An Overview of Princeton's Program on Science and Global Security Biodefense Activities

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An Overview of Princeton’s Program on Science
and Global Security Biodefense Activities
Laura H. Kahn, MD, MPH, MPP
Research Staff
Program on Science and Global Security, WWS, Princeton
University
7th NJ Universities Homeland Security Research Consortium
Symposium, New Brunswick, November, 2006
Co-Principal Investigators
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Laura H. Kahn, MD, MPH, MPP Research Staff
member
Frank von Hippel, PhD, Professor of Public
and International Affairs
Christopher Chyba, PhD, Professor of
Astrophysical Sciences and International
Affairs. Professor Chyba recently served on
the IOM/NRC panel on "Globalization,
Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life
Sciences."
Activities at Princeton
University
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Biodefense Seminar Series supported by
the Carnegie Corporation of New York
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Description of Series
Papers from Series
Four State Public Health Preparedness
Study supported by the Josiah Macy, Jr.
Foundation of New York
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Key Findings
Carnegie Biodefense Seminar Series
Goals:
 To engage leading university, biotech, and
pharmaceutical industry scientists in discussions with
security analysts of issues of biodefense, biothreats,
biosecurity, biosafety, and bioethics.
 To help the life sciences community contribute to
biodefense policy development.
 To develop collaborative relationships between policy
and security experts and the bioscience community
to deal with the dual-use dangers of modern biology.
2003-2004 Seminar Series
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Dr. David Franz, Vice President, Chemical and Biological
Defense Division, Southern Research Institute, “Biosafety Level
4 labs: What research, how many and where?”
Dr. Mark Wheelis, Professor of Microbiology, UC Davis, “The
Role for International Transparency in Biodefense R & D.”
Dr. Michael Moodie, President of the Chemical and Biological
Arms Control Institute, Washington DC and Dr. Jonathan
Tucker, Senior Researcher, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Strengthening the
BWC: Lessons Learned from the Failed Attempt to Agree on a
Verification Protocol; Where Next?”
Dr. Adel Mahmoud, President, Merck Vaccines, Merck and Co,
Inc., “Technical, Economic and Legal Obstacles to the
Development of Vaccines and Other Therapeutics for Potential
Bioterrorism Agents.”
2006 Spring Seminar Series
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Dr. Richard Ebright, Rutgers University, 'Biodefense
Research: NIH Role, NIH Management, Oversight of
Safety, Oversight of Security, and Oversight of Dual-Use
Implications.”
Dr. Nancy Connell, UMDNJ, 'Codes of Ethics and
Whistleblowers in Biodefense Research.”
Dr. Alan Pearson, Center for Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, 'Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons.”
Dr. Christopher Chyba, Princeton University, “Proposed
International Regimes for Regulating Biotechnology
Research”
Dr. Scott Steele, FBI, “Coordination on Bioterrorism
Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Initiatives.”
Dr. Laura Donohue, Stanford University, “Terrorist
Speech and the Future of Free Expression.”
Spring Seminar Series at University of Medicine and
Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ) (Coordinated by Dr.
Nancy Connell)
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Dr. Malcolm Dando, University of Bradford, UK & Dr.
Brian Rappert, University of Exeter, UK, "The Life
Sciences, Bio-security and Dual-Use Research."
Dr. Michael Allswede, University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center, "Forensic Epidemiology."
Dr. Gigi Kwik-Gronvall, Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies, University of Pittsburgh, “From Anthrax to
Flu: Preparing the Country for Biological Threats.”
Fall 2006 Seminar Series
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October 6: Dr. Stanley Lemon, Chair and Director of the
Institute for Human Infections and Immunity, University of
Texas Medical Branch. “Biosecurity vs Bioinsecurity: BSL4
Research in the 21st Century.”
October 13: Milton Leitenberg, Senior Research Scholar on
Arms Control and Biological Weapons, School of Public Policy,
University of Maryland. “Assessing Biological Weapons and
Bioterrorism Threat.”
October 20: Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls, and
Negotiations, U.S. Department of State. “The Debate over the
Role of the Biological Weapons Convention in Today’s BioDefense Equation.”
Fall 2006 Seminar Series
(continued)
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October 27: Dr. Jens Kuhn, Research Scholar, Division of
Tumor Virology, New England Primate Research Center, Harvard
Medical School. “Integration of Former Soviet Bioweapons
Facilities into the International Research Community—Success
or Failure?”
December 1, 2006 Dr. Dennis Kasper, Director Channing
Laboratory, William Ellery Channing Professor of Medicine,
Professor of Microbiology and Molecular Genetics, Harvard
Medical School. Chair of the National Science Advisory Board
for Biosecurity. What is the NSABB all about?
December 8, 2006 Dr. W. Ian Lipkin, Jerome L and Dawn
Greene Professor of Epidemiology and Director of the Infectious
Disease Laboratory Mailman School of Public Health; Principal
Investigator and Scientific Director, Northeast Biodefense
Center, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University.
“Pathogen Surveillance and Discovery.”
Papers from Series
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LH Kahn, “Biodefense Research: Can Secrecy and
Safety Co-Exist?” Biosecurity and Bioterroism 2004,
Volume 2.
http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.110.html
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J Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure
Worse than the Disease?” Arms Control Today,
October 2004.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker.asp
S Wright, “Taking Biodefense Too Far,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2004.
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04
wright
Biodefense Research: Can
Secrecy and Safety Co-Exist?
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Paper examined the interface between
secrecy and safety.
Transparency of Select Agent Research to
First Responders (physicians and public
health professionals)
A National Surveillance System of Laboratoryacquired infections
Provide epidemiologic data on the incidence,
severity, and community impact, if any, of
these infections.
Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation Supported Four
State Public Health Preparedness Study
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Goals of study:
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To assess how state and local health departments,
and state agriculture departments, are responding
to the threats of emerging infectious diseases and
bioterrorism.
To assess leadership, disease surveillance, clinical
capabilities, laboratory capabilities,
communications, funding, and attitudes.
Four states were studied: New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Surveyed all
local health departments and over 4000 physicians
and 4000 veterinarians.
Key Findings
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For human public health, there is confusion
between political and professional leadership.
Confusion did not exist for animal health.
Minimal physician and veterinarian
engagement with local public health
organizations. Over a quarter of the
respondents did not know if their community
had a local public health agency or not.
Physicians’ and veterinarians’ opinions of local
public health agency capabilities during a
crisis were uniformly low.
Key Findings
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There is minimal communication between
physicians and veterinarians. In an era in
which the vast majority of emerging
infectious diseases are zoonotic,
communication and collaboration between
these professionals is critical.
With the exception of New York State, few of
the local public health agencies were able to
provide incidence-rate data for many vaccinepreventable diseases in human populations.
Key Findings
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In a crisis situation, public health would be
almost entirely dependent on volunteers,
local clinics, physicians’ offices, and the
National Guard for out-of-hospital clinical and
preventive services.
Vaccination and disease statistics for all
species of animals were not available in all
four states.
Key Findings
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Local public health agencies that depended
upon local sources for primary funding were
11 times less likely to have received federal
biodefense funds than agencies that received
most of their funding from the state.
Local public health agencies that had received
federal biodefense funding were more likely
to have hired new surveillance staff and new
equipment than those that did not receive
these funds.
Thank you!
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Carnegie Biodefense Seminar
Series:
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/BW_series/index.html
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Four State Public Health
Preparedness Report:
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/Macy/index.html
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