32-33 Ban.L.J.(2003-04) 137-156
STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE
RESPONSIBILITY AND SELF-DEFENCE : THE
INDIAN CONTEXT
B.C. Nirmal
I - INTRODUCTION
India has been a victim of the cross-border terrorism sponsored
by Pakistan for the past nearly two decades and has lost tens of
thousands of innocent men and women and security forces. The world
very well knows how Pakistan's trained and supported militants hijacked
the Indian Airlines plane in 1999 and brought that to Kandhar and the
invidious role played by Taliban at that time. There was a terrorist attack
in the historic Red Fort in Delhi followed by an attack on the Jammu and
Kashmir Legislative Assembly. A Pakistan-based terrorist organisation
Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility for the terrorist strike on the J
& K Assembly and named a Pakistani national, based in Pakistan as one
of the suicide bombers involved. Ironically, that suicide attack took place
a day after the Pakistani President announced on Television that
Pakistan had no terrorist groups operating in India. But India's endurance
and patience reached the breaking point when on December 13, 2001,
Pak trained terrorist suicide squad struck the Indian Parliament. As the
prime Minister Vajpayee observed the terrorist attack was 'an attack on
our sovereignty, on our national self respect, and it was a challenge to
our democratic system'. The only way to defend ourselves, according to
the political establishment, is by forcing Pakistan to end stop crossterrorism. With this objective in mind India has launched a diplomatic
offensive and also deployed its army on the frontiers (which at the time of
this writing has been pulled out). As in the past the U.S., Britain and other
allies in the American War on terrorism tried to play down the event by
advising India to show restraint and have a talk with the President of
Pakistan who after obtaining American certificate of a trusted 'friend and
ally' is in no mood to accept the four demands that India had made in the
wake of the terrorist attack of December 13, India's demands are :
handing over of the 20 terrorists; closure of facilities, training camps,
arms supply, funding and all direct and indirect assistance, stoppage of
infiltration of arms and men from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir and
unambiguous renunciation of terrorism in all its manifestation. Although
under pressure from Washington the President of Pakistan in his
January 12's address expressed his resolve to take on extremism and

B.Sc. LLM. Ph.D. (Law), Professor, Faculty of Law, BHU, Executive Editor,
Banaras Law Journal and Member, Executive Council of the Indian Society
of International Law, New Delhi.
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[Vol.32-33
has also taken some phoney actions on terrorism, it has flatly refused to
accept the legitimate demands of India .
In the present circumstances what are India's options to put an
end to the Pakistan's 'covert aggression," Should a country of a billion
population with more than 1.2 million soldiers on active duty and having
advantage in conventional weapons and also an edge in nuclear war visa-vis its adversely just lament? India has undoubtedly a right to defend
its territorial integrity, sovereignty, values and freedom with all the
resources it can command against cross-border terrorism. Says the
Prime Minister "India does not want war, India has never been an
aggressor in her long history. But we have a sovereign right to defend
ourselves against cross-border terrorism, which is a proxy war that is
already thrust on us . Pakistan will be solely responsible for the
consequences of encouraging terrorism against
India and when,
expedient, turning a blind eye to terrorist group with transnational
linkages operating from its soil". Thus, India has not ruled out the
possibility of military option.
This scenario provides an immediate context for undertaking a
review of the existing international framework for regulating statesponsored terrorism.
II. STATE - SPONSORED TERRORISM
As the phenomenon of state sponsored terrorism has proliferated
since the mid-1970's, so has it received the increasing attention of
Governments, politicians and the general public. As the name itself
suggests, this type of terrorism is 'sponsored' by one State against
another State, though the degree of sponsorship may vary from case to
case. It can consist of such things as the supply of financial assistance,
training, arms and travel documents to terrorist groups which, more or
less have their own agenda. State sponsored terrorism is also committed
when a sponsoring State directly controls terrorist activities aimed at the
enemy state. In either case state sponsorship of and involvement in
international terrorism is likely to greatly increase the destructive potential
of a terrorist group. It is in fact a form of a relatively inexpensive
surrogate war by which a State may strike its enemies in a way that is
less risky militarily than conventional armed conflict Involvement of a
State in this type of terrorism may take several forms. Lambert refers to
the assassination of opponents of political regimes by a State's agents
and the destruction of the Rainbow Warrior, a ship owned by the
environmental group 'Greenpeace' and involved in protesting French
nuclear testing in the South Pacific as examples of state-sponsored
terrorism.1 but the better view is to consider them as examples of stateterrorism as these are directed against political opposition rather than
against the security of another State. Actually the expression 'state
1
Joseph J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law (1990), p. 21.
2003-04]
STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE RESPONSIBILIT
139
sponsored terrorism' is so imprecise and confusing that distinguishing
this type of activity from individual or state terrorism may be difficult in
some cases. This is exemplified by the Iranian Hostages case in which
the initial seizure and detention of the American diplomats and civilians in
Tehran took place solely at the initiative of the students but their
subsequent holding was supported and even controlled by the Iranian
regime, Stohl and Lopez have called it state-terrorism2, while Wilkinson
has referred it as state-sponsored terrorism.3
The concept of 'state-terrorism' refers to free 'conduct by the
organs of the state against its own population, whether the entire
population, a certain segment thereof (such as a minority community or
political opposition), or the population of an occupied territory'.4 While
individual terrorism is usually anti-state violence, the purpose of State
terrorism is to enforce the authority and power of the State. This type of
activity hardly fits within the scope of international terrorism in view of the
absence of an internationalizing element. But if the scope of State
terrorism is expanded to include State action on the international plane,
such actions will constitute an act of international terrorism. In this
context it may be noted that the United Nations document of 1973 refers
to a concept of State terrorism held by some states as:
"terror inflicted on a large scale and with the most modern
means on whole populations for purposes of domination" or
interference in their internal affairs, armed attacks perpetrated
under the pretext of reprisals or of preventive action by states
against the sovereignty and integrity of third States, and the
infiltration of terrorist groups or agents into the territory of other
States."5
Writers like Stohl expand the scope of state terrorism to include
'coercive diplomacy', 'covert behavior and 'surrogate' terrorism 6 while
others favour further expansion of the concept to include almost every
type of objectionable act that a State may take on the international level.
