‘A Deeper Channel Floats All Boats’:
The Port Economy as Urban Growth Engine
David Jaffee
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
University of North Florida
Jacksonville, FL 32224
Ph: 904-620-2215
Email: djaffee@unf.edu
Forthcoming in Environment and Planning A
Abstract
This paper analyzes an urban growth strategy revolving around port logistics. The
growing significance of port economies is linked to the larger process of globalization
and the increasing geographic distance between the points of production and
consumption. Transportation and logistics emerge as a potential growth scheme for cities
and regions that seek to develop “logistics clusters”. The analysis is based on the case of
Jacksonville Florida, and the effort by public and private officials to identify and promote
the maritime port as an engine of growth. This case study considers the efficacy of the
growth machine model in understanding this urban development process as well as the
limitations of this approach when applied to a development strategy based on the
“strategic coupling” of the urban economy with global supply chains under conditions of
intense inter-port competition. The requirements of the port logistics sector for largescale publicly financed infrastructure projects, and the modification of the natural
environment for commerce, poses unique challenges and uncertainties for this
development strategy.
The analysis of urban political economy has been shaped heavily by the insights
of the growth machine model (Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch,1987) that posits the
power and influence of land-based elites in advancing a pro-growth agenda. As urban
areas develop plans for economic expansion, and advance particular strategies for local
and regional economic development, they are supported by elite coalitions and promoted
through the rhetoric of universal economic interest and civic boosterism. This paper
analyzes various dynamics of an urban development strategy in the context of the recent
growth agenda advanced in support of the Jacksonville (Florida) Port Authority (herein
referred to as JAXPORT) and the maritime port’s expansion. This case study will serve
to highlight and illuminate some of the ways in which the growth machine model and
associated forms of “boosterism” (Cronon, 1991; Elfin & Wysong, 1990; Lessof, 2008;
Boyle, 1999) represent a powerful and compelling framework for understanding urban
development. However, this model has limitations in the context of an urban and regional
development strategy tied to the port logistics sector and global supply chains requiring
public investment in large-scale infrastructure (Erie, 2004; Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011).
In the case of Jacksonville, this involves a consideration of the relationship among fixed
place-based geographic assets that include the “natural” maritime environment, the
intermodal mobility of global commodities, and the costs of modifying the “natural”
conditions to strategically couple the local economy with international commerce.
Together, these factors pose some unique and significant challenges to the aspiration of
the growth machine coalition.
Introduction and Background: Growth Machines and Port Economies
One of the most widely used perspectives in the analysis of the process and
dynamics of urban economic development initiatives is the growth machine model
(Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987). The ability of the meta-theme of growth to
mobilize and bind local elites is based primarily on the material interests of those who
own land and commercial properties, and the prospect that growth will enhance the
exchange-value of these assets. These interests contribute to the political mobilization of
elites who seek to influence local government on fiscal and regulatory matters related to
stimulating growth and land use policy. As a consequence, many other local urban actors
and constituencies may also benefit from growth due to the resources that flow from an
increasing population, income stream, and tax base. This model includes an equally
critical dialectical element fueled by the “countercoalitions” that can emerge as growth
infringes upon and threatens both the use values and the potential exchange values of
urban spaces and suburban neighborhoods (Logan & Molotch, 1987). The mobilization
of countercoalitions can thwart efforts of local elites to impose their land use preferences
on the local population.
Closely associated with the growth machine model, emphasizing the importance
of legitimacy, is the role of civic boosterism that can serve to unify the community,
mobilize public opinion, and shape identities of place. In this view, the ability of local
elites to advance the growth imperative, and particular associated development projects,
requires a range of strategies and tactics that serve both to convince the local population
of the goodness of the growth plans as well as shape the larger image of the city and
region in a manner that is consonant with the intended development. Boyle (1999, p. 55)
has described these “efforts made by local elites to refashion collective emotion and
consciousness within cities in order to legitimate political projects that function primarily
in their interests” as “Urban Propaganda Projects”. While the term “booster” was
originally used to describe land speculators in the American frontier during the
nineteenth century (Cronon 1991), today it refers to any type of “promotion of regional
economic growth” (Eflin and Wysong, 1990), and associated strategies or tactics (Gold &
Ward, 1994). Boosterism has been the subject of studies of Sunbelt regions and cities
such as Corpus Christi, Texas (Lessof, 2008), and Tampa, Florida (Eflin and Wysong,
1990) that have attempted to promote redevelopment, a new regional identity, as well as
expand the tax base through tourism and particular forms of commerce.
This analysis considers the ways in which the local port economy is supported
and promoted by the local pro-growth coalition and the associated legitimacy campaigns
designed to mobilize public opinion and define the collective identity of the region.
In addition to these more familiar perspectives on urban growth strategy, one
must also consider how the particular economic sector that is being promoted – in this
case the port economy devoted to commodity transportation and distribution, rather than
production or consumption -- shapes the application of the growth machine model and
introduce several other factors in the analysis of the local political economy. The “port
economy” is defined here as the constellation of economic activities that revolve around
the transportation, logistics, and distribution of goods moving through a maritime port.
The growing significance of port economies over the past twenty years can be
directly linked to the larger process of globalization and the dispersion of production, or
the increasing distance between the point of production and the point of consumption
(Bonacich & Wilson, 2009; Dicken, 1998). This is reflected in the well-established and
growing literature on global commodity chains, global production networks (GPNs), and
global value chains (GVCs) (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994; Henderson, et al., 2002; Coe,
et al., 2004). Under a globalized production system, raw materials are extracted in one
place, parts and components may be produced in another, manufacturing may take place
in yet another, and final consumption still another. As the geographic space between
interdependent activities in a commodity chain increases, transportation and logistics
take on an increasingly vital role in the circulation and distribution of commodities. Not
only operationally, but also financially, as there is continuous pressure to keep logistics
and supply-chain costs as low as possible so that the comparative advantage gained from
production in low cost nations is not lost in the transportation and distribution process.
