01Asia 12/19/2002
WSJ.com - International Commentary
October 27, 2000
Eurasia Bends to Russia's Will
By Vladimir Socor, a senior analyst with the Washington-based
Jamestown Foundation.
Earlier this month, the leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the founding documents of a
Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). A meeting of the prime ministers
in Kazakhstan's capital Astana on October 6, followed by a conclave
of the five presidents in Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek five days
later, put the final seals of approval on the creation of that
would-be bloc. Russian President Vladimir Putin initiated and pushed
for this project, with his ministers as main drafters of the
documents.
The five signatory countries are members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, that ineffectual club of twelve former
Soviet-ruled countries. Moscow has failed in its efforts to turn the
CIS into a mechanism of control over the former dependencies. The
CIS never became a functional organization; instead, it has now
entered a process of disintegration, as shown by the formation of
such subgroups as the Russia-Belarus Union and, now, the EAEC.
This new organization is to be created "on the basis of the CIS
Customs Union," of which the same five countries are members.
Founded in 1994 and revamped in 1996, the CU has all along existed
on paper only. The EAEC's stated goals are to "bring the Customs
Union to fruition by establishing, on its basis, a single economic
space, a functioning common market, and coordinated economic
policies." Unfortunately, the new, two-tier arrangement will only
spawn new bureaucratic layers on top of the existing ones and
exacerbate the dysfunctional characteristic of every CIS body. This
dysfunction stems from both organizational incoherence and
contradictory economic interests even among the nominal allies.
Beyond purely economic considerations, however, Moscow's initiative
seems designed to use the EAEC as a means of political control over
the member countries' economic policies and external relations.
Those goals are clearly discernible in the EAEC's main founding
documents.
The first document, unprecedented -- and indeed precedent-setting -in the CIS, introduces sovereignty-delegation and weighted voting.
The old, lethargic CU's executive body at the deputy prime
ministers' level, known as the Integration Committee, is being
upgraded and expanded as the standing executive body of the EAEC.
Member countries should "voluntarily delegate" to the Integration
Committee certain economic policy-making functions of the national
governments.
The new decision-making procedure elevates Russia to a stronger
position than those of the others. It institutes a voting formula
dubbed "4-2-2-1-1." In any vote taking, Russia will cast four votes;
Belarus and Kazakhstan, two votes each; and Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, one vote each. The Russian leaders argued that this
formula was more than fair to the other four countries. They even
maintained that Russia's economic power should have entitled that
country to an "8 to 2" ratio, involving eight votes for Russia and
two for the rest.
The Integration Committee's decisions are to be submitted to
sessions of the countries' presidents for approval. That conclave's
decisions will continue to be based on the consensus principle,
rather than on majority voting. But any president of a non-Russian
country should find it difficult to withhold consensus to a decision
that came out of the Integration Committee with a heavy stamp of
Russian and allied approval on it.
The second document casts the EAEC as an "international
organization," empowered to represent its member countries in
international economic relations -- specifically, in negotiations
with "other" international economic unions and organizations. In
practice, that would mean inserting a Russian-dominated central
bureaucracy between EAEC's individual member countries and the
international trade system. Should that come to pass, Moscow would
be able to line up these countries behind it in negotiating the
terms of accession to the World Trade Organization. The Russian
government has all along sought to form such a group and play a
stronger hand in negotiating special terms for WTO membership.
Moscow would also like to use the EAEC as a means of dealing with
the European Union on the collective behalf of the EAEC's member
countries. At the CIS Customs Union's summit in May of this year,
Mr. Putin failed to persuade member countries to give the CU the
status of an "international organization" -- that is, empower its
"joint" bodies to speak for the constituent countries. He now hopes
to obtain such approval from the rump group of countries in the
EAEC.
The third document is an agreement to negotiate common terms
regarding the access of goods and services from "other countries" to
the markets of the EAEC countries. The apparent intent is to create
a Russian-led trading bloc, one that would limit the member
countries' ability to join the international economic system, and
which may erect trade barriers in order to ensure Russian dominance
on these countries' markets.
Kyrgyzstan is the only one of these countries to be a member of the
WTO. Kazakhstan is a candidate for membership. The Kyrgyz leaders
hoped aloud during the EAEC summit meeting that EAEC membership and
WTO membership would not turn out to be incompatible with each
other. At the last two CU summits, Mr. Putin -- as prime minister in
1999 and president this year -- had asserted that Kyrgyzstan and, by
implication, Kazakhstan risk countermeasures if they do not accept a
"common stance" toward the WTO.
The EAEC's emergence suggests that Russian policy makers are by now
reconciled to a de facto division of the "CIS space" in two distinct
zones: a would-be bloc under Russian leadership and the group of
countries that see their future in association with the West. That
latter group is the GUUAM association of Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Oil- and gas-rich Turkmenistan,
with its status of permanent neutrality, stays out of all CIS
activities, including the creation of the EAEC.
Last month in New York, the GUUAM countries' presidents agreed to
work toward creating a free-trade zone of those five countries. The
reformist government of Ukraine has taken the lead in that effort.
The plan was discussed this week in Moldova's capital Chisinau by
the National Coordinators, the first institutional creation of
GUUAM. With the parallel emergence of EAEC and GUUAM, the
nine-year-old CIS seems headed for a split and early demise.
-- From The Wall Street Journal Europe
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WSJ.com - Saving Eurasia
March 21, 2001
Saving Eurasia
By John E. Tedstrom. Mr. Tedstrom is senior economist at RAND and
the Jacyk visiting professor of international policy at Columbia
University. From 1999-2000 he was director for Russia, Ukraine and
Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council.
Look out from Turkey, across the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and you
see that an arc of crisis has emerged in Eurasia. The threat this
poses to U.S. and European interests is real. Without high-level and
strategically minded engagement, hard-won progress in the former
members of the Soviet Union will erode, leading to years, if not
decades, of difficult and expensive cleanup work.
Every country in this subregion linking Europe and Asia -- that is,
roughly, all the countries between the Polish and Chinese borders -is beset by domestic political crises, deep economic challenges, and
social tensions. In most, living standards continue a decade-long
decline, and mortality rates are on the rise. Drugs, corruption, and
infectious diseases threaten not only the citizens of the region,
but those of neighboring countries and beyond. In Ukraine, Eurasia's
"keystone," we're seeing daily demonstrations against the elected
president, Leonid Kuchma; in Georgia, separatist rebels continue to
fight the central government of President Eduard Shevardnadze; in
Uzbekistan, the autocratic government of Islam Karimov continues to
battle drug traffickers and Islamic guerrillas. And so on.
