Introduction
The marriage between international relations (IR) theory and Asian studies
is a far-reaching development in social science scholarship of the past half-century,
which has been subject to little reassessment. Intensifying over many decades, it has
aroused wide-ranging intellectual debate and been tested by abrupt change in Asian
countries that was rarely anticipated. Reflecting on the challenges of this marriage is
the object of this book. If IR theory is normally evaluated from the point of view of
the theorists, this volume takes a regionalist perspective. It follows an evolutionary
approach, focusing on one decade after another, showing how the evolving regional
context kept challenging existing theories, which, despite adjustments, often trailed
behind regional events. Showcasing changes from the 1970s, we reflect on the longterm union of IR theory and Asian studies with emphasis on China, Japan, Russia as
a power in Asia, the Korean peninsula, and ASEAN and India as actors in East Asia.
IR theory is placed on a lofty pedestal in various academic circles and called a
fraud in certain political circles. Praise puts it at the pinnacle of social science works
on foreign affairs, achieving rigor, providing powerful generalizations, stimulating
research through deductive and testable hypotheses, and framing the discussion in
efforts to understand the forces driving bilateral or multilateral ties between states.
Criticism dismisses it as a smokescreen for ideology or identity, by which facts are
twisted or selectively introduced in order to serve a predetermined frame of mind.
Since the 1970s Asia provides a particularly good testing grounds because it was so
rarely the primary basis for the theories and so often too complex and changing to
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be easily pigeonholed into positive affirmation of the theory in its initial incarnation.
The challenge before us is not to deconstruct the theories in an effort to determine
how much they are a reflection of ideology or identity, but to concentrate on what
was happening in Asia to ascertain the success of theorizing and what was missing.
A pattern of misjudging Asia is seen from the time of the Vietnam War to that
of uncertainty about a new Cold War between the United States and China. From the
mid-1960s response to the Sino-Soviet dispute by committing U.S. and allied forces
to a massive military undertaking on the Indochina peninsula to the delayed mid2010s response to Chinese assertiveness by fixating on whether a second Cold War
is starting, IR theory grappled with the changing balance of power in Asia, the forces
at work in regional reorganization, and the power of national identities that defied
theories steeped in realism and liberalism paying scant regard to local perceptions.
Writing about IR theory has a predictable monotony, repeated in academic
courses, introductions to scholarly publications, and perfunctory reviews of the field
in studies of individual countries and regions. First come theoretical frameworks or
generalizations. Next follow thematic interests and cases to which they are applied.
The approach taken here is different. We start with some compelling questions from
each decade. Then, we ask to what extent were the theories explaining or predicting
change sustained or refuted, and what is the resulting state of theory applied to Asia.
The objective is to identify the themes that theories have, more or less, addressed.
From the perspective of area specialists, such themes focus attention on countries
and regions of analysis, which successively have challenged theorists to think anew.
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The countries under our purview are the principal actors in Asia during the
Cold War and post Cold War periods. The “big four” are: the United States, Russia
(the Soviet Union), China, and Japan. All in this group figure in each chronological
period that follows. Among other states or regional groupings, the ones that warrant
the most attention can usefully be labeled the “other four.” They are: South Korea,
North Korea, India, and ASEAN. Over four decades the great power balance among
the “big four” changed significantly, as the impact of the “other four” appreciably
varied too. In the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet alliance was part of the Cold War. In the
1960s the Sino-Soviet split complicated the Cold War, as Japan was reasserting great
power status. The 1970s Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japan normalization altered the regional
context, as the Soviet Union narrowly depended on just a few Asian states. Dramatic
developments in the 1980s not only ended the Cold War and raised China’s status,
they also drew more countries into a theoretically significant IR mix. ASEAN became
an important force in Asian IR from the 1990s, and India acquired a broad regional
role from the 2000s. The rise and fall of great powers and the changing challenge by
other states active in regional reordering are the foundation for theoretical analysis.
