The London Conference:
key issues for the Government’s review
Tony Travers
London School of Economics
October 2005
This paper is intended to provide a brief summary of the key issues raised by the
Government’s current review of the Greater London Authority’s powers and duties. Many of
these issues are not new. London government has been reviewed before and is also currently
the subject of an investigation by the London Assembly and Association of London
Government’s Commission on London Governance. The scale and complexity of the capital
and its history have left a two-tier local government arrangement, though with significant
provision in the hands of Whitehall and its agencies. Once again, the balance of powers
between the centre, the metropolitan level and the boroughs is under discussion.
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1.
Background
London’s government was reformed in 1855, 1888, 1899, 1965, 1986 and 2000. The 2000
arrangements left the city with three levels of government, each of which is elected. Central
departments and their agencies are responsible for services such as social security, health,
university and college education, national and commuter rail, civil aviation, heritage, sport
and culture. The Greater London Authority is responsible for (most) transport (some)
economic development, police (non-operational), fire and emergency and citywide planning.
The 32 boroughs and the City of London run schools, personal social services, social housing,
refuse collection, local street management and lighting, local planning and libraries.
There are different ‘borders’ between the tiers of London government. Whitehall departments
and their appointed bodies must interact with the GLA and the boroughs. Equally, there are
numerous exchanges between the boroughs and the GLA. In addition, there are funding
streams for the Government to GLA functional bodies and to the boroughs. There are also
small flows of resources from the GLA to the boroughs.
2.
The government’s review of the GLA and its powers
After five years of operation, the government has decided to review the GLA’s powers and
responsibilities. Although this exercise could be limited to a narrow consideration of the
balance of service provision between Whitehall and the GLA, it is inevitable that once started
a review of this kind will examine broader issues. Thus, the relationship between the GLA
and the boroughs as well as the internal operation of the Mayor’s Office and Assembly are
likely to be examined. This “issues” paper is concerned with a wide range of possible
changes. It is intended to prompt debate. It is not in any sense a set of recommendations.
The review is explicitly about the GLA and its powers. The most obvious possibility would
be transfers of responsibility from Whitehall and its quangos to the Mayor. A list of plausible
transfers is shown below.
Whitehall powers and duties which might be transferred to the GLA
Leading contenders
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Housing resource allocation and planning
Organisation and subsidy of commuter rail
Learning and Skills Councils
Art
Sport
Planning (though not for ‘national’ projects)
Most GOL duties (eg, regeneration funding).
Other Possibilities
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English Heritage (London)
British Transport Police – London functions (to the Met)
Magistrates Courts administration
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More complex and controversial possibilities
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Strategic Health Authority functions
Allocation of local government grants to the boroughs
Oversight of boroughs’ performance.
Borough/joint responsibilities that might be transferred to the GLA
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Waste regulation
Funding for voluntary organisations (London-wide scheme)
Local Roads (key routes not with TfL)
City Police (to the Metropolitan Police)
Hampstead Heath, Crystal Palace, other metropolitan open spaces
Planning decisions (major schemes – overturn of borough refusal)
Parking regulation, fines
GLA responsibilities that might be transferred to the Boroughs/ joint arrangements
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TfL roads
Local Policing
Assembly function (replaces by a ‘Senate’ of Borough leaders
The above long list of possible functional transfers between tiers of London government need
not affect the underlying operation of each. Nor is it exhaustive. Central government would
not be significantly diminished by any (or indeed all) of the service transfers listed. The GLA
could assume additional functions by the extension of its existing ‘core-and-functional body’
structure. The boroughs could add or remove services in much the same way as they have in
the past.
3.
Other Potential Reforms - GLA Internal operations
After five years of operation, a number of potential reforms to the GLA have emerged as
possibilities. Generally these proposals have been made in response to the weaknesses in the
arrangements originally set up. Again, possible changes are listed as a menu: it would not be
necessary to undertake any or all of them for the service transfers discussed in the earlier
sections to be enacted.
The Mayor
The Mayor of London is relatively “strong” office within a relatively weak upper tier. The
Mayor sets the budgets of Transport for London, the London Development Agency, The
Metropolitan Police Authority and of the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority.
The Mayor also appoints the chairs and chief officers of some, but not all, of these functional
bodies. Finally, the Mayor appoints a small number of advisors. The Assembly currently
appoints all other GLA staff.
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In creating the GLA the government hoped that by giving the Assembly powers to appoint
almost all the Assembly’s officers it and the Mayor would be encouraged to operate in a
consensual and constructive way. In reality, the process of appointing senior officers and
advisors has been obscure and a challenge to accountability because of the need for
unobserved horse-trading about appointments. Worse, the fact the Mayor does not appoint
senior GLA executives has had the effect of weakening the relationship between the Mayor’s
Office and its top officials. This latter problem is reinforced by the GLA senior staff’s need
to work for both the Mayor and the Assembly.
A number of possible reforms could be envisaged, though such changes need to be seen
alongside any others to be made. It is important to understand the balance of power between
the Mayor and Assembly in the light of all changes proposed. With this reality in mind, a
number of reforms might be made. Possible changes are listed below:
Changes that could be made to the Mayor’s powers:
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To appoint all senior GLA staff, particularly the Chief Executive
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To all board member of all the functional bodies
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To appoint all commissioners/chief executives of functional bodies,
possibly subject to Assembly confirmatory hearings.
In addition to the possibility of making changes to the Mayor’s powers, there are aspects of
the operation of the Mayor’s Office which could be altered. The original expectation
(enshrined in the London Government Act, 1999) that the Mayor would operate through two
personal advisors and a ten-strong policy unit has not come about. What has actually
happened is that a large Mayor’s Office has evolved, with appointments made partly by the
Mayor and partly by the Assembly.