For the port economy, the primary focus is on “container logistics” which involves the
intermodal movement of containerized finished and semi-finished goods. In this context,
U.S. ports, and the urban areas and regions in proximity, serve as the spatial nodes
through which global commodity/production chains flow via intermodal transportation to
national wholesale and retail markets.
On the one hand, the port, as a node in global production networks, has increased
in relevance and significance as a result of the spatial dispersion of production, the
growing distance between production and consumption, and the subsequent need for
transportation and logistics networks and gateways (Hesse & Rodrigue, 2004, 2006). On
the other hand, the port economy itself engenders a spatially concentrated and fixed set of
interdependent landside distribution activities and infrastructure, usually in urban settings
(see Jacobs, Ducruet, & de Langen, 2010). Logistics related services are central to this
concentrated activity, described by Bonacich and Wilson (2008:64) as “a special kind of
industrial district, one geared to the process of international trade.” Rodrigue, Comtois,
and Slack (2009) describe these areas as “freight distribution clusters where an array of
distribution activities agglomerate” with the advantages of spatial proximity based on the
factors of land, accessibility, infrastructure, planning and regulation, economies of
agglomeration, and internal multiplying effects. The growing prominence of goodsmovement industries necessitates greater attention to cities as “terminals” (Hesse, 2008)
or “gateways” (Notteboom & Rodrigue 2005) through which the flow of commodities is
coordinated (Erie, 2004). The geographic expansion of the sphere of commodity
circulation and distribution, linked logically to the spatial reorganization of production
and consumption, points to the role of logistics as a potential growth strategy for cities
and regions who seek to develop “logistics clusters” (see Sheffi, 2012).
Container vessel cargo coming from Asia, which makes up the vast majority of
goods flooding into the US market, is known as “discretionary cargo” because it is not
linked or tied to any single geographic location or market. That is, it could as easily enter
the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, though destined for the Midwest and the East
coast (aka “landbridge”), instead of New York and New Jersey; similarly, cargo could be
routed through the Panama Canal and into Jacksonville Florida or another East coast port
to reach the same market. With cargo loaded into standardized shipping containers, and
an intermodal truck and rail system capable of moving the containers rapidly throughout
the United States, shippers and ocean carriers have a great deal of discretion over the port
of call. This transformation in the nature of maritime cargo, and the loosening of the
relationship between the port and final market destination, serve to intensify port
competition which is now driven less by one’s particular geographic location than the
port infrastructure, the costs of moving cargo, and the ability of the cargo to seamlessly
move through an extended -- inter-organizationally and geographically -- supply chain
(Fleming & Baird, 1999; Notteboom, 2004; Jacobs, 2007).
Therefore, the analysis of the port economy as an engine of urban economic
development may pose a different set of issues, challenges, and strategies than other
forms of development. Accordingly, it may require a theoretical lens that incorporates the
emergence and consolidation of neo-liberal styles of urban governance and development
policy as well as the global forces that have fueled and reinforced these tendencies. More
broadly, it is also likely to conform to the larger shift of sub-national governmental units - such as cities, states, and counties – competing for and providing capital investment and
thus playing less a “managerial” than an “entrepreneurial” role (Harvey, 1989). The
former involved regulation, redistribution, and service provision whereas the latter entails
neo-liberal supply-side oriented policies designed to attract, facilitate and subsidize
capital investment and accumulation. As part of this larger shift toward neo-liberal
economic policy at the international, national, and now local levels, recent trends in urban
political economy have highlighted the growing significance of particular forms of public
investment (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011). Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodrigues (2002)
emphasize the importance of large-scale urban development projects (UDP) as part of the
new urban policy (NUP). This form of urban governance privileges state-financed
development projects driven by private–public partnerships but is restricted in scope to
the imperatives of capital accumulation. Similarly, Brenner and Theodore (2002: 369371) outline the creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth,
commodification, and the rule of capital. At the urban/local level the various strategies
include new networked forms of local governance involving the establishment of publicprivate partnerships, the creation of privatized urban infrastructures designed to position
cities within supranational capital flows, and the construction of large-scale megaprojects
designed to attract investment and reconfigure land-use patterns. A prior analysis of a
logistics-based urban development strategy (Negrey, Osgood, & Goetzke, 2011), situated
in a growth machine framework, points both to the strategy of leveraging locational
advantages to participate in global supply chains as well as the necessity for significant
infrastructural investment to sustain a competitive advantage. In that case, Louisville’s
effort to establish the city as the UPS airline hub was fueled by a public-private growth
machine partnership promoting public financed airport infrastructure.
While the growth machine model provides a general framework for the analysis
of the interests and actions of pro-growth coalitions, it fails to delineate some of the
unique dynamics and elements that characterize more recent trends in urban and regional
development strategy. These are based on insertion into globalized chains of production
and distribution, the expanding significance of logistics, and the associated infrastructure
requirements for strategy success. There are several theoretical and case study
contributions that provide this greater conceptual specificity as well as a framework for
interpreting the particular case of Jacksonville.
Jacobs and Lagendijk (2014) outline a theoretical framework based on the
concept of “strategic coupling”. Applied to the case of seaports as a fixed node in global
production networks (GPNs), with containerized cargo as the global flow, urban and
regional development strategies involve coupling the “fixity” of infrastructure with the
“mobility” of intermodal logistics, as the latter requires the former. In this model, a
public and business coalition advances the need for and financing of a “structure of
provision” (Ball, 1986). More specifically, “The provision and deployment of key
infrastructure – physical as well as regulatory – is one of the prime vehicles through
which to facilitate the insertion of a place into a GPN and, thus, to accomplish strategic
coupling” (Jacobs and Lagendijk, 2014: 51).
In a similar vein, Hall and Clark’s (2010) study of the Vancouver port identifies a
“politics of reconnection” between global shipping interests and port city-regions. While
the forces of discretionary containerized cargo and intermodal transportation have
weakened the connection between seaports and the city-region, fixed infrastructural
requirements necessitate reconnection. Using the work of Cox (1998), the site of
reconnection is made with those ‘spaces of dependence’ that situate physical logistics
infrastructure and ‘spaces of engagement’ comprising local political activity aimed at
ensuring infrastructural provision.
