Private Lives in the Public Sphere:
Family-Employment Spillover among
Low-Income Women
Dr. Lucy P. Jordan
Research Fellow
University of St Andrews
lpj1@st-andrews.ac.uk
Broad Conceptual Framework


Dominant social values are reflected in relationships
between families, the market and the state
US child care policy strategy as case study



where administrative regulations and practices can influence
access and sustainability of receiving public assistance for
child care
eligibility restrictions, transaction costs, financial disincentives
operate to ration potentially scarce resource—public child care
subsidies
Child care subsidies by low-income women may
facilitate sustained participation in paid employment
with important long-term economic benefits
Child Care & Subsidies

Residualist US Welfare State

Changes in women’s labour market participation

Public child care funding streams were consolidated
as result of Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act of 1996


Temporary Aid the Needy Families (TANF)
Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) - Individual US
states have broad discretion in design
Employment-family spillover


Spillover can be negative or positive
Employment-to-family spillover


scheduled hours, workplace flexibility and social
support (Hill et al, 2001, p. 49).
Family-to-employment spillover

dependent (child and elder) care difficulties and
other family obligations (Glass & Estes, 1997).
Methods
Quasi-experimental research design


Try to address selection bias & endogeneity
Instrumental Variable (IV) approach


Select measures of child care subsidy policy
(CCDF) as exogenous variables, primarily to
address issues of endogeneity
Data Sources

Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study
(Fragile Families)




Nationally representative sample of 20 U.S. cities
Oversampling of non-marital births
Baseline (4,898 mothers) and one-year follow up
(89%)
CCDF &TANF policy, local economy controls
Table 3.4: Fragile Families sample descriptives (weighted)
All Mothers
CI
Mean
Mother's Demographics
Married
Black, Non-Hispanic
Other Race, Non-Hispanic
White, Non-Hispanic
Hispanic
High School Graduate
Immigrant
Age
Number of Additional
Children Less 6 in HH (1-7)
Work year prior to focal
child birth
History of TANF receipt
prior to focal child
Household poverty category
(0 to 6)
% Ever Receive Subsidy
Since Focal Child Birth
N
0.52
0.35
0.06
0.29
0.29
0.71
0.27
27.04
[ .48 - .56 ]
[ .32 -.39 ]
[ .04 - .09 ]
[ .25 - .33 ]
[ .25 -. 33 ]
[ .68 - .75 ]
[ .23 - .31 ]
[ 26.5 - 27.5 ]
0.70
[ .61 - .79 ]
0.66
[ .62 - .70 ]
0.29
[ .26 - .33 ]
2.76
[ 2.38 - 3.21 ]
4%
3,849
[ 3.6 - 5.1% ]
Policy Context

CCDF Policy





Access: local agency, state agency, combined
Parent co-payment
Monthly reimbursement rate
State prioritises TANF recipients
TANF Policy




Time limits for participation
One time diversion payment
Maximum benefit
Strictness: Family cap & Duration of sanction
Research Question & Hypotheses



How does child care subsidy receipt vary
based on different configuration of policy
levers?
Child care subsidy participation will facilitate
balance between paid employment and
family life
Child care subsidy participation will be
associated with lower levels of negative
family-employment spillover
Subsidy Receipt


