財務管理 期中報告
南台科技大學
企業管理研究所 碩士在職專班
N9670011 王曉翎
目錄
一、簡介---------------------------------------------------------------- 1
二、本文部分
1、論文內容目錄
《章節頁次標示錯誤》----------------------------------------- 3
《錯、漏、贅字部分》----------------------------------------- 4
《疑似抄襲部分》------------------------------------------------6
2、文獻回顧與探討
《中英文文獻姓名標註錯誤部分》---------------------------7
《中英文文獻闕漏部分》---------------------------------------8
《寫作格式應統一部分》---------------------------------------9
三、參考文獻
1、中文文獻部分-------------------------------------------------10
2、英文文獻部分-------------------------------------------------12
四、小結---------------------------------------------------------------19
一、簡介
本研究主要是以台灣經濟新報(TEJ)對台灣上市公司評估所做的信用
風險指標(TCRI)為代理變數，選取樣本涵蓋 1997 至 2006 年間的紡織
和電子產業，樣本資料共 4,569 筆。
目的欲藉由全面性檢測控制權與現金流量權偏離程度、管理者持股、
董事會組成、大股東持股以及機構投資者持股的治理機制，探討這些
構面對信用風險的影響。
1
闡述企業信用風險指標
論文的價值不在於論斤稱兩。價值不在於厚度，而在於深度。
題目太大，縱然有研究價值，但易因能力不足而無法落實。
建議題目修改為公司治理與信用風險之關連性研究。
2
二、本文部分
《章節頁次標示錯誤》
頁次 11~15
闕漏
頁次 25~29
闕漏
頁次 35~43
闕漏
錯誤標註，
應為 15
3
《錯、漏、贅字部分》
4
本篇論文錯漏字不多，但因過度引用二手文獻，文章閱讀起來十分
不通順。
文獻探討需以嚴謹的過程來整理與評閱，其流程包含文獻蒐集：研
究者的研究題目、搜尋有關文獻、篩選適合的文獻；接著才是文獻探
討：閱讀與內化文獻、撰寫與整理文獻、批判與歸納文獻。
研究者閱讀文獻的最終目的，在找出過去研究者對於該議題的研究
發現，以及過去的研究問題為何？也就是過去的研究問題哪些沒有發
現，哪些已有實證，但是仍沒有釐清變項之間的關係，甚至哪些變項
還沒有納入分析或還未被進行使用等。
更重要的是能找到適當的理論觀點來詮釋研究者所設定的研究問
題、研究架構，避免淪為文獻堆積，並提出有價值的後續分析。
5
《疑似抄襲部分》
本篇文章過度引用二手文獻
節錄自許溪南
比對後上述文字源自下列參考文獻
節錄自許溪南、歐陽豪、陳慶芳，2007，“公司治理、盈餘管理與財
務預警模型之建構＂，會計與公司治理，第四卷，第一期，頁 85-121。
6
《中英文文獻姓名標註錯誤部分》
節錄自林君玲?
頁次 10，此篇參考文獻闕漏。
節錄自林君玲，1999，企業財務危機預警資訊之研究--考慮公司監理
因素，國立台灣大學會計學研究所。
林君玲引用 Baysinger B. D., Kosnik R. D. and Turk T. A. “Effects of
Board and
Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy,” Academy of
Management
Journal, Vol. 34, pp.205-214.
但研究者卻列出 Baysinger, B. and Hoskisson, R. E., 1990, “The
Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on
Corporate Strategy,” Academy of Management Review, 15(1),
pp.72-87.
比對後該段參考文獻應是參考江向才、何里仁或廖秀梅、李建然、吳
祥華之文章。
頁次 7
首次提到時應列出完整作者，如 Claessens, S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L.
Lang ,1999.
頁次 10
第二次提到時才可簡列首位作者，如 Claessens et al., 2002.
相同錯誤分別在頁次 1、2、3、7、9、10、11、12、14 皆出現。
7
《中英文文獻姓名標註錯誤部分》
頁次 12，作者標註錯誤：金成隆
頁次 12，作者標註錯誤：Ruback
《中英文文獻闕漏部分》
頁次 10、13、15，上述參考文獻中闕漏未列出。
8
《寫作格式應統一部分》
頁次 9，代理問題最早由 Jensen and Meckling(1976)提出「利益收斂假
說」，接著 Jensen and Ruback(1983)又提出「利益掠奪假說」
，
後續研究者 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny(1988)又提出不同見解，
建議應有系統的整理歸納。
頁次 14，作者標註不清：董事長兼任總經理公正性之理論究竟為 Fama
and Jensen(1983)還是 Yermack(1996)所提出?