The chronological chapters weigh the impact on theory of these countries by
decade. In the 1970s and 1980s, the big four loom large. In the 1990s South Korea,
North Korea, and ASEAN form a second tier of states for the theorists covering the
region. Over time, China’s impact grows, that of Russia and Japan declines, India
finally gains a third-tier role on matters centered on the reorganization of East Asia,
and the United States retains its centrality as an actor in the region even as more
bilateral and trilateral relations exclusive of the U.S. presence are drawing attention.
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Three rising powers were in the forefront in challenging the United States in
Asia. In the decades to the late 1980s the Soviet Union was the prime challenger. It
had a disproportionate impact on theorizing about IR. From the mid-80s to the late
1990s Japan made its strongest mark as a challenger to the United States and a force
for reshaping Asia with commensurate significance for IR theory. Finally, from the
mid-90s to the present China has charged ahead as the foremost challenger. In the
following chapters this sequence is reflected in the weight given to these three. For
area experts, evaluating theories starts with assessing how they treat the powers.
IR theory concerns security, development, and culture, especially as the last
two forces affect security. As the concerns of IR theory increasingly turned to Asia,
this seemed to be a shotgun marriage. Theorists steeped in arguments drawn from
experiences in the Western world gingerly, belatedly took the circumstances of Asia
into account, while specialists on the region hesitantly incorporated IR theory into
their analysis. Pressing issues at times forced a union between these distinct camps.
Reviewing the evolution of IR theories applied to Asia can help to draw lessons that
lead to a more satisfactory, sustainable union. The dominant partner has been the IR
theorist, and the perspective of regionalists can provide balance in the relationship.
This project stresses issues in the rise of Asia from the 1970s, looking back
on how IR theory dealt with them. The union of theory and regional analysis is often
driven by pressing issues; so it is with them that we may most beneficially start. By
organizing analysis according to decades, we show the context of the time as well as
the interrelations of theories under consideration. This approach allows for overall
assessments of how useful were the theoretical formulations over a particular time
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frame and also to what extent were there improvements from decade to decade. As
the rise of Asia became inexorable, a disconnect between IR studies and analysis of
Asian bilateral or multilateral relations continued. Taking a broad view of IR themes
that successively drew the attention of social scientists, the chapters below present
a diverse approach to what is theory and how it has been manifest in studies of Asia.
The Chronological Organization of This Book
This book is divided chronologically over five decades. Certain theoretical
concerns bridge two or more decades, but they are largely covered in the decade
when they gained prominence. Asia’s transformation came at an extraordinarily
rapid clip. Each decade brought a fresh perspective on the region. The scholarship
under consideration in this book is primarily that of the West, written in English,
with the United States at the epicenter, but some attention is also given to theories
in other great powers, which at times led to contrasts reflected in Western works.
The contributors to this project have also written extensively on the perspectives
seen in countries of the region. Theory, however, has remained largely the province
of the West, which faces special challenges in extending its frameworks to Asia. Not
only have security issues proved vexing, so too have questions regarding the impact
of the successive economic rise of various states and its varied cultural significance.
The 1970s mark a turning point from more than a century of a weak Asia in
comparison to the dominance of the West to an ascendant Asia quickly challenging
the United States and other Western states as the center of global dynamism and
power. In the 1840s-60s China, Japan, and Korea joined the states of South Asia and
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Southeast Asia as marginal outposts in the far-flung international system shaped by
the Western powers. Although Japan broke loose from this system and in the 1930s40s sought to forge its own regional system and China in 1949 joined a rival system
established by the Soviet Union, centered in Europe, these countries were too weak
and marginal in the 1950s-60s to lead a regional resurgence. Only in the 1970s did
the situation change dramatically. China normalized relations with many states, the
United States and Japan in the forefront, and charted a new course that ensured its
rapid rise. Meanwhile, Japan’s “flying goose formation” drew other Asian states into
its production orbit and gave it leadership pretensions in the region. As the United
States suffered a defeat in Vietnam, looked vulnerable in the Watergate scandal, and
retreated to a degree in Asia, the Soviet Union grew bolder in its effort to militarize
the region, relying on a massive build-up in its Far East and on North Korea. This
contrasted to the growing economic clout of South Korea, several Southeast Asian
states, and Taiwan, and Hong Kong, which were joining in a commercial region. In
one decade Asia’s role in the international community was greatly transformed.
