The (Forgotten) European Political Community
1952-1954
by
Linda Risso
Pembroke College, Cambridge
In the early 1950s, European policy-makers recognised the need to go beyond the restricted
scope of the treaties for the European Coal and Steel and Defence Communities and to provide
them with a democratic and comprehensive political structure. The debate concerning this
undertaking reached its highest peak in the discussion surrounding the European Political
Community.
Although initially the EPC was praised by the ECSC members, in the following months the
project underwent major changes and eventually collapsed in 1954. The reason for the EPC’s
failure lay both in the widespread opposition to the rearmament of West Germany and also in the
criticism of its supranational nature, which its potential members considered a threat to national
sovereignty and independence
Re-examinations of the project of the European Political Community (EPC) and of the opposition
then faced by European policy-makers reveal remarkable precursors to the current discussions
regarding the European Constitution. Yet none of the people involved in the Convention or in the
IGC have made any reference to it; indeed, one might conclude from their silence that many of
them hardly remember it. Hence the need to investigate and comprehend nature and limits of the
EPC: an insight into the history – and particularly the failure – of the Political Community would
offer a better understanding of the obstacles that are on the way of the ‘Constitution for Europe’.
This paper opens with a brief account of the history of the European Defence Community,
recalling how the signing of the Paris Treaty in 1952 paved the way to the first European
Constituent Assembly. Through the analysis of the Assembly’s final report, this paper draws
attention to the delicate issue of finding a balance between the need to achieve genuine common
foreign and defence policies and the need to safeguard national sovereignty and independence.
First steps towards a united Europe
Federalist demands for a European Constituent Assembly resonated throughout all the early postwar plans for economic and political cooperation and the principle of a Political Union was
enshrined in the ‘Manifesto of Ventontene’ (1941).
The foundation of the Council of Europe (May 1949) seemed to meet federalist demands, but it
was soon revealed to be a disappointment. The decision-making powers rested in the Committee
of Ministers (composed of the Foreign Ministers of member states), whereas the Consultative
Assembly (consisting of appointees of national parliaments) had virtually no decision-making
powers. Not only was the Assembly subordinated to the Committee of Ministers, but the Ministers
were required to reach their decisions by unanimity only. This conflicted with the federalist
demand for a democratically elected Assembly with wide-ranging powers, operating through
majority voting.
Discussion regarding which route should be taken underwent a dramatic acceleration with
Robert Schuman’s proposal for the creation of a Franco-German coal and steel pool. The project
entailed the ultimate surrender of national sovereignty over the coal and steel sector to a
supranational High Authority. Although this fell short of federalist demands, the prospects of a
limited, but definitive, surrender of national sovereignty was seen as the first step towards the
ultimate creation of a united Europe and consequently received their support.
1
In March 1952, after lengthy talks, the Treaty of Paris – which established the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) – was signed and came into effect in July 1952. The ECSC was
administered by the High Authority, a supranational organisation made up of nine independent
members appointed by the member countries. The High Authority would work closely with the
Council of Ministers, in which each country had a vote and would be responsible to the Common
Assembly, whose 78 members were drawn from national parliaments. Although the High
Authority was the main governing body, the Council could veto its decisions and the Assembly
could ask for its resignation. Once more, in the federalists’ eye the ECSC was a disappointment:
the Assembly was not elected nor did it have decision-making power, but instead possessed a
merely consultative role.
The European Army project
As European policy-makers were taking the first steps towards European integration, the problem
of the defence of Western Europe progressively became a crucial issue. Between 1949 and 1950,
the foundation of NATO and the outbreak of the Korean War had put the rearmament on the
front burner.
