Topic Area:
H2
Paper Number:
8205
Authors:
Karisa Ribeiro,
Andre Dantas,
Koshi Yamamoto
Title:
The Brazilian Experience in Road Concession: Past, Present and Future
Abstract:
In recent years, Brazil has passed through a process of transference of public services. Due
to limited resources to maintain the level of services, government has been transferring
them to private companies. Specifically in transports, the road concession program has
been criticized in many aspects. In order to understand crucial issues and evaluate new
perspectives for the program, this paper performs a historical and critical analysis. We
identified possible reasons for current situation that are mainly related to a restricted
planning strategy. Based on this backdrop, two future perspectives for the Brazilian road
concession program were developed.
Key words: Concession, Road, Infrastructure, Public-Private Partnership
Method of Presentation:
(1) OHP
(X)
(2) Slide Projector
( )
(3) LCD Projector
( )
1
Topic Area Code: H2-8205
The Brazilian Experience in Road Concession: Past, Present and
Future
Karisa RIBEIRO
Civil Engineer, Master Student
Andre DANTAS
Master in Transportation, Ph.D. Student
Koshi YAMAMOTO
Professor
Dept. of Civil Engineering
Nagoya Institute of Technology,
466-8555, Gokiso-cho, Showa-ku, Nagoya, Japan
Tel.& Fax. : + 81-52-735-5496
E-mail: karisa@keik1.ace.nitech.ac.jp
2
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a worldwide tendency on the establishment of public-private partnerships
to promote efficiency and productivity of infrastructure-related services is observed. Due
to budgetary restrictions, many countries are considering these partnerships as a form to
keep and improve the quality of services supplied to users taking advantage of nongovernmental funds (Krauz, 1996; Barret, 1999). This tendency is more visible in
developing countries, since their economy do not present stable conditions to support huge
investments as needed in the development of infrastructure (MacDonald, 2000).
Among developing countries, Brazil’s case on public-private partnerships can be
highlighted due to its continental dimension and acknowledged role as a leading nation in
South America. Since 1990, Brazilian government has been developing extensive policies
of concession on public services and facilities. Transportation, telecommunication and
energy sectors have been transferred to private companies. Especially in transportation,
which involves many social, economical and political aspects, the transference of the
infrastructure is fundamental since it is responsible for 250 billion dollars or 40% of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) (Magalhaes, 1998).
In transportation context, Brazilian Road Network (BRN) is the most important mode.
BRN has 1,5 million Km, which responds for 65% of freight transportation and 95% of
passenger’s displacements (ANFAVEA, 1999). Despite of its significance on Brazilian
reality, recent surveys show that BRN lacks of considerable amount of investments (CNT,
1999). According to Magalhaes (1998), GDP’s share devoted to road financing decreased
from 1,51% in 1975 to 0,54% in 1982 and 0,32% in 1988. Consequently, there has been a
decline on network growing, which was 12% a year in 1975 and has reached 2% a year in
1996.
Without the necessary financing resources to maintain BRN, Brazilian government has
been conducting a concession program based upon the partnership between public and
private sectors. Among the many ways of operations and management contracts of private
participation in infrastructure (Silva, 2000), concession is dedicated to temporally
transference of recuperation and maintenance services in exchange for exploration rights
such as payment of tool feel. After pre-defined term and conditions, government reassumes
control of the road. Nevertheless, Brazilian Road Concession Program (BRCP) has been
recently criticized in many of its conceptions and results. Complains from users (CNT,
1997; Pires and Giambiagi, 2000), discussion on technical merits (Lee, 1996) and political
divergences are some of the problems affecting the program and Brazilian society. These
problems can create an environment of disharmony in BRCP, mainly because the payment
of tool fee has been considered extremely high pondering the benefits and the large amount
of taxes previously collected.
There have been few technical and scientific researches to evaluate BRCP under a critical
approach. Efforts were noticed, but they lack of a general vision and are mostly dedicated
to perform specific analysis such as the evaluation of the concession results for some road
segments (Galvao, 1998) and calculation of tool fees (Souza, 1997). Moreover, due to
BRCP’s peculiar characteristics, international experiences and models can not be integrally
adopted. Therefore, it is essential to perform a deep study on the understanding of this
program in order to specify new perspectives for future developments.