Reformers in the region are looking to the West and finding little
support or interest. Since President Bill Clinton's abbreviated
visit to Kiev in June last year, the United States has failed to
give adequate high-level attention to those countries. For its part,
the European Union has all but closed its doors. NATO's cooperation
with its partners is critical but not sufficient. Turkey has been an
important counterbalance to Russian pressure for the fragile states
of the Caucasus, but its ability to play that role going forward is
more limited now due to its own internal financial crisis.
Strategic Vacuum
Not surprisingly, Russia has stepped in to fill the strategic
vacuum, even though it has little to offer these states in terms of
promoting their development and integrating them into the global
system of market democracies. President Vladimir Putin has used
Ukraine's energy and political crises as opportunities to increase
Russia's leverage and he recently visited Baku to sign a strategic
partnership agreement with Azerbaijan. Elsewhere, the Russians have
been balking at withdrawing their troops from Georgian military
bases, and earlier this month President Eduard Shevardnadze
surprised many in the West when he bowed to Russian pressure and
declared that Georgia may not pursue integration with NATO in 2005
as planned, though it could remain neutral.
The West has a lot at stake. The failure of these states to make
progress will likely lead to renewed proliferation problems, the
spread of disease and drugs, and uncontrolled migration. Even more
important is this fundamental fact: the failure of democracy to take
3
root in these states, or the erosion of their independence and
sovereignty, would be a strategic failure for the West and have
implications for decades.
This challenge demands U.S. leadership. The countries of this
subregion themselves are not able to find a way out. The European
Union is, as ever, preoccupied with its own transformation and,
probably for related reasons, lacks a strategic vision of what
Eurasia can and should become. It also appears to be intimidated by
Russia. While Russia has legitimate interests in the region, it does
not have the vision, the resources or the desire to promote
democracy, human rights, or economic integration with the West.
A strategy to address this challenge has four major parts. First,
Washington and Europe should engage in a new dialogue to create a
common strategic vision for countries as disparate as Ukraine,
Georgia and Uzbekistan and develop a concrete policy agenda. We
should then challenge governments and publics in the region to meet
our renewed commitment to transition and integration with their own.
Second, we must accept that what happens inside these countries
matters. Our efforts to promote positive internal change in the
region directly serve our international security interests, and the
new U.S. administration should move quickly to take a fresh look at
how it can revamp its assistance programs to make them more
effective.
'Trouble Belt'
Third, we should take make every effort to strengthen the reform
efforts of countries that lie between Western Europe and this
"Trouble Belt." This is not because they are geopolitical buffers
but because they can export their success to the region.
Poland plays a very important role in this regard vis-a-vis Ukraine.
Turkey's role, especially with regards to immediate neighbors like
Georgia and Azerbaijan, is critical. But Turkey's own transition
needs support, especially from the European Union, if it is to
maximize its influence.
Finally, Russia must be part of the solution. Russia needs first of
all to accept that the independence of its "near abroad" is a
historical fact and, just as importantly, that Russia's own
interests are best served if these states are successful. When
Ukraine and the others prosper and integrate with Europe, new and
unique opportunities are created for Russia as well.
Stabilizing the region will not happen overnight. But these
countries are important; their failure would be a major blow to the
West and would present even bigger problems for Russia. It is in all
our interests to redouble efforts to encourage their successful
transformation.
-- From The Wall Street Journal Europe
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The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition
March 27, 2001
International Commentary
Give Central Asia a Hand
By Mark Brzezinski. Mr. Brzezinski was director for Southeastern European
affairs at the U.S. National Security Council from 1999 to 2001.
WASHINGTON -- Concerns over Turkey's financial crisis and currency devaluation
have been felt globally, but nowhere more acutely than in the new states of the
Caucasus and Central Asia. For it is through Turkey, more than any other large
4
neighboring state, that the Caucasians and Central Asians hope one day to be
connected to Europe. If Turkey's modernization and progress toward European
Union membership sputters, the new Eurasian states will be left much more
vulnerable to the tender mercies of Russia, Iran and China.
U.S. policy towards the Caspian region has been based on the notion that state
independence will become an enduring reality when a network of pipeline and
transportation routes links the region directly to the major centers of global
economic activity.
The thinking is that, because the main pipelines to the region continue to pass
through Russian territory, giving Moscow a strong role in determining how the
new wealth is to be shared, the region remains a Russian dependency. Therefore,
the cornerstone of U.S. policy has been the construction of an oil pipeline from
Baku, Azerbaijan through Georgia to Ceyhan, Turkey. If the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
and other transportation links are built, no single power will have a monopoly
over access to the region's wealth.
Covering the Tab
But the painful truth about the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline has always been that there
may not be enough recoverable oil to make the project economically viable.
Energy analysts estimate that the route requires six billion barrels of oil to
finance the project -- and that as of now there is a guarantee of less than four
billion barrels. New discoveries in Kazakhstan may put the project within reach,
but the U.S. correctly expects the tab to be covered in large part by those
nations that will use the pipeline. The Turkish government has concluded a
contract to build its section of the pipeline for $1.4 billion dollars, and has
provided limited guarantees for cost overruns.
With Turkey's economy unraveling, and with fears that Turkish banks are in even
deeper trouble with investors pulling out hard currency, Turkey's contribution
to the Baku-Ceyhan project is uncertain.
Considering this uncertainty, the Bush administration may have to decide if the
pipeline is sufficiently important to U.S. strategic interests in Eurasia that
it would commit U.S. money to make up any difference in cost, a "geopolitical
surcharge" as it were. And even if the pipeline goes forward, the U.S. should
consider other measures to undergird the sovereignty of the new states of
Eurasia.
First, the Eurasian states have come to realize that closer cooperation among
themselves is essential to preservation of their sovereignty. The U.S. should
support this positive trend. In the early 1990s, personal antagonisms between
leaders of the region prevented meaningful regional cooperation. The emergence
of the "GUUAM" grouping, consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan
and Moldova, provides the first truly independent Eurasian regional body. GUUAM
has created the basis for successful collaboration on trade, economic,
transportation, energy and security issues.
GUUAM serves as the Eurasian equivalent to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
but so far GUUAM has received minimal support from the U.S., in part because it
is a counterweight to the Commonwealth of Independent States, the body Russia
relies on to promote regional integration. A cooperative relationship between
the OSCE and GUUAM could be cultivated, particularly in the areas of border
security and economic modernization. Support of GUUAM would help these countries
help themselves.
Second, Western assistance should focus on "bottom-up reform," teaching the next
generation of leaders how democratic governments and market economies work.
