Bios—a life of test (486)
1) Test as experience---the world is recognized as being that through which we
experience ourselves, through which we know ourselves, discover ourselves, and
reveal ourselves to ourselves.
2) Bios as an exercise---an exercise on the basis of which, through which, we form
ourselves, transform ourselves, advance towards an aim or salvation, or head
towards our own perfection. (486-7)
We educate ourselves throughout our life, and at the same time we live in order to
be able to educate ourselves. That life and training are coextensive is the first
characteristic of the life-test. (440)
The transfiguration or nullification of evil does not take place then merely and solely
in the form of the adoption of a rational position for looking at the world. The
transfiguration into good takes place at the very heart of the suffering caused, insofar
as this suffering is actually a test that is recognized, lived, and practiced as such by
the subject. (443)
…due to the test attitude, which doubles and adds a value to every personal
experience of suffering, pain, and misfortune, a value that is directly positive for us.
This added value does not nullify the suffering, it attaches itself to it, rather, and
makes use of it. It is insofar as it harms us that the evil is not an evil. (443)
Life as formative test and misfortune is a good precisely insofar as it is misfortune
(443)
The gods surround good men with the series of test, misfortunes, etcetera, necessary
to form them. It is not the joust but a protective benevolence which is there in order
to arrange misfortunes. (445)
Life as a test
Life must be recognized, thought, lived, and practiced as a constant test (437)
One has to take care of the self throughout one’s life (439)
We must educate ourselves constantly through the tests (439)
In the classical Stoicism it is the thought of the whole that is supposed to nullify the
personal experience of suffering. In the case of Epictetus, and within this same
theoretical postulate that Epictetus upholds, there is, if you like, another type of
mutation due to the test attitude, which doubles and adds a value to every personal
experience of suffering, pain, and misfortune, a value that is directly positive for
us….It is insofar as it harms us that the evil is not an evil. (443)
…what characterizes the test in classical Greek tragedy, what underpins it anyway, is
the theme of the confrontation, the joust, of the game between the jealousy of the
gods and the excess of men. In other words, it is when the gods and men confront
each other that the test really appears as the sum of misfortunes sent by the gods to
men in order to know whether men will be able to resist, how they will resist, and
whether men or the gods will prevail. (444)
Now this wrestling match, this great joust between the power of the gods and the
power of men, is not at all what underpins the Stoic test as defined by Seneca and
Epictetus. Rather, it is out of a rather pernickety paternalism of suffering that the
gods surround good men with the series of tests, misfortunes, etcetera, necessary to
form them. It is not the joust but a protective benevolence which is there in order to
arrange misfortunes. (445)
The art of living (tekne tou biou)
Caring about oneself means equipping ourselves for a series of unforeseen events by
practicing a number of exercise which actualizes these events with an unavoidable
necessity…(485)
It is in these exercise, in the interplay of these exercise, that we will be able to live
existence as a test throughout our life. (485)
A transformation, an important mutation with regard to classical Greek thought, in
which the bios should be the object of a tekne, that is to say of a reasonable and
rational art. (487)
1) The world ceased being thought so as to be known through a tekhne. (487)
2) The bios ceased being the object of a tekhne and became the correlate of a test,
an experience, and an exercise. (487)
If the form of objectivity peculiar to Western thought was therefore constituted
when, at the dusk of thought, the world was considered and manipulated by a
tekhne, then I think we can say this: that the form of subjectivity peculiar to Western
thought, if we ask what this form is in its very foundation, was constituted by a
movement that was the reverse of this. It was constituted when the bios ceased
being what it had been for so long in Greek thought, namely the correlate of tekhne;
when the bios (life) ceased being the correlate of a tekhne to become instead the
form of a test of the self. (486)
How can what is given as the object of knowledge (savoir) connected to the mastery
of tekhne, at the same time be the site where the truth of the subject we are
appears, or is experienced and fulfilled with difficult? How can the world, which is
given as the object of knowledge (connaissance) on the basis of the mastery of
tekhne, at the same time be the site where the “self” as ethical subject of truth
appears and is experienced? How can the world be the object of knowledge and at
the same time the place of the subject’s test? How can there be a subject of
knowledge which takes the world as object through tekhne, and a subject of
self-experience which takes the same world, but in the radically different form of the
place of its test? (487)
In Greek classical culture, the tekhne tou biou is, I believe, inserted in the gaps left
equally by the city-state, the law,, and religion regarding this organization of life. For
a Greek, human freedom has to be invested not so much, or not only in the city-state,
the law, and religion, as in this tekhne (the art of oneself) which is practiced by
oneself. It is, then, within this general form of the tekhne tou biou that the principle
or precept “ take care of yourself” is formulated. (447)
You cannot develop the tekne you need if you do not attend to yourself (447, 448)
Art of living and taking care of the self