3
This work intends to introduce and analyze past, present and future of BRCP. Throughout
a historical analysis, we focus on the comprehension of the program since its origins,
evaluation of its basic conceptions, identification of changes and tendencies and
comparison of development stages. In this sense, we contribute both for the improvement
of BRCP and for identification of critical aspects that will interfere in concession programs
in developing countries.
This paper is structured in six sections. After this introduction, the characteristics and
evolution of BRN are reported in order to examine the reasons for implementation of
BRCP. In the sequence, we describe the framework of BRCP focusing on achieved results.
On fourth and fifth sections, a critical analysis and future perspectives are described,
respectively. Finally, on the sixth section, based on the complete examination of the BRCP,
conclusion topics are stated.
2. BRAZILIAN ROAD NETWORK: CHARACTERISTICS AND EVOLUTION
BRN is divided into three jurisdictions that are federal, state and municipal. Federal roads
are administered by DNER (National Department of Roads) and comprehend 66 thousand
Km. Roads under state’s jurisdiction are controlled by DER (State Departments of Roads),
which responds for 187 thousand Km. Local bureaus are responsible for 1,21 million Km
of municipal roads. The basic network was established between the years of 1945 and 1975
as part of the National Plan for Terrestrial Transportation System and that defined the
current technical-administrative framework (Lee, 1996). Resulting from the
implementation of this plan, main urban areas were connected and its main conception and
structure remains the same after 25 years. Resources for the development of BRN were
originated from consumption of oil and specific road taxation that formed a national road
fund. Using this fund, BRN expanded 17 times in a 30 year-period.
Since 1975, situation was drastically changed towards a policy of taxes’ reorganization and
creation of new funds. Resources from the national road fund were completely transferred
into a development fund that supported a large variety of sectors, which led to complete
suppression of any specific budget dedicated to BRN. According to LASTRAN (1998),
since 1975, BRN just used resources generated from the annual national budget that were
considered insufficient to keep minimal levels of operations. Under this scenario of deep
restriction and gradual deterioration of BRN, Brazilian government initiated efforts
towards the obtainment of additional budgetary resources. Some efforts were directed to
gain international bank loans and to create new taxes, but they hardly reach the objective
due to temporally nature and absence of a general plan to support them. For instance, in
1986, a tool fee-stamp was created in order to back up the recuperation of BRN. It
consisted of a stamp that had to be visible on vehicle’s front glasses, otherwise it was
prohibited to use the system. After many protests and judicial processes, it was suspended
mainly because it was insufficient to fulfill 20% of BRN’s necessities.
As a consequence of this erroneous management, conservation status of BRN sharply
decreased creating various socio-economical problems in many areas of Brazil. As verified
by CNT (1999), 92% of BRN were classified as strongly damaged. Magalhaes (1998)
argues that these conditions are directly affecting operational cost of transportation,
generating more accidents and increasing travel time. Furthermore, this situation is much
4
more critical in Brazil, since its primary economical sector is deeply dependent on BRN to
reach consumers all over the country (World Bank, 1995).
3. BRAZILIAN ROAD CONCESSION PROGRAM
In 1990, Brazilian government started a national plan of decentralization on public services
and facilities, which was called PND (National Plan of Decentralization). Though it
involved all sectors of infrastructure in the same direction, each one assumed its own
criteria, objectives and actions to establish the partnership with private investors. In
transportation sector, Ministry of Transportation initiated its decentralization activities in
1993 by applying the concession model in recuperate and maintain federal roads.
Following, we describe these activities into two phases of development.
3.1 First phase
Preliminary, a technical group was formed aiming to identify and select road segments in
terms of economical return and therefore attractive to private sector. Additionally, this
group dedicated to the conception and elaboration of a framework to conduct the legal
process of concession. Studies were performed in approximately 52 thousand-Km of
federal roads in order to select 15 thousand-Km. After this selection, it was concluded that
it was essential to firstly recuperate the existent network and then move to construct of new
roads. Therefore, the technical group adapted the BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer)
system into a ROD (Recuperate, Operate and Devolution) model (Almeida, 1994). It is
clear that the adoption of ROD in opposition to BOT leads to the reduction of the amount
of investment, since construction activities were abolished. Consequently, it was expected
that toll fees would be inferior to those if BOT system was applied in order to create shortterm benefits to users.