According to the latter view military maneuvers and war games in the
vicinity of another State which presents a threat to that other State, 'the
development, testing and deployment of nuclear and space weapons
systems'. and the transport of nuclear weapons through the territory of
2
3
4
5
6
Stohl & Lopez (eds.), The State of Terrorist (1984), 563. On State Terrorism,
see Berman & Clark 'State Terrorism : Disappearances', Rutgers Law Journal,
(1982), 531.
Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (2nd ed. 1986), 280 withregard to
assessination of opponents abroad Wilkinson calls it state-sponsored terrorism,
while Laqueur has referred to it as State-Terrorism. Laqueur, The Age of
Terrorism (1987), 145.
Lambert, n. 1, at 15.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 28th
Sess, Supp. 28, para 24, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973).
Stohl, 'International Dimension of State Terrorism' in Stohl & Lopez, n. 2, at
pp. 44-45.
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THE BANARAS LAW JOURNAL
other States and international waters would
terrorism.7
[Vol.32-33
qualify as acts of state-
It is true that 'state terrorism', 'state-sponsored terrorism' and
'individual terrorism' fulfill different functions and manifest themselves in
different ways. Yet, they are tied with one another and hence should be
studied together. Apart from the fact that inducing a state of fear is
common to these types of terrorism, the fact that the first two types of
terrorism are in the ultimately analysis committed by individuals or
groups of individuals either on behalf of States or as organs of States
require an understanding of individual or group terrorism. Moreover,
many States maintain, that not only is State terrorism the worst type of
terrorism but is also the predominant cause of individual terrorism. 8 It is
also said that State terrorism is responsible for many more deaths and
injuries than is individual terrorism.
After approaching the concept of State-Sponsored terrorism with
reference to the functions and actors and contrasting the same from state
terrorism, attention should be paid to the concept of terrorism as such
which because of being an emotive and politically loaded term defies any
generally accepted definition. Although there are more than 109
definitions of terrorism,9 writers continue to disagree on the bounds of
terrorism, acts to be included in the definition and the basic causes of
terrorism.10
In this scenario the definition of terrorism given by the U.S.
Department of State may be used as a starting point for the ensuing
discussion. Terrorism is 'premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine state agents, usually, intended to influence an audience".11
This is "simply good' definition which requires a political motivation but
does not allow for a relative concept of terrorism. It includes state terror
but does not require a 'target of terror' as Schmid's definition 12 does.13
7
8
9
10
11
12
See Geneva Declaration on Terrorism (1987) signed by R. Boudabbous, F.
Boyle, R. Charvin, R. Clark, R. Falk, H. Koechler, S. MacBride, W. Perdue and
T. Sono cf Lambert, n. 1, at 14, 16.
This has been the view of developing countries in Terrosim Committee. See
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Internaitonal Terrorism, UNGAOR, 28th
Sess, Supp. 28, UNDOC. A/9028 (1973), paras 49, 54 & 62-63. See generally,
Lambert n. 1, at 17.
Schmid, Political Terrorism : A Research Guide to Concept, Theories, Data
Bases and Literature (1983) 119-152.
Bell, 'Trends in Terror : The Analysis of Political Violence', 29 World Politics,
(1977), 447, 481.
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1988 (1989) V. quoted
in Lambert, n. 1, at 18.
Schmid's definitioin is as follows :
"Terrorism is a method of combat in which randam or symbolic victims serve as
instrumental targets of violence. These instrumental victims share group or
class characteristics which form the basis for their selection for victimization.
2003-04]
III
STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE RESPONSIBILIT
141
GLOBAL CONSENSUS ON THE CRIMINALITY OF THE ACTS
OF TERRORISM
There appears to be general international consensus that all
acts, methods and practices of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable
and therefore are not to be tolerated regardless of the cause and the
identity of their perpetrators. Although none of the General Assembly
resolutions defines the concept of terrorism, their unequivocal
condemnation of acts, methods and practices of terrorism and their
stress on the imperative need to further strengthen international
cooperation between States in order to take and adopt practical and
effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all forms of
terrorism that affect the international community as a whole is a
breakthrough of sorts given the fact that following the failure of the Ad
Hoc Committee on Terrorism to reach any sort of consensus regarding
appropriate action to be taken against terrorism General Assembly felt
constrained to defer the issue for a number of years. Change in the
language in the most recent General Assembly resolutions indicates the
nature and depth of increased universal consensus on the illegality of
acts of terrorism and the desirability to eliminate and combat international
terrorism. While the earlier General Assembly resolutions went through
the usual formula of reaffirming the right to self-determination and
national liberation, resolutions adopted since 1994 are conspicuous by
the absence of such formula.14 This change in the attitude of States is
partly because of the end of ideology in a unipolar world in which
globalization has become a buzz word and partly because of the
increasing awareness of the dreaded nature of international terrorism in
all its forms and manifestations with their adverse consequences for the
constitutional order of States and human rights of innocent people on the
one hand and international peace and security and friendly relations
among States on the other.
13
14.
Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other
members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear of violence
(terror). This group or class whose members' sense of security is purposively
undermined, is the target of terror. The victimization of the target of violence is
considered extra-normal by most observers from the witnessing audience on
the basis of its atrocity; the time (e.g. peacetime) or place (not a battlefield)
victimization or the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conventional
warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of
terror; 'sectors of this audience might in turn form the main object of
manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to
immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or
compliance or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g. a government) or
favouring the short or long term interests of the users of this method of combat.
Schmid, n. 9 at 111.
Lambert, n. 1, at 18-19.
Eg. General Assembly Resolution, on 'Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism', 9 December, 1994, reproduced in 35 IJIL, (1995), 228.
142
IV -
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PROHIBITION OF STATE-SPONSORED
INTERNATIONAL LAW
[Vol.32-33
TERRORISM
IN
State sponsorship of terrorism in the territory of another state is
specifically forbidden by the U.N. General Assembly's 'Declaration of
Principles of International Law' 15 and its Definition of Aggression. 16
Alongside certain descriptions referring to aggression the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, 1970 declares :
"Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed
bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of
another state.
Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in
another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when
the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or
use of force".
Thus organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of
civil strife or terrorist acts in another State are not only in violation of the
principle of non use of force which is a principle of jus cogens but also
involve the violation of the principle of non-intervention in matters within
the national jurisdiction of states. To quote the 1970 Declaration again :
Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state
interfere in civil strife in another State.
International law recognizes the right of every sovereign State to
conduct its affairs without outside interference. The I.CJ. has observed
in the Corfu Channel case, 'Between independent States, respect for
territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.
There is no general right of intervention in international law, much less on
the request for assistance made by an opposition group in another
state.17 The Court further observed : 'Indeed, it is difficult to see what
would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law, if
intervention which is already allowable at the request of the government
15
16
17
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G-A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24 Oct. 1970 UNGAOR, 25th Sess. Supp.
28, p. 121, U.N. Doc A/8028(1971).
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December, 1974, UNGAOR, 29th Sess. Supp.
31, p. 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975). See also B.C. Nirmal, 'Aggression as
Defined by the General Assembly', 19 Indian Yearbook of International Affairs,
(1986), 323.
I.C.J. Rep. 1949, p. 35.
2003-04]
STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE RESPONSIBILIT
143
of a state, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition". 18 In
this context it is important to note that 'acts constituting a breach of the
customary principle of non-intervention will also if they directly or
indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of
non use of force in international relations."19
The principles established by the General Assembly in the
Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970, proclaiming the duty of every
state to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, have also been
reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13
August, 1998. In view of resolution 1373 (2001) which was adopted in
the wake of the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, that occurred in the
United States20, it is the duty of States to prevent and suppress the
financing of terrorist acts, criminalize the wilful provisions or collection,
by any means of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the
intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they
are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts and to freeze without
delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons
who commit, or attempt to commit terrorist acts or participate in or
facilitate the commission of terrorist acts Not only States should prohibit
their nationals or persons or entities in their territories from making funds,
financial assets, economic resources available to persons who commit or
attempt to commit, facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist
acts, they should also refrain from providing any form of support to
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, they should suppress
recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminat the supply of
18
19
20
The Nicaragua case, I.C.J. 1986, para 246.
The Nicaragua case, I.C.J. 1986, para 209.
EU Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and Home) Sep. 20, 200 40
I.L.M. (2001), 1257; EU - Ministerial Statement on Combating Terrorism Id.
1263; European : Conclusions Plan of Action of the Extraordinary Council
Meeting on 21 Sept. 2001 Id. 1264; NATO : Statement by the North Atlantic
Council Id. 1267; NATO : Statement by NATO Secretary Generd Lord
Robertson Id. 1268; OSA : Declaration of Solidarity from the House of
America Id. 1269; OAS : Resolution on Strengthening Hemisphere Cooperation
to Prevent, Combat and Eliminate Terrorism id. 1270; Statement by the Hon'ble
Donald J. Johnston - SG of the OECD on Fighting International Terrorism id.
1275; UN. GA. 56/1 (Condemnation of terrorist Attacks in the USA), Id 1276;
UNSC Resolution 1368 (2001), 1277; UNSC. Res. 1373 (on Threats to
International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, id. 278.; U.S. Public
Law 107-40 (Joint Resolution to Authorize the use of US Armed Forces against
these Responsible for the Recent Attacks Lannched Against the United States,
id. 1282; U.S. Executive order 13224 Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, Support
Terrorism 1283; ICAO Declaration on Misuse of Civil Aircraft as Weapons of
Destruction and other Terrorist Acts Involving Civilian Aviation. ILM (2002),
UN SC Res. 1377 of Nov. 12, 2001; ILM (2002), 503.
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[Vol.32-33
weapons to terrorist; take the necessary steps to prevent the commission
of terrorist acts and prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit
terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes
against other states or their citizens.
Although the basic thrust of the said Security Council resolution
is on financing of terrorism, it nevertheless goes beyond that and requires
States to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit
terrorist acts or provide safe havens and calls upon them to intensify and
accelerate the exchange of operational information regarding terrorist
actions and movements, forged or falsified travel documents, traffic in
arms, explosives or sensitive materials, use of communications
technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession
of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. All States should
exchange information and cooperation to prevent and suppress terrorist
acts and to take action against the perpetrators of terrorist acts. They
should become parties to, and fully implement as soon as possible, the
relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
Further, all States are required to ensure that refugee status is not
abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts by
refusing request for the extradition of alleged terrorist. Moreover, before
granting refugee status, all States should take appropriate measures to
ensure that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated
in the commission of terrorist acts.
Turning to the impermissibility of State-sponsored terrorism
under the 'Definition of Aggression', Article 3(g) provides : 'The sending
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force against another State of
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial
involvement therein'. Under its terms mere organizing, encouraging and
preparing armed bands is by itself not an act of aggression so long as
they have not crossed the frontiers of another State and that too when
the qualifications mentioned in this provision have been clearly fulfilled.