Inviting young Germans to the U.S. after World War II was decisive in building a
new democratic Germany. The Library of Congress's recent program to host 2,000
local and national officials from Russia to show them how American society works
is a good start, but it must be done on a broader scale, encompassing other
newly independent states and Central Asia.
Third, Central Asia should be on the agenda in U.S. discussions with Iran. With
the beginning of the new Bush administration, there is now more discussion of
gradual improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations. This development would greatly
increase global access to the region and, more specifically, reduce Russia's
5
monopoly over pipelines. In the long run it is in the interest of the Iranians
to have a belt of Islamic states to their north serving as a zone of stability
between Iran and Russia. As the U.S. slowly explores a dialogue with Iran, a
U.S.-Iranian discussion on Central Asia might be useful, with an eye toward
developing a plan to eventually provide direct access through Iran to Western
markets.
Fourth, Russia must change from being a bully in the region to being a
constructive partner respectful of the sovereignty of its neighbors. Exclusion
of Russia from the Caspian is neither desirable nor feasible. In fact, Russia's
active economic participation in the region's development is essential to the
area's stability.
Positive Collaboration
But Central Asian leaders increasingly feel that Russia is using the specter of
terrorism and Islamic radicalism to regain control over the region, and that the
U.S. is being co-opted by Vladimir Putin to join Russia's self-serving mission
to act as Europe's shield against Muslim extremism. An example of more positive
collaboration would be to involve Russian institutions in the development of
Caspian energy resources, relying on Russian technical expertise and
manufacturers in Caspian basin consortia.
The U.S. and Europe have an opportunity to promote a delicate regional balance
in Eurasia. This would permit the gradual inclusion of the area in the emerging
global economy while the states of the region consolidate themselves. The
alternative is the rise of nationalism, ethnic conflict, political fragmentation
and even possibly open hostilities along Russia's southern frontiers.
Bush administration policy makers might keep these wider regional concerns in
mind as a new U.S. policy toward Eurasia is developed. And when deciding whether
to close its doors to Turkey, European policy makers should consider the link
between Turkey's evolution and orientation and the future of the Eurasian
states.
-- From The Wall Street Journal Europe
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The Caucasus and Central Asia
BROOKINGS RESOURCES
Central Asian Security: The New International Context, Roy
Allison and Lena Jonson, eds.
"A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the
Caucasus and Central Asia since 1991," article by Fiona Hill
"The Caspian Basin and Asian Energy Markets," background
paper by Regine Spector
Research on Russia, South Asia, and China
The Caucasus and Central Asia
Policy Brief #80—May 2001
6
by Fiona Hill
[Full Brief also available in PDF format (505kb)]
The Caspian Basin and the surrounding states of the Caucasus
and Central Asia have crept from obscurity onto the U.S.
foreign policy agenda. While the individual countries of the
two regions may not be of vital interest to the United States,
the countries that border them are. Four have nuclear weapons,
one is an important NATO ally, and two are states that have
posed direct challenges to U.S. security by their support for
terrorist movements.
There is great potential for interstate conflict involving
these border countries. So even if the United States did not
consider the Caucasus and Central Asian states of vital
interest, it might be drawn in by the actions of others.
Keeping the regions off the crisis response list should be a
priority for the U.S. and Western governments.
A number of developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia underscore the
need for the United States and its allies to pay closer attention to the
area around the Caspian Basin. The border states of Russia, Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan, China and, more distantly, Pakistan and India, have close
links with the region and are critical to U.S. foreign policy. The Caspian
Basin itself has become one of the principal points of tension in
U.S.-Russian relations, and the Caucasus and Central Asia are focal points
for a range of issues on America's global agenda: the rise of militant
Islamic groups, international terrorism, drugs and weapons trafficking,
human rights abuses, ethnic conflicts, humanitarian disasters,
environmental catastrophe, and energy security.
In the next two years, the Caucasus and Central Asian states could become
zones of interstate competition similar to the Middle East and Northeast
Asia. Economic and political crises, or the intensification of war in
Chechnya or Afghanistan, might lead to the "Balkanization" of the regions.
This, in turn, could result in military intervention by any of the major
powers. Given the fact that both Turkey and Iran threatened intervention
in the Caucasus at the peak of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1992-1993, this
risk should be taken seriously.
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Unfortunately, the Caucasus and Central Asian states lack the capacity to
tackle crises without outside help. Economic collapse has produced social
dislocation and extreme poverty. Widespread corruption and the
entrenchment of aging leaders and their families have eroded support for
central governments and constrained the development of a new generation of
leaders. The internal weakness of the Caucasus and Central Asian states,
7
combined with brutal regional wars, makes them extremely vulnerable to
outside pressure—especially from Russia. Although Russia itself is weak,
it is far stronger than all the states combined, and while its direct
influence over their affairs has declined since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, it remains the dominant economic, political, and military force.
The West will have to assist the states in bolstering their institutional
capacity and in promoting cooperation among them. American engagement
remains crucial given its weight on the international stage, the potential
threats to its own security, and the fact that it has leverage in the
regions. In spite of a few glitches, the Caucasus and Central Asian states
have been receptive to the United States and are among its few potential
allies in a zone where other states are not so amenable to U.S. activity.
Regional countries need American moral and material support to maintain
independence in the face of increasing pressures, and its guidance in
dealing with presidential transition crises and addressing human rights
abuses. Even with limited political and financial resources, U.S.
leadership can do a great deal to defuse regional tensions and mitigate
problems. However, this will only be possible if a policy is defined early
and communicated clearly, if there is a particular focus on partnership
with European allies in addressing regional challenges, and if Russia is
encouraged to become a force for stability rather than a factor for
instability in the regions.
The Caucasus and Central Asia at a Crossroads
This is a critical time for the Caucasus and Central Asian states because
a number of negative trends could converge to bring about a crisis.
Responding to that crisis requires the United States to build a long-term
strategy based on a frank assessment of regional needs and of U.S.
capabilities and resources.
The Clinton administration's approach to the regions was ad hoc. It
tackled a laundry list of initiatives in response to crises and shifting
policy priorities. Issues such as oil and gas pipelines, conflict
resolution, and human rights were targeted at different junctures, but an
overall strategy—which was essential given limited government resources
for the regions—was never fully articulated. As a result, American
priorities were not communicated clearly to local leaders, resulting in
frequent misinterpretations of intentions. Domestic constituencies in the
United States undermined leverage in regional conflicts. Incompatible
government structures and conflicting legislation fostered competition
among agencies and encouraged a proliferation of parallel initiatives,
while congressional mandates limited areas in which scarce funds could be
applied and thus reduced flexibility. The new administration must get
ahead of this negative trend in setting policy and priorities, while
tackling U.S. government deficiencies directly. In crafting policy,
several developments need to be considered:
The civil war in Afghanistan will likely regain momentum this summer.