However, within the Mayor’s Office there is a powerful inner core of executive advisors
which provides the Mayor with an ‘operating system’, linking directly to the functional
bodies, commissioners and beyond. The Mayor himself is also instrumental in negotiating
with functional bodies, their chairs and commissioners.
Are the existing arrangements at the core of the Mayor’s Office efficient and effective? To
some extent, this is a question to be addressed by both current and future mayors. However,
there are a number of possible changes that could be made to enhance the capacity of the
Mayor. Such changes include:
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A requirement to appoint three or four Deputy Mayors, as official
positions working directly for the Mayor, possibly subject to Assembly
confirmatory hearings
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Formalising a number of other key position within the GLA
administration, particularly those working at the core of the Mayor’s
Office.
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A strong and effective Mayor’s Office is an essential feature of a system of mayoral
government. Successive holders of the office will operate it differently. But all will require
an effective and accountable core of senior officials to allow the Mayor to evolve policy,
direct functional bodies oversee performance and provide leadership.
The Assembly
The 25-member Assembly exists to oversee and scrutinise the Mayor. Its single most
powerful intervention is an annual opportunity to vote down the Mayor’s budget. The
Assembly also appoints a number of members who sit on the police and fire authorities (and a
smaller number on the development agency). However the Assembly currently has no vote on
mayoral policies, strategies or appointments.
It has been suggested that the Assembly’s role in providing a significant proportion of
members for the police and fire authorities has created a conflict of interest. Put simply, it has
proved difficult for the Assembly to scrutinise either the police or fire services. Many
Assembly members believe that by being members of these authorities they can provide
accountability.
The Assembly has, because of its limited powers and small number of members, found it hard
to develop an effective role for itself. Party groups are so small that there is little need for
organisation or formality. Because the Assembly is not providing members for an
‘administration’ there is little need for conventional internal structures for business
management. As a result, many members feel the Assembly has performed less effectively
than it might. Potential reforms could seek to strengthen the Assembly as well as removing
any existing inhibitions to action.
Changes that could be made to the Assembly’s powers
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No automatic places for Assembly on functional bodies (though the
Mayor could choose to appoint individual members)
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Assembly could be given a power to vote on mayoral plans and
strategies. (Possibly subject to a two-thirds majority)
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In the longer-term, the Assembly could become a ‘legislative’ body,
following the American model
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The Assembly could have a larger (or smaller) number of members
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The Assembly could, by law, have to appoint a ‘speaker’ or ‘leader’
formally to represent its collective views
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The Assembly could be given its own (self-determined) budget and
staff
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The requirement that the Assembly adhere a two-thirds majority for an
alternative budget (to veto the Mayor’s budget) could be reduced, after
a simple two-thirds majority to a 50 per cent majority for an alternative
budget
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It has also been suggested (by the Mayor) that:
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The Assembly could be replaced by a ‘Senate’ of Borough leaders
The Boroughs
The 2005 review is, according to the government, concerned with the powers and
responsibilities of the GLA. However a number of proposals have been put forward in recent
years about both the number and the powers of the boroughs. It is inevitable that such issues
will now be considered during a further analysis of London government.
The 32 boroughs that have operated since 1965 are among the most mature of all British
political institutions (compare them with endlessly-reformed local NHS bodies to understand
the difference). The City of London, of course, has enjoyed separateness and autonomy since
before William the Conqueror arrived in 1066.
Some reforms that would affect the boroughs have been considered in the earlier sections of
this paper. These changes are summarised below. Some of these possibilities would probably
be inconsistent with others.
Possible reforms affecting the boroughs
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Reforms to the governance of waste management.
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Transfer of multi-borough voluntary organisations’ funding from the
Association of London Government to the Mayor
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Transfer of some or all local roads to Tell
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Transfer of the City Police to the Metropolitan Police
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Transfer of some metropolitan open spaces to the Mayor
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Transfer of some planning powers to the Mayor, especially the
possibility of allowing a mayoral over-ride to borough planning
refusals
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Boroughs no longer to appoint members to LFEPA
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Transfer of some health functions to the boroughs
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Transfer of some neighbourhood police functions to the boroughs
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Transfer of some or all TfL roads to the boroughs
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Borough leaders to become GLA ‘Senate’ to replace the assembly
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Borough members could be appointed by the Mayor to any or all
functional bodies.
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Beyond this list there is the highly-charged question of whether or not 32 is the correct
number of boroughs. Some commentators have suggested 14, others as few as five. The
boroughs themselves have not shown enthusiasm for a reduction in their number. Any change
to boundaries would be a major upheaval to the capital’s government.
5.
Urban Parishes
The Government has proposed that urban parishes should be introduced in London. Such
bodies would operate within each borough and would, presumably, require their own
resources and electoral legitimacy. No firm proposals have yet been put forward about
London’s new urban parish tier, though ministers appear to remain committed to a level of
governance below existing councils.
Of course, in the 19th century, London government was generally centred on parishes or
‘district boards’ which brought smaller parishes together to provide basic public services.
Perhaps these earlier institutions, or something similar, could form the basis of new
neighbourhood and community institutions.
6.
A City Charter
Finally, a further possible reform of London’s government arrangements provokes the
question of whether London’s system of government could be subjected to some form of ‘city
charter’ that could provide a longer-term basis for a constitutional settlement between central
government and the GLA and also between the GLA and the boroughs. Arrangements of this
kind exist in the United States and could, presumably, be created here.
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