For an activity of this type to constitute an act of aggression, it is
necessary that armed bands or groups or irregulars or mercenaries carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces.21 Article
3(g) may be taken to reflect customary international law. In consequence
under customary law an armed attack includes not merely action by
regular armed forces across an international border but additionally the
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands or groups to the
territory of another State which carry out acts on such a scale and effects
as to amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces. As
the International Court in the Nicaragua case observed, the notion of
armed attack includs acts by armed bands of the said gravity but does
not extend to assistance to rebels in the form of the provisions of
21
The Nicaragua case, I.C.J. Rep. 1986, para 195.
2003-04]
STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE RESPONSIBILIT
145
weapons or logistical or other support. 22 Such assistance, however, could
constitute a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal
or external affairs of the State.23
V. EXISTING ANTI- TERRORISM CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS
Although there is no comprehensive international convention on
terrorism, some notable progress has been achieved in codifying
international rules regarding the prevention and punishment of terrorism.
Conventions and protocols have been adopted with respect to a number
of international offences favoured by terrorist groups viz hijacking of civil
aircraft, sabotage of civil aircraft and navigation facilities, attacks in
international airports, attacks on diplomats, attacks on maritime targets
and on platform on the continental shelf, taking of hostages physical
protection from nuclear material, marketing of Plastic explosives, terrorist
bombing, and financing of terrorists. 24 These instruments reflect what
Gal- Or has aptly called the 'object oriented' or 'segmented approach' and
are concerned only with
offences which have an international
dimension.25 While these instruments are not identical, obligations
imposed by all of them are remarkably similar. These instruments cover
matters like the establishment of jurisdiction, notification of the results of
prosecution, aut dedere aut judicare, facilitation of the extradition option,
22
23
24
25
Id.
Id.
The 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Others Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft, 2 ILM (1963), 1042, the 1970 Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 10 ILM, (1971), 133; the 1971
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 10 ILM; (1971), 1151; the 1973
New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 13 ILM,
(1974), 41; the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
18 ILM., (1979), 1456, the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and Protocol thereto
for the Supression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, the terrorist Bombing Convention, 1998;
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
1999, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism 2005. See generally, V.S. Mani, ‘Future Strategies in the War
against Terrorism and proliferation of weapons or Mass Destruction : An Indian
Perception’, IJIL 44 (2004), 221-259, See generally, Shubber, 'The International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages', 52 BYIL (1981), 205; Wood, 'The
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, ICLQ, 23
(1974), 791; Shubber, 'Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970- A
New Regime', ICLQ, 22 (1973), 706; Verway, 'The International Hostages
Convention and National Liberation Movements', 75 AJIL (1981), 69;
Halberstam, 'Terrorism on the High Seas : The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the
IMO Convention on Maritimee Safety', 82 AJIL, (1988), 269.
Gal Or International Cooperation To Suppress Terrorism (1985), 87.
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[Vol.32-33
mutual assistance in criminal matters, cooperation to prevent acts of
terrorism. Moreover, all the instruments require States parties to make
the listed offences punishable under their domestic laws, and rely solely
on the municipal law of each State for the prevention and punishment of
the target crimes.
As can be readily seen from the above discussion, there is no
dearth of international instruments to prevent and punish the prohibited
acts of terrorism. Of course, the existence of anti terrorist instruments
and actually taking steps to implement and enforce them are two different
matters. There is little doubt that some of the obligations that these
instruments establish are soft and leave many vital matters to the
discretion of the individual State, while other provisions are amenable to
differing interpretations.26 But it is not so much the flaws from which these
instruments suffer but rather a continuing reluctance on the part of some
of the States to recognize that acts of international terrorism are
unacceptable and should be neither tolerated nor supported which is
responsible for the worldwide prevalence of international terrorism.
A small number of states not only encourage terrorist activities in
other State but even engage themselves in such activity as an instrument
of their foreign policy.27 The attitude of the so called crusaders against
terrorism is not different. Terrorism does not recognize any boundary or
religion nor does it value human life. When India repeatedly pointed out
this fact to the United States, they did not take it seriously. The World
knows that America thought of waging war against terrorism only when
its interests were deeply hurt by the tragic events of 11 September,
2001. But when the terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament on 14
December they gave only sympathy to India and nothing else, and
advised restraint to India. When the WTC came tumbling down and the
Pentagon was reduced to a smoking wreck, Washington did not talk to
the Talibans or Osma Bin Laden but rather launched a well orchestrated
military operation against the latter. But the U.S. has been asking India to
talk to Pakistan for all the bloody mess the latter has created in this
country for more than a decade. Washington's attempts to club India and
Pakistan in the same pack is ridiculous and undermines the credibility of
the so called international coalition against terrorism. American war on
terrorism with the help of Pakistan which is responsible for statesponsored terrorism in India clearly shows that when it comes to fighting
terrorism in other parts of the globe, countries like United States are more
guided by their own interests than by considerations of right and wrong.
When this double standard will go?
Another important reason for increase in the acts of international
terrorism is the lack of enforcement machinery to secure the compliance
of the provisions of the anti-terrorism instruments by Sates Parties. In the
26
27
Lambert, n. 1, at 56.
See Lambert, n.1, at 45.
2003-04]
STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE RESPONSIBILIT
147
absence of a mechanism for sanctions these conventions are less sturdy
than they could otherwise be.