Decade-by-decade the balance between the West and East Asia was changing
as was that between the superpowers and great powers active in the region. Taking
these factors into account provides a basis for reinterpreting the focus of IR theory.
The social sciences took little heed of Asia in the 1950s, Very few universities had
courses about Asia or taught Asian languages. The Korean War brought attention to
East Asia, as had the war with Japan in the 1940s. Yet, demonization of the North
Koreans and Communist Chinese aroused little interest in introducing courses and
conducting research, given how off limits these countries were. Due to the legacy of
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World War II, the lingering paradigm was a dichotomy between totalitarianism and
democracy. Deductive reasoning steered assumptions about Asia toward repetition
of those about Europe. The sooner countries chose freedom—free elections, free
markets, and the free world—, the better their chances for economic development,
popular satisfaction, and peaceful relations with the outside world. To the extent
Asia was considered distinctive, writers drew on longstanding notions, such as
“oriental despotism” and the “Asiatic mode of production.” Only by shedding such a
unfortunate legacy, borrowing wholesale from the West with little regard for what
might be retained from tradition, would states finally join the march to progress.
This was popular reasoning, but slowly thinking about Asia and IR began to change.
In the 2010s a central question was whether there would be a new Cold War
with the United States and Japan on one side and China on the other. In this context,
would Russia stick close to China, seek a pivotal position in the middle, or shift to
balancing China—choices that draw attention to a revived strategic triangle. Other
questions centered on India and ASEAN maneuvering between the two adversaries.
Although South Korea is allied to the United States, its ties to China are stronger
than Japan’s and may also involve some maneuvering between poles. North Korea is
a factor in both Sino-U.S. relations and South Korea’s calculus. As various attempts
at regionalism proceed haltingly, relations among these states shape the outcome. In
theoretical discussions, state policies range from pure pursuit of national interests
to emotional addiction to national identities. Civilizational issues arise as identities
are brought to the fore. They entered the discourse about the viability of alliances in
enhancing trust and the deepening of mutual antipathy lead toward conflict or war.
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The 1950s and 1960s as Background
From the 1950s, as world leaders faced new challenges in Asia they invoked
theories of international relations to guide them. Should the United States advance
to the Chinese border in the Korean War? Would the Sino-Soviet alliance persist in
the aftermath of Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization speech and Mao Zedong’s antirightist campaign that followed a year later? Should the United States intervene in
the Vietnamese war of reunification? Would Japan’s “economic miracle” lead both to
convergence with the United States and “normal” alliance relations? Once the SinoSoviet dispute had turned vitriolic, would there be a twist in the strategic triangle in
which the United States is implicated? The questions kept coming, at least several in
each decade, as East Asia’s importance grew in foreign policy and academic theory.
The Cold War was at its peak in the first half of the 1950s. McCarthyism set
back Chinese studies, casting suspicion on arguments such as that Communism had
appeal to many Chinese angered by corruption. The shadow of the Korean War left
writings on North Korea simplistic. Yet, even if international relations were slow to
develop a distinctive Asian orientation, some scholarship on Asian states began to
build a foundation for different approaches. One theme was the early indicators of
modernity in premodern Japan. Another was precocious development of premodern
China. Stereotypes began to be broken by the end of the 1950s, as returnees from
the war and the occupation of Japan with language training and experience in the
region approached the region with fresh eyes. They were seen as regionalists and
did not often draw attention from the theorists, despite some cross-fertilization.
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In the 1950s, a central question was the extent to which unilinearity exists
and leads to peace and stability. If premodern stages of development were either the
same or had little bearing on modernization, then unilinearity could be reaffirmed.