Roughly speaking I would say that from the classical period, this problem seems to
me to have been one of defining a certain tekhne tou biou (an art of living, a
technique of existence). And you recall that the principle of “taking care of oneself”
was formulated within this general question of the tekhne of tou biou. The human
being is such, his bios, his life, his existence is such, that he cannot live his life
without referring to a certain rational and prescriptive articulation which is that of
tekhne. (447)
Socrates: you cannot develop the tekhne you need, you cannot make a rational
object of your life as you wish, if you do not attend to yourself. The epimeleia
heautou is inserted therefore within the necessity of the tekhne of existence. (447)
In the Hellenistic period, and certainly in the period of the high Empire, which I have
especially studied—we see a sort of reversal, a twisting on the spot between
technique of life and care of the self. It seems to be that what actually happens is
that the care of the self is no longer a necessary and indispensable element of the
tekhne tou biou (the technique of life). The care of the self is not something with
which one must begin if one wishes to define properly a good technique of life. It
seems to me that henceforth the care of the self not only completely penetrates,
commands, and supports the art of living—not only must one know how to care for
the self in order to know how to live—but the tekhne tou biou (the technique of life)
falls entirely within the now autonomized framework of the care of the self(447-48)
What one finds, what anyway must be obtained through the tekhne one installs in
one’s life, is precisely a certain relationship of self to self which is the crown,
realization, and reward of a life lived as a test….One must live so as to establish the
best possible relationship to oneself….One lives with the relationship to one’s self as
the fundamental project of existence, the ontological support which must justify,
found, and command all the techniques of existence. (448)
…this turning around…which shifted the relationship between care of the self and
technique of life (449)
Greek novels—test of life
…with the Greek novel, rather, the theme that life must be a formative test of the self
appears very clearly…everything that may happen to man, all the misfortunes that
may befall him (shipwrecks, earthquakes, fires, encounters with bandits, death
threats, imprisonment, enslavement), everything that happens to these characters
with an accelerated rhythm which, as in Odysssey, actually leads back home, all of
this displays life as a test. (449)
knowledge and the subject
When the question of the relations between the subject and knowledge
(connaissance) of the world is posed, there is the need to inflect knowledge (savoir)
of the world in such a way that it takes on a certain form and a certain spiritual value
for the subject, in the subject’s experience, and for the subject’s salvation. The
spiritual modalization of the subject is the answer to the general question: What is
involved in the relationships of the subject to knowledge of the world? (318)
How can the subject at as he ought, how can he be as he ought to be, not only
inasmuch as he knows the truth, but inasmuch as he says it, practices it, and
exercises it? (318)
Whoever wishes to study the history of subjectivity – or rather, the history of the
relations between the subject and truth – will have to try to uncover the very long
and slow transformation of an apparatus (dispositif) of subjectivity, defined by the
spirituality of knowledge (savoir) and the subject’s practice of truth, into this other
apparatus of subjectivity which is our own and which is, I think, governed by the
question of the subject’s knowledge (connaissance) of himself and of the subject’s
obedience to the law. In fact, neither of these two problems (of obedience to the law
and of the subject’s knowledge of himself) was really fundamental or even present in
the thought of ancient culture. There was “spirituality of knowledge (savoir),” and
there was ”practice and exercise of the truth.” (319)
1980—“Subject and Truth”---sexual material concerning the aphrodisiac (experience)
and sexual behavior, and extract from it the more general terms of the problem of
“the subject and the truth.” (2)
1981—The question I would like to take up this year is this: In what historical form do
the relations between the “subject” and “truth,” elements that do not usually fall
within the historian’s practice or analysis, take shape in the West (2)----emimeliea
heautou (care of the self)(2)
Know yourself and care of the self
Socrates---When this Delphic precept, this gnothi seauton, appears in philosophy, in
philosophical thought, it is, as we know, around the character of Socrates. (4)
When this Delphic precept (this gnothis seauton) appears, it is coupled or twinned
with the principle of “take care of yourself” (epimeleia heautou)….In some texts, to
which we will have to return, rather, a kind of subordination of the expression of the
rule “know yourself” to the precept of care of the self. (4)
The gnothi seauton (‘know yourself”) appears, quite clearly and again in a number of
significant texts, within the more general framework of he spimeleia heautou (care of
the self) as one of the forms, one of the consequences, as a sort of concrete, precise,
and particular application of the general rule: You must attend to yourself, you must
not forget yourself, you must take care of yourself. The rule “know yourself” appears
and is formulated within and at the forefront of this care. (4-5)
Socarates—care for your self
You care for a whole range of things, for your wealth and our reputation. You do not
take care of yourself. He goes on: “And if anyone argues and claims that he does care
[for his soul, for truth, for reason] don’t think that I shall let him go and go on my way.
