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Introduction
The period following the Cold War generated dramatic changes in the organization of the
international system and the role of the United Nations (UN). As the most prevalent violent
conflicts have shifted from interstate wars to intrastate and often inter-group conflicts, peace
operations have become more multidimensional in character. Designed to address the realities of
1945, the UN is presented with multiple challenges in responding to modern forms of violent
conflict. In addition to the changing nature of conflict, UN peacekeepers are also faced with
increasingly broad mandates involving peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In order for the UN to
seize the opportunities presented by a changing arena of violent conflict, a number of challenges
must be addressed. How has the UN employed conflict transformation processes in past
missions? What areas of UN operations are most receptive to conflict transformation strategies?
The gaps in UN implementation of multidimensional missions can be addressed through
the application of a conflict transformation paradigm. As the primary actor in peace operations,
the UN is well-positioned to function as a force of conflict transformation on an international
scale. Given the UN’s legitimacy in peace operations and the conflict transformation paradigm’s
focus on addressing the full context that generates violent conflict, the two have the potential to
develop a mutually beneficial relationship. Multidimensional peace operations are challenged by
the need to immediately integrate peacekeeping and peacebuilding components on the ground,
addressing both the short and long term peace agendas. The application of a conflict
transformation framework identifies and uses “processes that respond both to the immediate and
the longer-term agenda,” guiding the course of missions towards long-term change without
neglecting the importance of immediate implementation.1
1
Lederach, John Paul. The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. Intercourse, PA: Good Books. 2003. p. 65.
Maxey 2
In order to examine the role conflict transformation has played in multidimensional UN
peace operations to date and illustrate areas in which a more thorough application of the conflict
transformation was needed, conflict transformation will be explored in the context of the UN
missions to Cambodia. Within the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), direct attention will be
given to the role of information programs as an arena for conflict transformation. A crucial part
of multidimensional missions, UN information programs establish legitimacy and generate
consent for peace operations from the local population. These programs directly facilitate
conflict transformation’s aims to view episodes of conflict as an opportunity to engage the wider
citizenry and uncover potential that is beneficial to the entire community.2 The use of
information dissemination strategies within the mine, electoral, and human rights programs of
UNAMIC and UNTAC each involve a combination of three conflict transformation approaches:
1) direct interaction with the local population; 2) use of Cambodian citizens in their
implementation; and 3) development of institutions which remained active following the
departure of the UN.
Within the broader missions, the effectiveness of information programs as conflict
transformation processes will be analyzed in each of the mine, electoral, and human rights areas.
Although the UNAMIC and UNTAC missions met mixed success in implementing the different
dimensions of their mandates, links can be drawn between the use of conflict transformation
processes and the success or failure of different components. In order to illustrate these
connections, an overview of the structure and categories of UN mission and the historic context
of the Cambodian conflict will precede a discussion of the use of information programs.
2
Ibid., p. 64.
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UN Mission Structures and Conflict Transformation
The United Nations was developed to address the challenges of the post-WWII world,
with chapters in its Charter allowing for both peaceful negotiations (Chapter VI) and forceful
action to prevent or end violent conflicts (Chapter VII). Traditional peacekeeping stations UN
forces between hostile parties in order to contain armed conflict and facilitate a peaceful political
settlement.3 In addition to traditional peacekeeping, the UN has also engaged in preventative
diplomacy, peace-enforcement, and multidimensional operations, such as UNTAC, which
involve aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding. The expansion of available forms for UN action
is an attempt to respond to a changing modern context. While peace-enforcement4, authorized
by Chapter VII of the Charter, can play a vital role in assuring there is peace to be kept,
preventative diplomacy and multidimensional post-conflict peace-building provide the best
arenas for the a conflict transformation approach.
Although difficult and underdeveloped, by seeking to identify and ease tensions before
violent conflict erupts, preventive diplomacy represents the most desired and efficient form for
handling conflict. It is defined by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as
“action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from
escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”5 Preventative
diplomacy focuses on uncovering and addressing the underlying causes that lead to episodes of
violent conflict. In order to uncover sources of tension, UN preventative strategies consist of
confidence building measures, possible preventative deployments, and the need for effective
3
Doyle, Michael, Ian Johnstone & Robert Orr, eds. Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in
Cambodia and El Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1997. pg. 3.