All of the above mentioned conventions are designed to regulate
the conduct of individuals, but they are also applicable to those acting on
behalf of a State as they are to persons acting in a private capacity. True,
State terrorism is not covered by these conventions but it is regulated by
the rules of international humanitarian law and human right law. The ad
hoc U.N. Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 28, the
Lockerbie case29, the attempt by a Spanish Court to prosecute former
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet30, and the establishment of the
International Criminal Court31 are evidence of the fact that international
law is slowly building a system for dealing with state terrorism.32
VI.
STATE
RESPONSIBILITY
FOR
SPONSORING
TERRORISM IN ANOTHER COUNTRY
OF
We have seen that State sponsorship of terrorism in the territory
of another State involves a serious breach of international obligations of
imperative nature, in particular those relating to non use of force and nonintervention which are well entrenched in both customary and
conventional international law. It is not only contrary to the letter and spirit
of the UN Charter but is also against a legally binding decision of a
competent international organisation such as the Security Council. The
delinquent State may therefore be held responsible for this type of
internationally wrongful act provided the act in question is imputable to it.
On a general level, a State will be responsible for the use of unlawful
force by its military forces against a neighboring State. It will also be
liable if it fails to prevent autonomous armed groups from using its
territory as a base for unlawful attacks.33 It is a well established rule of
international law that a State may be held responsible for unlawful acts or
omissions directly committed by the State and directly affecting other
States e.g. the breach of a treaty, the violation of the territory of another
28
29
30
31
32
33
S.C. Res. 808 (1993) and S.C. Res. 955(1994). For the text of Statutes see 32
ILM. (1993), 1593-1613, and 33 ILM (1994), 1600-1613.
I.C.J. Reports, 1992, p. 3.
Pinochet (Ex parte) R.V. Bowstel Metropolitan Stipendary Magistrate (1999)2
All.E.R. 97.
For the text of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, See 37
ILM. (1998), 1002-1069.
See generally, P.S. Rao, 'International Terrorism, Self-Determination and
National Liberation', Souvenir & Conference Papers, Vol. III, International
Conference on International Law in the New Millennium (4-7 Oct. 2001),
organized by the Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi. 813-832.834.
See Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. The Janes
Claim (U.S. V. Mexico) (1926) UR IAA 82, The Corfu Channel Case 1949 ICJ
Rep. 40 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, 30
ILM, (1991), 577.
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state, or damages to sate property. Thus in the Nicaragua case34 the
laying of mines in Nicaragua's internal or territorial waters and certain
attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and on naval base by its
agents were found imputable to the United States.
A State may also be held responsible for the activities of all its
organs, such as the army, police, judiciary, departments35 of State and
security forces. An example of state responsibility for the activities of the
States own agents is the Rainbow Warrior36 case. In the instant case the
UN. Secretary-General was asked to mediate between France and New
Zealand. His ruling in 1986 provided inter alia for French payment to New
Zealand and for the transfer of two French agents to a French base in the
Pacific, where they were to stay for three years and not to leave without
the mutual consent of both States. Subsequently, both the agents were
repatriated to France before the expiry of the three years without the
consent of New Zealand. New Zealand invoked the arbitration clause of
the 1986 Agreement and put forward arguments based on the breach of
a treaty obligation by France. France countered that argument by
contending that only the law of 'state responsibility' was relevant and
further that concept of force majeur and distress exonerated it from
liability. Rejecting the French argument the Arbitral Tribunal decided that
the law relating to treaties was relevant and ruled that any violation by a
State of any obligation of whatever origin gives rise to state responsibility.
We have seen above that a State is responsible for the unlawful
activities of its organs provided such acts are attributable to it. Activities
of these organs are still attributable to the State even if they are beyond
the legal capacity of the officials involved. 37 Article 8 of the ILC Draft
Articles provides that the conduct of a person or a group of persons shall
be considered as an act of the State in the following circumstances. First,
the most obvious case is where it is established that such person or
group was in fact acting on behalf of that State. The Zaifroo claim38 is an
example of this situation. The second situation is where such person or
group was in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in
the absence of the official authorities and in circumstances which justified
the exercise of those elements of authority. This is exemplified by A.G. of
Israel v. Eichmann39, where it was not clear whether abductors of
Eichman were actually Israeli agents or private citizens de facto acting on
34
35
36
37
38
39
ICJ Rep. 1986 14.
Art. 5 of the ILC Draft Articles. See also Paraguay v. U.S.A. (Provisional
Measures) 37 ILM, (1998), 810; Rainbow Warrior Arbitration, 26 ILM (1987)
1346.
26 ILM (1987), 1346.
The State will still be responsible, if the organ was acting on behalf of the State
at the time. Article 10 of the Draft Articles, See also Youmans Claim (U.S. V.
Mexico), RIAA 4 (1926), 110.
Great Britain V.U.S. ) RIAA, 6 (1925), 160.
ILR 36 (1961), 5.
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STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE RESPONSIBILIT
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Israel's behalf. The acts of private individuals may also be attributed to
the state in the situation exemplified by the Iran case40, wherein the
initial attack on the U.S. Embassy by militants could not be imputable to
Iran because they were clearly not agents or organs of the State but 'the
subsequent approval of the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of Iran
to the attack and the division to maintain the occupation of the Embassy
translated that action into a State act'.