Thus, in addition to the growth machine, these more recent and emerging
political-economic models of urban development can inform the interpretation and
analysis of the expanding Jacksonville port economy. One of the most significant ‘spaces
of dependence’ for the Jacksonville maritime port is the St Johns River channel that
provides access to the JAXPORT container terminals. In order to deliver a “structure of
provision” that can enable “strategic coupling”, the growth coalition must garner support
and financing for a costly infrastructure project that will modify this natural resource.
The Case of Jacksonville Florida and JAXPORT
We can now consider the case of Jacksonville in this larger context. Material for
this case study is based on a diverse range of information and data sources. These include
local media reports from the Florida Times-Union and Jacksonville Business Journal,
interviews and conversations with various significant public officials and private sector
actors, archival documents posted on the JAXPORT webpage or requested by the author,
and participant and unobtrusive observation at public hearings and task force meetings.
Geographically, Jacksonville is located in the northeast corner of the state of
Florida. The Jacksonville metropolitan area has a population of roughly 1.3 million. Its
economy is highly diversified among finance and insurance, biomedical and healthcare,
retail trade, manufacturing, and construction. Growth has been largely generated by
population increase and associated residential and commercial building construction. The
city had no singular economic identity, but has regarded itself as a potential
transportation and logistics hub.
Downtown Jacksonville lies on the banks of the St. Johns River 18 miles west of
where the mouth flows into the Atlantic Ocean. The river serves as the channel for the
JAXPORT marine terminals located at several points along its banks. The Jacksonville
Port Authority, also known as JAXPORT, dominates and determines the priorities of the
Jacksonville port economy. JAXPORT is a government entity that operates as a private
corporation. Local tax revenue is used for its operating expenses. As a “landlord port”,
JAXPORT leases its land, terminals, and equipment to private maritime firms and this
source of revenue supports expansion and maintenance of physical facilities and
infrastructure.
In 2005 JAXPORT operated two major terminals; Talleyrand, located close to
downtown Jacksonville, and Blount Island located closer to the mouth of the St Johns
River. The cargo coming through these terminals was highly diversified among bulk,
break-bulk, vehicles, and containers. The primary trade lane for JAXPORT was NorthSouth with the Caribbean and Central and South America, and with the leading trading
partner Puerto Rico (which does not qualify as “foreign” trade). The relatively low level
of container traffic compared to other major ports, coupled with the almost exclusive
North-South trade lanes, made JAXPORT a relatively minor player in the U.S. port
system.
A critical turning point for the Jacksonville port economy, and the emergence of
the port as a major focal point for urban/regional economic development, came in 2005
when JAXPORT retained John C. Martin Associates to conduct a business and strategic
analysis of the JAXPORT enterprise (Martin Associates, 2005). Martin Associates is the
leading consulting firm for maritime ports in the United States; they conduct strategic
plans and economic impact studies for many U.S. port authorities. The most critical
component of the JAXPORT plan pertained to recommendations for expanding the port
operation.
At the time of the Martin Associates study (2005) there were three major factors
fueling East coast port optimism. First, the high volume of containerized imports flooding
into West coast ports, namely Los Angeles and Long Beach, was producing serious
congestion problems for shippers and carriers. There were questions over whether the
West coast ports could continue to effectively and efficiently absorb the projected
increases in Asian imports. Second, the West coast had recently been the site of a costly
labor dispute between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and
the Pacific Maritime Association in 2002 (Hall, 2004). The labor union representing East
coast longshore workers – the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) – was
regarded as less militant and politically radical than the ILWU (Jaffee, 2010). Therefore,
the shipping industry was looking for additional and alternative ports through which to
move their cargo. Third, and what would be a factor of growing importance in enhancing
the potential role of East coast ports, the Panama Canal was planning to widen and
deepen its locks (originally slated for completion in 2014) thus allowing the largest
container vessels (known as “Post-Panamax” given their inability to traverse the canal
due to width/depth restrictions) to travel directly to East and Gulf coast ports. Together,
these developments were interpreted as representing a huge opportunity to capture
additional containerized cargo as well as justifying the public and private investments in
new and expanded port infrastructure. More specifically, Martin Associates
recommended that, in order for Jacksonville to take advantage of these opportunities and
move to the upper echelon of East Coast ports (with, for example, New York/New Jersey,
Norfolk, or Savannah), it would have to, first and foremost, engage in the East-West
Asian trade lanes and move many more containers.
JAXPORT followed closely this recommendation. In 2008, it signed
agreements with two of the leading global Asian shipping lines – Mitsui MOL
(Japanese) and Hanjin (Korean). In 2010 the first 158-acre container terminal was
completed at the Dames Point location (built at a cost of $230 million) and leased by
Mitsui MOL (and operated by its TraPac subsidiary). A 90-acre Hanjin container
terminal was slated for completion in 2013. Each container terminal was expected to
be capable of an annual throughput of 800,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEUs)
containers when operating at full throttle. This increase in container traffic, it was
promised, would move JAXPORT into the upper tier of U.S. maritime ports.
Growth Coalitions and Boosterism
It is a central thesis of this paper that the nature of the growth machine and
boosterism strategy takes a distinct shape due to the sector of the local economy that is
being lauded as the engine of economic development and job growth. In this case it is the
port logistics sector linked to trends and patterns of global production and distribution,
and requiring large-scale infrastructural investments, aimed at reconfiguring the coastal
seascape, and funded with taxpayer dollars. The significance of these factors will be
highlighted below.