No. I shall question him, examine him and argue with him at length… (5)
Socrates’ task is to stop people, young and old, citizens or strangers, and saying to
them: Attend to yourselves. (5)
1) This activity of encouraging others to care for themselves is Socrates’ activity, but
it is an activity entrusted to him by the gods. (6)
2) So as to be able to care for others, Socrates has neglected his wealth, civic
advantages, political career, office or magistracy….Thus the problem arises of the
relation between the “caring for oneself” and sacrificing himself. (7)
3) The care of the self will thus be looked upon as the moment of the first
awakening. (7-8)
4) The care of oneself is a principle of restlessness and movement, of continuous
concern throughout life. (8)
Care of the self as the philosophical attitude
…the epimeleia heautou (the care of the self and the rule associated with it)
remained a fundamental principle for describing the philosophical attitude
throughout Greek, Helenistic, and Roman culture (8)
Care of the self and modern subject
…a cultural phenomenon of a determinate scale actually constitutes within the
history of thought a decisive moment that is still significant for our modern mode of
being subjects (9)
You can see that the notion of epimeleia heautou (care of the self) has a long history
extending from the figure of Socrates stopping young people to tell them to take care
of themselves up to Christian asceticism making the ascetic life begin with the care of
the self (10).
Features of the care of the self:
1) A way of being---An attitude towards the self, others, and the world. (10)
2) A standpoint---A certain of form of attention, of looking. (10) The care of self
implies a certain way of attending to what we think and what takes place in our
thought. (11)
3) Forms of reflection and practices---A number of actions exercised on the self by
the self, actions by which one takes responsibility for oneself. (11)
Why does the gnothis seautou have this privileged status for us, to the detriment of
the care of oneself? (12)
1) Care of the self has been considered negatively as a sort of challenge and
defiance, a desire for radical ethical change, a sort of moral dandyism (12)
2) The austere rules of taking care of the self appear reacclimatized, transposed,
and transferred within a context of a general ethic of non-egonism taking the
form either of a Christian obligation of self-reunciation or of a “modern”
obligation towards others. (13)
These rules of taking care of the self, however, were born within an environment
strongly marked by the obligation to take care of oneself (13)
3) The problem of truth and the history of truth----Cartesian moment (14)
A. It requalifies the gnothi seauton (know yourself)---it placed self-evidence at
the origin, the point of departure of the philosophical approach (14)….this
knowledge of oneself made the “knowing yourself” into a fundamental
means of access to truth. (14)
B. It discrediting the epimeleia heautou (care of the self)---when the
philosopher can recognize the truth and have access to it in himself and solely
through his activity of knowing, without anything else being demanded of
him and without him having to change or alter his being as subject. (17)
Modern age of the relations between the subject and the truth begin when it
is postulated that , such as he is, the subject is capable of truth, but that, such
as it is, the truth cannot save the subject. (19)
Spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right.
Spirituality postulates that the subject as such does not have right of access
to the truth and is not capable of having access to the truth….It postulates
that for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must be changed,
transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point,
other than himself. (15)
Askesis (ascesis of as exercise of self on self)(315)
In reality askesis is a practice of truth; it is a way of binding him to the truth
(317)
I think ascesis (askesis) had a profoundly different meaning for the Ancients.
First of all, because obviously it did not involve the aim of arriving at
self-reunciation at the end of ascesis. It involved, rather, constituting onself
through askesis. Or more precisely, let’s say it involved arriving at the
formation of a full, perfect, complete, and self-sufficient relationship with
oneself, capable of producing the self-transfiguration that is the happiness
one takes in oneself (319-20)
The objective of ascesis is in fact the constitution of a full, perfect, and
complete relationship of oneself to oneself (320).
