King’s College London
University of London
This paper is part of an examination of the College counting towards
the award of a degree. Examinations are governed by the College
Regulations under the authority of the Academic Board.
MA EXAMINATION
7AAN2059
Philosophy of Language
Summer 2013
TIME ALLOWED: 2 HOURS
Answer TWO questions
Where a question gives you the option to answer one or more parts of
that question, credit will be given for the quality and coherence of
your answer rather than the quantity of parts answered.
DO NOT REMOVE THIS PAPER FROM THE EXAMINATION ROOM
TURN OVER WHEN INSTRUCTED
2013 © King’s College London
7AAN2059
Answer TWO questions.
1. What are words for? What is a language for?
2. What are reasonable goals for a semantic theory? How might a
theory be organised so as to meet these?
3. Frege writes that in certain cases, “The mere wording, as it can be
fixed in writing, is not the full expression of the thought, but for the
correct understanding of this one also needs knowledge of certain
accompanying circumstances which, along with this [the wording] are
used as means of the thought’s expression.” (“The Thought” (1918:
64))
a. In what sorts of cases does this problem arise?
b. How might it be addressed (or treated in a theory of language)?
c. What does it show about the function of words?
SEE NEXT PAGE
7AAN2059
4. Frege also says that sometimes one must change wording in order to
express the same thought under different circumstances. Here are two
things he says about this:
a) (1897): “The word ‘I’ designates different people in sentences
in the mouths of different people. It is not necessary that the thought
that he is cold by expressed by the one who is cold himself. This can
also occur though someone else, if he designates the one who is cold
by name.” (“Logik” (1897: 146))
b) (1918): “Now, everyone is presented to himself in a special and
primitive way, in which he is presented to no one else. If now Dr.
Lauben thinks that he has been injured, this primitive way in which he
is presented to himself probably lies at the basis of this. And a thought
determined in this way can only be grasped by Dr. Lauben himself. A
thought which only he can grasp is one which he cannot communicate.
So if he now says, ‘I have been wounded’, he must use this ‘I’ in a
since which others can also grasp, perhaps roughly in the sense of ‘the
one who is speaking to you at this moment’, by which he makes use of
the accompanying circumstances for the thought’s expression.” (“The
Thought” (1918: 66))
How can Frege say both these things? Or can he? Does he contradict
himself, or has he changed his mind? Why does this matter?
5. Could two people share all the psychological states it is possible for
them to share given the differences in their (respective local)
environments, and nonetheless speak of, and mean to speak of,
different things when each says, e.g., ‘Copper conducts electricity’, or
‘Linen breathes’?
SEE NEXT PAGE
7AAN2059
6. Answer a) and/or b)
a) Are there (could there be) any examples of intelligible, coherent
assertions which are neither true nor false? If no one could produce
one, is it then true that every intelligible, coherent assertion is either
true or false?
b) A different question: Could there be such a thing in logic as a truthvalue gap? How is this different?
7. Answer any or all of these
a) What is a singular thought? Why do there need to be singular
thoughts? Or do there?
b) What might an expression of a singular thought be? What does this
show about the semantics of a language?
c) Are there objects singular thoughts cannot be about?
8. Can there be different singular thoughts, of the same object, that it
is such-and-such way? What would be the point of this? When and how
would it happen? (Optional: How if at all do such differences relate to
difference in meanings of words?)
9. Discuss the notion same thought. When would two expressions of a
thought be expressions of one thought? (Optional: What is the
importance of this for the semantics of attitude-ascriptions?)
SEE NEXT PAGE
7AAN2059
10. EITHER
a) What is intensionality? Is there any? What is its connection (if any) to
intentionality?
OR
b) A principle (‘The Principle of Substitutivity’): exchanging a part of
an expression of a thought (alternatively an element of a thought on a
given decomposition) for another, where this leaves the reference (or
Bedeutung) of the part unchanged, leaves the reference (or truthvalue) of the whole expression (or thought expressed) unchanged. (A
notable case: when the reference of the part, or element, is an
object.) For the sake of this principle Frege holds that in certain cases
the reference of a whole expression of a thought—normally, he thinks,
a truth value—is the thought expressed itself. (Frege refers to this as
‘oblique reference’.) How does this help preserve the principle? How
might it help in understanding what attitude ascriptions (e.g., belief
ascriptions) say?
OR
c) A thought: where the principle of substitutivity did not hold, neither
would existential generalisation (if Fa, then there exists an x such that
Fx). Why should this be true? Is it confirmed by attitude ascriptions? If
so, how?
11. Kaplan takes the function of words (in the expression of thoughts)
to be making recognisable the thought expressed. Having thus diverged
from, e.g., Davidson, he nonetheless takes sentence meaning to
identify (and be identified by) a function from (values of) fixed
parameters to thoughts. How is he able to do this? What pressures
move him towards doing so? (Why should meaning determine functions
from anything to anything?)
FINAL PAGE