With the expansion of container terminal infrastructure at JAXPORT, two forms of
boosterism began to develop that conform to patterns observed elsewhere. The first form
– what I will call “generalized boosterism” – promotes the entire regional economy while
emphasizing port logistics as one of the major sources of dynamism and reasons invest
and locate in Jacksonville. The initial pro-growth coalition promoting the port economy
as a regional economic engine was first led by the Cornerstone Regional Development
Partnership, later renamed the JAXUSA Partnership, a private nonprofit organization
affiliated with the regional chamber of commerce. The partnership includes relationships
with development agencies in the seven county region of Northeast Florida. JAXUSA is
dedicated to corporate relocation, expansion, and site selection. The generalized
language takes the following form (JAXUSA Partnership, 2014): “Our close-knit
community of business leaders promotes the seven-county region and helps other
businesses – like yours – relocate to or expand in the region. If you’re ready for an easyto-access, rapidly growing market, JAXUSA Partnership will find the perfect site for your
next venture. Our market is affordable, ideally situated on the East Coast, and ready to
welcome new businesses looking to expand in Northeast Florida from other cities and
countries.”
In their effort to market the region, they include six economic sectors – financial
services, health and life sciences, logistics, aviation and aerospace, advanced
manufacturing, and information technology. The logistics sector, as a potential magnet
for investment and relocation, is placed in the context of the regions “global presence”.
The language of boosterism centered on the port logistics sector emphasized the
following (JAXUSA Partnership, 2014): “We have an intermodal system that is second to
none, a well-established Latin American trade lane presence and rapidly expanding
Asian and European service. Our deep water port, JAXPORT, has three marine terminals
that handle 8 million tons of cargo, including more than 515,000 vehicles, annually. It
also supports 65,000 jobs in the region and generates $19 billion in annual economic
impact.”
Along with such sloganeering associated with generalized boosterism, there was also
”targeted boosterism” involving the more concerted efforts by cities and growth
coalitions to construct symbolic representations of place (Shields, 1992) and engage in
“place management” (Ashworth & Voogd, 1994), “cultural politics” (McCann, 2002), or
the social construction of place highlighting particular economic or cultural sectors. This
has manifested itself into what is referred to as “urban branding” (Kavaratzis and
Ashworth, 2005) based on the larger principles of corporate branding. As part of the
promotional campaign to redefine the regions economic strengths and attraction,
economic development officials branded Jacksonville as “America’s Logistics Center”,
an effort that, like all good branding schemes, includes a distinctive logo (see below).
The newly developed branding logo was placed at various strategic locations around
Jacksonville. The logo proclaims Jacksonville as America’s Logistics Center despite the
fact that there are several other cities and regions in the United States that can more
legitimately claim this title.
In addition to the symbolic dimensions of boosterism, there are also the very real
and familiar material interests that fuel the growth machine and have a direct stake in an
expanded port economy. These business interests could be divided into the “diffuse” and
“specific”. The diffuse interests are represented by the larger pro-growth coalition
supporting almost any investment that fuels population growth and expands the demand
for real estate, driving up property values generally. The unwavering support from the
local Chamber of Commerce reflects this segment. Specific forms of support come from
those business interests more closely connected to and standing to directly benefit from
an expanding port economy. These would include logistics firms broadly defined, those
commercial real estate developers that have invested in the construction of warehouse
and distribution center facilities, and firms likely to gain contracts from the expansion
and modification of the land and coastal infrastructure required for the movement of
cargo and goods.
Moving Beyond the Growth Machine: “Second Nature”, Structures of Provision,
and the Speculative Mega-Project
So far we have highlighted a fairly common and predictable pattern of growth
machine-style boosterism involving broad coalitions of business interests, represented by
regional development entities and firms, supporting potential local and regional sources
of economic dynamism. But a development strategy resting on the expansion of a port
economy, devoted to distribution, rather than production or consumption, and dependent
on global commodity flows, introduces several interrelated factors that contribute to a
deviation from the more familiar growth machine pattern described thus far. This poses
some unique and greater challenges for both gaining public support and realizing the
development objectives (see Erie, 2004).
First, a growing and competitive port economy requires what I will term
speculative mega-projects that involve huge public sector investment in, and often an
extended federal approval process of, large-scale coastal and transportation infrastructure
as a presumed necessary, but ultimately insufficient, condition for realizing the economic
development objectives; speculative because, in this case, there is no guarantee that “if
you build it, they will come.” (See Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011 for a different but related
angle on “speculative infrastructure” emphasizing the use of capital markets and longterm bonds as high-risk financing mechanisms).
The need for a speculative mega-project is prompted by a type of conflict that
departs from the standard tension highlighted in the original growth machine model. In
the original formulation (Logan & Molotch, 1987), there is a Polanyi-like double
movement (Polanyi, 1957) that posits the emergence of a socio-political “countercoalition” to challenge the dominant local elite growth machine when the use value of
land and property is threatened by developers intent on extracting exchange value.
However, in the initial stages of the JAXPORT expansion strategy, there was no
opposition, latent or manifest, to the container terminal development plan. JAXPORT
was successful in achieving the first stage of the consultant’s recommendations by
signing long-term leases with Asian shipping lines and constructing a large and highly
visible 158-acre container terminal (with Mitsui/TraPac) at the foot of the widely traveled
Dames Point Bridge.
The primary obstacle standing in the way of Jacksonville realizing its aspiration
to become “America’s Logistics Center”, or stymying the efforts of the port economy
growth coalition, was not created by organized human opposition but rather by the very
natural resource that made the port economy possible in the first place – the St. Johns
River. More specifically, there were two impediments. First, the existence of strong tidal
currents at the point where the St Johns River intersects the Intracoastal Waterway
created a nozzle effect that prevented 24-hour-a-day navigational port access for
container vessels. Second, and what has proven ultimately more significant, at a current
depth of 40 feet, the existing St. Johns River channel did not meet the ideally desired 50
foot depth for the largest post-Panamax vessels that would soon be able to traverse the
Panama Canal. The first issue would require a coastal re-engineering project; the second
a massive and costly dredging/deepening project – that is, a speculative mega-project.