The NATO Council meetings of September 1950 had led to an American resolution to rearm
West Germany and, in the following months, this materialised in the Spofford plan, which foresaw
full German rearmament under the control of NATO. In order to prevent the re-establishment of
German military and general staff, the French proposed the creation of a European Army, whose
members would put their troops under the control of a supranational authority and a European
Defence Minister (Pleven Plan).1
The plan for a common European army entailed the creation of a supranational authority and
the curbing of national sovereignty: once the integrated army had come into being, it would have
been impracticable for its members to have fully independent foreign policies. The Defence
Community would represent its members in the international arena, with the right to enter
defensive agreements and to join international organisations. Moreover, the creation of a common
army required common training and – more importantly – a common budget to fund it. Finally,
the EDC Treaty established an integrated procurement policy as well as a joint research project
designed to lead to a more integrated armament industry. As a consequence of the power it
would gather, the European Defence Community encountered the problem of maintaining
adequate democratic control.
After initial hesitation, the Italian delegation at the EDC Conference acknowledged the need to
establish a European Political Community as a democratic guarantee for the common army. Alcide
De Gasperi, the Italian Prime Minister, proposed a political authority that would answer to an
elected Parliament and that would coordinate the foreign policies of its members and administer
the budget to finance the new army. To ensure that it would be capable of accomplishing these
goals, the new authority would have large powers of taxation and full – and independent –
decision-making power. Thus, the foundation of the new political authority would entail significant
limits to national sovereignty. The Community members would permanently delegate to the
supranational authority the right to levy taxes and to represent them in the international arena,
including the right to conclude treaties or international agreements.
The audacity of the Italians was not matched by the other five delegations, which displayed less
conviction. It became progressively clear that the EDC Conference had neither the power nor the
sufficient cohesion to discuss the scope and the structure of the Political Community. As a
compromise, they inserted Article 38 into the EDC Treaty, which ensured that, although
temporarily postponed, the discussion on the political dimension of the integrated army would
later be taken up by a Constituent Assembly.
The first part of Article 38 established that once it had come into being, the EDC (temporary)
Assembly work towards the creation of a democratically elected Assembly, which would become
the cornerstone of the Political Community. The EDC Assembly would also address problems
arising from the coexistence of the different agencies for European cooperation that were already
established, or that might be established in the meantime, with the purpose of ensuring the
highest degree of coordination within the framework of the new Europe.
The second paragraph of Article 38 stipulated that the Assembly’s proposals would be submitted
to the Council within six months and, once its approval had been secured, they would be passed
on to the national governments. An intergovernmental conference would be called within three
months to discuss the proposals and proceed to ratification by national parliaments.
2
Article 38 of the EDC Treaty
1. Dans le délai prévu au deuxième paragraphe du présent article, l’Assemblée étudie:
a. la constitution d’une Assemblée de la Communauté Européenne de Défense, élue sur
une base démocratique;
b. les pouvoirs qui seraient dévolus à une telle Assemblée;
c. les modifications qui devraient éventuellement être apportées aux dispositions du
présent Traité relatives aux autres institutions de la Communauté, notamment en vue
de sauvegarder une représentation appropriée des États.
Dans ses études, l’Assemblée s’inspirera notamment des principes suivants:
l’organisation de caractère définitif qui se substituera à la présent organisation
provisoire devra être conçue de manière à pouvoir constituer une des éléments d’une
structure fédérale ou confédérale ultérieure, fondée sur le principe de la séparation
des pouvoirs et comportant, en particulier, un système représentatif bicaméral;
l’Assemblée étudiera également les problèmes résultant de la co-existence des
différents organismes de coopération européenne déjà créés ou qui viendraient à
l’être, afin d’en assurer la coordination dans le cadre de la structure fédérale ou
confédérale.
2. Les propositions de l’Assemblée seront soumises au Conseil dans un délai de six mois à
dater de l’entrée en fonction de l’Assemblée. Avec l’avis du Conseil, ces propositions seront
ensuite transmises par le Président de l’Assemblée aux Gouvernements des Etats membres,
qui, dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la date à laquelle ils en auront été saisis,
convoqueront une Conférence chargée d’examiner lesdites propositions.