Already, the incursion of refugees and fighters from Afghanistan into
Central Asia and the activities of Central Asian militant groups have
strained fragile political situations in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan.
Governments in Central Asia are violating human rights as they clamp down
on Islamic groups in response to acts of terrorism and militant
activities. In Uzbekistan, the closing of mosques, a ban on political
opposition movements, and arrests of practicing Muslims have forced groups
underground and increased support for insurgencies and extremists.
8
In Chechnya, the war shows little sign of resolution through political
negotiation. Refugees and fighters have been pushed across borders into
the South Caucasus by Russian troops, as well as into neighboring Russian
regions. As in Afghanistan, an intensification of the war in Chechnya is
likely this summer.
Other Caucasus civil wars are in a state of "no peace, no war." Recent
international efforts to resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, led
by the United States, France, and Russia, have raised expectations for a
peace settlement. But, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, opposition figures
openly discuss the resumption of war if leaders are perceived to have sold
out.
Georgia is teetering on the verge of collapse, overwhelmed by internal
difficulties and burdened by the inability to combat corruption and tackle
economic reform. The dual secessions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have
split the country and spillover from Chechnya has soured relations with
Russia. In winter 2000, Russia imposed new, stringent visa requirements on
Georgia and temporarily suspended energy supplies over payments and a
contract dispute, increasing pressure on the beleaguered country.
In both Georgia and Azerbaijan, political succession has become a critical
issue. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan will soon face the same
crisis. No provisions have been made for a presidential transition, and
emerging leaders have often been suppressed or forced into exile.
All of these issues are exacerbated by the continued downturn of regional
economies. The Asian and Russian financial crises of 1998 were a major
setback, leading to the devaluation of currencies, untenable debt burdens,
and the withdrawal of foreign investment. Deep-rooted corruption feeds
into the economic crisis and hinders the emergence of small and
medium-sized businesses that could spur market development and economic
growth.
For both regions, Russia is the only source of reliable employment, a
significant market for local products, and, in the short-term, the
principal energy supplier. In Georgia alone, approximately 10 percent of
the population currently works in Russia and sends home an amount
equivalent to nearly a quarter of Georgia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
This influx of economic migrants has exacerbated ethnic tensions within
Russia. Because regional governments cannot pay their energy bills,
clashes over energy with Russia will continue, increasing tensions and
instability.
In Central Asia, high unemployment fosters the smuggling of raw materials
and consumer goods, and trafficking in arms and drugs. Eighty percent of
heroin sold in Europe originates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and about
half of this production flows through Central Asia. The heroin trade in
Central Asia has created a burgeoning intravenous drug problem and an
HIV/AIDS outbreak that mimics the early epidemic in Africa. Health workers
fear an escalation in a matter of months that will overwhelm local medical
systems and the region's miniscule international programs. A major
HIV/AIDS crisis would be the final straw for states like Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan.
9
U.S.-Russian Tensions in the Caspian Basin
Converging with this regional crisis is a sharp difference of opinion
between the United States and Russia over U.S. involvement in Caspian
energy development and engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In
Moscow, the United States is portrayed as purposefully weakening Russia's
strategic position and bent on establishing Central Asia and the Caucasus
as U.S. outposts. Where American policymakers speak of intervention in a
positive sense to promote regional cooperation and stability, Russian
political commentators speak of American "vmeshatel'stvo"—literally,
negative intervention—to constrain Russia. The United States and Russia
are at odds politically and semantically in the Caspian.
Because approximately 50 percent of Russia's foreign currency revenues are
generated by oil and gas sales, the Putin administration has made
increasing Russian energy exports to Europe a priority. Caspian energy
resources play a major role in Russian calculations. Gas from Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan flows into the Russian pipeline system, where it supplies
the Russian domestic market and supplements Russia's European exports.
Russia is the largest supplier of gas to Turkey, and has begun
constructing a new Black Sea pipeline ("Blue Stream") to increase
supplies. But gas flowing to Turkey from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Azerbaijan—and bypassing Russia—could pose direct competition. Over the
last five years, U.S. policy in the Caspian Basin has promoted multiple
gas and oil pipelines to world markets to increase export options for
regional states, persuading Moscow that the United States seeks to squeeze
Russia out of regional energy development.
Beyond energy issues, Russia sees itself caught between NATO to the west
and chaos to the south. In the Caucasus, Russia has lost its strategic
defensive structures against NATO's southern flank in Turkey. Moscow
perceives this loss as significant, given NATO expansion east and the
alliance's willingness to use force in the extended European arena.
Explicit statements of intent to join NATO by Georgia and Azerbaijan have
angered Russian policymakers, along with the active involvement of
regional states in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, and the formation
of a regional alliance among states that have opted out of the Russian-led
Commonwealth of Independent States security structures (the so-called
GUUAM group of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova).
Although Central Asia is less a zone of competition because of shared
concern about Afghanistan, which resulted in unprecedented U.S.-Russian
collaboration on UN sanctions against the Taliban in December 2000, U.S.
bilateral military relations with regional states still alarm Moscow. The
fact that an energetic Pentagon moved faster than the State Department to
engage Central Asian counterparts has led Moscow to view U.S. actions in
both regions with deepening suspicion.
Crafting U.S. Policy
To address these issues, the Bush administration will first have to
recognize that the Caucasus and Central Asia are a major factor in
U.S.-Russian bilateral relations. Russia does not only view its dealings
with the U.S. through the prism of NATO, missile defense, and
non-proliferation issues, although these are currently the United States'
top security priorities in the relationship. Russia's southern tier is now
its most sensitive frontier and the Caucasus and Central Asia are its
number one security priority.
Having recognized this fact, the Bush administration must present a
unified front when dealing with Moscow and the region, and prevent the
various agencies from acting in conflict with each other. The
administration needs to articulate a message that is positive and
10
inclusive for Russia as well as regional states and stick to it. It should
emphasize regional stability, cooperative relations, political solutions
to conflicts, border security, human rights, institutional development,
orderly successions of political power, anti-corruption efforts, and
opportunities for citizen participation in political and economic
decisionmaking.
Although this framework would not be considerably different from the
general themes of the Clinton administration, the notion of explicitly
recognizing the importance of the Caucasus and Central Asian regions in
the bilateral U.S.-Russian relationship—and staying focused—would be a
departure. The primary goal should be to encourage Russia to adopt a
positive approach to relations with its neighbors that eschews commercial
and political bullying. To this end, the administration will have to
maintain a direct dialogue with its Russian counterparts in working out a
practical approach for the Caucasus and Central Asia.