關於董事會有降低代理問題之功能，在此處應為 Fama and
Jensen(1983)所提出之論點。
9
三、參考文獻
1、中文文獻部分
參閱國立高雄第一科技大學教務處編製之學位論文格式規範。
台灣博碩士論文知識加值系統
CEPS 中文電子期刊服務
Web of Science
補充中文遺漏文獻
林君玲，1999，企業財務危機預警資訊之研究--考慮公司監理因素，
國立台灣大學會計學研究所。
引用 Baysinger B. D., Kosnik R. D. and Turk T. A. “Effects of Board and
Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy,” Academy of Management
Journal, Vol. 34, pp.205-214.
中文參考文獻共 14 筆，錯誤標註 9 筆、闕漏 1 筆。
1.江向才、何里仁，2003，“公司治理之資訊透明度與經營績效關聯性之實證研
究＂，管理會計，第 63 期：1-20。
江向才與何里仁，2003，”公司治理之資訊透明度與經營績效關聯性之實證研
究”，管理會計，第 63 期 (3 月)：1- 20。
3.李馨蘋、張瓊月，2006，“股權結構與公司風險之實證研究＂，中華管理學報，
第七卷，第四期，頁 51-69。
李馨蘋、張瓊月，2006，“股權結構與公司風險之實證研究＂，中華管理學報，
第七卷，第四期，頁 51-69。
5.林穎芬、劉維琪，2003，“從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用
程 度＂，管理學報，第二十卷，第二期，頁 365-395。
林穎芬、劉維琪，2003，“從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用程
度＂，管理學報，第二十卷，第二期，頁 365-395。
6.金成龍、林美鳳、梁嘉紋，2008，“公司治理結構和法人說明會之關聯性研究
＂， 管理學報，第二十五卷，第二期，頁 221-243。
金成隆、林美鳳、梁嘉紋，2008，“公司治理結構和法人說明會之關聯性研究＂，
管理學報，第二十五卷，第二期，頁 221-243。
8.許溪南、歐陽豪、陳慶芳，2007，“公司治理、盈餘管理與財務預警模型之建
構＂，會計與公司治理，第四卷，第一期，頁 85-121。
許溪南、歐陽豪、陳慶芳，2007，“公司治理、盈餘管理與財務預警模型之建構
＂，會計與公司治理，第四卷，第一期，頁 85-121。
10
9.陳瑞斌、許崇源，2007，“公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究＂，交大管
理學報，第二十七卷，第二期，頁 55-109。
陳瑞斌、許崇源，2007，“公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究＂，交大管理
學報，第二十七卷，第二期，頁 55-109。
11.葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統，商智文化出版社。
葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統，商智文化出版社。
12.葉銀華，2002，“從台灣上市公司網站資訊揭露看透明度＂，會計研究月刊，
第 200 期，7 月，頁 70-77。
葉銀華，2002，“從台灣上市公司網站資訊揭露看透明度＂，會計研究月刊， 第
200 期，7 月，頁 70-77。
13.廖秀梅、李建華、吳祥華，2006，“董事會結構特性與公司績效關係＂，東吳
經濟商學學報，第 54 期，9 月，頁 117-160。
廖秀梅、李建然、吳祥華(2006)，”董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－兼
論台灣家族企業因素的影響”，東吳經濟商學學報，第 54 期，頁 117-160。
11
2、英文文獻部分
英文參考文獻共 43 筆，錯誤標註 39 筆、闕漏 1 筆。
補充英文遺漏文獻
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Governance: Evidence from Taiwan,” International Review of Finance, 2(1-2), pp.
21-48.
43. Yermack, D., 1996, “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with A Small
Board of Directors.” Journal of Financial Economics , 40, pp.185-212.
Yermack, D., 1996, “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of
Directors,” Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), pp. 185-211.
四、小結
1.避免引用太多的二手文獻。在沒有直接閱讀一手資料的前提下，一
篇文章的二手引述資料如果太多，表示該研究沒有去評閱比較新的文
獻，也就是沒有檢討過去幾年來，該議題新的研究發展趨勢，也就無
法掌握新的研究發現，這樣會降低研究論文品質與水準。
2.理論的論點不完整。當研究者引用的文獻論點不周延或是資料無法
說明研究問題與內容時，則不應引用。他人論點不完整的文獻可能有
幾種原因造成：
(1)他人研究也是引用二手資料，並未掌握第一手資料或完整說
明。
(2)人云亦云、缺乏證據佐證者，也就是研究者不求甚解，只引用
文章表面上的文字，並沒有深入探究文獻的深層意義。
(3)第二外國語的文獻，例如：非英文的文獻，除非有專業人士翻
譯之後，能掌握文獻的意義再引述較合宜。
3.未出版的文獻最好不要引用。建議引用經過匿名審查，也就是雙盲
式審查過的文獻，較具有學術水準。
4.善用適當的圖表。一張圖表代表千言萬語，它能吸引讀者閱讀，也
易讓研究者容易澄清及表達重要的觀念。
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