Next, as part of the concession process, specific studies were conducted for each road to be
transferred. These studies, which were performed by consultant companies, consist on the
obtainment of information to describe operational conditions and requirements to be used
in the selection process of the concessionaire. Mainly, they concentrated on the evaluation
of original construction projects and on reports from field surveys. Resulting from these
studies, a descriptive and detailed manual called PER (Program of Road Exploration) was
generated, which contains minimum requirements and standards of quality and quantity to
be reached by the concessionaire at short and long terms (DER, 1998). Some of these
requirements and standards are delineated as follows:
- Types and description of initial reconstruction works;
- Capacity improvements and upgrade;
- Specification on periodic maintenance as well as operation and conservation;
- Services for users (hospital, mechanical and telecommunication); and
- Time schedule for implementation of investments.
After these definitions and an extensive process of legal qualification had to take place.
The winner concessionaire was chosen considering the lowest toll fee to be charged from
users. Variable terms of concession were established considering specific revenues of each
road under concession. It was also stipulated that the payment of toll fees could only
5
initiate after the preliminary reconstruction activities, due to the long period without
careful maintenance that directly affected the level of service (DNER, 1998).
Additionally, it was regulated that the acquirement of financing funds was a strict
attribution of concessionaires. Funds could come from bank loans, toll fee collection and
commercial exploration of road area. These regulations intended to limit or eliminate any
participation of public funds, but in practice it was not verified. For example, Figure 1
shows the financial structure of Presidente Dutra Highway, where it is clearly noticed that
within external funds a considerable part was indirectly originated from a federal bank of
development (BNDES) (World Bank, 1999).
14%
BNDES
Other
20%
32%
66%
68%
Concessionaire
Banks
External financing
Figure 1. Financial Structure of Presidente Dutra Highway
Another important characteristic of this phase was the payment system of toll fee.
Differently of systems commonly used in many countries, a fix value of toll fee was
charged according to vehicle’s category. Called “open system” (Raux and Adan, 1999), it
means that for every 100 Km, user had to pay the toll fee, without any consideration on the
total distance of the displacement within the highway (DNER, 1998). Figure 2 shows a
typical example that is still observed in most part of roads under BRCP. For instance, we
noticed in this figure that intermediary traffic between cities B and C are not computed nor
charged, since there is no control on them. On the other hand, trips from A to B and from
A to C, despite the fact that they are related to totally different distances, are charged with
the same value of toll fee.
City B
Legend
City C
Point of origin/ destination
Toll Gate
Access
Traffic Flow
Road
City A
Figure 2. Some typical cases of displacements within the “open system”
6
During three years, four federal roads and one bridge were conceded. Table 1 shows a brief
description of the results in these concessions. Involving only 857 Km and representing
investments around 1 billion US dollars (IBBTA, 1995), we observe that all roads under
concession do not present extension superior to 200 Km, except Presidente Dutra Highway
(BR116) that connects the most important cities of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo).
It is observed that there are different values of toll fees, which can be understood due to the
variety of conditions in each one but the toll fee at Rio-Niteroi Bridge can be considered
extremely high since there was not structural reforms or any special projects. It is also
observed that for all roads toll fee values suffered variations along the time. Though the
inflation rate in this period was almost insignificant (Castro, 2000), variations on toll fee
values reached 93%.
Table 1. Results and characteristics of the initial concessions in Brazil
Road
Segment
Length
(Km)
Date of
contract
signature
Term of
Estimated Forecasted
concession investment
Vehicle
(years)
(US $ mi)
Per day
Investment Toll fee /Km
(U$)/
(U$/Km) at
Km/years
opening
1997
1998
1999
0.030
0.053
0.057
0.058
33.388
0.017
0.026
0.027 0.028
197.000
70.831
0.012
0.017
0.018
0.019
150
30.000
41.551
0.026
0.031
0.032
0.034
20
20
60.000
8.904
0.010
0.028
0.030
0.034
23
1.110
83.400
83.965,2
0,019
0,031
0.032
0.034
RioNiteroi
Bridge
13.2
Dec 94
20
70
72.000
265.152
Rio de
Janeiro- Juiz
de For a
179.7
Oct 95
25
150
58.000
406.6
Oct 95
25
720
144.4
Nov 95
25
112.3
Mar 97
856.4
-------
Presidente
Dutra
Toll fee evolution
(U$/Km)
Rio de
JaneiroAlem
Paraiba
OsorioPorto
Alegre
Total /
Average
Souce: DNER- Annual report: 1997, 1998, 1999.