A State may be responsible in its own rights
(primary
responsibility) for failing to prevent individuals or armed groups using its
territory to commit wrongful acts against foreigners within its territory or
as a base for attacks against another State. But before a State can be
held responsible for military aid reaching the armed opposition in
another State the imputability of such aid to the authorities of the former
state must be proved by sufficient credible evidence. As the International
Court of Justice observed in the Corfu Channel case 'it can not be
concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a state over its
territory and waters that state necessarily knew, or ought to have known,
of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, not yet that it necessarily knew,
or should have known, the authors. This fact by itself and apart from
other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shift
the burden of proof'.41 Therefore, if the flow of arms is in fact reaching
the affected State despite the best efforts of its own, and allies, and the
state accused of sending arms has acted with due diligence to prevent
the flow of arms, the latter can not be held responsible.42
A different situation arises where a State supports the activities in
another State of a terrorist or militant group determined to undermine the
territorial integrity of the latter State or overthrow the existing government
of the latter State. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ considered the relevant
principles for determining the responsibility of the former State in such
situations and laid down the 'control and dependency' test for this
purpose. According to this test 'merely' financing, organizing, training,
supplying and equipping the rebel group is not enough to establish the
responsibility of the doer State. For this conduct to give rise to legal
responsibility of the doer State, 'it would in principle have to be proved
that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations
in the course of which the alleged violations were committed'. 43
Obviously, this is a high burden of proof. One may wonder whether this
test is not too strict, especially when it leaves the victim State without
any effective, peaceful, international remedy. Be that as it may, the
control and dependency' test was also applied by the majority of the
Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal in the Tadic case.44 Although in the
40
41
42
43
44
Yeager V. Iran (1987).
Corfu Channel case, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18.
Id. para 157.
Id. para 115.
36 ILM, (1997), 908.
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instant case there were very close links between Yugoslavia and Bosnian
Serbia, the Tribunal declined to attribute the actions of the Bosnian Serb
forces in Bosnia to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montengro) because of the absence of effective control of the latter on
the former. In his dissenting opinion, the President of the Tribunal said
that 'control and dependency was just one test of attributability and put
forward the additional test of 'delegation'.
A serious breach of the prohibition of aggression is not just an
international delict but a most serious wrongful act of interest to the
international community as a whole and hence can be termed as an
international crime. International crime under ILC. Articles on State
Responsibility, is a 'breach by State of an international obligation so
essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international
community that its breach is recognized as a crime by the community as
a whole'.45 Although the current Special Rapporteur has suggested a reworking of draft Article 19 and the abandonment of the alleged
distinction between civil and criminal responsibility on the ground that the
terminology of 'crimes' of states is potentially misleading, many
commentators accept that a distinction should be drawn between the
most serious wrongful acts of interest to the international community as
a whole, and simple delicts.46 As certain forms of terrorist activities by or
on behalf of a State may constitute an armed attack (aggression), the
rules of State responsibility which eventually emerge in the context of
international crimes or serious wrongful acts should have an important
bearing on the development of international norms relating to statesponsored terrorism.
VII - POSSIBILITY OF THE U.N. ENFORCEMENT ACTION
States are generally under an obligation not to sponsor terrorist
activity or assist it in any way, Breach of this obligation may in certain
situations make the sponsorer state responsible in international law. In
addition to this, enforcement action can be taken by the Security Council
against States engaging or possibly supporting such activities. In this
context it is pertinent to note that in resolution 731 (1992), the Security
Council referred to 'acts of international terrorism that constitutes threats
to international peace and security'. This resolution was adopted in the
context of criticism of Libya for not complying with requests for extradition
of suspected bombers of an airplane. In another resolution, the Council
determined that 'the failure by the Libyan government to demonstrate by
concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism and in particular its
continued failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests in
resolutions 731 (1992), constitutes a threat to international peace and
security'. Again, Security Council resolution 1070 (1996) adopted with
45
46
Article 19 of the Draft ILC Articles on State Responsibility..
See Martin Dixon, Text Book on International Law (First Indian Reprint 2001),
235.
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STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE RESPONSIBILIT
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regard to Sudan re-affirmed that 'the suppression of acts of international
terrorism', including those in which States are involved is essential for the
maintenance of international peace and security. This resolution was
adopted in the context of the failure of Sudan to comply with earlier
resolutions demanding the extradition of suspects on its territory wanted
in connection with an assassination attempt against the President of
Egypt. Recognition of relationship between terrorism and international
peace and security in both cases constitutes an important step in
combating international terrorism in as much as it paves the way for
imposition of binding sanctions upon states engaging or possibly
supporting terrorist activities. Mention should also be made of two
Security Council resolutions (Resolution 1267 of 15 Oct 1999 and
Resolution 1333 of 19 December 2000) calling on the Taliban to hand
over Osama Bin Laden and imposing sanction on Taliban. In Resolution
1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 the Security Council called upon the
international community to re-double their efforts to prevent and suppress
terrorist attacks and to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and
supporters of terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Interestingly this
resolution does not contain specific mention of Taliban or Osama Bin
Laden as responsible for that tragic attack. The same formula was also
followed in the S.C. Resolution 1373 (2001) which while condemning the
11 September terrorist attacks and reaffirming that 'such acts, like any act
of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and
security'. as well as to the 'inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence' makes no specific mention of either the Taliban or Osma Bin
Laden.
VIII.
LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST STATE
SPONSORED TERRORISM
In a perceptive article, 'Terrorism and the Law'. Soafer argues
that attempts to rescue hostages and actions against countries that
sponsor terrorism's would not be seen as objectionable because the
principle of territorial sovereignty is not the only controlling rule in this
regard.47 In the view of another commentator 'unless the international
community acquires suitable instruments, capable of preventing and
repressing such criminal events, resorting to unilateral armed force is
likely to continue to increase on the part of those States whose nationals
become the victims of terrorist attacks, in order to fil the vacuum created
by the lack of effective control mechanism'.48 Many writers and states,
however, dispute the legality of such actions by invoking Article 2(4) read
with Article 5149 of the United Nations Charter. Since the anti-terrorism
47
48
49
Soafer, 'Terrorism and the Law', Foreign Affairs (1986), 901, 919, cf Lambert,
n 1, at 323, f.n. 59
Rohzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad through Military Coercion and
Intervention on Grounds of Humanity (1985). 66-67 Cf Lambert, n 1, at 325
The view supporting a permissive interpretation of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter and a wider right of self-defence has been endorsed by Bowett, Self-
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conventions neither prohibit nor sanctions, the use of force by a State to
rescue hostages or to combat state sponsored terrorism, the legality or
otherwise of such actions is to be found in customary and conventional
law relating to the use of force. While the restrictive interpretation of the
relevant legal principles of the U.N. Charter permits a use of force only
for self-defence under Article 5149, the permissive school sees a total ban
on the use of force as an emasculation of a State's ability to protect itself
against the illegal conduct of other States and asserts a wider right of self
defence. According to supporters of this view the pre-Charter law
permitted the use of force for certain non-aggressive purposes and since
the Charter did not alter the direction of international law, the customary
right of self-defence still survives. Under the permissive approach the use
of force in the following four circumstances is justified under the
customary right of self-defence : (i) in response to an armed attack
directed against state territory (ii) in anticipation of an armed attack of
threat to the State's security, (c) in response to an attack (threatened or
actual) against territory, nationals, property and rights guaranteed under
international law, and (iv) where the attack does not itself involve
measures of armed force, such
as economic aggression and
propaganda.50 This approach assumes that if the flexible conditions of
the Caroline case51 are satisfied, the use of force in the exercise of the
customary right of self-defence is permissible. In fact, there are many
cases where the use of force against the terrorism sponsoring states has
been sought to be justified on the ground of the customary right of the
self defence by the State resorting to force and its supporters. The U.S.
bombing of Libya in 198652, and the U.S. attack on Baghdad in 1993 in
response to an alleged terrorist threat against ex President Bush were
justified by the United States as acts of self-defence. Israel also justified
the Entebbe incident as an act of self-defence.53
50.
51
52.
53.
defence in International Law (1958). On the contrary Brownlie supports a
restrictive approach in this regard. See Brownile, International Law and the Use
of Force by States (1963)
Martin Dixon, A Text Book of International Law (2001), 300
The Caroline case, in Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. II, (1906), 409.
The U.S. justified its action on the basis of self-defence consistent with Article
51 of the U.N. Charter. The legality of the U.S. action however, seems to be
doubtful. See Murphy, 'The Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to Combat
International Terrorism', 25 Colum J. Trans. L.(1986), 86-88; Greenwood Air
Operation Against Libya' 'International Law and the United States', 89 West
Virginia L.R., (1987), 933, 937-48
Israel justified its action on the basis of self-defence and stated that its actions
were in the 'the limits of the Caroline case, i.e, necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.
The U.S. representative concurred and stated :
There is a well established right to use limited force for the protection of one's
own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where
the State in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or unable to
protect them. The right, flowing from the right of self-defence, is limited to
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By way of contrast, under the restrictive approach to the use of
force it is argued that the right of self-defence now available is to be
found in Article 51 with the result that a State may resort to self-defence
'if an armed attack occurs' but not otherwise. While this view may sound
utopian considering that there is no international police and no reliable
machinery for the vindication of rights allegedly denied, the problem with
the permissive view is that it places the distinction between lawful and
unlawful force on the subjective intention or aim of the acting State and
thus gives wider freedom of action to the powerful States.54 Besides, the
permissive interpretation of the law of self defence is at odd with the
principle expounded by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua
case. Although the Court in the instant case recognized that customary
law continued to exist alongside treaty law in the field of the right of selfdefence and said that there was not an exact overlap and the rules did
not have the same content, the majority favoured the restrictive view of
the customary right of self-defence only when armed attack occurs but
not otherwise.
According to the ratio of the Nicaragua judgment while terrorist
activities of the description contained in Article 3(g) of the Definition of
Aggression constitute an armed attack against which the right to
individual as well as collective self defence is available, less grave from
of terrorist activity may justify the use of proportional counter measures
by the victim state alone. In fact, as the Court said in the instant case
'States do not have a right of 'collective' armed response to acts which do
not constitute an "armed attack".55 Also pertinent for the purpose of the
present discussion is the following observation of the Court 56 :
'While the concept of an armed attack includes the dispatch by
one state of armed bands into the territory of another state,
supply of arms and other support to such bands cannot be
equated with armed attack. Nevertheless, such activities may
constitute a breach of the principle of the non use of force and
an intervention in the internal affairs of a State, that is, a form of
conduct which is certainly wrongful, but is of lesser gravity than
an armed attack'.
Use of force whether made under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
or under customary right to self-defence is subject to the requirements of
necessity and proportionality. This view has been taken by the
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case and in the Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. In the
latter case it was emphasised that '(t) he submission of the exercise of
54.
55.
56.
such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened materials
from injury'. The U.S. also justified its failed operation to rescue its nationals
held as hostage in Iran on various theories including self-defence.
Dixon, n. 50, at pp. 298-299.
ICJ Rep, para 211.
ICJ Rep. 1986, para 247.
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the right of self defence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality
is a rule of customary international law'. 57
In view of the above discussion it is clear that in certain situations
forcible measures may be adopted by way of a response to terrorist
activities. In the words of a commentator 'a major terrorist incident
mounted or supported by one State against another will justify measure
under
the rubric of self defence, provided that the necessary
requirements as to, for examples, proportionality are observed". 58 In his
view, 'a series of smaller-scale incidents may have the same effect, but it
is unlikely that isolated, relatively minor terrorist activities would justify
the use of force by the target state against the state supporting the
activity in question'.59
Turning to the question whether the alleged right of hot pursuit
can be used to justify armed incursions into the territory of neighboring
states for the purpose of destroying the military basis of terrorist groups
or Jehadis who have launched, or will launch, attacks against the State, it
may be noted that in the Southern African context, the Security Council
on many occasions condemned the practice of hot-pursuit and the
States resorting to it could not find any support for their claim,60 They
were seen as an aggression or contrary to Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. It is, therefore doubtful whether a right of hot-pursuit across land
has any basis in International law.61 But it is permissible for the victim
State to take defensive measures on its own territory in the event of an
armed attack by guerrillas.