Ascesis involves acquiring something through askesis (ascesis). We must
acquire something we do not have, rather than renounce this or that element
of ourselves that we are or have. We must acquire something that, precisely,
instead of leading us gradually to renounce ourselves, will allow us to protect
the self and to reach it. In two words, ancient ascesis does not reduce: it
equips, it provides. And what it equips and provides us with is what in Greek
is called a paraskeue. (320)
When the objective of ascesis is to arrive at the constitution of this full
relationship of oneself to oneself, its function, or rather its tactic or
instrument, is the constitution of a paraskeue. What is this? Well, the
paraskeue could be called both an open and an oriented preparation of the
individual for the events of life….In the ascesis, the paraskeue involves
preparing the individual for the future, for a future of unforeseen events
whose general nature may be familiar to us, but which we cannot know
whether and when they will occur. It involves, then, finding in ascesis a
preparation, a paraskeue, which can be adapted to what may occur, and only
to this, and at the very moment it occurs, if it does so. (320-21)
It involves preparing ourselves only for what we may come up against, for
only those events we may encounter. (321)
The paraskeue will be nothing other than the set of necessary and sufficient
practices, which will enable us to be stronger than anything that may happen
in our life(321-22)
…the immediate objective of the askesis, on account of its final objective
being the constitution of a full and independent relationship of oneself to
oneself, is the constitution of a paraskeue ( a preparation, an equipment).
And what is this paraskeue? It is, I believe, the form that must be taken by
true discourse in order for it to able to be the matrix of rational behavior. The
paraskeue is the structure of the permanent transformation of true discouse,
firmly fixed in the subject, into principles of morally acceptable behavior.(326)
The paraskeue is, again, the element of transformation of logos into ehos.
And the askesis may then be defined as the set, the regular, calculated
succession of procedures that are able to form, definitively fix, periodically
reactivate and, if necessary, reinforce this paraskeue for an individual. The
askesis is what enables truth-telling—truth-telling addressed to the subject
and also truth-telling that the subject addresses to himself—to be constituted
as the subject’s way of being. The askesis makes truth-telling a mode of being
of the subject. (327)
Ascesis really is what enables truth-telling to become the subject’s mode of
being(327)
Constituting oneself an exercise in which truth-telling becomes the subject’s
mode of being: (327)
Askesis and logoi (discourse)
What is this equipment (paraskeue) made up? It is made up of logoi
(discourses). By logoi it is not enough to understand merely a supply of true
propositions, principles, and axioms, etcetera. Discourses should be
understood as statements with a material existence. The good athlete, who
has the sufficient paraskeue, is not merely someone who knows this or that
about the general order of nature or particular precepts….The athlete is
someone who provides himself with phrases he has really heard or read,
really remembered, repeated, written and rewritten. They are the master’s
lessons, phrases he has heard, phrases he has spoken or which he has said to
himself. It is from this material equipment of logos, to be understood in this
sense, that the necessary framework is constituted for whoever would be the
good athlete of the event, the good athlete of fortune. Second, these
discourses—discourses existing, acquired, and preserved in their materiality
are of course not any discourses whatsoever…..These materially existing logoi
are then phrases, elements of discourse, of rationality: of a rationality that
states the truth and prescribes what we must do at the same time. Finally,
third, these discourses are persuasive….They are persuasive in the sense that
they bring about not only conviction, but also the actions themselves. They
are inductive schemas of action… that person will then act as if spontaneously.
It is as if it were these logoi themselves, gradually becoming as one with his
own reason, freedom, and will, were speaking for him: not only telling him
what he should do, but also actually doing what he should do, as dictated by
necessary rationality. So, these material elements of rational logos are
effectively inscribed in the subject as matrices of action. This is the paraskeue.
And the aim of the askesis necessary to the athlete of life is to obtain this.
(322-24)
The third characteristic of this paraskeue is the question of its mode of being.
….The logos must be boethos (aid), telling us what we must do, or rather,
actually making us do what we must do.(324)
To play the role of aid, to really be the good pilot or fortress or remedy, the
logos must be “ready to hand”….I think this is a very important notion falling
within the category of memory….In fact, we can say that the basic function of
mneme (memory in its archaic form) was not only to maintain the poet’s
thought or saying in its being, value, and luster, but also, of course, by thus
maintain the luster of the truth, its function was to be able to enlighten all
those who uttered the saying anew, who uttered it because they themselves
partook of the mneme, or who heard it from the mouth of the bard or sage
who directly participates in this mneme. (325)
In reality each must have this equipment ready to hand, and he must have it
ready to hand not exactly in the form of a memory that will sing the saying
anew and make it shine forth in its light, always new and always the same.