Although a through analysis of the military provisions of the EDC Treaty is beyond the scope of
this paper, it is worth remembering that the EDC was much more advanced than any of the
initiatives currently under discussion. With very few exceptions, all national troops would be
placed under the Community’s control, with integrated training, procurement policies and
armament production.2 Moreover, within the framework of the Defence and Political Communities
the European Army would be constantly under the democratic control of the supranational
institutions, which would also be responsible for the implementation of a common defence and for
the coordination of their foreign policies.
From the Luxembourg Resolution to the Ad Hoc Assembly
Article 38 provided for an Assembly with limited but real constituent powers, but its
materialisation was subordinated to the ratification of the EDC Treaty, a process that was likely to
be lengthy. On the other hand, while EDC negotiations were still in progress, several motions in
the Six parliaments had demanded that the creation of a political authority precede the formation
of the European Army. This request was motivated in part by the fear that premature rearmament
could jeopardise the democratic development of the newborn West German democracy.
At the first ECSC Council meeting (Luxembourg, September 1952), the Italian delegation
suggested that the ECSC Assembly initiated discussion regarding the feasibility of a political union.
The Six agreed to appoint a special Assembly, made up of the ECSC Assembly and nine additional
members to undertake the task of interpreting Article 38 and laying the foundation of the future
European Political Community.3 The ‘Luxembourg Resolution’, as this decision became known,
allowed the Assembly six months to carry out its tasks.
The gathering met for the first time in October 1952 and chose the title of ‘Ad Hoc Assembly’,
rather than ‘Constituent Assembly’ because the latter was criticised by many delegates as ‘too
ambitious’. A Constitutional Committee, under the chairmanship of Heinrich von Brentano, was
appointed to draw up a preliminary draft treaty for the Assembly’s consideration.
The Constitutional Committee’s discussion was directed by Article 38 of the EDC Treaty, which
had already spelt out the institutional structure of the future Community with a democratically
elected parliament, an executive representing the member states and a court of justice. On the
other hand, the delegates needed to build on the provisions of the ECSC and EDC treaties,
through which the Six had already surrendered national sovereignty.
The work of the Constitutional Committee was hampered by internal divisions. On the one
hand, the Italian delegation, supported by the Dutch delegation, favoured a broad interpretation
of Article 38 and pushed for the creation of a federal Europe with wide-ranging powers.
Conversely, the French tolerated little more than the coordination of the ECSC and the EDC and
opposed all attempts to create a real supranational authority.4 The Constitutional Committee
3
focused more on the need to provide the European institution with sufficient democratic control
than it did on enlarging the capabilities of the Community.
Europe’s first Constitution
After six months of intense debate, the ‘Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European
Community’ was ready and the Ad Hoc Assembly remitted it to the ECSC Council of Ministers. 5 It
established a supranational community that, like the European Coal and steal and Defence
Communities, would be ‘founded upon a union of people and states’, but, unlike them, it would be
indissoluble.6
The EPC would have a bi-cameral Parliament consisting of a People’s Chamber and a Senate
(Chapter II). The former would be directly elected for five years and its 268 seats would be
distributed according to population but a carefully weighted system would prevent any two large
states from dominating the Assembly. France would have 70 seats (on account of its overseas
territories), West Germany and Italy would each have 63, Belgium and the Netherlands would
each have 30 and Luxembourg 12. The Senate would be elected by national parliaments for five
years in accordance with the procedures determined by each member state. The 87 seats of the
Senate would be distributed in the same proportions as in the Lower Chamber, but France would
only have the same number of seats as Germany and Italy.
The Senate would elect the President of the European Executive Council, who would in turn
appoint the Ministers. The Draft clearly stated that the Executive Council would not include more
than two Members of the same nationality. After its appointment, the Executive Council would
have to receive the Parliament’s vote of confidence and would have to resign if, at any stage, this
confidence were lacking. According to Article 31 of the Draft Treaty, a three-fifths majority of the
People’s Chamber would constitute a vote of no-confidence.
Although the decision-making power rested in the hands of the Executive Council, Parliament
was also endowed with large powers. In addition to the right to withdraw its confidence to the
Executive Council, Members of Parliament (along with those of the Executive Council) would have
the right to initiate legislation and the right of amendment, interpellation and inquiries (Article 23).