4
Peace-enforcement requires the use of force to address outright aggression. Most often applied when ceasefires
have been agreed to but not complied with, the UN peace-enforcement seeks to restore and maintain the ceasefire,
ensuring that there is a peace to be kept. UN peace-enforcement forces are often more heavily armed than
peacekeepers.
5
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations, 1992. p. 2.
Maxey 4
warning systems.6 Additionally, successful preventative diplomacy requires a basis in facts, an
understanding of global trends and developments, and accurate analysis. This framework
recognizes violence as an episode that exposes the underlying structures and tensions of conflict.
It directly corresponds to conflict transformation’s understanding of violent episodes as
embedded in a greater pattern of conflict.7 By locating the causes of violent conflicts within the
structures of society, the UN is presented with the opportunity to provide channels for conflict
transformation before violence erupts. However, the current absence of a comprehensive early
warning system and the demand for more robust training programs and observers on the ground
are obstacles to the adoption of preventative diplomacy as a primary method in peace operations.
Although preventative diplomacy has yet to be widely implemented, multidimensional
operations with peacebuilding components have increased drastically in both number and scale
and represent the future of UN peace operations.8 Multidimensional operations are based in
Chapter VI of the UN Charter; they extend beyond the scope of traditional peacekeeping without
entering the sphere of peace-enforcement. In multidimensional operations, the UN is granted
open-ended consent to operate as an independent agent. In addition to peace enforcement and
peacekeeping, the peacebuilding components of multidimensional operations perform tasks as
widespread as holding elections, clearing minefields, and building schools to facilitate social and
political transformations.9 Through these activities, UN peacebuilding aims to create structures
which sustain peace after the mission’s completion and transform the areas of society and
government which guided the original conflict towards violence. They thus address the
6
Ibid.
Lederach, John Paul. p. 16.
8
Doyle, Michael, Ian Johnstone & Robert Orr, eds. p. 1.
9
Ibid., p.7.
7
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immediate needs of the society while creating channels to uncover the structures at the core of
the conflict and enact the long-term change necessary for a conflict transformation approach.
Although multidimensional operations often begin with traditional peacekeeping—
maintaining ceasefires and disarming warring parties—the majority of its components can be
classified as peacebuilding operations. Such components represent a comprehensive effort to
identify and support structures that consolidate the peace and channel tensions away from
violence in the future.10 By constructing a new environment that allows conflicts to be expressed
non-violently, peacebuilding efforts following one conflict may also serve as a form of
preventative diplomacy for future conflicts. Additionally, with the goal of rebuilding social and
political structures, peacebuilding components of multidimensional operations present societies
with opportunities to examine the roots of the conflict and engage the population in the
reconstruction process. Rather than offering a quick, temporary resolution to one episode of
violent conflict, peacebuilding operations give attention to the underlying causes of conflict and
long-term needs of societies in a manner compatible with the conflict transformation paradigm.
It is thus in these multidimensional missions where conflict transformation techniques can be
most appropriately implemented by the United Nations.
As evidence to its commitment to expanding and improving the effectiveness of
peacebuilding missions as a part of multidimensional operations, the UN established a
Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund, and Peacebuilding Support Office in 2005.
The Commission is charged with bringing together involved actors, marshaling resources, and
offering advice concerning peacebuilding and recovery.11 The Commission is currently focused
on creating signs of peace on the ground to promote the consolidation of peace. At the time of
10
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. p. 5.
“United Nations Peacebuilding Commission.” United Nations. 2008. 8 November 2008.
<http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/index.shtml>.
11
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implementation, the UNTAC mission in Cambodia represented the largest multidimensional UN
mission and the lessons learned from its successes and failures serve as the foundation for
informing future operations. An examination of the Cambodian conflict and UN missions
illustrates the presence and effectiveness of conflict transformation approaches within
multidimensional peace operations.