With its message clear, the administration needs to bring its bureaucratic
mechanisms in line to focus on key issues and countries. Even if
responsibility for the Caucasus and Central Asian states is divided within
government departments, effective structures will have to be created to
preserve links between the regions, and conflicting legislation will have
to be streamlined to resolve interagency conflicts over responsibilities.
This will require the executive branch to work closely with Congress to
reconcile appropriations with a comprehensive program for the regions and
to articulate U.S. interests through public hearings and testimony. If the
administration has appropriate mechanisms in place, some policy
innovations should be considered to address regional problems:
Rethink the U.S. Approach to Central Asia
The Central Asian states
require the most serious reassessment in U.S. policy. Central Asia is
rapidly becoming a base for extremism and terrorism, and the U.S. needs to
look ahead to avert its "Afghanicization." The pivotal states for regional
security are Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which both border Afghanistan. The
United States has bilateral military relations with Uzbekistan, but is
barely present in Tajikistan, where permanent U.S. representation has been
withdrawn because of fears for the safety of Embassy personnel. The Bush
administration must change the American approach to both countries by
emphasizing human rights and cooperative regional relations in Uzbekistan
(rather than simply security), and by increasing its focus on Tajikistan.
Productive relations between Uzbekistan and its neighbors are key to
regional stability. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have significant Uzbek
diasporas and are dependent on Uzbekistan for cross-border communications
and energy supplies. Uzbekistan has frequently used this leverage to
negative effect with these vulnerable neighbors. The United States should
encourage high-level discussions between Uzbekistan and its neighbors that
would address border access and gas deliveries as well as militant
incursions across the Tajik and Kyrgyz borders into Uzbekistan.
Of all the regional states, Tajikistan is the most receptive to outside
assistance, serving as a potential model for dealing with Islamic and
political opposition. The Tajik government engaged its opposition in a
dialogue that resulted in power-sharing arrangements and an end to a
five-year civil war. Given the precipitous decline of the Tajik economy,
even the reestablishment of a permanent U.S. embassy—with appropriate
security precautions—and a modest increase in aid programs related to job
creation and health would be a major boost.
11
Link Human Rights and Security
As a general rule, the administration
should engage Central Asia without reinforcing authoritarian regimes. In
Uzbekistan, while militant groups are real threats to the state, human
rights abuses are an equal threat and increase sympathy for the militants.
The United States has considerable leverage with Uzbekistan through its
military engagement activities. In 2000, Uzbekistan came close to losing
congressional certification for these programs, and the Pentagon placed
greater emphasis on human rights in its special forces training
curriculum. Taking this as a cue, the Bush administration should emphasize
mutually-reinforcing security and human rights objectives throughout
Central Asia and should encourage cooperation among the Pentagon, State
Department, and international human rights groups on security-human rights
linkages. The administration should also emphasize U.S. support for
regional non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that seek to increase both
citizen participation in government and access to objective sources of
information.
Spotlight HIV/AIDS in the War on Drugs
While the United States and
international organizations have paid some attention to tackling drug
trafficking in Central Asia by funding border security and local
interdiction efforts, the public health dimension has not been addressed.
The growing HIV/AIDS epidemic along drug routes in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Kazakhstan threatens to undermine the region's meager economic and
political achievements. The emergent public health crisis must be part of
the U.S. and international agenda for the region and funding should be
allocated for HIV/AIDS prevention programs and for NGOs working directly
with intravenous drug users, women's groups, and regional youth.
Factor in Other Regional Players
During the Clinton administration, the
United States had an Osama bin Laden policy but no Afghanistan policy, and
increasingly lost sight of a wider Central Asian policy as
Afghanistan-related security concerns increased. But without stability in
Afghanistan, local governments can do little to tackle the movement of
militant groups or drugs and arms trafficking across the Afghan border.
Active U.S. engagement with Pakistan is key to addressing the crisis in
Afghanistan. Likewise, Iran is an important player in the dynamic of
Caucasus and Caspian energy politics, but was routinely excluded from
regional calculations by U.S. policy. A rapprochement between the United
States and Iran would effect a seismic shift in regional geopolitics and
pave the way for increased cooperation among the states of the Caucasus
and Central Asia. When crafting its strategy, America must consider how
bilateral relations with all the neighboring countries will effect
developments in the two regions.
Engage Europe
Central Asia and the Caucasus have become Europe's
backyard, and the European Union and key states like Germany are beginning
to formulate long-term plans for engagement with the regions. Over the
next decade, if Turkey and the Eastern European and Baltic States accede
to the Union, Russia will be the only country separating an expanded
Europe from Central Asia and Afghanistan. As North Sea energy reserves
diminish, Europe will also put greater emphasis on Caspian energy.
Given limited resources, the United States should work with European
allies to identify a long-term strategy for the regions that is targeted
to respond to their most acute needs and not just to the priorities of
donors. The European Commission has a substantial aid program and has
spent almost one billion Euros in the Caucasus alone since 1991. But the
Commission is bureaucratic and slow, and European diplomats acknowledge
that assistance has been poorly targeted with little positive effect on
12
regional stability and development. The United States may not be able to
work directly with the Commission, but many European Union member states
have bilateral assistance programs and could be brought into task forces
for individual states. The United States has already cooperated with
France on conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, and with Great Britain
and Germany in providing security assistance to Georgia. Close German
relations with Russia and increasing German interest in Central Asia offer
additional opportunities for a transatlantic dialogue on regional
stability.
Work With Europe to Seek a Political Solution in Chechnya
Chechnya is
one of the primary threats to regional stability and the linchpin in
Russia's relations with the South Caucasus. Without movement toward a
solution, the war will drag on, bringing Russia into increasing
confrontation with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and exacerbating an already
catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Caucasus. Chechnya deserves as
much international attention to resolution as Northern Ireland and
Palestine, but the United States and Europe have frequently been at odds
in their approach. In its dialogue with Russia, the Bush administration
should continue to emphasize the importance of a political solution to end
the war, and keep the issue high on the transatlantic agenda.
Maintain the General Thrust of Energy Policy
The Clinton administration
spent significant political capital on promoting multiple oil and gas
pipelines from the Caspian and the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline across the Caucasus to Turkey. Pipeline diplomacy often
overshadowed other American initiatives in the regions. As a result, some
American policy analysts propose that the new administration step back
from this policy. But, after five years of intensive engagement,
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan is already a regional political reality, even though
it has yet to be built. Repudiating this policy now would be tantamount to
a repudiation of U.S. engagement in the Caspian and relations with
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, the strategic partners in the venture.
The general policy should continue, but it should be brought in line with
broader economic development priorities and initiatives that address the
immaturity and fragility of regional political institutions.