3.2 Second phase
In 1996, expansion of BRCP was firstly considered by DNER. Through the creation of a
new division specifically devoted to concession, initial studies were introduced in order to
evaluate more than 7 thousand-Km (DNER, 1998). Simultaneously, some state agencies
also decided to institute their own process of concession according to regional needs
(Castro, 2000). At State’s level, approximately 7,5 thousand-Km were independently
evaluated from federal regulation.
Despite of the expansionist image that was associated to this phase, in fact, it comes from
the redefinition on many criteria previously applied. Mainly due to economical problems
and negative reactions from users and society, serious changes on the initial conception of
BRCP were urgent. Specially concerning users’ reactions, Pires and Giambiagi (2000) and
CNT (1998) show that toll fee was accepted, but the value was considered very high.
Moreover, some definitions in the first phase such as the “open system” of toll fee
7
collection generating uncharged traffic, the overestimation of demand and critical
conditions of road conservation were decisive to the implementation of new directions on
BRCP. Additionally, economical crisis in Asia devaluated Brazilian currency and
consequently there was increase on interest rates affecting the obtainment of internal and
external loans by concessionaires.
In order to establish clear and correct definitions and then overcome the problems of first
phase, the following changes were processed:
- Reduction of service levels provided by concessionaires;
- Reorganization of time schedules for implementation of investments;
- Studies on the determination of new locations for toll gates;
- Selection of the winner concessionaires considering both the lowest toll fee and
bidding value; and
- Revision of equivalent vehicle indexes to reduce the amount of toll fee paid by
trucks (DER, 1999).
The second phase is undergoing and partial results have not been displayed yet. As
previous experiences generated more impacts due to user’s reaction than the benefits,
results have been carefully and gradually inserted into media. It is known that about 15
thousand-Km are under concessionaire selection. Another interesting point is that the
major part of the roads under concession is concentrated in South and Southeast Regions of
Brazil as shown in Figure 3, notably the most economically important regions that involve
56% of BRN.
Brasilia
Rio de Janeiro
Sao Paulo
Figure 3. Roads under concession in Brazil
8
4. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
BRCP has contributed to restructure the road network and provide a better condition of
traffic. Before its implementation, a large part of BRN was damaged, but in 1999 it was
verified that only 37,8% of federal roads need recuperation. It shows that considerable
amount of investments has changed previous scenarios, reducing the number of accidents
and travel time as well as the creation of several new jobs. These results were also decisive
to provide a competitive level for Brazilian products in international markets. Nevertheless,
despite of all positive facts, still there are several aspects leading to a deeper discussion on
BRCP’s efficiency. Among them, we could point out the adoption or not of this concession
program, but it will not be discussed here since the decision to proceed is already taken and
consolidated. Therefore, we focus on the evaluation of critical points that are expected to
be part of current discussion in Brazil and many other developing countries.
The gravest point in BRCP is that it is not part of a strategic planning inside governmental
sphere. Decentralization agencies of Brazilian infrastructure defined their own limits, terms
and criteria without a more detailed linkage between themselves such as observed in BRCP.
This conduction is totally opposite to World Bank’s (1999) recommendation that the
success of road toll programs depends on the establishment of a stable structure of
planning, as observed in France, Italy, Japan and Spain. In the same situation of Brazil,
Indonesia and Mexico conceived their concession programs in an isolated way and
consequently faced serious problems during and after the transference.
In the same direction, it is clearly observed that BCRP’s conception is devoted to punctual
and immediate topics. Punctual in the sense that it is not concerned on the expansion of
BRN, while immediate refers to the urgent necessity to obtain resources and results to
improve the traffic conditions in Brazilian roads. Contributing for this conclusion, some
facts such as the adoption of ROD model and the selection of concession roads in saturated
areas with great perspectives of financial revenue are noticed. First phase of BRCP
concentrated on the existent roads without any preoccupation towards the construction of
new ones, so investments were directed into areas with a high concentration network that
just need recuperation and maintenance. This policy is extremely conservative and
arguable since public-private partnerships should be used to attract investments towards
the development and create incentives for implementation of new industries and
economical activities all over the nation (Scott et al., 2000).
Another aspect to be discussed is BRCP’s vulnerability to users’ reactions. In the first
phase of BRCP, as shown in Table 1 toll fee were readjusted during a short period mainly
because initial definitions (demand, recuperation, etc) were incorrect in their forecasts.