Context of the Cambodian Conflict and UN Missions
The history of Cambodia is rife with episodes of occupation and armed conflict. The
continual entrance and exit of external actors prevented the integration of local parties and
members of the population into political structures and created a crisis of legitimacy for the state.
The weak state and absence of institutions created a space for guerilla fighters and competing
factions to pursue their aims through violent means. Thus, a careful examination of Cambodian
history reveals the lack of state legitimacy and effective institutions as the epicenter of the
conflict behind decades of violent episodes. Good governance and institutions are recognized by
the conflict transformation paradigm as important factors in channeling conflict away from
violence. Institutions provide “incentives and structures for co-operation and accommodation
between elites” which prevent violent conflict, while good governance promotes “development,
civil politics and helpful external policies.”12 In addition to these structural and political
obstacles, the Cambodian population was also subjected to decades of famine, oppression, and
genocide under the Khmer Rouge which ruled Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.13
12
Miall, Hugh. Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 2007. p. 116-117.
Chandler, David. “Cambodia Deals with its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia.”
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions. 9(2008): p. 355.
13
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During the colonial period, Cambodia was ruled as a French protectorate for 90 years
beginning in 1863 and then occupied from 1941-1945 by Japanese forces.14 Independence from
France was obtained in 1954 and Cambodia became the Kingdom of Cambodia ruled by King
Sihanouk who, after abdicating to his father, became Prime Minister and created the People’s
Socialist Communist Party.15 From this point forward, the political history of Cambodia became
a struggle for legitimacy and authority, as the country was continually passed among guerilla
groups, warring factions, and external powers, including Vietnam.16 Following his father’s
death, Sihanouk returned as the head of state and allowed North Vietnamese guerillas to create
bases inside Cambodia as part of their campaign against the South Vietnamese government.17 In
1970, Sihanouk was overthrown in a coup led by Prime Minister Lon Nol, who declared the state
a Khmer Republic and established a monarchy. His government was overthrown only five years
later in 1975 by communist guerillas of the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, who advanced to the
capital following a string of victories in the provincial cities.18
The rise to power of the Khmer Rogue represents one of the darkest periods in
Cambodian history. Under the rule of Pol Pot, the state was renamed the Democratic
Kampuchea. As part of the organization’s communist agenda, urban citizens were forced into
the countryside to become agricultural workers, money was deemed worthless, religion
prohibited, and basic freedoms abolished.19 During the four years the regime remained in power,
an estimated two million Cambodians—almost one out of every three—died from malnutrition,
disease, exhaustion, or executions, while countless others were subjected to torture and violent
“Timeline: Cambodia.” BBC News. 2008. 5 November 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asiapacific/county_profiles/1244006.stm>. p. 1.
15
Doyle, Michael. 1995. p. 19.
16
Chandler, David. “Three Visions of Politics in Cambodia.” In Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN
Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone & Robert Orr, eds., 1997. p. 25.
17
“Timeline: Cambodia.” p. 1.
18
Doyle, Michael. 1995. p. 19.
19
“Timeline: Cambodia.” p. 2.
14
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oppression.20 The actions of the Khmer Rogue during this period have been labeled genocide,
with the mass graves known as the “killing fields” serving as one of the country’s most
memorable landmarks.
The Khmer Rouge regime was toppled in 1979 when Vietnamese forces invaded the
country and installed a new government in Phnom Penh, forcing the Khmer Rouge to flee to the
Thailand border.21 During the 1980s, the Vietnamese directed government excavated the killing
fields and held “Days of Hate” in which the horrors of the Khmer Rogue were brought to the
forefront of national consciousness.22 These tactics were used to justify the actions of the
government and stigmatize the Khmer Rouge regime to prevent it from returning to power.
However, the new government was unable to gain legitimacy or recognition in the international
arena and, under the encouragement of China and the United States (US), three rebel factions—
the National United Front for an Independent Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
(FUNCINPEC), the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the Khmer
Rouge—joined together to form a government in exile known as the Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).23 The CGDK succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops in 1989 and Hun Sen became the Prime Minister, renaming the country the
State of Cambodia.24
Despite the change in governance, the continued existence of factions and absence of a
power-agreement held Cambodia in a state of civil war. In order to address this civil conflict, the
US, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom drafted a peace plan for an interim
administration composed of the four factions—FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, the Khmer Rouge, and
20
Chandler, David. 2008. p. 355.