Tab. 1 – Vote distribution according to the Draft Treaty
People’s Chamber
Senate
70
63
63
30
30
12
268
21
21
21
10
10
4
87
France
Federal Republic of Germany
Italy
Belgium
The Netherlands
Luxembourg
Total
Sources: Draft Treaty, Articles 15 and 17
Alongside the Executive Council, the Council of National Ministers represented the member
governments. The chairmanship would be taken by each of the Council Members in turn for a
period of three months, in accordance with the alphabetical order of the names of the Member
States (Article 36). In the Draft Treaty the tasks of this body were only briefly described as
harmonising the action of the Executive Council with that of the national government (Article 35).
Finally, the Draft Treaty established a Court of Justice and an Economic and Social Council. The
Court would be identical to the Court of the ECSC and of the EDC, thus ensuring unity of
jurisprudence (Articles 38 and 42). The Economic and Social Council would be an advisory body
set up by the Council of Europe and would assist the Executive Council and Parliament (Chapter
V).
Legislative proposals would need the approval of both chambers by simple majority. Once
majority had been ensured, the bill would become law and be promulgated by the President of
the Executive Council within eight days. For its part, the European Council could issue
implementing regulations and, together with the member states, would be entrusted with the
execution of such laws and regulations (Articles 52-54).
According to the Draft Treaty, the Community could make three types of decisions: it could
propose a law, formulate a recommendation, and give advices. Legislative proposals would need
4
the approval of both chambers by simple majority. Once majority had been ensured, the bill
would become law and be promulgated by the President of the Executive Council within eight
days. For its part, the European Council could issue implementing regulations and, together with
the member states, would be entrusted with the execution of such laws and regulations. In order
to ensure that a law was implemented, the Executive Council was empowered to issue regulations
and decrees (Articles 52-54). Parliament could also issue recommendations. They would be
binding in their aims, but would leave the choice of the means of implementation to the member
states (Article 54). Finally, the Community could give an ‘advice’, which left the addressees – the
member states or other Community organs – free to determine what action to take.
Recognising the need to provide a coherent and comprehensive institutional framework for the
existing agencies of European integration, the Draft Treaty stated that the EPC would take over
the powers and competencies of the ECSC and EDC within two years of the creation of the
People’s Chamber (Articles 59-60). Thus, the Draft Treaty provided a consistent institutional
system, avoiding unnecessary duplications. The Parliament and Council of National Ministers of
the Community would replace the parallel institutions in the ECSC and EDC forthwith and judicial
powers would be exercised by a single Court of Justice (Article 60). The ECSC High Authority and
the EDC Commissariat would be under the responsibility of the European Executive Council during
a two-year transitional period, when their presidents would be members of the Executive Council
and have voting rights. Thereafter, the High Authority alone would continue its existence as an
‘administrative board’, whereas the Commissariat would be dissolved (Article 62).
The Draft Treaty was also very careful in limiting the powers of the new institutions and
maintained a principle of required unanimity with regard to the most sensitive issues, namely
international relations and fiscal policy. In the field of foreign relations, for example, the Executive
Council would negotiate and conclude treaties or international agreements on behalf of the
Community, but each decision had to obtain the unanimous approval of the Council of Ministers
(Articles 67-70). The establishment of the Community budget was also subject to the unanimity
principle. The financial resources of the Community would derive from taxes and loans and from
the contributions paid by the member states. The methods and rates for levying taxes and for
determining the amount of the contributions would be decided by the Executive Council in the
form of bills, which would then be unanimously approved by the Council of Ministers. Before being
promulgated, the provisions would be submitted to Parliament for final approval (Articles 77-80).
In accordance with its economic and social aims, which included the promotion of economic
expansion, the development of employment, and the improvement of standard of living in the
member states, the Community would also ‘establish progressively a common market based on
the free movement of goods, capital and persons’. In order to achieve its aims, the Community
would ‘foster the coordination of the policy of the member States in monetary, credit and financial
matters’ (Article 82). Besides enabling the free movement of people (Article 83) and setting down
general provisions towards the establishment of the common market, the Draft Treaty established
a ‘Readaptation Fund’ to mitigate hardships suffered by workers and enterprises because of the
creation of the common market (Article 85).