(325)
In reality it must be a memory of activity, a memory of action, much more
than a memory of song. (326)
But when the event occurs, the logos at that point must have become itself
the subject of action, the subject of action must himself have become at that
point logos(326)
Logos must be like a good pilot on a boat, who keeps the crew in place, who
tells it what it must do. (324)
Parrhesia
Etymologcally, Prrhesia is the act of telling all (frankness, open-heartedness,
plain speaking, speaking openly, speaking freely)….It is the openness which
makes us speak, which makes us say what has to be said, what we want to say,
what we think ought to be said because it is necessary, useful, and true. (366)
Parrhesia is the necessary form of philosophical discourse….It must be both a
technique and an ethics, an art and a morality. (368)
It must be a discourse that the disciple’s subjectivity can appropriate and by
which, by appropriating it, the disciple can reach his own objective, namely
himself. For this, a certain number of rules are necessary on the master’s side,
rules that once again do not focus on the truth of discourse, but on the way in
which this discourse of truth is formulated. (368)
Parrhesia—master
And so it is only when we turn to the master, that is to say to the person who
must deliver true speech, that quite naturally the problem arises: what to say
and how to say it, according to what rules, technical procedures, and ethical
principles? It is around this question, in fact at the very heart of this question,
that we encounter the notion I began to speak to you about last week:
parrhesia. (372)
It seems to me that the term parrhesia refers both to the moral quality, the
moral attitude or the ethos, if you like, and to the technical procedure or
tekhne…for conveying true discourse to the person who needs it to constitute
himself as a subject of sovereignty over himself and as a subject of veridiction
on his own account. (372)
Parrhesia—definition
“telling all”—The freedom of the person speaking. What is basically at stake
in parrhesia is what could be called, somewhat impressionistically, the
frankness, freedom, and openness that leads one to say what one has to say,
as one wishes to say it, when one wishes to say it, and in the form one thinks
is necessary for saying it. (372)
Two adversaries of parrhesia(373)
1) Moral adversary—flattery
2) Technical adversary—rhetoric
anger and power (374)
The impossibility of exercising one’s power and sovereignty over oneself
insofar as and when one exercises one’s sovereignty or power over others—is
situated precisely at the point of connection of self-control and command
over others, of government of oneself and government of others. ((374)
Flattery—the opposite of anger
The question of flattery and the moral problem of flattery is the exact
opposite and complementary problem. What actually is flattery? If anger then
is the superior’s abuse of power with regard to the inferior, it’s perfectly
understandable that flattery will be a way for the inferior to win over the
greater power he comes up against in the superior, a way for him to gain the
superior’s favors and benevolence, etecetera. (375)
The flatterer is the person who gets what he wants from the superior by
making him think that he is the best. (375)
The flatterer is the person who prevents you knowing yourself as you are. The
flatterer is the person who prevents the superior from taking care of himself
properly. (376)
The figure of the flatterer and the dangers of flattery rush in here, in this
insufficiency that ensures that we are never alone with ourselves, in this
inability to be alone, when we are either disgusted with or too attached to
ourselves. In this non-solitude, in this ability to establish that full, adequate,
and sufficient relationship to ourselves, the Other intervenes who, as it were,
meets the lack and substitutes or rather makes up for this inadequacy
through a discourse….The flatterer will introduce a foreign discourse, one that
precisely depends on the other, on him, the flatterer. (378)
The subjectivity, the typical relationship of self to self of the flattered person,
is therefore a relationship of insufficiency mediated by the other. (378-9)
Parrhesia—anti-flattery
…unlike what happens in flattery, he speaks to the other in such a way that
this other will be able to form an autonomous, independent, full and
satisfying relationship to himself….The objective of parrhesia is to act so that
at a given moment the person to whom one is speaking finding himself in a
situation in which he no longer needs the other’s discourse. How and why
does he no longer need the other’s discourse? Precisely because the other’s
discourse was true. It is insofar as the other has given, has conveyed a true
discourse to the person whom he speaks, that this person, internalizing and
subjectivizing this true discourse, can then leave the relationship with the
other person. The truth, passing from one to the other in parrhesia, seals,
ensures, and guarantees the other’s autonomy, the autonomy of the person
who received the speech from the person who uttered it. (379)
Roman empire—parrhesia
The basic problem in the Roman Empire at this time was evidently not the