Doyle, Michael. 1995. p. 19.
22
Chandler, David. 2009. p. 361-362.
23
Ibid., p. 17-19.
24
“Timeline: Cambodia.” p. 2.
21
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the State of Cambodia—that would run the country as members of a Supreme National Council
(SNC) under the supervision of the UN until free elections could be held.25 On October 23,
1991, following a previous agreement to a ceasefire, the Agreements on the Comprehensive
Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was signed in Paris by the four factions. 26
In order to ensure the implementation of the peace treaty and the maintenance of the
ceasefire, the UNAMIC mission was deployed to Cambodia in 1991. The UN first deployed the
UNAMIC mission in October 1991. Its mandate was to assist in the maintenance of the ceasefire
and initiate mine-awareness training for civilians prior to the deployment of the larger
multidimensional UNTAC mission.27 The mandate was expanded in 1992 to incorporate
additional training programs for mine-detection and mine-clearing for repatriation routes,
reception centers, and resettlement areas.28 Mine clearance programs worked directly with
Cambodian civilians and served as a preliminary form of information programs, creating a
foundation from which the UNTAC mission could expand information channels.
The multidimensional UNTAC mission became operational on March 15, 1992. UNTAC
was to work with the SNC, established by the Agreements as “the unique legitimate body and
source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence,
and unity of Cambodia are enshrined,” to successfully implement the Agreements.29 UNTAC’s
mandate included creating an environment that valued human rights, the organization and
conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the
maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of Cambodian refugees and
25
Doyle, Michael. 1995. p. 19-20.
Ibid., p. 20.
27
“Cambodia—UNAMIC: Mandate.” United Nations. 2008. 9 November 2008.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_missions/unamicmandate.html>. p. 1.
28
Ibid.
29
“Cambodia—UNTAC: Mandate.” United Nations. 2008. 9 November 2008.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacmandate.html>. p. 1.
26
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displaced persons, and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure.30 At the point of
maximum deployment, 15,991 peacekeepers were involved in UNTAC’s military component,
while 3,359 were deployed as part of the civilian police component.31 During the electoral
period, 50,000 Cambodians participated in the mission as electoral staff and 900 international
officers served as observers at polling stations.32
In order to fulfill its mandate, UNTAC was faced with four key tasks: 1) take control of
civilian administration agencies involved in implementation of the Agreements; 2) perform
crucial military functions including verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces, monitoring the
ceasefire, overseeing mine clearance, assisting in disarmament, and enforcing the demobilization
of 70 percent of each faction’s forces while incorporating remaining forces into the Cambodian
army; 3) organize and conduct a free and fair election; and 4) develop and oversee a program for
human rights education.33 Although not directly delineated in the mandate, the use of conflict
transformation approaches within information programs supported and facilitated the
implementation of other components. While the military components of the mandate were
largely unfulfilled34 upon UNTAC’s departure and the UN was unable to achieve control over
the country’s civil administration, the election was conducted successfully and the related
information programs left the country with foundations for positive media structures.35
30
Ibid.
“Cambodia—UNTAC: Facts and Figures.” United Nations. 2008. 9 November 2008.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacfacts.html.> p. 1.
32
Ibid.
33
Bratt, Duane. “Defining Peacekeeping Success: The Experience of UNTAC.” Peacekeeping and International
Relations. 25(1996): p. 3-4.
34
Factions were neither disarmed nor demobilized and the Khmer Rogue defected from the treaty before the
mission’s completion.
35
Ibid., p. 4.