Provision was also made for the creation of ‘Specialised Authorities’ that would strengthen the
collaboration between central governments and the Community (Articles 88-89), such as the
‘Green Pool’ for agricultural markets, the ‘White Pool’ for medical services, and the European
Transport Authority.
With regard to the Community’s foreign relations, the Draft Treaty established that the
Executive Council would be empowered with the stipulation of treaties and international
agreements on behalf of the Community and its members (Articles 67-68). Moreover, with the
unanimous approval of the Council of Ministers, the EPC would ensure the coordination of the
foreign policies of its members through permanent consultation and exchange of information
between the Council of Ministers, the Executive Council and the governments of the member
states and through the implementation of existing agreements between the members or the
creation of new ones (Articles 69-70). On the other hand, the members would be prevented from
concluding treaties or entering into new agreements with third parties without the prior approval
of the Community (Articles 72-73). Finally, the Draft Treaty established the creation of a European
diplomatic service (Article 74).
5
Watering down the Draft Treaty
Meanwhile, in France the Pinay government had fallen at the end of December 1952. As the new
French government led by René Mayer relied on Gaullist support, one of the conditions imposed
by the RPF was to replace Robert Schuman at the Foreign Ministry. Georges Bidault was the only
name upon which the Christian Democrats of the MRP and the Gaullists could agree. Bidault – an
MRP member himself – was known to hold some reservations concerning the EDC, particularly
with regard to the limitations of national sovereignty and France’s commitment to the Union
Française. Consequently, in January 1953, Bidault appeared more inclined to slow down the
integration process rather than to push for an immediate ratification of the EDC Treaty and this
clearly pleased the Gaullists.
The new government’s attitude towards European integration – and particularly towards any
attempt to undermine national sovereignty – was far more cautious than that of its predecessor.
Despite having been the initiator and promoter of the European integration process, French
foreign policy had undergone a dramatic change and by 1953 France had turned into one of the
fiercest defenders of national sovereignty.
Another obstacle lay in the way of the EPC. According to the ‘Luxembourg Resolution’, the
Assembly’s proposals were to be handed over to the EDC Assembly. But the ratification of the
EDC Treaty was still to come, and the more time that elapsed between the submission of the
Draft Treaty and the ratification of EDC, the higher the chances for second thoughts and
modifications of the Draft Treaty.
Changes in the international arena reinforced national reservations. The death of Stalin
particularly had a direct impact on the EDC ratification process and consequently on the EPC.
Between April and June 1953, Moscow’s statements became more appeasing and were seen in
Europe as the beginning of new East-West relations. This brought about a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude
in several countries, but nowhere more so than in France, where the Socialists and the Radicals
proposed to postpone the ratification of the EDC Treaty until after relations with the new Soviet
leadership had been established.7
The Draft Treaty was discussed at the intergovernmental conference (Rome, 22 September - 9
October 1953; The Hague, 26-28 November 1953; Paris, 12 December 1953 - 8 March 1954). It
would be lengthy to give an account of long discussions and the proposed amendments to the
Draft Treaty. Suffice it to say that the minimalist approach adopted by the French was opposed by
the Germans and Italians, which persisted in their defence of the Ad Hoc Assembly’s original
proposals.