question of freedom of opinion. It was the question of truth for the Prince:
Who will tell the Prince the truth? Who will speak frankly to the Prince? How
can one speak truthfully to the Prince? Who will tell the Prince what he is, not
as Emperor but as a man? (381)
Rhetoric—art of persuading
Parrhesia—anti-rhetoric
1) Parrhesia is not an art (383)--2) it is not so much defined by the content itself but that it is a specific,
particular practice of true discourse defined by rules of prudence, skill,
and the conditions that require one to say the truth at this moment, in
this form, under these conditions….That is to say, what essentially defines
the rules of parrhesia is the kairos, the occasion, this being precisely the
situation of individuals with regard to each other and to the moment
chosen for saying this truth. (384)
It is precisely according to the person to whom one speaks and the
moment one speaks to him that parrhesia must inflect, not the content of
the true discourse, but the form in which this discourse is delivered. (384)
3)The essential function of rhetoric is to act on others in the sense that it
enables one to steer or influence deliberations in assembly, lead the
people, direct an army, etecetera. It acts on others, but always to the
greater advantage of the person speaking….Parrhesia, rather, has a
completely different objective and purpose. The positions of the person
speaking and the person spoken to are completely different. Of course,
parrhesia also involves acting on others, but not so much to order, direct,
or to incline them to do something or other. Fundamentally it involves
acting on them so that they come to build up a relationship of
sovereignty to themselves, with regard to themselves, typical of the wise
and virtuous subject, of the subject who has attained all the happiness it
is possible to attain in this world. (385)
….The exercise of parrhesia must be dictated by generosity, generosity
towards the other. (385)
parrhesia is free speech, released from the rules, freed from rhetorical
procedures, in that it must, in one respect of course, adapt itself to the situation, to
the occasion and to the particularities of the auditor. (406)
vertical and horizontal relationship in parrhesia
I must respond to the words of truth that teach me the truth and consequently help
me in my salvation, with a discourse of truth by which I open the truth of my own
soul to the other, to others. (391)
It is an explicit, developed, and regular verbal practice by which the disciple must
respond to this parrhesia of the master’s truth with a certain parrhesia, with a
certain open-heartedness, which is the opening of his own soul that he puts in
contact with the others’ souls, thus doing what is necessary for his own salvation, but
also encouraging the other not to have an attitude of refusal, rejection, and blame
towards themselves. (390-91)
Parrhesia circulates in this double, vertical, and horizontal organization. Of course, it
comes form the master who has the right to speak and who can only
speak….However, in another respect, this parrhesia is turned around, reversed, and
becomes the practice and mode of relationship between the students themselves.
(390)
…there is the sign of a transition from the master’s parrhesia to the parrhesia of the
students themselves. The practice of free speech on the part of the master must be
such that it serves as encouragement, support, and opportunity for the students who
will themselves also have the possibility, right, and obligation to speak freely. (389)
Parrhesia—conjectural art
…this conjectural art is based on the kairos, the occasion….You must choose exactly
the right moment. You must also take account of the state of mind of the person you
are speaking to….In this respect, in this seizing of the opportunity, Philodemus says,
parrhesia calls to mind the art or practice of the nagivator and the practice of
medicine….Parrhesia, he says, is an aid, a therapeia (a therapeutics). And parrhesia
must make it possible to treat properly. (388)
Governing is, precisely, a stochastic art, an art of conjecture, like medicine and also
navigation: Steering a ship, treating a sick person, governing men, and governing
oneself all fall under the same typology of rational and uncertain activity. (404)
Death and care of the self (478)
This is the possibility of a certain form of self-awareness, or a certain form of
gaze focused on oneself from this point of view of death, or of the
actualization of death in our life
1) To take a sort of instantaneous view of the present from above; it enables
thought to make a cross section of the duration of life, the flow of
activities, and the stream of representations. (479)…We immobilize the
present in a snapshot, so to speak. (479)
In performing each action as though it were the last, it will be “stripped of
all casualness,” of all “repugnance for the empire of reason…(479)
2) The retrospective view over the whole of life. (479)
The thought of death makes this looking back and evaluative
memorization of life possible. (480)
Judgment on the present and evaluation of the past are carried out in this
thought of death, which precisely must not be a thought of the future but
rather a thought of myself in the process of dying.