The one hitch that drew closer attention to Asia was the argument that states could
fall off of the rails, by succumbing to authoritarianism. The shadow of fascism hung
over the decade, as did the dichotomy between the “free world” and communism. A
theory in keeping with this image of a deviation from the normal path was Oriental
Despotism, a variant of the Asiatic mode of production. Theory often appeared to be
a response to Marxism, countering its periodization of history steeped in social class
and class struggle analysis with another, ranging widely on bureaucratization and
the rise of a merchant stratum. From communist countries and those influenced by
theories associated with Marx and his students came arguments that proletarians of
the world would unite in a new global order. They were opposed by theories about
middle classes wedded to free markets and free elections uniting in a “democratic
peace.” This central theoretical clash of the 1950s would continue into the 1980s.
In the 1950s theories of comparative socialism and comparative capitalism
as factors in IR were little developed. The Sino-Soviet relationship was slow to draw
theoretical interest. Similarly, the U.S.-Japanese relationship was widely assumed to
be on firm footing because of shared values as the theory of “democratic peace” was
assumed with little interest in Asian conditions, despite Japan’s recent importance
as the enemy. This was a decade of meager theoretical interest in Asian conditions.
Four IR questions connected to Asia were of paramount importance in the
1960s. First, after Nikita Khrushchev’s declaration of “peaceful coexistence” along
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with “de-Stalinization,” would Washington and Moscow succeed in setting relations
on a forward track in a manner that could enable them to manage hot spots, such as
Vietnam and the Korean peninsula? This depended heavily on a domestic question:
would the march away from totalitarianism continue or be blocked by forces within
the Soviet Union? It also depended on the meaning of “peaceful coexistence,” which
Khrushchev had declared. Second, after the Sino-Soviet split came into the open in
1960, analysts asked if this would transform the purported “strategic triangle” and
both states’ relations to the United States by engulfing the socialist bloc in a fight
over its leadership. At the core of this IR query was a domestic question: would their
ideological differences trump a shared Communist ambition to the point of inducing
a conflict played out around the world and on their long border? Third, given Japan’s
attempt in the 1930s-40s to establish the “East Asian co-prosperity sphere” through
war and colonialism, there was doubt about whether the course of development set
by the U.S. postwar occupation would lead to reconciliation with its Asian neighbors
or renewal of leadership ambitions on terms deemed unacceptable by them. Behind
this IR issue was a domestic query: would conservatives who gained dominance be
apologetic for what had transpired and would the left coalition that vied with them
for power find balance between pacifism as grounds for “rejoining Asia” and realism
in the face of Cold War dangers? Fourth, after the 1960 riots in Japan in opposition
to the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the question lingered about the sustainability and
depth of the alliance as a foundation for IR in Asia. This required an assessment of
an internal Japanese matter: would Japan’s political elite and public be satisfied as
part of the “West?” Great powers stood in the forefront as IR theory was considered.
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Those seeking to answer the above list of questions with reference to theory
faced difficulties. There was the challenge of finding equilibrium between deductive
theory little cognizant of Asian experiences and inductive analysis seen as limited by
a dearth of evidence from the countries in question. There was also the disciplinary
limitations of IR analysis separated from comparative politics and research on the
domestic determinants of IR and of social science analysis separated from the area
studies approach of using Asian languages and gathering detailed information in the
countries of the region. Disciplinary boundaries mattered too: political science and
history overlapped in Asia more than many were prepared to recognize, while the
fields of sociology, economics, and anthropology were groping to fit into the mix.
In the 1960s, a fundamental question was the extent to which modernization
means convergence. To the degree it does not, then attention turned to the capacity
of communist-led states to modernize, reforming away from the Stalinist model, and
of Japan to rely on different traditions and a greater state role to lead in Asia toward
a distinct trajectory of modernization. The implications of convergence for foreign
policy figured heavily in theoretical debates. Two cases of divergence overshadowed
this discussion. As the decade advanced, U.S.-Soviet divergence trumped indications
of Soviet reform, “peaceful coexistence,” and convergence in modernization. Further,
U.S.-Japanese divergence became more apparent as Japan’s “economic miracle” gave
it confidence to be more assertive about differences. Meanwhile, China’s claims to
have a distinct model of modernization, contradicting many theoretical assumptions
about what is required, further tested analysis. So, too, did the Sino-Soviet dispute in
revealing the great gulf in the socialist camp, challenging analysts to find its causes
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and explain its implications for international relations. The four questions raised for
the decade, thus, were not entirely separate. A common thread could be discerned.
