King’s College London
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
This paper is part of an examination of the College counting towards
the award of a degree. Examinations are governed by the College
Regulations under the authority of the Academic Board.
BSc/BA/BEng EXAMINATION
5AAN5000
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE MIND
SUMMER 2013
TIME ALLOWED: 3 HOURS
Answer THREE questions, AT LEAST ONE from each section.
Avoid overlap in your answers.
DO NOT REMOVE THIS PAPER FROM THE EXAMINATION
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2013 © King’s College London
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5AAN5000
Section A
1. Explain the difference between phenomenal consciousness and
access consciousness. Is the distinction important for the scientific
study of consciousness?
2. If a patient in vegetative state showed fMRI evidence of intact visual
imagery in response to instructions, but failed to answer questions
correctly through visual imagery activations, what should we conclude
about her state of consciousness?
3. What is a neural correlate of consciousness?
4. Explain the distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of
explanation. Should findings from scientific psychology and
neuroscience figure in personal level explanations?
5. EITHER
(a) Is it legitimate to treat a psychological mechanism as processing
representations without there being an intelligent reader of those
representations?
OR
(b) Can the representational theory of mind admit of representations
that lack any semantically-significant constituent structure? Are there
any?
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5AAN5000
6. Explain the most important characteristics of a psychological
module. What explanatory work do they do?
Section B
7. Can a substance dualist provide an adequate account of
psychophysical causation?
8. In what sense, if any, is knowing what it is like to see red simply an
ability, and why might this matter?
9. Does Kripke's objection rest on a spurious contrast between the
identity theory of mind and other theoretical identifications?
10. Evaluate the absent qualia objection to functionalism.
11. Does Davidson provide any good arguments for the anomalism of
the mental?
12. In what sense, if any, does the content of my belief that there is
water in the glass depend upon the chemical composition of the stuff
that we call 'water'?
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