This caused severe reactions and pressures over road agencies in all levels of jurisdiction
(federal, state, municipal). Therefore, new definitions for second phase were influenced but
decisions were taken separately, i.e., each road agency made their own criteria without
specific regards to the others (Pires and Giambiagi, 2000). Consequently, negotiations have
led to the reduction on toll fees and quality of services provided by concessionaires
generating totally different values and levels of concession (DNER, 1999). Obviously,
such behaviour expresses that BRCP’s structure is not constructed under reliable basis of
confidence and on technical principles either it is indifferent to external political pressures.
According to Halperin (1999), experiences in Hungary and Thailand show that the
governmental agencies are very tempted to interfere in the process after demonstration of
9
user’s dissatisfaction, but hardly they can establish again the equilibrium that is reached
only through tribunal disputes.
Contributing for this situation of BCRP comes from the limited source of information and
technical-scientific studies supporting its activities (Castro, 2000). In order to define prices,
terms and conditions of operations on concession roads, concessionaires mostly confine
their studies bearing the information obtained from PER. However, this manual lacks of
detailed description of road conditions those are hardly updated and not so much reliable
for deeper analysis. On the other side, staffs of DNER and DER agencies struggle to keep a
database with all necessary information, due to budget and personnel limitations.
Consequently, suitable analyses are not conducted and risk factors are overestimated
influencing on toll fee definition and in the program as well.
5. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
The comprehension and projection of BRCP’s future comes from the historical and
organizational understanding and its relation to socioeconomic and political issues. Until
now, we discussed and detailed all the steps and their respective problems as well as the
solutions that were taken along seven years of experiences. Based upon the context of
BRCP’s evolution, we establish here two distinct scenarios for future perspective. The first
scenario describes possible progresses considering that the same conception that has been
applied. On the other hand, the second scenario is an exercise of reflection in order to
create new perspectives that have not yet been debated. Following, we separately describe
these scenarios, trying to identify possible developments, advantages / disadvantages and
future necessities.
5.1 Scenario 1 – without alterations in BRCP
The continuity of BRCP certainly would improve the most important part of BRN at a
short term. Results show that the quality of services is increasing and that concessionaires,
DNER and DERs are trying to create a better concession environment.
However, it is not clear what kind of impact this policy can generate in a near future. There
are many factors indicating that future perspectives will be correlated to the increase of
conflicts between users, concessionaires, and government. Firstly, these conflicts can
happen due to the absence of a central agency to act in coordination and inside PND. In the
decentralization program, each agency has assumed separately a large variety of
delineation, resulting, for instance, in many difficulties to integrate road, hydro, air, and
railway modes. Therefore, if any action to define a common standard of regulation
between the agencies is not taken, then these difficulties could create additional costs for
transportation as occurred in Mexico (Ruster, 1997). Once integration problems are
verified, it will be necessary to establish connections between them, which will surely
affect the final costs of toll fees.
In the sequence, due to punctual and immediate approach of BRCP, conflicts tend to rise.
We believe that soon there will be serious problems related BRN’s saturation, because the
more road conditions are improved, the more flows will naturally grow in main roads
leading to reduction of capacity levels. As a natural consequence, concession roads will
need expansion, but that is not a simple task since these roads are located in extensively
10
occupied areas. Clearly, there has been no previous plan to act in this direction, so costs
will sharply increase. Additionally, due to a non-expansionist policy and limited concerns
on roads with low demand, production costs in non-developed regions will certainly
expand since transportation infrastructure has not received proper assistance or treatment.
Summarizing, not only actors involved directly in concession program (users, government
and concessionaires) will be affect, but socio-economical activities can suffer impacts
much more complex than we can foresee right now.
Finally, conflicts tend to appear due to the limited level of information offered to users and
technical evaluations. Both factors will contribute to increase uncertainties related to
definition of toll fees that probably will affect all actors involved. As observed by Hayashi
et al. (1998) without user’s understanding it becomes difficult to gain the support of the
people when introducing unfamiliar systems. On the other side, there have been restricted
conditions to process extensive analysis using suitable and updated data.