We need not address the theoretical concerns of the 1960s in detail because
they persist in the 1970s. The Soviet-U.S. competition linked to interpretations of
social classes and modernization reaches new intensity by the end of the 70s. SinoSoviet competition and the importance of comparisons between socialist countries
is no less meaningful in the 1970s. The U.S-Japan relationship tied to modernization
only grows in significance and as a force in IR in the 1970s. With China increasing its
theoretical relevance in the strategic triangle, the 1970s provides the background
for sustained examination of the issues that are identified as salient in the 1960s.
The Theoretical Challenge Before Us
In 2012 Alastair Iain Johnston assessed what East Asia tells us about theory
in IR, arguing that it does not tell us enough because it has been relatively neglected.
That neglect exacts a price in explanatory variables that are omitted or downplayed,
he adds. Reviewing arguments about rising powers and conflict, institutions, and
historical memory and conflict, Johnston concludes that theories of IR may require
serious revision. Yet, he hesitates to be explicit about the kinds of revisions expected
that will impact theory, apart from suggesting themes raised for East Asia that do
not appear often in coverage of transatlantic areas more widely incorporated into
past theories. He mentions themes tied to balancing, such as engagement, hedging,
and insurance; coverage of hierarchy, status, patron-client relations and civilizations
as other themes linked to order; informality, perceptions of identity differences, and
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preference for bilateralism as forces for weak institutionalization; and the use of
historical memory for legitimacy and victimhood leading to threat perceptions as
barriers in international relations.i This analysis centers on shortcomings in theory
from the perspective of the IR theorist. What is also needed is attention to how this
disconnect between Asian studies and IR theory led to shortcomings in explaining
the transformation of Asia. The themes he raises can also be considered through the
lens of how have theories fared in interpreting the main issues that have arisen in
Asian IR related to balancing, status, identity differences, and historical memory.
Theories of balancing, engaging, and hedging face the nature of the strategic
triangle and other triangles such as those including Japan, responses to the rise of
China as a rival to the United States, and concerns about middle powers including
South Korea and the impact of rogue states such as North Korea. These theories are
subject to evaluation in real time as states made choices about which powers they
would engage or balance. IR theory is heavily invested in these themes, and many of
the cases that have preoccupied theorists are among those we cover in our analysis.
Johnston’s themes linked to hierarchy, civilizations, identity perceptions, and
order are in the forefront of coverage of Asian IR. Arguing that IR theory is guilty of
neglect is a starting point for considering how, decade-by-decade, such negligence is
responsible for misjudging the course of bilateral relations in the region. These are
not themes at the center of IR theory, but they are widely noted in coverage of Asia.
The same conclusion holds for historical memory and obsessions with victimhood,
which Johnston also observes are underestimated in IR theory. The chapters that
follow consider how all of these themes matter in theorizing about IR across Asia.
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In a rough manner, we can point to three distinct theoretical orientations. In
realist theory, the extreme is an aggressive state that assumes a hostile world with
no prospect of resolving differences except through the display of superior force. In
liberal theory, the extreme is an idealistic state that presumes regional and global
institutions can be established without great difficulty through further overtures. In
constructivist theory centered on national identity, the extreme is an obsessive state
that prioritizes historical justice to overcome perceived humiliation or misuse of the
“history card.” Proceeding from the level of individual state preferences to bilateral
relations and on to broader IR challenges, we reflect on the impact of these choices.
Painting with a broad brush that disregards differences across time, we can
tentatively order the countries under consideration on the realist dimension: North
Korea, China, Russia, India, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and ASEAN. On the
liberal dimension, a different observable order is: the United States, ASEAN, South
Korea, Japan, China, India, Russia, and North Korea. On the constructivist dimension,
the prevailing pattern is: North Korea, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, India, the
United States, and ASEAN. If the overall tendency is an inverse relationship between
realism and liberalism, the major exceptions are the United States and, to a lesser
degree, China. U.S. idealism is a recurrent force for globalization and an extensive
type of regionalism, but it is counterbalanced by U.S. realism that checks liberalism
and by U.S. national identity that sets limits on how to pursue idealism. In contrast,
Chinese idealism in a regional context is a much more limited force, while realism is
much stronger than in the United States and national identity intensifies realism but
restrains liberalism. Japan’s relative passivity is reflected in restrained realism and
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liberalism coupled with a national identity of some intensity but less so than in all of
the states with which it borders. Theoretical discussions address these differences.