31
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Information Programs in UNAMIC and UNTAC
Upon their entry into Cambodia, the UN missions encountered a situation of instability
and underdevelopment, as many citizens still worked on the subsistence farms to which they
were confined under Pol Pot. After decades of war and internal conflict, the country lacked a
functioning bureaucracy, the administrative structures were in ruins, and there was a dearth of
trained staff to fill positions in policing, health, and legal work.36 In order to address these
structural weaknesses, massive reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts were needed. As a part
of these efforts, information programs were used in activities related to mines, elections, and
human rights. Information programs supported a conflict transformation approach to the conflict
by directly involving the local population, using Cambodian citizens in mission implementation,
and developing long-term institutions. These practices opened channels to uncover and address
the epicenter of the conflict, while long-term structures held the potential for processing conflict
differently in the future.
To create a conducive environment for reconstruction and peacebuilding, the Agreements
charged UNTAC with the responsibility to “conduct a mass public information program in the
recognition and avoidance of explosive devices.”37 The task of mine-awareness began under
UNAMIC, which establish information programs for small teams of UN military personnel to
train civilians in avoiding injury. Entering Cambodia immediately after the end of violent
conflict, the mine-awareness program was well-positioned to establish channels for uncovering
the epicenter of the conflict and involving the local population in the conflict transformation
process. Under UNTAC, the mine-awareness program was expanded and eventually led to the
creation of the Cambodian Mine Action Center, which continued clearance activities after the
36
Lehmann, Ingrid. Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire. Portland, OR: Frank Cass
Publishers, 1999. p. 54.
37
Ibid., p. 55.
Maxey 12
transition period ended.38 These programs provided peacekeepers with the opportunity to
establish a rapport with the local population and become a recognized and trusted presence. The
program aimed from its initiation to involve civilians in the mine clearance and awareness
process and create lasting structures which could eventually be placed under Cambodian control.
The use of training programs to both inform civilians of the dangers of remaining mines and
involve them in the process of mine clearance shows signs of direct engagement and
communication. Additionally, the successful creation of a Cambodian Mine Action Center
provided a lasting structure in an environment desperate for institutional development. Despite
this success, mine-clearance programs relied on uni-directional flows of information.
Distributing awareness materials to the local population without developing channels through
which local citizens could provide information to the UN or uncover deeper issues related to the
location and history of minefields undermined the program’s potential to facilitate conflict
transformation.
Whereas raising awareness of minefields was a necessary precondition, planning and
conducting a free and fair election represented the largest and most significant civilian
component of the UNTAC mission. Management of the electoral process and the corresponding
information programs took place in two phases: registration, followed by the actual electoral
campaign. The electoral component of the UNTAC mission was composed of four branches:
Operations and Computerization, Administration and Coordination,
Information/Communications/Training and Complaints/Compliance/Enforcement.39 Information
programs operated within the Information/Communication/Training sector. Through elections,
Cambodian voters were given a chance to impact their government for the first time in decades.
38
Ibid.
Doyle, Michael. “Authority and Elections in Cambodia.” In Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN
Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone & Robert Orr, eds., 1997. p. 150.
39
Maxey 13
The legacy of violent conflict and oppressive rule, however, had left the country without
legitimate or functioning electoral structures and a society without experience or knowledge of
fair electoral practices. Changing these historical structures and creating methods through which
the government could be held accountable to the people were necessary steps to transforming the
conflict. The effective implementation of such change necessitated the legitimation and
institutionalization of free and fair electoral processes. To create the necessary environment,
public information programs were implemented to introduce Cambodians to the electoral
process, ensure them of the secrecy of their ballot, and stress the importance of voting.40
Logistically, these programs determined who was eligible to vote and the amount of
representation allocated to each province.41 By establishing connections with the local
population and creating an environment of legitimacy for UN staff, information programs
provided support and eased the creation of polling stations for the official election.
Within UNTAC, the information programs operated with a large degree of independence
and played a central role in implementing a variety of mandates. The electoral education and
information programs began with the voter registration process on October 5, 1992, which
continued until the end of January 1993. To carry out the registration effort, 450 UN volunteers
served as district electoral supervisors, working in five member teams with 4,000 Cambodian
registration personnel.42 The use of Cambodian civilians as part of the registration force and the
organization of electoral districts allowed the program access to all parts of the country, ensuring
the distribution of materials to the majority of the population. By the time registration ended, 4.6
40
Ibid., p. 149.