Overall, however, the French demand for safeguarding national prerogatives and the right to
veto the Executive Council’s decisions eventually undermined the Draft Treaty. A good example of
how this process took place is provided by the discussions regarding the composition and
prerogatives of the Senate. Supported by Belgium and West Germany, France proposed an Upper
Chamber composed of National Ministers – and therefore renamed ‘Chamber of States’ – as a
means of strengthening national control over legislation and counterbalancing the supranationality
of the People’s Chamber. Despite Italy’s opposition to the French proposal, which Italy thought
risked confusing executive and legislative power and lacked democratic control, France persuaded
the other four delegations to endorse its proposal, which was eventually approved. 8
The collapse of the EDC … and of the EPC with it
When the IGC began in September 1953, none of the signatories of the EDC Treaty had actually
ratified it. Time had indeed provided an opportunity for second thoughts concerning the
integrated army project. Sensitive issues such as the defence of national sovereignty and
independence, combined with the still-fresh memories of the Nazi occupation, hampered progress
towards the creation of the European Defence Community. Particularly in France apprehension
had been rife, and this resulted in the production of an entirely new set of amendments to the
original text in the form of the Additional Protocols.9 The National Assembly had initially
considered the Protocols as a preliminary condition for continuing the pursuit of the EDC, but soon
even these did not seem sufficient to counterbalance the rearmament of Germany and further
commitment was still sought from Britain.
As a result of the pressure exerted by the US Secretary of State Foster Dulles, the Benelux
Countries and West Germany’s Lower Houses approved the Treaty by the end of 1953 and in the
following four months ratification was completed. Only France and Italy – the two countries who
had initiated the project and supported it throughout the previous phase – delayed ratification. In
6
Italy, the EDC question became entangled with the need to solve the problem of Trieste, but the
government still enjoyed a large majority in both Chambers and the Treaty probably would have
been ratified once it had been submitted.
20.1.1954
12.3.1954
19.3.1954
7.4.1954
31.7. 1954
Tab. 2 – Ratification of the EDC Treaty
Dutch Upper House completes ratification
Belgian Senate completes ratification
German Bundesrat completes ratification
Luxembourg Chamber approves EDC
Italian parliamentary committees recommend EDC ratification
France’s situation was exacerbated by political instability and by the fact that two key parties –
the Socialists and the Radicals – were deeply divided on the issue. It was evident that since the
spring of 1953, French concerns had shifted from the German rearmament towards the
supranational features of the EDC and EPC Treaties. At the end of August 1954, the French
National Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty, and, because it owed its existence to Article 38, the
Political Community died with it.
The EPC: a missed opportunity or a misunderstanding?
Through the EPC European policy-makers attempted to address three problems which had
surfaced after the establishment of the first agencies of European integration: the need to built a
comprehensive institutional framework, the need to provide sufficient democratic control, and the
need to reach a balance between an efficient common foreign policy and respect for national
sovereignty.
The Political Community was advanced in terms of its scope and the structure of its institutions,
but far less so in terms of its powers. The Draft Treaty provided a democratic and consistent
institutional framework based on a traditional division of powers. The new supranational authority
would have consolidated the existing European institutions within a larger – and one might say
more rational – political structure with a single jurisdictional system, thus avoiding duplications
and an excessive fragmentation. The EPC provided democratic control, the lack of which was to
be criticised often in following fifty years. Moreover, the Draft Treaty established the superiority of
community law over national law. Finally, by directly addressing the need to establish a common
market, the EPC Treaty paved the way for the further European integration. With respect to this,
it is worth remembering that the failure of the project did not diminish the commitment of the
policy-makers who had been involved in the Ad Hoc Assembly’s talks. On the contrary, many of
them – such as Von Brentano, Hallstein, and Spaak – were among the major supporter and
organisers of the subsequent negotiations which led to the Messina Conference and the Common
Market.
On the other hand, if it had come into being, the EPC would hardly have been able to have
effective and independent foreign and fiscal capabilities and national vetoes could have easily
impeded, if not paralysed, its functioning. Decision-making power lay entirely in the hands of the
national governments. The member countries retained considerable powers of veto within the
Council of Ministers, particularly in the fields of finance and foreign relations, and any single
member easily could have blocked the functioning of the Community. Moreover, the supranational
features the EPC should not make us forget that the Council of Ministers was still the central body
of the new Community and preserved the clear intention of protecting the will of each of its
members. Because of the increasingly weaker support for the project, it is highly doubtful that the
new community would have had enough strength to implement advanced policies and it is
probable that it would have to fight almost continuously against attempts to curtail its powers and
competencies.
