LECTURE 4
SPINOZA & BRADLEY
TWO KINDS OF
MONISM
INDIVIDUALITY
WHAT IS AN INDIVIDUAL THING?
NOT: MODIFICATIONS OF THINGS
NOT: MERE COLLECTIONS OF THINGS
NOT: EVENTS
NOT: STUFFS
NOT: UNIVERSALS (OR “ACCIDENTS”)
MONISM
THERE IS ONLY ONE SUBSTANTIAL THING (“THE
ONE”, “THE ABSOLUTE”, “THE ABSOLUTE
MIND”, “THE ABSOLUTE IDEA”, “GOD”,…)
TWO WESTERN MONISTS:
BARUCH SPINOZA
F. H. BRADLEY
SOME WESTERN AND EASTERN MYSTICS
VAN INWAGEN’S CHARACTERIZATION
OF MONISM
• “THERE IS A SINGLE
INDIVIDUAL THING AND THAT
THING COULD NOT HAVE
POSSIBLY CO-EXISTED WITH
ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL
THING.”
TWO FORMS OF MONISM
(1) ORDINARY “THINGS” DO NOT EXIST IN THEIR
OWN RIGHT – THEY ARE MODES,
MODIFICATIONS, OR ACCIDENTS OF THE ONE.
(SPINOZA)
(2) ORDINARY “THINGS” HAVE NO KIND OF BEING
AT ALL – NOT EVEN AS MODIFICATIONS. THE
BELIEF THAT THERE ARE MANY (i.E. MORE THAN
ONE) ENTITIES IS A COMPLETE ILLUSION.
(F. H. BRADLEY & THE ABSOLUTE IDEALISTS)
BARUCH (BENEDICT) SPINOZA
(1632-1677)
SPINOZA’S HOUSE IN RIJNSBURG,
HOLLAND
THE OTHER RATIONALISTS
RENE DESCARTES
1596-1650
GOTTFRIED WILHELM VON LEIBNIZ
(1646-1716)
FRANCIS H. BRADLEY
(1846-1924)
SPINOZA’S ACTUAL ARGUMENT IS
VERY COMPLICATED
SPINOZA’S MASTERPIECE, ETHICS, IS PRESENTED
AS A DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM – WITH
DEFINITIONS, AXIOMS, AND PROOFS. WE
WILL NOT TAKE THE TIME TO PRESENT IT IN
DETAIL. [SOME OF HIS PROOFS ARE NOT
VALID AND NOT ALL OF HIS AXIOMS SEEM
SELF-EVIDENT.] FOR HIS PROOF THAT THERE
IS ONLY ONE THING (“SUBSTANCE”, “NATURE”,
“GOD”), THE CRUCIAL PREMISE IS:
SPINOZA’S CRUCIAL PREMISE
“IF A THING IS NOT ABSOLUTELY
INDEPENDENT OF EVERYTHING ELSE,
THEN IT MUST BE A MERE
MODIFICATION OF SOMETHING
ABSOLUTELY INDEPENDENT OF
EVERYTHING ELSE.”
VAN INWAGEN’S QUESTION
WHY SHOULD WE BELIEVE THIS? IT IS NOT
OBVIOUS, OR EVEN PLAUSIBLE, AND SPINOZA
GIVES NO INDEPENDENT ARGUMENT FOR IT.
(IT IS NOT GOOD PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD TO
QUESTION A PREMISE JUST BECAUSE IT IS A
PREMISE. BUT HERE WE HAVE SOMETHING
THAT NEEDS FURTHER JUSTIFICATION.)
F. H. BRADLEY’S ARGUMENT AGAINST
“THE MANY”
• (VAN INWAGEN’S RECONSTRUCTION)
OVERALL ARGUMENT:
(1) IF THERE ARE TWO OR MORE THINGS,
THEN THERE ARE EXTERNAL RELATIONS.
(2) ALL RELATIONS ARE INTERNAL.
__________________________
(3) THERE ARE NOT TWO OR MORE
THINGS.
INTRINSIC VS. RELATIONAL ATTRIBUTES
• AN ATTRIBUTE A IS RELATIONAL IF AND ONLY IF
ANYTHING X’S HAVING A IMPLIES THE
EXISTENCE OF SOMETHING OTHER THAN X
(AND ITS PARTS).
• BEING AN UNCLE
• BEING 10 MILES FROM CHICAGO
• BEING TALLER THAN SOMEONE
INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES
AN ATTRIBUTE IS INTRINSIC IF AND ONLY IF IT
IS NOT RELATIONAL.
SOME TESTS: (a) IF SOMETHING ACQUIRES AN
ATTRIBUTE BUT DOES NOT REALLY
CHANGE,
THEN THE ATTRIBUTE IS RELATIONAL (NOT
INTRINSIC).
(b) IF AN EXACT DUPLICATE OF SOMETHING
WOULD ALSO HAVE A CERTAIN ATTRIBUTE, THEN
THE ATTRIBUTE IS INTRINSIC.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS
• A RELATION R HOLDING BETWEEN THINGS X
AND Y IS INTERNAL IF ITS’ HOLDING IS
COMPLETELY DETERMINED BY THE INTRINSIC
ATTRIBUTES OF X AND Y.
• A RELATION R IS EXTERNAL IF AND ONLY IF IT
IS NOT INTERNAL.