Fiona Hill is a fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
Institution.
The views expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author and are
not necessarily those of the trustees, officers, or other staff members of
the Brookings Institution.
Copyright © 2001 The Brookings Institution.
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Islam in Central Asia
AUG 16, 2001
Islam in Central Asia
he people of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan have always lived under despots. Their history is so dismal
that Communism for them was a time of relative prosperity. Now, 10 years
after they became independent nations, they have once again become
sultanates, ruled by tyrants who maintain tight control of political and
13
economic activity.
While the governments claim they are a steadying force, their repression
is creating instability. Uzbekistan is leading a regionwide crackdown on
all forms of Islam that are not state-controlled — repression that is
driving entire villages into opposition and forcing religion underground.
An Islamic guerrilla movement seeks to establish an Islamic state in
Uzbekistan, but its 1,000 or so fighters are mainly active when the snows
blocking the mountain passes between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan melt each
August. Far more dangerous is the crushing response of Islam Karimov,
Uzbekistan's authoritarian president. If a Taliban-style threat arises in
Central Asia, it will be because the dictatorships inadvertently helped to
create it.
When the Soviet empire broke up, millions of people in Central Asia began
to practice Islam. Unfortunately, local governments saw religion that was
independent of the state as a threat. In Uzbekistan, the most populous of
the Central Asian nations, with 25 million people, the government has
arrested thousands of religious Muslims and sentenced hundreds of them to
long jail terms, even though they were not accused of violent acts.
Thousands of villagers in Islamic areas have been forcibly resettled.
The current guerrilla movement arose in part because of government
actions. When the mass arrest of Muslims began in 1997, young religious
men went underground or fled to safety in Afghanistan or Tajikistan, where
they made contact with more militant movements. Mr. Karimov has used an
unsolved February 1999 bombing, which some believe was carried out by the
security forces, as a justification for an even wider crackdown.
While American officials talk about human rights when they meet with their
Central Asian counterparts, Washington's interest in the region's oil and
gas reserves and fear of another Afghanistan limit American criticism.
Washington has never counted Uzbekistan among the nations that violate
religious freedom. It richly deserves to make the list in September. The
military and economic cooperation given in the name of assuring stability
may in fact be helping to brew dangerous instability. The real parallel
for Central Asia could be Iran under the Shah, who suffocated his nation
into revolution.
Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company | Privacy Information
U.S. Missteps Seen in Wasted Investments in Central Asia
SEP 04, 2001
U.S. Missteps Seen in Wasted Investments in Central Asia
By BIRGIT BRAUER
LMATY, Kazakhstan — As Communism crumbled, the United States set up
investment funds to foster start-up companies and other ventures in
fledgling market economies. But many of these efforts were undermined,
financial experts say, when Washington appointed individuals with little
business experience — politicians, lawyers and academics — to make
investment decisions.
A case in point is the Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund. Through a
string of bad business decisions, and possibly fraud, the fund has lost as
much as $80 million that it received from American taxpayers, resulting in
discussions within the United States about shutting it down, said a
government official familiar with the fund. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation is investigating several of its transactions, the official
said.
Another person associated with the fund, Donald Nicholson, who headed its
program in Uzbekistan until early 2000, said, "Out of the $110 million
14
spent by the time I left, I would estimate that probably $80 million have
been lost, both honestly and otherwise."
Stephen J. Solarz, a former Congressman from Brooklyn, headed the fund
until last year. He and a lawyer for the fund, Michael S. Sommer, said in
separate interviews that some of the losses were so questionable that the
fund's board referred them more than a year ago to the Justice Department
and the United States Agency for International Development, which oversees
the fund.
"We brought these potentially improper transactions to the attention of
the Department of Justice and U.S. A.I.D. and the fund has been fully
cooperating in their investigation," Mr. Sommer said.
With $150 million in seed money, the enterprise fund was created in 1994
to invest in small- and medium- sized businesses in five Central Asian
republics. Investing wisely was not an easy task anywhere in the former
Soviet Union. But the fund's record is particularly bleak.
Of the $111 million that the fund spent, a large share went toward
salaries for fund employees and high overhead expenses, the government
official said. The fund's own operating costs ate up 40 to 50 percent of
total outlays, whereas investment funds in developed markets usually spend
only 2 to 4 percent.
The list of failed business undertakings is long. Among them is a $5
million loss for a brick factory in Uzbekistan that was not built, Mr.
Nicholson said. There were also many cases of overpayments to suppliers,
often through dubious intermediaries, he added.
One money-losing proposition involved a $5 million spinning mill purchased
from the agency that was charged with selling off plants and equipment
from East Germany. When the equipment arrived in Tashkent, the Uzbek
capital, it turned out that it could not spin cotton, the country's
leading crop, but only synthetic fibers, and was unusable.
The fund also lost money in Turkmenistan when it bought an intravenous
solutions company in Europe for $5 million. Mr. Nicholson, who had joined
the fund at around the time of that decision, said the company was worth
no more than $2.5 million and its annual capacity was far too large for
the Turkmenistan market. He immediately stopped the deal and resold the
company, incurring a $3 million loss.
In Kazakhstan, the fund invested about $1.6 million in a proposed dry
mortar plant that was never built, said a person involved with the fund,
an episode that led to a drawn-out court battle.
Another questionable transaction involved the purchase of an Almaty
apartment building two years ago with the fund's money. The cost and the
reason for buying it were not clear, the same person said.
Mr. Nicholson said he had informed the fund's board of such troubling
investments, which led to the F.B.I. investigation. "The magnitude of
questionable activities kept growing," he said. "There was no way I would
feel comfortable." But how many of these actions resulted from bad
business decisions or malfeasance is hard to judge, he said.
A government official in Washington familiar with the inquiry said it was
unclear whether there had been criminal intent or wrongdoing. The
investigation, first reported by The Wall Street Journal last December,
has moved slowly because of the difficulty of locating some of the people
involved, the official said.
Many experts believe that the fund's failures lie mainly in the board's
lack of knowledge about business and particularly the local business
environment. Also the fund made mistakes by recruiting people in America
who were inexperienced in international dealings, Mr. Nicholson said.
Unfamiliar with emerging economies, these people frequently overestimated
the markets and misjudged local companies, he said.
Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company | Privacy Information
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America's Central Asian Allies
October 2, 2001
America's Central Asian Allies
ust as the desire for international collaboration against Communism drew
America into unseemly alliances with dictators during the cold war, the
new campaign against terrorism is pulling Washington ever closer to
tyrants and satraps in Central Asia. Three of the least appealing leaders
— in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan — have now become American
allies against their southern neighbor Afghanistan. Access to airfields
and military bases may require some short-term cooperation, but Washington
should not give these dictators license to pursue their abusive policies
against Muslim citizens.