IX.
ARMED
ASSISTANCE
MOVEMENTS
TO
NATIONAL
LIBERATION
It is sometimes argued by the terrorism sponsoring States that
militants groups to whom they are giving armed support are not terrorist
outfits but national liberation movements engaged in a struggle for self
determination. In this context following points may be noted. First, the
scope for the application of the right to external self-determination is
extremely limited in the post-colonial and the post cold war era. 62
Secondly, the Friendly Relations Declaration (Art. 5) and the Definition of
Aggression (Art.7) have dealt with the issue in a deliberately ambiguous
fashion, stating only that peoples under colonial occupation, foreign
domination or racist regime have the right to achieve self -determination
and to receive unspecified assistance. Thirdly, there is no evidence that a
customary practice has developed permitting armed assistance to
57.
58
59
60
61
62.
ICJ Reports 1996, para 41; 35 ILM., (1996), 809, 822.
M.N. Shaw, International Law (1997), 806.
Ibid.
See B.C. Nirmal, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law (1999),
Ch. IX.
Martin Dixon, n. 36. at 312.
See B.C. Nirmal, n. 60, Ch. X
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STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM STATE RESPONSIBILIT
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national liberation movements. Fourthly, it is true that a great majority of
Asian African states supported the right of self-determination of the
colonized people in the era of decolonization, but it is extremely doubtful
whether they still hold the view when the decolonization process is over.
Fifthly, use of force to suppress the right to self-determination is
unacceptable in terms of a series of U.N. General Assembly resolutions
adopted in 1970's. Sixthly, a national liberation movement covered by
Article 1(4) of 1977. Additional protocol I is required to respect and
observe the rules of international humanitarian law and to this end to
make a declaration under Article 96(1) of Protocol I. Seventhly national
liberation movements not within the purview of Article 1(4) of Protocol I
would be covered by Protocol II. As the material field of Protocol II has
been raised to a level of intensity of armed conflict which is virtually
commensurate with a classical civil war in situations falling short of a
civil war State's action is permissible against rebel groups subject to the
provisions of the domestic law and the requirements of international
human rights law.63 And, finally the Security Council resolution 1264 of
Dec. 1999 which, authorised States to use 'all necessary measures' to
protect the rights of the East Timoreans suggests that use of force in
support of a self-determination movement is permissible only after
authorisation by a competent international organisation as a collective
action.
X. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It is evident
from
the foregoing discussion that state
sponsorship of terrorism in the territory of another state is specifically
forbidden by the General Assembly
Declaration of Principles of
International Law and its resolution on Aggression. It is not only contrary
to the purpose and principles of the U.N. Charter but in certain cases
may constitute serious threats to international peace and security. Where
acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to international peace
and security the Security Council can act under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter and impose binding sanctions upon sates engaging or possibly
supporting such activities. In certain situations the use of force against
terrorism-sponsoring State will also be justified in the context of selfdefence. Where a country has been a victim of a small scale terrorist
incidents, the target State will be within its legitimate right of self-defence
to use forcible measures against the State supporting the activities in
question. The victim State may also adopt counter- measures against the
state sponsoring terrorism if the activities in question do not constitute an
armed attack but involve a violation of the principle of non use of force
and the principle of non-intervention. The position of the right of hotpursuit across land borders in international law appears to be uncertain
63.
B.C. Nirmal, 'Wars of National Liberation and International
Humanitarian Law' 28 IJIL (1988), 201 at 215.
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but a State can take defensive measures on its own territory in the event
of an attack of Jehadis, militants or terrorist groups.
Under the rules of State responsibility a State might be held
responsible for failing to prevent the armed group using its territory as a
base for terrorist attacks against another state. As already indicated, a
state may also be held responsible for extending support to their activities
provided the requirements of the 'control and dependency test' are met in
a given situation.
Existing anti-terrorism conventions, despite flaws, provide a
framework for the legal regulation of individual and group terrorism, their
provisions are also applicable to those who conduct terrorist activities on
behalf of a State. As the 'object-oriented' or 'enumerative approach'
which is the hallmark of the existing anti-terrorism instruments is not the
most expedient way of dealing with terrorism on a universal basis,
substantial progress achieved by the international community in the
drafting of a comprehensive convention on terrorism should be seen as a
positive development in the global war against terrorism.
It is also clear from the above discussion that law is on the side
of India in its current initiatives against state sponsored terrorism. It has
every right to defend its territory, people, values and freedom from
terrorist attacks sponsored by Pakistan and can even use force against
the latter under the rubric of self-defence subject to the fulfillment of the
requirements of the Caroline formula. But the availability of the right to
self-defence against state sponsored terrorism does not necessarily
mean that the target State must exercise it without weighing the pros and
cons of such action. Although it is for the political establishments in this
country to choose the appropriate option among available options, there
are at least three important factors which might restrain it from pursuing a
militaristic approach against its adversary in the current crisis - (i) lack of
political will and self-confidence, (ii) fear of nuclear war in the Indian SubContinent and (iii) doubts about the effectiveness of the military approach
to the problem of terrorism. It is perhaps for these reasons that the
government has decided to give diplomacy more chance and this
strategy has also begun to make some impact. Terrorism is a
multidimensional problem and as such requires multipronged strategies.
It is essential therefore that while pursuing other possible strategies India
also identifies and addresses the root causes of terrorism and
strengthens its internal security system.