Ibid.
42
Lehmann, Ingrid. p. 58.
41
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million Cambodians had been registered to vote, despite logistical and legal problems, as well as
roads made nearly impassable by the rainy season.43
In addition to registration, UNTAC also operated a broader information program
covering issues of electoral rights. The electoral rights component of the program represented
one of the mission’s most successful dimensions. Charged with informing Cambodian voters of
their rights and ensuring the secrecy of their ballots, the communications and information
division faced legacies of electoral manipulation and oppression and a lack of electoral
structures. When the campaigns began, the Khmer Rouge had begun to defect from the
Agreements. The Khmer Rouge, as well as the Cambodian People’s Party, engaged in tactics of
voter intimidation, violence—including murder, assassination and arbitrary detention—and
coercion.44 Unable to fully curtail these tactics through military components, UNTAC’s voter
education efforts were the only hope for the completion of a successful election. To counter the
parties’ manipulation strategies, UNTAC developed a radio station to broadcast unbiased
information about the electoral process. To ensure information broadcasts reached local
populations, a total of 143,000 radios were distributed, making them one of the most popular
commodities in Cambodia.45 Once established, daily radio broadcasts dispensed information
about ballot secrecy, security, political parties, and voter rights. Additionally, the UNTAC
station offered broadcast time for all registered political parties, allowing candidates to address
unfair attacks and preventing the establishment of a media monopoly by any one party.46
Beyond providing crucial services during the electoral season, the UNTAC radio system created
43
Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., p. 58.
45
Heininger, Janet. Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia. New York: Twentieth Century
Fund Press. 1994. p. 110.
46
Doyle, Michael. 1997. p. 153.
44
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an independent source of trusted information and developed a media structure that remained in
place after the completion of the mission.
Although these broadcasts successfully disseminated information to the Cambodian
population, the information flow was also predominantly uni-dimensional. More directly
involving Cambodians in the gathering of information and conduction of the broadcasts would
have deepened the roots of unbiased media structures. Creating positive media structures is an
important component of conflict transformation, acting as a channel through which the public
can hold the government accountable and voice popular discontent.
Along with radio broadcasts, UNTAC also relied on a variety of additional print and
media sources for information dissemination. Videos, cassettes, posters, brochures, and comic
books were used by education teams and distributed throughout the country during community
meetings.47 UNTAC also made use of television and video mediums to convey its message.
Video parlors were used to show informative videos in Khmer, allowing the UN to overcome the
language barrier and shortage of Khmer speakers. Television dramas and news programs used
local actors to distribute information on cantonment, human rights, voter registration, and the
activity of political parties.48 These programs demonstrate a strong understanding of how
information flows within Cambodian society; however, they did not make strides to create a bidirectional information flow—between either the population and UNTAC or Cambodian citizens
and the Cambodian government—or invest Cambodians in the success of the projects.
In addition to information, voters also needed a neutral political environment and
structures through which they could feel comfortable seeking and exchanging information. To
create such an environment, UNTAC’s electoral staff organized village-level meetings in which
47
48
Lehmann, Ingrid. p. 58.
Heininger, Janet. p. 110.
Maxey 16
Cambodians were free to ask questions, express their concerns, and share their opinions.49 Such
programs allowed Cambodians to become familiar with public discourse in secure, trusted
settings, countering previous experiences with coercion and oppression and creating informal
structures which could form a foundation for civil society. Additionally, the direct interaction
with UN workers increased the understanding and support granted to UNTAC’s presence and
work in the country. These informal meetings were used to gather information from the local
population, establishing a bi-directional flow of information between the community and UN.