In discussing bilateral relations, we can likewise apply the three dimensions
of theory, adding the concept of national identity gaps in covering constructivism. A
national identity gap is a measure of the intensity of the divide between the national
identities of two states that regard each other as significant for their overall identity.
Separately, I have presented estimates of the gaps for most of the bilateral relations
in Northeast Asia. The higher the gap, the greater the impact of identities is likely to
be on the dyad. This estimate of intensity is a composite of separate calculations for
five dimensions of national identity: ideological, temporal, sectoral (a combination
of political, economic, and cultural identities), vertical (the domestic order), and
horizontal (the external order). Gaps may be asymmetrical, especially when a state
with a high score for constructivism faces one with a much lower score. China’s high
intensity gaps with the United States, Japan, and South Korea reflect the recent force
of national identity. Combined with its high score for realism, the result is troubled
relations of central concern to IR theory. By contrast, the recent low intensity gap in
Sino-Russian relations means that two highly realist states have experienced quite
smooth relations. The intensity of national identity gaps has theoretical significance
for other dyads for which realism and liberalism do not offer convincing arguments,
notably Japanese-South Korean relations. Bilateral relations were the main concern
during the Cold War and remain the building blocks of IR studies, including theory.
Triangles merit theoretical attention too, as seen in the notion of the strategic
triangle for Sino-U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Given the recent reality
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of countries in Asia being tugged between China’s growing pull and U.S. traditional
or balancing relations, the theoretical importance of triangles has been increasing.
Yet, realist concentration on balance of power may omit attention to the role of both
economic integration and national identity affinity as a force in this triangle. Below,
attention to the strategic triangle and its lingering shadow after the Cold War is one
theme, along with the Sino-Japanese-U.S. triangle, the Sino-South Korean-Japanese
triangle and others. Assessing how theories have dealt with triangles is essential.
To the extent identity issues are covered, it is difficult to avoid themes such
as Asian vs. Western values, popular in the 1990s, and China’s emphasis on Eastern
vs. Western civilization. Along with the Cold War, theory has included discussions of
socialism vs. capitalism, modernization and convergence of these two systems and
of the United States along with its principal challenger—whether the Soviet Union,
Japan, or China. These go beyond bilateral relations to broader contrasts between
two systems, one centered in the West. Regionalism offers another theoretical issue,
especially as debates about its prospects contrast exclusive ties within Asia versus
inclusive ties involving the United States. These diverse subjects, interpreted usually
through dichotomies, emerge for each decade, often crossing the boundaries linked
to realism and liberalism with a heavy dose of constructivism in their coverage.
Recurrent themes appear in many chapters that follow, with resemblance to
the standbys introduced with IR theory but also reflecting distinctive features of
East Asia history over the past half century. Realists will find emphasis on balance of
power familiar, although few would put as much emphasis on the strategic triangle
of the United States, China, and Russia/the Soviet Union. Maneuvering associated
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with perceptions of this triangle has driven much regional reorganization, altering
threat perceptions and how the pivotal state of North Korea has been interpreted.
Liberals will understand the stress on regionalism, despite possible surprise at the
range of venues linked to this concept. As economic integration has accelerated in
this region, successive states have sought leadership through it, testing how far an
economic agenda can propel wide-ranging regionalism. Finally, constructivists are
familiar with coverage of historical memories and notions of victimization as thorns
in the path of mutual trust. These and other themes of national identity figure in the
assessment of East Asia far more than would be expected from most IR theories
i
Alastair Iain Johnston, “What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About
International Relations Theory?” Annual Review of Political Science, No. 15 (2012),
pp. 53-78.