NORRIS: And this story involving the subprime mortgage crisis, something... many days. But you take us much deeper into this.

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NORRIS: And this story involving the subprime mortgage crisis, something that tops the news
many days. But you take us much deeper into this.
GLASS: Well, we had this question, which truthfully with all the great coverage we have not
understood the answer to. And basically the question had to do with these loans that banks would
give out at the height of the crisis, that are at the heart of this crisis. And basically, there are these
loans where you didn't have to prove you could pay them back. You didn't have to prove you had
a job. You didn't have to put money down.
There's something called a NINA loan, which stands for No Income No Asset. One of our
producers, Alex Blumberg, talked to a guy who got a loan like this, named Clarence Nathan. And
Clarence worked three, part-time, not very steady jobs, made about $45,000 a year, and he took
out this loan against his house that was huge, really.
Mr. CLARENCE NATHAN: Call it 540 for round figures.
GLASS: And you basically barrowed $540,000 from the bank, and they didn't check your income.
Mr. NATHAN: Right. They don't call me up and say, you know, how much money? They don't do
that. I mean, it's almost like you pass a guy in the street and say, lend me $540,000. He says,
well, what do you do? I got job. Okay. Essentially, that's the process.
(Soundbite of music)
GLASS: Would you have loaned you the money?
Mr. NATHAN: I wouldn't have loaned me the money, and nobody that I know would have loaned
me the money. I mean, I know guys who are criminals who wALEX BLUMBERG: That's right,
Adam. This whole crisis really starts with what you and I have come to call the global pool of
money.
(Soundbite of music)
BLUMBERG: What that is - most people don't think about it - it's the world investments - pension
funds, investing for people's retirements, insurance companies investing your premiums,
government central banks investing the wealth of nations.
Ms. CEYLA PAZARBASIOGLU (International Monetary Fund): A lot of money; it's about 70
trillion.
BLUMBERG: That's Ceyla Pazarbasioglu of the International Monetary Fund, and let's try to
figure out how much is $70 trillion. Think of all the money everyone spends on Earth every year.
Everything you bought in the last year, add everything the U.S. government and the U.S. military
spent money on, add all the corn in Mexico and all the money folks spent on lawyers and all the
rice sold in China, all the money spent everywhere on Earth in a year; that is less than $70 trillion,
less than this global pool of money.
(Soundbite of music)
DAVIDSON: So it's a lot of money, and there's this army of people, investment managers, whose
job it is to watch over that money. And they're pretty nervous because they have two sort of
contradictory concerns. They don't want to lose any of it, and they also want to make it grow.
So for a long time, they made it grow by investing in very safe, pretty boring investments, things
like U.S. treasuries and municipal bonds.
BLUMBERG: But right before our story starts, something happened to that global pool of money;
it got a lot bigger. In fact, it doubled between 2000 and 2006. In other words, several centuries to
get to about 35 trillion, and then over the course of six years, it got another 35 trillion.
And there are a lot of reasons for this growth, but the main one was that a lot of countries that
used to be poor, that used to have no real savings, suddenly became rich. Brazil, India, of course
China started making things that the rich countries wanted. And those countries banked their
profits and looked around the world for ways to invest them.
So suddenly there's twice as much money scouring the world for investments, but the world
wasn't ready. There weren't twice as many good investments. And so this global money looked
around and found one investment that it liked in particular - the U.S. housing market, and a
special bond created by Wall Street.
BLUMBERG: Mike Francis worked at Morgan Stanley, the Wall Street investment bank. And he
was producing these bonds that allowed global investors to buy into the U.S. housing market.
Mr. FRANCIS: More people wanted bonds than we could actually produce. That was our difficult
task, was trying to produce enough.
BLUMBERG: Here's how Mike Francis and a lot of other people on Wall Street performed this
kind of financial magic of turning mortgages into bonds. They'd buy up mortgages, thousands of
them, and pool them all together. That way, they'd have this constant stream of mortgage
payments coming to them every month. And they would sell shares in that stream to global
investors. That's how you create a mortgage-backed security, a mortgage-backed bond.
And for a few years there, like between 2003 and 2006, almost nothing in the world was growing
as fast as U.S. house prices, and these bonds were sort of a way for investors to get a piece of
that action.
But there was a problem.
DAVIDSON: Right, there's always a problem.
BLUMBERG: Right. And the problem here was that to make a mortgage- backed security, you
need a mortgage, and there weren't enough mortgages. By 2003, with super-low interest rates
and all this money from global investors, everyone who wanted a mortgage and who had the kind
of steady income and money in the bank to afford one, already had gotten a mortgage.
