CONTROLLING DANGEROUS
PATHOGENS PROJECT
Regional Workshop on Dual-Use Research
Mátraháza, Hungary
May 12-14, 2006
J. Fűrész
Nobel prize winner Hungarians
Lénárd Fülöp
F
1905
Bárány Róbert
O
1914
Zsigmondy Richárd
K
1925
Szent-Györgyi Albert
O
1937
Hevesy György
K
1943
Békésy György
O
1961
Wigner Jenô
F
1963
Gábor Dénes
F
1971
Wiesel, Elie
B
1986
Polanyi, John C.
K
1986
Oláh György
K
1994
Harsányi János
G
1994
Kertész Imre
I
2002
Herskó Ferenc
K
2004
O = élettani ill. orvosi, F = fizikai, K = kémiai, B = béke, G = közgazdasági dí
„CONTROLLING DANGEROUS
PATHOGENS PROJECT”
1999 Study
Rapid detection of security related bioagents
Preparation a laboratory capability to
enhance the protection of human
resources
Multipurpose, modular, deployable, mission
tailorable,,,
Bio security in its broad meaning, can be seen as
active measures to avoid spread of human &/or
agricultural pathogens
Bio-safety can be seen as the protection of the
workers of the laboratories and installations, as
well as the protection against the
uncontrolled/unwilling spread of pathogens or
diseases to the outside.
•The menace has to be encountered in
regional context.
•It makes unavoidable sharing information
and experience on preparedness,
response plans and crisis management
strategies in regional approach.
We are focusing on health threats, want to
strengthen mechanisms and capacities to
identify, to verify and to respond to threats.
We are aware and know the
requirements for diagnostic needs and
means of surveillance and
epidemiological activities
MULTINATIONAL
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
RADIOLOGICAL,
AND NUCLEAR TASK FORCE,
CHALKIDA, Greece Aug01-Oct01
Do we initiate a knowledge harmonization
process at regional level (?)!
Janus-faced
Science
Dual-Use Research
J. Fűrész
The modern science and technology has a driving
role in the development and there is a need to
strengthen economic, technical and scientific cooperation
Science was the engine of progress of
Western civilization over the last three
centuries.
Religio, religare = relation, community in common mind.
In the recent century appeared a new pseudo-religion:
the science
What relatively easy to do:
Specification of Weaponization-related goals.
1. Enhance pathogen infectivity, pathogenicity, antibiotic
resistance, or resistance to host immunological defenses
2. Improve the ability of a microbial pathogen to remain
viable and virulent during prolonged storage and/or
after release into the environment
3. Facilitate the dissemination of biological agents as a fineparticle aerosol
4. Facilitate the dissemination of a biological agent by
contamination of food or water sources
5. Create a novel pathogen or one with characteristics that
have been altered to evade current detection methods or
host immune defenses
6. Assemble oligonucleotides to synthesize the genome of a
pathogenic microorganism.
The Dual Use Dilemma (I)
Dual use research means science, with legitimate purpose
that may be misused to pose public health and/or national
security
The Dual Use Dilemma (II)
Microbiology just a part of the landscape





Deliberate engineering of immune escape, stealth viral vectors
Overproduction of host inflammatory mediators to produce
toxic shock
Knocking out genes that regulate key cell processes such as cell
proliferation.
Small molecules that disrupt molecular circuits, eg networks in
immune response, blood clotting system, higher brain function
Acoustic disruption – bone pain, airway modulation, ultrasonic
skin heating.
George Poste, NAS meeting 2003 (not formally published):
Advances in life
sciences &
biotechnology bring
benefits to
medicine, public
health, &
agriculture.
Risk to public
safety and security
from the misuse of
this science &
technology
.
Naturally occurring accidents
Misadventure
Deliberate misuse
Dual use research in life sciences
includes research:
 with
 that
legitimate scientific purpose
may be misused to pose a biologic
threat to public health and/or national
security
Weak understanding of the implications of dual-use
capabilities posed by research in the life sciences
What to do ?
The special character of the science.
The knowledge
acquisition is a result of
personal activity, the
community of scientist
characterized by the
autonomy.
Autonomy of Science
The scientist itself is not
a machine looking for Polányi Mihály
the truth, but the
scientist has full
autonomy to accept or
reject the verity of
anything.
Polányi (1929)
a tudósközösség autonómiáját, a
tudás személyes és hallgatólagos
aspektusát hangsúlyozza, de távol
tartja magát azoktól a nézetektõl
is, amelyek már a tudásszociológia
elõfeltevéseit jelentik:
társadalomba-ágyazottság, közös
tudat, stb.
A tudás megszerzése személyes
aktus eredménye. Nem
szociologizálja, mindemellett
kimondja, hogy a tudós nem
valamiféle igazságkeresõ gép,
hanem "végsõ soron a tudós maga
dönti el, hogy mit fogad el
igazságként".(Faragó
Péter:TUDOMÁNYTERVEZÉS ÉS
TUDOMÁNYOS AUTONÓMIA.
http://66.249.93.104/search?q=ca
che:jnoSV-4cjQJ:www.kfki.hu/chemonet/polan
yi/0012/farago.html+k%C3%B6z
%C3%B6s+tudat+tudom%C3%A
1ny&hl=hu&gl=hu&ct=clnk&cd=
1&client=firefox-a)
Universality of Science
•freedom of movement,
•association,
•expression and communication for
scientists as well as
•equitable access to data, information
and research materials
The publication of results is expected from scientific
community, which resulted in the appearance of new
kind of collective thinking
With the rise of ubiquitous networked
communication due to the internet and its
enhancement by mobile access anytime, anywhere,
our capacities for effective problem- solving both
on the practical and the more abstract levels have
vastly increased.
The misuse of the impersonalized knowledge increased
What & how to do (I)?
Have to develop effective national and
international laws, regulations, and
policies in relation to the life sciences
What & how to do (II)?
Have to develop a culture of responsibility of
•Scientists,
•Management of laboratories,
•Industry and research facilities
•Governmental & non-governmental
institutions employing and funding
research in the life sciences.
•Publishers
•Educational and training system
What do not do?
Do not prohibit research of any kind that
is carried out with peaceful intent, or
restrict the
publication of results.
Where we are now ?
We are all on the same shipboard.
DON’T MISS, DON’T LEAK THE BOAT