The role of natural physical conditions in both facilitating and thwarting the
aspirations of commerce has been articulated by Cronon’s (1991) concept of “second
nature” (see also Lefebvre, 1976). Developed out of his historical analysis of the role of
Chicago in the development of the larger U.S. economy, Cronon highlights how
seemingly “natural” advantages are used to promote the city as an attractive location for
particular forms of economic activity. As he explains: “A kind of ‘second nature’,
designed by people and ‘improved’ toward human ends, gradually emerged atop the
original landscape that nature – ‘first nature’ – had created as such an inconvenient
jumble. Despite the subtly differing logic that lay behind each, the geography of second
nature was in its own way as compelling as the geography of first nature, so boosters and
others often forgot the distinction between them. Both seemed quite natural.” (p.56).
In the case of Chicago, much was made of the role of the railroad as Chicagoans
“assimilated the railroad to the doctrine of natural advantages, merging first and second
nature so that the two became almost indistinguishable” with “first and second nature
mingled to form a single world” (p. 72-73). Similarly, for Jacksonville, other “natural”
advantages have been be championed that are in fact of the “second nature” variety such
as the interstate highways that offer north-south and east-west transit (I-95 and I-10,
respectively) as well as the CSX and Norfolk Southern rail systems that link to national
markets.
But the most significant as well as challenging “natural” advantage that
Jacksonville possesses is the St. Johns River feeding into the Atlantic Ocean. At the most
fundamental level, this gives Jacksonville a “jurisdictional advantage” over other
locations that have no such access to global shipping lanes. The port in Jacksonville was
originally built and expanded to exploit this physical geographic asset permitting
maritime shipping. Since the port’s inception, the river has been continually modified and
shaped in order to serve as a commercial conduit. While both the dredging/deepening and
Mile Point projects are currently framed as alterations to natural conditions, they are
simply the latest phase in the seemingly endless reconfiguration of the physical
environment to satisfy the imperatives of commerce. The first dredging and deepening
operation was conducted in 1892 bringing the depth to 15 feet. In 1902 the river channel
was deepened further to 24 feet and its width expanded to 300 feet from Jacksonville to
the mouth at the Atlantic Ocean. In 1924 the channel was deepened again to 30 feet. In
1945 the river was redirected at Dames Point creating the Fulton Cut and forming Blount
Island. Three additional dredging projects from 1965 to the present have established the
current depth at 40-42 feet.
Thus, as Cronon has noted, “Whatever the advantages of a particular landscape,
people seem to always reshape it according to their vision of what it should be…the
location with so many ‘advantages’ turned out to have some daunting disadvantages as
well” (p.55). For Jacksonville, while the river makes possible the existence of the port, it
is now, once again, deemed deficient, in its present form, to satisfy the next phase of
maritime commerce involving the scale economy of post-Panamax container vessels.
There is a second closely related and distinctive aspect of the port economy
development strategy that further reinforces its increasingly speculative status. This is the
fact that the need for, approval of, and potential economic benefits accruing from, the
necessary megaprojects, are determined by forces largely outside the control of local
officials and urban elites. The need of all ports to expand infrastructure and deepen
channels is determined by the multinational shipping lines that seek to move greater and
greater quantities of containerized cargo with larger and larger vessels, thus reducing
transportation costs. The first generation container vessels carried approximately 1000
TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) containers and required between 20-30 feet of water
draft. Today, the largest New Post-Panamax Triple-E vessels can carry up to 18,000
TEUs requiring at least 50 feet of draft. Once a decision has been made locally to
respond to the demands of international shippers and carriers for deeper water, the
deepening project must then be studied and approved by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and then Congress must also approve and then provide Federal appropriations
to fund the project.
Assuming this extended approval and appropriations process is successful, and
the project is completed, there remains the question of whether the shippers and carriers
will chose to include a particular port in its port rotations. If there was only one port on
the East coast, or if the containerized cargo was tied to a specific geographic location, the
return on the public investment might be assured. However, there are multiple ports
competing with each other for the discretionary cargo that can conceivably enter the US
consumer market through any port, moving to its final destination using the welldeveloped U.S. intermodal transportation system (truck and rail).
Table One lists the largest East Coast ports, by TEU throughput, the depth of their
channels currently and, in parentheses, if proposed projects are funded and completed.
Almost every port on this list is seeking to expand its terminal infrastructure and/or
deepen its channel in order to become a leading port that can receive the largest container
vessels. Some will win and some will lose, and the urban development strategy, and the
mega-project on which it is based, could all be for naught.
While most urban development projects are unable to guarantee absolute success
and involve some speculative character, it should be particularly clear in this case that the
“supply” of port infrastructure – building container terminals and deepening channels -does not create its own demand. In fact, economists have described the demand for
transportation and logistics services as a “derived demand” (Bamford, 2001), meaning
that the demand for and use of these services, and associated infrastructure, is determined
by the supply and the demand for something else, namely containerized cargo (see
Rodrigue, 2006 for an alternative view).
There is one final distinguishing factor worth noting. Unlike an urban
development strategy that is building a place-based location for production or
consumption, this particular segment of the logistics industry is creating a gateway for the
entry and mobility of freight, largely shipping containers (see Cidell 2012; Hesse, 2008),
and the further geographic flow and distribution to final consumer destinations that are
potentially far from the port city. This aspect of modern containerized shipping and
intermodal transportation has led to the widely cited phenomenon that container terminals
entail a geographic concentration of costs but a wide dispersion of benefits (Grobar,
2008; Hall, 2008; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005). The concentrated costs borne by the
urban area include the construction of infrastructure (McCalla, 1999), sub-optimal land
use patterns (Hesse, 2008), and traffic congestion, pollution, and noise (McCalla, Slack,
& Comtois, 2001; Hesse, 2008). The dispersed benefits include the income, employment,
and revenue derived from warehouses, distribution centers, and wholesale and retail trade
that can be located far into the hinterland where the goods and cargo are transported.
Again, this poses challenges for those championing the port economy as a local engine of
economic growth and prosperity, potentially undermining support for the growth machine
logic (Schneider, 1992).