Varies across 20 cities from 3% to 21% of
sampled women
Dichotomous measure based on series of
questions about ‘Who helps pay for child
care’ (relatives, government and other
agencies, non-resident parent, employers,
other)
Table 4.4 Ever receive subsidy marginal effects (standard errors) from
logit models, for all mothers (n=3,849)
Model 1
Model 2
Mother's Demographics
Married
-0.021 *** -0.022 **
( .007)
( .007)
Black, Non-Hispanic
0.01
0.01
(.007)
(.007)
Hispanic
0.02 +
0.02 +
(.013)
(.013)
Other Race, Non-Hispanic
0.00
0.00
(.001)
(.010)
Immigrant
-0.01 **
-0.01 **
(.005)
(.005)
Mom Age
0.00 *
0.00 *
(.000)
(.000)
First Birth
0.00
0.00
(.003)
(.003)
Additional Child in HH < 6
0.00
0.00
(.002)
(.002)
High School Graduate
0.01 +
0.01 *
(.003)
(.003)
Employed Year Prior to Birth
0.01 *
0.01 +
(.003)
(.003)
TANF Episode Prior to Birth
0.02 **
0.02 **
(.007)
(.006)
Policy Environment
Subsidy Eligibility
Voucher management agency
Subsidy Eligibility
State/county lead agency
Subsidy Eligibility
Combined
Copayment
Reirmbursement Rates
Subsidy Commitment
Time Limits
Diversion
Family Cap
Sanction Duration
Maximum Benefit/100
Reference
-0.010
(.005)
-0.003
(.004)
0.000
(.025)
0.000
(.025)
0.011
(.005)
-0.015
(.008)
0.008
(.006)
-0.001
(.006)
0.000
(.003)
0.000
(.00)
(.000)
+
+
*
-0.088
(.007)
-0.013
(.005)
-0.001
(.028)
0.000
(.025)
0.026
(.010)
0.007
(.008)
0.001
(.008)
-0.015
(.009)
0.000
(.000)
0.000
(.000)
(.000)
X
**
*
+
+
*
+
+
*
Region Fixed Effects
***p <.001 ** p <.01 *p <.05 +p <.10
All models control for household poverty and local market conditions
Key dependent variables
Table 3.3: Spillover between family and employment (weighted)
Mean
Mother employed during last year
0.67
SD
[ .63 - .72 ]
Total n
Mothers in labor market & using care
BREAKDOWN IN CARE ARRANGEMENTS :
Approximately, how many times in the past month did
you have to make special arrangements because your
usual child care arrangement fell through? [none/one or
more]
0.22
[ .17 - .29 ]
1,704
All mothers in labor market
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE STRESS : My shift and
work schedule (cause/caused) extra stress for me and my
child [never/all others]
0.46
[ .41 - .50]
2,797
EMPLOYMENT CHILD CARE CONFLICT: Where I
(work/worked), it (is/was) difficult to deal with child
care problems during working hours [never/all others]
IRREGULAR SCHEDULE
0.31
0.34
[ .26 - .35 ]
[ .29 - .38 ]
2,797
2,797
Table 4.7: Family-Employment spillover marginal effects (standard errors)
Mother's Demographics
Pr(Subsidy Receipt)
Breakdown in care
Employment Schedule
Stress
All mothers reporting
work
Mothers reporting work and non-familial care
0.725
(. 125)
Married
-0.102
(.061)
Black, Non-Hispanic
-0.030
(.061)
Hispanic
-0.035
(.212)
Other Race, Non-Hispanic
-0.011
(.109)
Immigrant
0.044
(.087)
Mom Age
0.007
(.005)
Additional Child in HH < 6
-0.018
(.034)
High School Graduate
-0.004
(.048)
Worked Year Prior to Birth
0.108
(.039)
TANF Episode Prior to Birth
-0.109
(.068)
Irregular Employment Schedule 0.092
(.051)
TANF Policy
Diversion
0.179
(.072)
Maximum Benefit/100
0.000
(.000)
***
+
**
+
+
*
+
0.610
(.024)
0.067
(.042)
-0.041
(.048)
-0.081
(.053)
-0.177
(.065)
0.146
(.071)
0.004
(.003)
-0.024
(.025)
-0.157
(.057)
-0.046
(.050)
-0.114
(.041)
-0.024
(.055)
0.025
(.055)
0.000
(.000)
***
*
+
**
*
+
Employment-Care
Conflict
0.689
(.027)
0.073
(.034)
-0.025
(.039)
-0.031
(.046)
-0.074
(.066)
0.112
(.051)
0.005
(.003)
-0.038
(.020)
-0.118
(.045)
-0.048
(.034)
-0.125
(.034)
0.068
(.051)
0.000
(.050)
0.000
(.000)
***
*
*
*
*
**
***
***
Note: All models control for household poverty level, city unemployment rate, fair market rent and city job
growth, region
***p <.001 ** p <.01 *p <.05 +p <.10
Key Findings

Modest effects of policy variables across all
models



Access to subsidies: multiple organisations
negative association (compared to local voucher
agency
Welfare strictness & TANF time limits as expected
TANF diversion
Key Findings




Individual’s prior history of TANF: strong
predictor
Single mothers more likely to have subsidy
Married mothers more likely to experience
negative employment-family spillover
High school graduate less likely to report
negative spillover
Limitations



State level policy data masks variation at
county level, especially in Texas (three cities)
Aggregation on features of employment
(occupation, shift hours)
Mode/type of child care (formal or
informal/centre based vs. kith or kin)