner. 2000. ‘The study of money,’ World Politics, 52, 407-36.
Eric Helleiner. 2001. “Still an extraordinary power, but for how much longer? The United
States in world finance”, in Lawton, Rosenau & Verdun, pp.229-248.
John Goodman & Louis Pauly, "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls?," In Frieden and
Lake
Susan Strange, “Finance, information, and power”, Review of International Studies 16,3,
1990, 259-79.
Note: It may be useful to examine: B. Eichengreen, 1997. Globalizing Capital : a
history of the international monetary system. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.
Library Call Number: >HG3881.E347<
Questions: Who are the winners and losers in a world of global finance? Why has
country after country decided to adopt more liberal domestic and international financial
policies, especially during the 1970s and 1980s? Do markets and institutions play a role
in influencing and constraining behavior of governments? What role do states play in
globalization of finance? What are the pressures faced by nation states in a world of
global finance? How do they respond to these pressures? How does the US exercise its
structural power in global finance?
Week 12. Central Bank Governance and Corporate social responsibility
Amtenbrink, F. (2004). The Three Pillars of Central Bank Governance – Towards a
Model Central Bank Law or a Code of Good Governance? Available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/amtenb.pdf
Eijffinger, S. C. W., & Geraats, P. M. (2003). How transparent are central banks? Center
for Economic Policy Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper (July).
Elgie, R. (1998). Democratic accountability and central bank independence: Historical
and contemporary, national and European perspectives. West European Politics, 21, 5376.
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Elgie, R. (2001). Democratic accountability and central bank independence: A reply to
various critics. West European Politics, 24, 217-221.
Bakir, C (2006). “Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası’nın 1930-2001 Arasında Siyasal
ve Ekonomik Bağımsızlığı: Siyasal–Ekonomik Etkileşime İlişkin Karşılaştırmalı Bir
Çözümleme” (The Political and Economic Independence of the Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey between 1930-2001: A Comparative Analysis) METU Studies in
Development, 33(1) 2006, pp.1-31.
Peter Burnham, “The politics of economic management in the 1990s” New Political
Economy vol.4, no.1, March 1999.
Questions: How revolutionary is central bank independence (CBI)? Who benefits from
CBI? What are the linkages between CBI, transparency and accountability? Can CBI be
reconciled with democracy?
Week 13. Developing Countries and the IPE
Core readings
Ziya Onis. 1991. “The logic of the developmental state.” Comparative Politics (October)
24 (1):109-27.
Ziya Onis. 1995. “The limits of neoliberalism: toward a reformulation of development
theory.” Journal of Economic Issues 29 (1): 97-120.
Joseph Stiglitz.2000. “Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability”,
World Development 28:6, pp.1075-86.
Basu Kaushik. 2003.”Globalization and the politics of international finance: The Stiglitz
Verdict”, Journal of Economic Literature XLI (September), 885-899.
Ziya Onis & Ahmet Faruk Aysan. 2000. “Neoliberal globalisation, the nation-state and
financial crises in the semi-periphery: a comparative analysis.” Third World Quarterly
21, 1, 119-40.
Yilmaz Akyuz & Korkut Boratav. 2003. “The making of the Turkish financial crisis.”
World Development 31, 9, 1549-67.
Korkut Boratav, Oktar Turel & Erinc Yeldan. 1996. “Dilemmas of structural adjustment
and environmental policies under instability: post-1980 Turkey.” World Development 24,
2, 373-394.
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Tosun Aricanli & Dani Rodrik, 1990. The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt,
Adjustment and Sustainability. St. Martin's Press.
Peter Evans. 1992. “The State as Problem and Solution” in Haggard & Kaufman (eds.)
The Politics of Economic Adjustment. Princeton: Princeton University Press. chp.3
Linda Weiss. 2003. Myth of Powerless State. ch.2,3.
David Held. 2004. Global Covenant. ch.2.
Barbara Stalling.1992. “International Influence on Economic Policy” in Haggard &
Kaufman (eds.) ch.1.
Suggested readings: Stiglitz and Squire (pp. 383-391), Broad, Cavanagh and Bello,
(392-404) and Williamson (pp. 405-416) in Frieden and Lake eds, International Political
Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. 4th ed. New York: Bedford/St.
Martin's, 2000. Dani Rodrik. 1999. New Global Economy and Developing Countries:
Making Openness Work Overseas Development Council Policy Essay Number 24,
Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press for the Overseas Development
Council.
Questions: “The Washington consensus [is] US designed neoliberal economic project,
and… a political project which underwrites the current US administration’s unilateralist
ambitions.” Would you agree or disagree with this statement, why? Is Washington
consensus a flawed formula for poor countries, why? What are the causes and
consequences of global inequality? Can developing countries adopt and implement
alternative strategies to the Washington consensus? Are there any examples?
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