Overall, in contrast to the standard growth machine dynamic, it is important to
note that the limited and fragmented opposition to the river dredging/deepening had less
to do with the intended conversion of a “use value” into an “exchange value”, or the
environmental impact of dredging, than the possibility that the financial and
environmental costs of the megaproject would not be sufficiently compensated by the
promised local economic and fiscal benefits; or, to put it in business parlance, that there
would be an unacceptable ‘return on investment’. While the river is a public resource
that people use for recreational purposes and enjoy for its aesthetic beauty, it’s second
(third, fourth, and fifth) nature as a long-standing conduit for commerce makes the
proposed dredging/deepening project a far less dramatic or threatening development.
Instead, the fact that it is a large public rather than private expense, with a sizable share
potentially coming from an already strained city budget, has placed the growth strategy
under greater scrutiny. Like all cities, Jacksonville faces the perennial fiscal
contradiction to reduce the tax burden while at the same time maintaining favorable
conditions for private investment. Added to this is Jacksonville’s heavy reliance on
property taxes during a housing foreclosure crisis, stagnant economic conditions, and
mounting pension obligations. The net result was a downgrading of the city’s bond rating
in June of 2014. Together these factors contribute to a greater sensitivity to cost-tobenefit ratios by both public officials and the local population. It would seem that this
may be a developing trend given reduced Federal support leading one study (Kirkpatrick
& Smith, 2011: 477) to conclude that “prospects for urban growth coalitions have
radically dimmed.”
The centrality of the speculative megaproject in the Jacksonville economic
development narrative aligns closely with theorizing that incorporates the growing
dominance of neo-liberal political economic policy and governance (Swyngedouw, et al.
2002; Brenner & Theodore, 2002) emphasizing public-private partnerships, the “strategic
coupling” of the urban economy into global flows of capital and goods, and public
investment in megaprojects that provide the necessary “structures of provision” to attract
commodity flows (Jacobs & Lagendijk, 2014).
Infrastructure Boosterism Campaigns and Economic Impact Studies
Promoting and galvanizing public support for the speculative mega-project
designed to modify and alter the natural restrictions to maritime commerce required a
new type of boosterism campaign strategy. Throughout the period when the Army Corps
was planning, conducting, and completing its study of the river deepening project, there
were several campaigns to garner support locally, and in Washington DC, for the
JAXPORT expansion efforts. These campaigns were less about the glorification of an
economy based on port logistics, than about galvanizing political support for public
investment in the megaproject. The first campaign, in 2010, designed to encourage
speedy approval of the infrastructure projects, was launched by a coalition that included
JAXPORT, the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce, and a small number local
businesses. They organized a lobbying campaign to pressure the Army Corps and
congressional representatives to fund and shorten the timeline for project approval and
completion. This campaign developed the slogan “Bring The Noise”. The stated mission
of this campaign, that claimed to have mobilized the community to write 14,000 letters to
public officials in support of the infrastructural projects, is “to mobilize North Florida’s
competitive spirit to drive port progress, a stronger economy, and a better quality of life
because everyone has a stake in the port’s growth and together we are more than the sum
of our parts”. The “title sponsor” of the campaign was England-Thims & Miller Inc. a
Jacksonville-based firm specializing in the management of large-scale infrastructure
projects. Other sponsors include CSX, a rail and intermodal transportation company; the
Northeast Florida Association of Realtors; RS&H, a facilities and infrastructure
consulting firm; Degrove Surveyors, Inc., a land and hydrographic surveying consultant;
HDR, an architecture, engineering, consulting, construction and related services
company; and Taylor Engineering, a coastal engineering firm. In short, this community
mobilization effort was led by firms that stood to gain directly from the taxpayer
supported dredging/deepening mega-project. Alschuler and Luberoff (2003, pp. 220223) confirm the point:" Mega-project support coalitions were, with rare exceptions,
spearheaded by business enterprises with very direct interests at stake. Nearly all projects
conferred disproportionate benefits on specific enterprises and locations, however, and
the support coalitions for these tended to be led by companies that stood to be prime
beneficiaries.”
The local business press has also served as a major booster of the port economy.
In 2009 the editorial board of the Jacksonville Business Journal (JBJ) threw down the
gauntlet for Jacksonville’s economic development future. In “Game on for Jacksonville”,
the journal argued that Jacksonville had received its “economic development marching
orders” and they include, first and foremost, unwavering support for the “half-billion
dollar” dredging project to deepen the St. Johns River so that the largest container ships
will have access to the two new container terminals. The JBJ also noted that there would
need to be significant investment in road and rail infrastructure to move the cargo.
Without these two projects, Jacksonville can “watch the ports of Savannah, Charleston,
and Norfolk eat our lunch”. The call-to-arms editorial finished with a flourish: “If the
Northeast Florida business communities need a rallying point, this is it. All businesses
will benefit if Jacksonville becomes a major international East Coast port. Need a slogan?
Try this: A deeper St. Johns floats all boats.” It is hard to imagine a bolder claim for the
universal benefit of a speculative megaproject.
As the Army Corps study and report was nearing completion, and some
scattered but unorganized local opposition to the economic and environmental cost was
beginning to form, a second campaign was launched. This one was much more explicit
and direct in its objective regarding the natural impediment as reflected in its campaign
slogan – “Deep Water Now”. It had a far larger number of sponsors, and higher visibility
through various media outlets. The lead sponsors are the City of Jacksonville, Jax
Chamber of Commerce, and the Civic Council, a non-governmental organization of local
and industry elites and opinion leaders. The lead banner of the Deep Water Now website
states: “The Port of Jacksonville is a vital component of our region’s economy.
Jacksonville’s business and community leaders stand united for a deep water port now.”
The webpage includes a list of sixty-six supporters covering the full range of businesses
and industries in Jacksonville from the Mayo Clinic to Winn-Dixie supermarkets to the
Bank of America.