For Pleven’s speech see Journal Officiel de la République Française. Débats parlementaires, Assemblée
Nationale, 24 October 1950, pp. 7118-9. At the beginning of his speech, Pleven recalled the Council of
1
Europe’s resolution calling for a joint European Army. CE Resolution on the European Army, 11 August
1950, by Winston Churchill, with amendments by André Philip.
2
The only exception was that of the French national forces required for duty in the Territoires
d’Outre-mer.
7
3
The nine additional members consisted of three Germans, three French and three Italians. Britain and
the other Western European non-EDC countries send observers. In total the Assembly included 87
members.
4 With regard to this, it is interesting to read the debates of the Constitutional Committee in ‘Débats de la
Commission Constitutionnelle (1. et 2. sessions)’, HAEC-PE2/8 and ‘Débats de la Commission
Constitutionnelle (3. et 4. sessions)’, HAEC-PE2/9.
5 ‘Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community’, HAEC-JMDS/85. This paragraph is
based on the Draft Treaty as well as on the comments provided by Cardozo (1987), pp. 54-62, and
Griffiths (2000), pp. 73-94.
6 National reservations concerning the latter question were to re-emerge in subsequent
negotiations and eventually brought about a substantial amendment of the Draft Treaty in 1953.
At the Conference of Rome of 1953, the Foreign Ministers of the Six discussed the possibility of a 50 year
limit for the EDC-EPC. See Conférence pour la Communauté Politique Européenne, ‘Rapport aux Ministres
des Affaires Étrangères’, Rome, 22 September-9 October 1953, p. 46.
7 In these changed circumstances, those policy-makers who had bound their name to European
integration found themselves in a very delicate position. In Germany, Adenauer was facing elections and
the difficulties the EDC and the Contractual Agreements were resulting in frustrated public opinion. In
Italy, too, the government was facing problems over Trieste and De Gasperi’s cabinet fell in July 1953
after only a fortnight in office. Although his successor, Giuseppe Pella, officially maintained Italian support
for European integration, he began to speak of a ‘moderate Europeanism’ and his awkward attempt to liberate
Trieste resulted in international embarrassment.
8 Conférence pour la Communauté Politique Européenne, ‘Rapport aux Ministres des Affaires Étrangères’,
Rome, 22 September-9 October 1953, pp. 11-17.
9 The French Additional Protocols demanded the amendment of articles 10, 13, 27, 31, 43, 75, and 107.
The Protocols were discussed at the Anglo-French Ministerial meeting of February 1953.
Historical Archives of the European Communities, Florence








Aide-Mémoire de la Délégation Italienne (9 October 1951), HAEC-IML/19
Débats de la Commission Constitutionnelle (1. et 2. sessions), HAEC-PE2/8
Débats de la Commission Constitutionnelle (3. et 4. sessions), HAEC-PE2/9
Conférence pour la Communauté Politique Européenne (Rome, 22 September–9 October 1953),
HAEC-PU/45
Ad Hoc Assembly Proceedings, Session of January 1953. Report of the Constitutional Committee
(Paris, 20 December 1952), HAEC-PE2/13
Projet de Traité portant Statut de la Communauté Européenne. Première partie : Rapport
introductif et exposé des motifs (Paris, 26 February 1953), HAEC-PE2/36
Projet de Traité portant Statut de la Communauté Européenne. Deuxième partie : Texte du Projet
de Traité (Paris, 26 February 1953), HAEC-PE2/37
Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community, HAEC-JMDS/85
Bibliographical References:



Cardozo R., “The project for a Political Community (1952-1954)”, in Pryce R. (ed.). The Dynamics of
European Union, (London: Croom Helm, 1987)
Griffiths R.T., Europe’s First Constitution: The European Political Community, 1952-1954, (London: Federal
Trust, 2000)
Preda D., Sulla soglia dell’Unione: La vicenda della Comunità Politica Europea. 1952-1954, (Milan: Jaca Book,
1993)
8