5.2 Scenario 2 – creating new paradigms for BRCP
In this scenario, we intend to discuss possible alternatives to solve problems and conflicts
previously observed. In this attempt, new paradigms are created based on international
experiences that have demonstrated creative solutions and successful and unsuccessful
results. These new paradigms have to be conceived facing the current level of progress
reached by BRCP, since we understand the impossibility and unfeasibility to restart the
program from the scratch. Therefore, we propose two distinct approaches considering a
short and a long-term perspective. The former would be concentrated on the solution of
urgent issues in undergoing and for future concessions, meanwhile the second one would
prepare the basis for a new conception.
5.2.1 Establishing new short-term perspectives
We propose that technical evaluations should be conducted to reduce conflicts looking for
a framework that has to be tuned with user’s expectations and capacity of payment. Similar
to experiences in Argentine and Chile (Estache, 1996; World Bank, 1999), the more the
concession process is clear and simple in its assumptions, the more it would create an
attractive environment for all concession’s players. Such a concentration on user’s point of
view and necessities is narrowly related to market’ delineation and segmentation using
appropriated techniques as proposed by Kotler (1998).
A great effort to obtain reliable information would be conducted to precisely define criteria,
levels of services, benefits, risks and costs. This procedure would suppress any doubt
related to toll fee values that have been charged and for future concessions (Nicola et al.,
1996). Concessionaires would take advantage in the sense that their risks could be reduced
and investors would have total clarification on how and when their revenues would come.
Figure 4 shows a sequential orientation to perform the proposed technical evaluations.
11
MARKETING
ENGENERRING
EXPECTATIONS
&
PAYMENT CAPACITY
DATABASE




Criteria
Service level
Risk
Investment
Figure 4 – sequential orientation for technical evaluations
5.2.2 Conceiving new long-term perspectives
A review of BRCP’s conception towards a strategic planning approach is expected to
create a new dimension for Brazil’s development. As part of a national planning in a macro
and long-term perspective, concession program has to be re-evaluated and re-structured in
order to define targets and goals, to incorporate internal and external factors affecting
concession environment and then to establish future strategies (Ng, 1993). For instance, it
has to be defined what part of road system will contribute for nation’s developments such
as how, where and when road concession must be considered necessary. Japanese road
system, for example, is a remarkable demonstration of government intentions trying to
expand not only in essential area but also in regions that need better infrastructure for
socio-economical development activities (World Bank, 1999). In Brazil’s case, clear
decisions have to be taken in order to specify policies of recuperation, expansion or both,
always regarding previous strategies defined in a national planning level and considering
the maximization of benefits for network analysis (World Bank, 1999).
In the sequence of these macro definitions, based upon this backdrop a new structure for
BCRP would be created. The World Bank (1999) proposes an interesting framework
including legal, administrative and financial issues but more detailed descriptions would be
fundamental due to BCRP’s complexities. Therefore, additional studies would be required
to fulfill a complete structure of concession development. In this sense, technical
contributions as theoretically proposed by Pires and Giambiagi (2000) would provide
insights if applied into case studies.
Finally, it would be necessary to create a coercive system to enforce and control practical
actions in the concession context. As it is a developing country passing through very
dynamic changes, this system should be independent from governmental influence and
composed of all sectors of Brazilian society involved in the program and acknowledge
technicians. As a council, it should evaluate if strategic missions and goals have been
achieved and how concessionaires and government should change their practices in order
to obtain success.
12
6. CONCLUSION
The Brazilian concession experience has been important to repair some parts of BRN. This
paper showed the reasons that made necessary the implementation of BCRP, its
development and results. Nevertheless, BCRP has suffered some criticizing from the
Brazilian society. We analysed the critical issues and verified their causes in order to reach
a better comprehension and understanding of the program. The principal criticizing of
program were: absence of a national strategic planing; conception devoted to punctual and
immediate problems; vulnerability to users’ reactions; and deficiency on technicalscientific studies and information.
Considering this context, we established two distinct future perspectives. Firstly, we
described a scenario taking into consideration the continuity of BRCP without alterations
and we verify that this direction will lead to the increasing of conflicts between concession
program’s players. In the second scenario, new paradigms were proposed for short and
long- term perspectives of development based upon international experiences and the
understanding of BCRP. We presented some alternatives to solve and reduce current and
future conflicts.
Finally, we expect that our analysis will contribute to improve not only BCRP but also
concession programs with similar characteristics. This work is an effort towards a critical
and technical approach that is supposed to be followed by many others researches in this
topic.
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