解釋此章標題
1) Negri 反對 Bartleby 的”I prefer not to”, 認為是 Hegel 所謂的”
abstract negation”, 而應用 determinate negation 的方式
In short, for them (Negri), Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” is a
Hegelian “abstract negation”which should then be overcome by the
patient work of the “determinate negation” of the existing social
universe (353)
2) Negri 誤解 Hegel 的 determinate negation
The Lesson of failures such as the Cultural Revolution is that the focus
should be shifted from the utopian goal of full reign of productive
expressivity that no longer needs representation, state order, capital, and so
forth, to the question, “What kind of representation should replace the
existing liberal-democratic representative state?”(375)
What is the specific character (the social content) of the “totalitarian excess”)
(378) (Zizek denounces the strict complicity between today's postpolitical
platforms (from the 'Third Way' to multiculturalism) and the 'totalitarian
excess' which he regards both as their fantasmatic supplement and
'concealed true face':'" the more democracy is conceptualised as an abstract
container purified of ideological divisions, the more it would reveal its
disavowed and traumatic core by generating new forms of racism, outbursts
of irrational/fundamentalist violence, and so on in a nutshell.)
Negri---citizen’s income
----governance(interaction between representative state power and
Councils of “expressive” movements (375-76)
Integration of national assembly and council assembly (Kautsky)
Interplay between class-organization and political leadership of the
revolutionary vanguard party (Trotsky)(376)
The Party(not democratic party) (377)----movement transubstantiated into
the form of political universality (377)
A split which always-already cuts from the represented “people” (378)
Leader—the external figure of the analyst (378)---radical change of
identity (378)
Dictatorship of the proletariat (379)---the totalitarian excess as part of no
part---to twist the very space of state representation in their direction
Chavez and Morales (379)—links with the disposed of the favelas (the
poor)
要保持 duality(p.365-7) deadlock (367)----要把 gaze 從 object 中解放
(Deleuze, cinema)(366)---為何 name 只能說一半, 為何要紮一個稻草人再
攻擊
Deleuze 錯誤的第一步 virtual 等同於 production, becoming,
molecular(366)---可以跟 biopolitics 對比----“life becomes resistance to
power when power takes life as its object” (Foucault, 92)
The proper site of production is not the virtual space as such, but, rather, the
very passage from it to constituted reality, the collapse of the multitude and
its oscillations into one reality(366)
早期 Deleuze (367)---the logic of sense, of immaterial becoming as the
sense-event, as the effect of bodily-material processes-causes, the logic of
the radical gap between the generative process and its immaterial
sense-effect (367)
Cinematic image is inherently sterile and impassive, the pure effect of
corporeal causes (367)----cf,從 object 中解放 gaze
However, there is an excess in the emergence of the New: neorealism is an
Event which cannot simply be reduced to its material/historical causes, and
the "quasi-cause" is the cause of this excess, the cause of that which makes
an Event (an emergence of the New) irreducible to its historical
circumstances. One can also say that the quasi-cause is the second-level, the
meta-cause of the very excess of the effect over its (corporeal) causes. This
is how one should understand what Deleuze says about being affected:
insofar as the incorporeal Event is a pure affect (an impassive-neutral-sterile
result), and insofar as something New (a new Event, an Event of/as the New)
can only emerge if the chain of its corporeal causes is not complete, one
should postulate, over and above the network of corporeal causes, a pure,
transcendental, capacity to affect. This, also, is why Lacan appreciated so
much The Logic of Sense: is the Deleuzian quasi-cause not the exact
equivalent of Lacan's objet petit a, this pure, immaterial, spectral entity
which serves as the object-cause of desire? (organs without bodies, 27,
following De landa)
後期 Deleuze—becoming as production(367)
Deleuze 的兩面----(368)
Either the infinite field of virtuality is an immaterial effect of interacting
bodies, or the bodies themselves emerge, or the bodies themselves emerge,
actualize themselves, from this field of virtuality.
The formal genesis vs. the real genesis (368)
Event as the power which generates reality---the schizo (flux of multiple
passions)
Event as the sterile, pure effect of bodily interactions—the masochist (the
repetition of the same sterile gesture) (369)
Intermixing of material bodies
Immaterial effect of sense (369)
Deleuze 的 virtual 的兩面 (368)-Is this opposition of the virtual as the site of productive Becoming and the
virtual as the site of the sterile Sense-Event not, at the same time, the
opposition of the “body without organs” and “organs without a
bodies”?