Through these channels, UNTAC workers gathered information concerning the success of
mandate implementation, abuses by political parties, local attitudes towards the UN, and
suggestions for improving the programs’ effectiveness. In addition to informal local channels,
UNTAC information officers also conducted opinion surveys on a regular basis to measure the
impact of information programs and the attitude of Cambodians towards the peace process.50
UNTAC’s commitment to opening bi-directional flows of information with the local
population in local settings illustrates an understanding of both the importance of maintaining
local consent and the value of establishing a cooperative relationship in order to transform the
conflict. In an environment of wavering consent for UN presence from the warring factions,
maintaining the support of the local population was critical to peacebuilding. Without a desire
among the local population to address underlying conflicts, no peace process is possible and any
gains made will be unlikely to survive following the departure of UN forces. Despite
overwhelming logistical barriers and complications in fulfilling the military dimensions of the
operation, the population’s direct interaction with information officers and desire for peace
allowed electoral components to succeed. Based in the population’s desire for peace,
49
50
Lehmann, Ingrid. p. 59.
Ibid., p. 64.
Maxey 17
Cambodians used the election to generate a political compromise between the contending
factions—a feat unattainable without local support and determination.51 However, the bidirectional flow of information which proved successful in informal, local settings was not
replicated in more official information dissemination components.
In the original UNTAC mandate, the task of holding free and fair elections was defined
by three factors: 1) the technical conduct of the poll; 2) the amount of violence, intimidation, and
harassment involved in the campaign; and 3) the degree to which incumbent parties have access
to unfair advantages.52 By the time elections were held, the latter two criteria were no longer
feasible in the Cambodian context, as an increasingly fragile security environment was
developing on the ground. In this environment, elections could not be as free and fair as those
held in other states or established democracies; however, based on the conduct and count at
polls, the election was technically free and fair, with voters believing both that their votes
mattered and that their ballots would remain secret.53 Despite intimidation and security threats,
Cambodian voters proved their determination to participate in elections. The level of
participation and voters’ understanding of the electoral process alludes to the success and impact
of UN information programs. As a result of this election, FUNCINPEC won the most seats,
followed by the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), and a three-party coalition was formed
between FUNCINPEC, the CPP, and the Khmer Rouge.54 Under coalition rule, the country was
re-named the Kingdom of Cambodia and the government-in-exile officially lost its seat at the
UN.55
51
Heininger, Janet. p. 131.
Doyle, Michael. 1997. p. 153.
53
Ibid., p. 155.
54
“Timeline: Cambodia.” p. 3.
55
Ibid.
52
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The information programs which gained strength registering and preparing Cambodians
to vote were also used to address the Agreements’ charge that UNTAC foster “an environment in
which respect for human rights shall be ensured.”56 Both the electoral and human rights
information programs were organized and implemented from a central structure, allowing for
shared information and strategies. In many cases, educating the population about its electoral
and political rights corresponded with the agenda of the human rights component. The UNTAC
human rights component—including a variety of staff and police monitors in addition to
information officers—was the largest and most influential of any peacekeeping operation at the
time of its implementation, designed to address the Cambodian legacy of human rights abuses
and genocide.57 The human rights component was carried out predominantly in the arenas of
institution building and education. The education program focused on training and information
distribution, using similar materials to the posters, brochures, and books produced by the
electoral component. Additionally, as in the electoral component, human rights staff members
were also deployed to conduct education and information programs throughout the country.58
The success of this component is reflected in the establishment of Cambodian human
rights groups with the combined ability to mobilize a membership of over 100,000.59 The
program also succeeded in creating a permanent UN Human Rights Center, which left behind a
positive institutional legacy and continued to monitor human rights and democracy
implementation following UNTAC’s departure.60 While the information and education
programs were implemented with general success, the broader human rights component suffered
from the absence of a judicial structure and institutions to hold individuals accountable for
56
Lehmann, Ingrid. p. 56.
Ibid.
58
Ibid., p. 57.
59
Doyle, Michael. 1997. p. 147.
60
Ibid.
57
Maxey 19
human rights violations. It was not until 2001—eight years after UNTAC’s departure—that a
tribunal to charge Khmer Rogue leaders with genocide was created.61 The component was
plagued by an ambitious mandate and insufficient resources; however, despite these
shortcomings, the information program allowed humans rights objectives to achieve a moderate
success relative to the circumstances.62 While creating positive new structures within the
country, the human rights component failed to dismantle or transform the existing legal
institutions which contributed to the epicenter of the Cambodian conflict.