When the Army Corps completed its report in May 2013 and recommended
deepening from 40 to 45 feet, based on the analysis of net national economic
development benefits, the local sponsor, JAXPORT, requested deepening to 47 feet,
which is what is referred to as the “locally preferred plan”. The Army Corps adopted the
latter plan with very little additional analysis or deliberation. While this was viewed as a
victory for JAXPORT, it had one very significant and negative unintended consequence –
under a “locally preferred plan” half the cost of the project would now have to be
assumed by local rather than Federal sources. The total cost was estimated at $733
million, with the non-Federal local share of this total at $383 million. The big question
that hangs over this project, assuming approval of a Federal budget allocation, is how the
local authorities will finance the sizable local share. Moreover, this local financial
obligation has subjected the project to much greater cost-benefit scrutiny as it pertains to
the local and regional economy.
For this reason, estimating the costs and benefits of such a project becomes a
strategic and political process. Projects that are too costly may fail to generate the
necessary public support, or may fail to be approved by those charged with decisionmaking authority. This can give rise to serious distortions in how costs and benefits are
calculated and communicated, which should not be terribly surprising given that the
stakes are high, powerful economic interests are involved, and large sums of money rest
in the balance. Under these conditions, an entirely accurate, balanced, and fair assessment
of costs and benefits is unlikely to be revealed by the project proponents who are
interested, first and foremost, in gaining approval and public support for the project. In
the research on public works projects, there is considerable evidence that costs are
routinely and systematically underestimated and benefits overestimated. According to
Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2002) statistical analysis of 258 transportation infrastructure projects,
estimates are not only highly and systematically misleading but best explained by
“intentional strategic misrepresentation” (or, as they also put it, “lying”). In fact,
Flyvbjerg (2005, p. 18) has developed the following equation that has been used to
achieve megaproject approval:
PROJECT APPROVAL = (underestimate costs) + (overestimate revenues) +
(undervalued environmental impacts) + (overvalued economic development effects)
Underestimating costs and inflating benefits is an expected aspect of the growth
machine strategy particularly when the desired growth depends on public approval and/or
taxpayer dollars. As it pertains specifically to maritime ports, the issue is the accuracy of
port economic impact studies. Those who have studied the changing relationship between
the port and the city, as a result of containerization and intermodal transport, conclude
that “it is easy to exaggerate the existing and potential role of ports in regional economic
development” (Gripaios & Gripaios, 1995;see also Grobar, 2008). Others address more
directly the methodology in concluding that “although methodologies to determine
economic impacts of port activity have been under continuous development and most
studies adopt a scientific approach, figures are often exaggerated” (Dooms et al., 2014,
p.3). Hall (2004, p. 363-64) provides an even more sweeping statement, “Port impact
studies offer very little useful analysis of . . . short-run substitution behavior. . . . Port
impact studies also offer very little useful analysis of . . . long-run effects because they
assume fixed production techniques, industrial structures, and associated logistics
arrangements.”
The most widely claimed benefit of the port’s presence and expansion, not
surprisingly, is jobs. In the case of Jacksonville, the community is told, at every
opportunity, that “JAXPORT Equals Jobs” though there has been very little detailed
information about the source of the figures or how they have been calculated. Through
its website, and included in their promotional materials, JAXPORT has consistently
claimed that Jacksonville’s port “generates 65,000 jobs” and “these positions provide an
average salary of $43,980, well above the Jacksonville average of $27,215”. These
figures are routinely echoed by all advocates of the JAXPORT enterprise – from the
executive director of the port to the Jacksonville mayor -- though most are unaware of
their origin let alone their accuracy. They are derived from an economic impact study
conducted by Martin Associates (2009), the leading consulting firm for the port industry.
They were published in a report, placed on the JAXPORT website, quoted by the press,
and then passed on as empirically-based facts, and repeated as part of the pro-port
mantra. However, a careful analysis of consultant’s report makes clear that the job figure
is inflated by at least half and the average income is based on limited data for far fewer
than 65,000 workers thus also producing an inflated figure. For the purposes here, details
on the methodological shortcomings (see Jaffee, 2009 for a critique and re-analysis) and
the more accurate figures are less important than the larger tendency by growth
coalitions, as noted above, to make grossly exaggerated claims regarding the economic
benefits of economic sectors and the necessary infrastructure projects. This familiar
pattern has been reported for other urban development projects such as convention
centers (Sanders, 2002), sports franchises and facilities (Noll & Zimbalist, 1997), and
public transportation (Kain, 1990; Pickrell, 1992).
Despite such efforts by Jacksonville proponents, the future viability of the deepwater project remains in question. While the dredging/deepening project has been
approved at all levels by the Army Corps and has received Congressional authorization,
the project has not yet been officially funded by either the Federal government, nor have
local or state officials agreed to fund the local share that will total close to $400 million.
The City of Jacksonville has formed a Mayor’s Port Task Force (with members
handpicked by the Mayor) to study the project and, if viewed favorably, recommend a
way to generate funding for the local share.
In addition to the question of whether funds will be appropriated and made
available, there is growing awareness that, with or without the river deepening,
Jacksonville still may not be competitive as a major East coast port. This is due to the
fact that there are other East coast ports (most notably Miami, Savannah, Charleston,
Norfolk, and NY/NJ) vying for the same position and the same cargo. Each of these
ports is already receiving more cargo than Jacksonville, two (Norfolk and NY/NJ)
already have channels of 50 feet, and the port in closest proximity (Savannah, less than
150 miles away) is far ahead of Jacksonville in progress toward channel deepening to 47
feet (see Table One).
Finally, observers of the maritime port industry are beginning to highlight the less
than optimal situation of multiple East Coast ports competing and expanding for a finite
and currently depressed level of container cargo. A leading industry publication
(Tirschwell, 2012) has noted the “serious overhang of unused terminal capacity” and the
fact that major East Coast ports such as Savannah, Charleston, and New York/New
Jersey are all currently operating at less than 60% container capacity. This state of affairs
contributes to the speculative aspect of the infrastructure projects.
The uncertainty that is a defining feature of this speculative megaproject will
persist for the indefinite future. JAXPORT and city officials will now have to lobby
Washington to get the cost of the project included in the Federal budget, a method will
have to be devised to pay for the local share, and boosters will need to continue to
mobilize public support. There is no timetable on when funding decisions will be made.