BwO---the productive flux of pure Becoming, the body not yet structured or
determined as functional organs
OwB---the virtuailty of the pure affect extracted from its embeddedness in a
body-----grin without a cat---time-image---gaze as an autonomous
organ without a body--C.F 老師講的科技的物質性(VS. ZIZEK 的
Transcendental materialism---impossibility and negativity)
Relying on Manuel de Landa’s account,9 Zizek draws attention
to a central tension or even contradiction between Deleuze I (of the Logic of
Sense and Difference and Repetition), and Deleuze II (the
Deleuzo-Guattarian duo of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaux).
For Deleuze I, the virtuality of becoming as the sense-event is
the passive, causally sterile effect of actual bodily-material causes and
processes. For Deleuze II, the domain of virtual singularities and flux
of pure becoming now becomes the productive cause of individuated
bodies and subjects within diverse concrete assemblages. So it seems
that the domain of virtuality, or pure flux of becoming, is on the
one hand an impassive effect, and on the other a generative process, which
suggests the need for some mediating figure or theoretical account to
explain the precise relationship between these central aspects of
Deleuze’s thought (OwB, 20-21 ff.).
Deleuze 所引發的兩種政治邏輯 (369)
1) The ontology of productive Becoming—the self-organization of the multitude of
molecular groups
2) Base/superstructure, a shadow theater, pseudo causes which are crucial in
transforming reality (370)
The gap between sterile virtual movements and the actuality of power(370)
Shadow theater--Marxist (or Utopian Socialist) meta-politics: political conflict is fully
asserted, but as a shadow-theatre in which events whose proper place is on Another
Scene (of economic processes) are played out; the ultimate goal of ‘true’ politics is
thus its self-cancellation, the transformation of the ‘administration of people’ into the
‘administration of things’ within a fully self-transparent rational order of collective
Will [5];
Negri 誤讀 Deleuze (Negri’s one-sided appropriation of Deleuze, an
appropriation which leaves out the radical duality of Deleuze’s thought,
365))----multitude is a perspective illusion or fantastic staging (365)
Moreover, Deleuze’s ontological dualism—the logic of pure becoming as
sterile effect versus the logic of pure becoming as productive process—is
then translated into two different political logics and practices. On the one
hand, the ontology of productive becoming leads to a Leftist DeleuzoGuattarian politics of “the self-organisation of the multitude of molecular
groups that resist and undermine the molar, totalising systems of power”
(OwB, 32). On the other hand, Zizek observes, Deleuze I’s ontology of the
sterile sense-event appears to remain‘apolitical’, without a corresponding
political logic or practice. Here one is tempted to point to Alain Badiou’s
attempt to construct precisely that kind of politics of universality based upon
an ontology of pure multiplicity, of fidelity to the Event of the New, whether
in art, thought, politics, or love.12 Zizek, however, while relying on
Badiou’s critique of Deleuze, argues that the seemingly ‘apolitical’
Deleuzian ontology of the sterile senseevent harbours a more radical
Deleuzian politics than the ‘vulgar’ Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of the
molecular multitude (as developed further in Hardt and Negri’s Empire, the
target of Zizek’s ‘political’ critique of Deleuze).
The notion of the direct productivity of social life itself leads Negri to assert
“biopolitics,” in manner different from Agamben: “biopolitics” meas
that human life itself is the direct topic and product of collective labor. It is
precisely this directly biopolitical character of production which enables
“absolute democracy”: “Biopolitical power is therefore contrasted to
biopower.” (356)
Neri 與 Marx
If anything, the problem with Negri and Hardt is that they are TOO MUCH
Marxists, taking over the underlying Marxist scheme of historical progress:
like Marx, they celebrate the "deterritorializing" revolutionary potential of
capitalism; like Marx, they locate the contradiction within capitalism, in the
gap between this potential and the form of the capital, of the
private-property appropriation of the surplus. In short, they rehabilitate the
old Marxist notion of the tension between productive forces and the
relations of production: capitalism already generates the "germs of the future
new form of life," it incessantly produces the new "common," so that, in a
revolutionary explosion, this New should just be liberated from the old
social form.
Negri 誤解 Marx
What is not in Marx, what Negri projects onto Marx’s “general
intellect,”is his own central notion of “biopolitics” as the direct
production of life itself in its social dimension. Where Negri sees a direct
fusion (with ‘cognitive work,”the ultimate objects of production are
social relations themselves), Marx posits a radical gap, the exclusion of the
worker from the production process: Marx envisages a fully automated
production process in which the worker “steps to the side” and is
reduced to its “watchman and regulator”; what this means is that the
underlying logic is here that of the “Cunning of Reason”: instead of
engaging himself directly in the production process, man steps aside and lets
nature work upon itself (358).