Successes and Failures
In 1992, the UNTAC mission entered an extremely fragile environment with the intention
of implementing one of the largest and most ambitious peace operations in history. By the end
of the mission in 1993, the UN had failed to significantly transform the structures or historical
nature of power in Cambodia and many mission components remained incomplete or failed.63
Despite the ambitious inclusion of peacebuilding and institution creation within the
peacekeeping mandate, UNTAC was also unable to exercise effective control over the
administration or change the factional framework which contributed to violent conflict.
Additionally, many of the components successfully implemented during the mission were not
sustained following the UN’s departure.
However, in the face of these obstacles, elections—as free and fair as possible under the
circumstances—were conducted, empowering the local population to participate in determining
their political future and creating a population of informed voters. Additionally, human rights
education and training programs were successfully put in place and created a foundation for
Cambodian civil society. The impact of human rights information programs is reflected in the
“Timeline: Cambodia.” p. 3.
Heininger, Janet. p. 100.
63
Doyle, Michael. 1997. p. 163.
61
62
Maxey 20
emergence of a variety of groups working to improve the quality of life and respect for liberty in
Cambodia.64 The success and permanence of these groups is in part a consequence of their use
of bi-directional flows of information to involve and learn from the Cambodian population.
Having been a crucial factor in developing the programs, Cambodian citizens are more likely to
invest in their continued presence following UN departure.
Under the circumstances of intimidation and in light of Cambodia’s oppressive history,
UN information programs were a vital factor in shifting the balance of individual components
towards success. Mine-awareness programs conducted under UNAMIC formed relationships
with the local population from the operation’s earliest stages and provided communications
channels on which future information components could build. Mine-removal programs also
involved the local population in removing one of the most dangerous, physical remnants of
violence and underlying conflict. However, these programs could have been strengthened by
establishing a bi-directional flow of information and using local contacts to uncover and develop
strategies for addressing the epicenter of the conflict.
Building on the foundation of the mine-awareness programs, UNTAC’s human rights and
electoral information/education programs reached deeper into Cambodian communities, meeting
citizens in familiar environments, to both distribute and gather information. The bi-directional
channels opened by these programs allowed UN information officers to tailor programs to
community needs and monitor the success of implementation. Additionally, close contact with
the local population provided an opportunity to address underlying structural issues. After years
of disenfranchisement and violent oppression, a system was created which allowed Cambodian
citizens a voice in the direction of their society. The human rights component also generated a
widespread recognition and appreciation for fundamental human rights and established
64
Lehmann, Ingrid. p. 77.
Maxey 21
monitoring structures and the beginning of a civil society which can serve to protect and
represent the interests of citizens in the future.
However, while the human rights and electoral information programs were successful in
conducting tasks at the local level during the UNTAC mission, the failure to establish bidirectional information flows in the official, national aspects of the program acted as an
impediment to conflict transformation. In the cases of radio broadcasts and the use of official
media structures, Cambodians were less directly involved and information was disseminated
without creating a dialogue with the citizens. Thus, Cambodians were less invested in these
structures and the long-term commitment to their maintenance—necessary for the continuance of
conflict transformation—following UN departure. A more thoroughly applied conflict
transformation approach would allow success achieved during the mission to continue after UN
departure by recognizing local citizens as stakeholders and acknowledging their unique power to
uncover and transform the conflict
Conclusion
The UNTAC mission represented a first in UN peacekeeping, containing an ambitious
mandate which incorporated peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities. While significant
aspects of the mandate were not fulfilled, areas of successful implementation expose the
importance of information programs and their potential to function as channels for conflict
transformation in future missions. In order to extend the success of mandate implementation, the
Cambodia case reveals the need to integrate the immediate demands of peacekeeping with
programs which address the epicenter of the conflict and will continue to actively transform
societal structures following UN departure. By communicating directly with local populations
and involving them in mandate implementation, while also developing permanent institutions,
Maxey 22
the application of a conflict transformation approach to UN missions fills gaps in current
multidimensional operations and generates long-term change without neglecting the importance
of immediate implementation.
Maxey 23
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