The three nations are among the world's worst violators of human rights.
Turkmenistan's president, Saparmurat Niyazov, has turned his nation into a
shrine to his rule and permits no dissent of any kind. Uzbekistan under
President Islam Karimov is only marginally more free. Tajikistan, emerging
from a five-year civil war, is ruled by President Emomali Rahmonov, who
has rigged elections and allowed abuses by security forces.
Mistreatment of Muslims is especially brutal in these countries.
Tajikistan has arrested hundreds of members of a radical but nonviolent
Islamic group. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan do not tolerate expressions of
Islam that are not state-sponsored. In Uzbekistan, Mr. Karimov has used
the excuse of an Islamic guerrilla movement to repress his opponents. He
has also arrested thousands of pious Muslims not accused of violent acts.
Uzbekistan's repression has, in fact, encouraged the rise of a violent
guerrilla movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. After a wave of
arrests in 1997, many young religious men fled to safety in Afghanistan,
where they made contact with violent groups, apparently including Osama
bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. A State Department official testified before
Congress in July that such repression "is actually radicalizing
Uzbekistan's disaffected and disenfranchised youth and driving them into
the arms of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its radical allies."
There is little question that Washington needs to use bases and airspace
in the three Central Asian states. But Washington should not be rewarding
these nations in ways that encourage further repression. America's battle
against terrorism is best served in Central Asia by encouraging
governments there to arrest those genuinely involved in violent acts and
leaving others free to worship and think as they please.
Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company | Privacy Information
America's Central Asian Allies
October 2, 2001
America's Central Asian Allies
16
ust as the desire for international collaboration against Communism drew
America into unseemly alliances with dictators during the cold war, the
new campaign against terrorism is pulling Washington ever closer to
tyrants and satraps in Central Asia. Three of the least appealing leaders
— in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan — have now become American
allies against their southern neighbor Afghanistan. Access to airfields
and military bases may require some short-term cooperation, but Washington
should not give these dictators license to pursue their abusive policies
against Muslim citizens.
The three nations are among the world's worst violators of human rights.
Turkmenistan's president, Saparmurat Niyazov, has turned his nation into a
shrine to his rule and permits no dissent of any kind. Uzbekistan under
President Islam Karimov is only marginally more free. Tajikistan, emerging
from a five-year civil war, is ruled by President Emomali Rahmonov, who
has rigged elections and allowed abuses by security forces.
Mistreatment of Muslims is especially brutal in these countries.
Tajikistan has arrested hundreds of members of a radical but nonviolent
Islamic group. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan do not tolerate expressions of
Islam that are not state-sponsored. In Uzbekistan, Mr. Karimov has used
the excuse of an Islamic guerrilla movement to repress his opponents. He
has also arrested thousands of pious Muslims not accused of violent acts.
Uzbekistan's repression has, in fact, encouraged the rise of a violent
guerrilla movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. After a wave of
arrests in 1997, many young religious men fled to safety in Afghanistan,
where they made contact with violent groups, apparently including Osama
bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. A State Department official testified before
Congress in July that such repression "is actually radicalizing
Uzbekistan's disaffected and disenfranchised youth and driving them into
the arms of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and its radical allies."
There is little question that Washington needs to use bases and airspace
in the three Central Asian states. But Washington should not be rewarding
these nations in ways that encourage further repression. America's battle
against terrorism is best served in Central Asia by encouraging
governments there to arrest those genuinely involved in violent acts and
leaving others free to worship and think as they please.
Copyright 2001 The New York Times Company | Privacy Information
IHT Article Print Page
Copyright © 2001 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com
Focus on Struggling Central Asia
International Herald Tribune International Herald Tribune
Thursday, October 11, 2001
The U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan have focused attention on other
countries in the region that are aiding the coalition against
terrorism, including the five countries of the former Soviet Union
in Central Asia.
Though better off than Afghanistan, the countries in the region
remain poor. The largest investor in the region is the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. Willem Buiter, chief economist
for the EBRD, spoke with Eric Pfanner of the International Herald
Tribune about the economic implications of the battle against
terrorism.
17
Q. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan
are hardly household words in the West. Suddenly they find
themselves in the front lines of the battle against terrorism. What
are the implications for the region?
A. These countries are now on the map in the political eye in a way
that they weren't before. I'm not saying this war is good for them.
But in addition to the disruption and dislocation that they will
undoubtedly suffer - the refugee problem, the interruption of normal
trading patterns, the possible damage to infrastructure, the
conflict spilling over physically - there is the possibility that
the opportunities and problems of these nations will be taken on in
a way that didn't happen before.
When the dust settles and people try to reconstruct Afghanistan,
they'll also look at ways of strengthening the institutions and
economies of these five countries.
Q. Is there a possibility of a Marshall Plan for the region after
the shooting stops?
A. I don't know if the Marshall Plan is the right analogy.
Afghanistan is in quite a different situation. It has already been
bombed back to the Stone Age. Its infrastructure is rubble. It does
not have the human infrastructure that our countries have. What
these countries will need is debt relief, additional humanitarian
aid and development aid. The infrastructure has to be renewed and
retargeted on viable economic links with the world - with the
modern, the market world. What they have in infrastructure tends to
be oriented toward the former Soviet Union. The private sector has
to be given a chance.
In Turkmenistan, the private sector is 25 percent of GDP. But the
best thing we can do for them is make sure we don't discriminate
against their exports. There is no point in putting in aid and
assistance on the one hand but slapping down markets with
anti-dumping penalties on the other hand.
Q. How great will the economic effects of the refugee problem be?
A. Most of the refugees so far have gone to Pakistan and Iran. There
are some refugees in Tajikistan, which has a long and largely
uncontrolled border with Afghanistan, and there could be a sizable
inflow, which could be disruptive. But presumably, humanitarian
assistance would come quite quickly.
Q. Did the Central Asian countries extract any quid pro quos for
allowing an American military presence on their soil or in their
airspace?
A. I don't think anybody sits down and says, "You can use our bases
if you provide us with a large jar full of money," but clearly
friends are treated better than enemies, and if a country incurs
costs or takes risks it will not hurt them.
Q. How can outside financing help the region develop?
A. Look at Kyrgyzstan. It's one of the most beautiful countries in
the world. In fact, before this conflict started, they were
developing a real ecotourism niche. Of course, at the moment, nobody
18
is going to fly to a country that is 60 miles (100 kilometers) north
of Afghanistan. But if you could put in the infrastructure - it's
magically beautiful.
Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two poorest countries in the
region, have a natural resource that in the long run is more
valuable than oil - fresh water. In this arid part of the world,
it's a tradable good. In Turkmenistan, it's gas. The only limit is
their ability to export it. Kazakhstan has large amounts of oil and
gas deposits. Uzbekistan, while not a major producer, has quite a
bit of the stuff, and they have every other mineral in the world.
Q. Does the decade of EBRD involvement in these countries hold any
lessons for the possible reconstruction of Afghanistan?
A. The one key lesson is that you have to reconstruct the role of
the public sector. They have to become a limited but competent state
instead of an all-intrusive, leviathan state.
They have the enormous disadvantage that they have not even the
trace of the apparatus of the state, the institutions of law and
order.
Copyright © 2001 The International Herald Tribune
WSJ.com
October 18, 2001
International Commentary
The End Game in Central Asia
By Kathleen Collins. Ms. Collins is an assistant professor of government and
Central Asian studies at the University of Notre Dame.
In the war against terrorism, the Bush administration has so far focused on
Osama bin Laden, his al Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban in
Afghanistan. But the U.S. must now begin preparing for a potentially larger
problem. Afghanistan is surrounded by weak states, and a durable peace in
Central Asia must contain not only the conflict within Afghanistan but also
bolster that country's faltering neighbors, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The U.S.
end game must therefore include long-term policies that promote stable
democracies and economic prosperity.
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are fragile, authoritarian states long plagued by
Islamic opposition groups, guerrilla insurgencies, Taliban threats and dubious
Russian interventions. These states are fertile ground for Islamic extremism and
region-wide instability. And they will feel the tremors of U.S. action in
Afghanistan in at least three ways.
First, in the covert movement of Taliban or pro-Taliban terrorist groups, such
as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), north across the Uzbek and Tajik
borders, and their positioning for future terrorist acts against those
governments. Second, via attacks by Taliban fighters on the Afghan-Uzbek border
in retaliation for Uzbek support of U.S. military forces. And third, in a
massive flow of refugees into Tajikistan and from there to Uzbekistan or
Kyrgyzstan.
These strongly secular Central Asian regimes have battled periodic IMU military
incursions and terrorist attacks for more than five years. The Taliban has
threatened Uzbekistan's borders since coming to power in 1996, and Uzbek
President Islam Karimov has long accused the Taliban of harboring IMU
terrorists. Although Uzbekistan has built the strongest military in former
Soviet Central Asia, it is not clear that its untried troops could effectively
suppress a larger, more organized guerrilla insurgency.
19
Emerging from a five-year civil war, Tajikistan's army is fragmented, poorly
supplied and ineffective. Tajikistan therefore relies on an estimated 20,000
Russian guards to secure its Afghan border, and thousands more to curb
insurgencies inside Tajikistan.
Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Russia might support the
war against terrorism by sending troops from Chechnya to fortify the former
Soviet region. Yet Uzbekistan is unlikely to cede such power to Russian troops,
which have been a double-edged sword in Tajikistan. Minimal stability for
Tajikistan has come at the price of sovereignty. Moreover, Russian troops,
demoralized by a second war against the Chechen "jihad," are unlikely to prove
an adequate match for Taliban forces. The U.S. and its European allies should be
skeptical of Russian intentions.
The anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance may be the beneficiary of
Western support and will no doubt move quickly to retake strategic regions south
of the Uzbek border. But it is not clear the Alliance's fractured, out-numbered
and ill-equipped army will be able to either invade or hold Taliban-controlled
territory. Even if they can, it is doubtful they can prevent members of Osama
bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network from scattering into the neighboring
Central Asian republics, where they could go underground and continue carrying
out their operations.
Nor should the Northern Alliance be expected to prevent a flood of hungry and
potentially armed refugees to the north. A few thousand of the estimated tens of
thousands of refugees displaced by war could lead to social unrest in already
economically strained Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
In the face of such a recipe for further conflict, how can the U.S. ensure
stability in Central Asia? First, the U.S. should provide Uzbekistan with
military aid. The Uzbek government has complained for several years about the
U.S.'s lack of interest in regional security and in Uzbekistan's strategic
importance. The U.S. should increase military-to-military collaboration that
will help Uzbekistan fortify its borders and become a stronger, more independent
ally.
Second, the U.S. needs nothing less than a Marshall Plan to spur economic growth
in Central Asia. Not just Afghanistan, but all the Central Asian states have
experienced a precipitous and devastating economic and social decline since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1991, this predominately Muslim region boasted
decent standards of living and a 99% literacy rate. Now more than 80% of the
population lives in poverty, of which increasing numbers are young men with no
opportunities for education or employment. Many of the villages of Tajikistan
are no better provisioned than their Afghan counterparts. The entire region has
suffered four years of drought, and several million Tajik, Uzbek and Kyrgyz
citizens are now facing food shortages or famine.
However, military support and economic aid must come with clear political
conditions. These should include strengthening democracy, implementing
free-market economic reforms and improvements in human rights. Indeed, the U.S.
must use every lever to pry open Central Asia's increasingly autocratic but
brittle regimes.
Despite Mr. Karimov's emergence as a crucial ally in the U.S. fight against
international terrorism, he is an infamous hard-liner who has stifled dissent,
driven political rivals into exile and locked up thousands of Islamic activists,
of whom only a tiny minority have engaged in terrorism. It is this kind of
relentless state repression that is radicalizing some Muslims in Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan and, to a lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan. The IMU is but one such group.
Only by tackling the underlying political causes of disaffection and extremism
can the U.S. and its allies prevent the Afghanization of the rest of Central
Asia.
For a decade, U.S. policies in Central Asia have been inconsistent and
self-defeating; Washington's focus has been the balance of power and Caspian Sea
oil rather than the causes of the region's civil wars, human rights abuses and
economic crises. The Bush administration now has a historic opportunity to
reverse these policies.
What does the U.S. get in return? The preemption of conflict, humanitarian
20
crises and potential state collapse bodes well for better relations with Muslims
in Central Asia and the larger Islamic world. Constraining Russian hegemony
should continue to be a U.S. strategic objective. Moreover, a stable,
economically open Central Asia, which contains one of the world's
fastest-growing populations, offers the promise of large markets for U.S. goods
and services.
The U.S. war against terrorism in Afghanistan, and the humanitarian assistance
that will accompany it, is a crucial first phase in the construction of a stable
Central Asia. The U.S. left much unfinished business in Afghanistan during and
after the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war. This time America must be prepared for a
long and relentless campaign, not only against terrorism but for peace and
democracy as well.
-- From The Asian Wall Street Journal
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21