But that global pool of money was hungrier than ever for these mortgage backed bonds.
DAVIDSON: So Wall Street started lowering its standards. It used to be that to get a mortgage,
you needed to prove that you made enough money, that you had a steady job, and that you had
some assets in the bank. But starting around 2003, every month or so Wall Street would loosen
things up a bit.
BLUMBERG: I talked to a guy named Mike Garner, who worked at Silver State Mortgage in
Nevada, and he told me that the standards kept falling. One month Wall Street would say
borrowers don't have to prove how much they make, they can just state how much and we'll trust
them.
MIKE GARNER (Silver State Mortgage): Then the next one came along and it was no incomeverified asset. So you don't have to tell the people what you do for a living. You don't have to tell
the people what you do for work. All you have to do is show that - or state that you have a certain
amount of money in your bank account.
(Soundbite of laughter)
Mr. GARNER: And then the next one it came out is just, no income, no asset. So you don't have
to state anything. You just have to have a credit score and a pulse.
BLUMBERG: That pulse thing, that was also optional. Like this case in Ohio, where 23 dead
people got mortgages. And even some of the living weren't exactly what you'd call a good credit
risk. The name of this new loan, remember, was No Income No Asset. People in the industry
called it a liar's loan. They expected people to lie.
And if that sounds crazy to you, it also sounded crazy to a lot of people in the business. Here's
Mike Garner.
Mr. GARNER: My boss had been in the business for 25 years. And he hated those loans. He
used to rant and just say, it makes me sick to my stomach, the kind of loans that we do. And you
know, he fought the owners and the sales force tooth and neck about these guidelines. And we
got the same answer every time. Nope, other people are offering it, we're going to offer it too, and
we're going to get more market share this way. House prices are booming, everything is going
GLASS: Neil Dave's(ph) Silver State Mortgage would've held on to that loan for 30 years, and so
they'd make sure the borrower could pay it back. But now in the new system, they held it for a
month or two, then sold it to Wall Street. All that risk was someone else's problem.
DAVIDSON: And Wall Street wasn't particularly worried, because they just passed the risk on to
that global pool of money, to the investors. Now, we're not saying that Wall Street and Silver
State were lying to the investors. Wall Street was constantly checking the risks of these
mortgages. They had these fancy computer systems that constantly monitored the quality of the
loans they bought. Morgan Stanley's Mike Francis…
Mr. MIKE FRANCIS (Morgan Stanley): All the data that we had to review, to look at on loans that
were years old, was positive. They performed very well.
BLUMBERG: The data told them not to worry, that mortgage foreclosure rates are low, like 1 or 2
percent. They never go above, say, 10 percent. So the mortgage-backed bonds were designed to
perform well even if foreclosure rates hit some ridiculous high, like 12 percent.
GLASS: We now know their numbers were way off because the data they were looking at back in
2005 and 2006, those data from the old days, back when only qualified borrowers got loans. It
wasn't data from this new world of no-income, no- asset loans to people with lousy credit.
BLUMBERG: Dan Negro is one of the people who bought mortgage-backed bonds. He works for
Dynamic Credit, a company that packaged those bonds into a new product called a CDO and
then sold them to those global investors.
DAVIDSON: We're in his office, and he brings up a screen on his Bloomberg Terminal. It's the
current statistics on one of those mortgage pools that Wall Street created, that this company
bought.
Mr. NIGRO: And the statistics are pretty bad. Nearly 41 percent of the pool is more than 60 days
overdue. Out of that, nearly 16.5 percent are in foreclosure.
BLUMBERG: Remember, for this bond to keep its value, the foreclosure rate has to stay below
around 10 percent. It's already way over that and climbing. He says it could go past 50 percent on
this bond.
GLASS: And therefore, this bond will lose money, and everyone involved in this is losing
something. There are more than 4 million Americans facing foreclosure, hundreds of mortgage
companies are now bankrupt, hundreds of thousands of people have lost their jobs. The IMF
estimates that banks and investors around the world could lose more than a trillion dollars.
Mr. NIGRO: Well, in retrospect, I probably should have found another line of business four years
ago.
DAVIDSON Just about everyone we talked to at every step of this chain says now that they knew
something weird was going on, that the deals they struck did not feel right. But none of them
really questioned things and why would they? Everyone was making money right up to the day it
all fell apart.
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