Marx 的錯誤
However, precisely as Marxists, on behalf of our fidelity to Marx's work, we
should discern the mistake of Marx: he perceived how capitalism unleashed
the breath-taking dynamics of self-enhancing productivity - see his
fascinated descriptions of how, in capitalism, "all things solid melt into thin
air," of how capitalism is the greatest revolutionizer in the entire history of
humanity; on the other hand, he also clearly perceived how this capitalist
dynamics is propelled by its own inner obstacle or antagonism - the ultimate
limit of capitalism (of the capitalist self-propelling productivity) is the
Capital itself, i.e. the capitalist incessant development and revolutionizing of
its own material conditions, the mad dance of its unconditional spiral of
productivity, is ultimately nothing but a desperate flight forward to escape
its own debilitating inherent contradiction... Marx's fundamental mistake
was to conclude, from these insights, that a new, higher social order
(Communism) is possible, an order that would not only maintain, but even
raise to a higher degree and effectively fully release the potential of the
self-increasing spiral of productivity which, in capitalism, on account of its
inherent obstacle ("contradiction"), is again and again thwarted by socially
destructive economic crises. In short, what Marx overlooked is that, to put it
in the standard Derridean terms, this inherent obstacle/antagonism as the
"condition of impossibility" of the full deployment of the productive forces
is simultaneously its "condition of possibility": if we abolish the obstacle,
the inherent contradiction of capitalism, we do not get the fully unleashed
drive to productivity finally delivered of its impediment, but we lose
precisely this productivity that seemed to be generated and simultaneously
thwarted by capitalism - if we take away the obstacle, the very potential
thwarted by this obstacle dissipates... (Therein would reside a possible
Lacanian critique of Marx, focusing on the ambiguous overlapping between
surplus-value and surplus-jouissance). So the critics of Communism were in
a way right when they claimed that the Marxian Communism is an
impossible fantasy - what they did not perceive is that the Marxiam
Communism, this notion of a society of pure unleashed productivity outside
the frame of Capital, was a fantasy inherent to capitalism itself, the capitalist
inherent transgression at its purest, a strictly ideological fantasy of
maintaining the thrust to productivity generated by capitalism, while getting
rid of the "obstacles" and antagonisms that were - as the sad experience of
the "really existing capitalism" demonstrates - the only possible framework
of the effective material existence of a society of permanent self-enhancing
productivity.
So where, precisely, did Marx go wrong with regard to the surplus-value?
One is tempted to search for an answer in the key Lacanian distinction
between the object of desire and the surplus-enjoyment as its cause. Recall
the curl of the blond hair, this fatal detail of Madeleine in Hitchcock's
Vertigo. When, in the love scene in the barn towards the end of the film,
Scottie passionately embraces Judy refashioned into the dead Madeleine,
during their famous 360-degree kiss, he stops kissing her and withdraws just
long enough to steal a look at her newly blond hair, as if to reassure himself
that the particular feature which makes her into the object of desire is still
there... So there is always a gap between the object of desire itself and its
cause, the mediating feature or element that makes this object desirable. And,
back to Marx: what if his mistake was also to assume that the object of
desire (the unconstrained expanding productivity) would remain even when
deprived of the cause that propels it (the surplus-value)? The same holds
even more for Deleuze, since he develops his theory of desire in direct
opposition to the Lacanian one. Deleuze asserts the priority of desire over its
objects: desire is a positive productive force which exceeds its objects, a
living flow proliferating through the multitude of objects, penetrating them
and passing through them, in no need of any fundamental lack or
"castration" that would serve as its foundation. For Lacan, however, desire
has to be sustained by an object-cause: not some primordial incestuous Lost
Object on which desire remains forever transfixed and whose unsatisfying
substitutes all other objects are, but a purely formal object which causes us
to desire objects that we encounter in reality. This object-cause of desire is
thus not transcendent, the inaccessible excess forever eluding our grasp, but
behind the subject's back, something that from within directs desiring. And,
as is the case with Marx, it is Deleuze's failure to take into account this
object-cause that sustains the illusory vision of unconstrained productivity
of desire - or, in the case of Hardt and Negri, the illusory vision of multitude
ruling itself, no longer constrained by any totalizing One. We can observe
here the catastrophic political consequences of the failure to develop what
may appear a purely academic, "philosophical," notional distinction.