If funding is secured, the project itself will take at least three years to complete. At that
time, the global port logistics landscape could have shifted dramatically making the
project redundant, unnecessary, or irrelevant. In the end, Jacksonville may be left with a
potential urban development project indefinitely postponed.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to develop an analysis of an evolving urban growth
strategy based on the port logistics economy in a southern port city. The focus is on the
role and expansion of an economic sector – shipping, goods-moving, and logistics – that
has received relative inattention from urban and economic sociologists (see Bonacich &
Wilson, 2008; Bensman, 2008 for notable exceptions). Based on the specific city-region
case of Jacksonville and northeast Florida, and the Jacksonville Port Authority
(JAXPORT), there are a number conclusions worth noting.
First, the analysis of the role of the urban business and political elite provides
general support for the efficacy of the growth machine model positing a unified coalition
supporting economic development initiatives, and engaging the associated tactics of
boosterism to gain broader community support for growth initiatives. Though dated, this
perspective remains durable. Consistent with original growth machine formulations, a
broad coalition of business interests and public officials has played an important role in
the promotion of the port and its expansion. This has taken the form of both generalized
support for any type of private sector development that promises greater economic
activity and population growth, as well as targeted support for the port logistics sector, in
particular, as exemplified by the proclamation of Jacksonville as “America’s Logistics
Center”. This type of boosterism, that designates urban and regional places as possessing
special physical and geographically unique qualities, has been a major part of the
JAXPORT campaign.
Second, a more nuanced and comprehensive analysis of this case requires the
incorporation of additional theoretical and conceptual tools. There are some important
deviations from the growth machine patterns that can be attributed to the particular sector
chosen as the urban development engine -- the port logistics economy and its connection
to global commodity flows as well as dependence on large-scale speculative
megaprojects as necessary, but insufficient, conditions for success. These aspects of
urban development strategies and challenges conform more closely with recent theorizing
that has incorporated global economic dynamics and neo-liberal models of urban
governance. One approach to analyzing the impact of globalization across nations and
city-regions, the commodity or global value chain model (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994;
Henderson, et al., 2002; Coe, et al., 2004) examines how nations, regions, and their
economic organizations insert themselves in the production and distribution chain as a
strategy for economic development. This necessitates an intensive effort involving the
“strategic coupling” of local assets with the demands of global commodity flows (Jacobs
& Lagendijk, 2014). With transportation and logistics activities representing one segment
of the global value chain, cities and regions can leverage their geographic location and
infrastructure to create “logistics clusters” (Sheffi, 2011) and engage in a “politics of
reconnection” that links fixed infrastructure with the movement of goods (Hall & Clark,
2010). The ability to successfully “couple” and “reconnect”, however, depends upon
large-scale urban and state-financed infrastructure projects -- the “structures of provision”
-- driven by private–public partnerships that can link city-regions within global capital
flows (Swyngedouw, et al., 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The Jacksonville case
exemplifies these strategies with the construction of container terminals to capture Asian
cargo flows and with the proposed deepening of the St Johns River as the maritime
infrastructure aimed at attracting the largest container vessels.
Third, and most critically, the Jacksonville case points to a factor increasingly
common for other port cities and regions that has an enormous impact on urban
development dynamics and prospects – that is, the “natural” impediments to the port
economy growth strategy represented by rivers, harbors, and channels that fail to satisfy
the imperatives of maritime commerce. For Jacksonville this involved coastal tidal
currents that prevent around the clock access to the container terminals and, more
significantly, a river channel too shallow for the post-Panamax container vessels. Rather
than an organized counter-coalition battling for the retention of local use values, as
highlighted in the growth machine model, it is the “natural” environment that stands as
the primary obstacle to expanding and strengthening the strategic coupling and
connection of the local to the global.
This confirms the importance of considering how natural geographic advantages
(“nature”) are exploited and then modified (“second nature”) in order to accommodate
the needs and demands of urban and regional development (Cronon, 1991; Lefebvre,
1976). More broadly, this suggests that further analysis of the port economy would
benefit from a closer alignment with the insights of political ecology that highlight the
capitalism-nature nexus generally (Heynen, Kaika, & Swyngedouw, 2006) and its
significance for waterfront development in particular (Bunce & Desfor, 2007). The
continuing requirement to further reconfigure the natural resource, in this case the
dredging of the St Johns River, as a speculative infrastructural megaproject, is what has
generated skepticism and latent opposition regarding the likely return on public
investment and ability to successfully compete with more established East coast ports.
Thus, it is the uncooperative maritime landscape, the cost of gaining its conformity under
urban fiscal crisis conditions (Kirkpatrick & Smith, 2011), and the prospects for an
economic payoff, that represent some of the most significant countervailing forces
working against the realization of the port economy growth engine.
Lastly, under the speculative megaproject scenario, the strategy of the pro-growth
coalition turned to a concentrated focus on mobilizing public opinion through inflated
claims about the economic benefits, with the parallel purpose of lobbying state and
federal officials for the requisite financial appropriations to fund the deepening project.
Both public campaigns – “Bring The Noise” and “Deep Water Now” – had less to do
with promoting the virtues of port logistics than lobbying for infrastructure financing and
convincing the public that the benefits would far exceed the costs.
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Table One. Largest U.S. East Coast Ports Based on TEUs 2013
TEU
Current Depth of
Throughput
Harbor/Channel
2013
(Project depth)
New York/New Jersey
5,467,345
50
Savannah, GA
3,034,010
42 (47)
Hampton Roads, VA
2,223,532
50
Charleston, SC
1,601,366
45 (52)
Port Everglades, FL
927,544
42
Jacksonville, FL
926,810
40 (47)
Miami, FL
901,454
42 (50)
Baltimore, MD
705,230
50
Philadelphia, PA
367,499
40
Source: American Association of Port Authorities. North American Port Container
Traffic Ranking 2013. Website at: http://www.aapa-ports.org/home.cfm