OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE: ACTIVE ACTION
Dalibor Jílek
1. Introductory explanations
1.1 The task is to prove that the realization of all agreed obligations following from the
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women requires
systematic and synergistic actions made by the states parties. Because legal thought has to
rely on proper dualistic approaches, one cannot avoid it. As will be shown, the Convention
contains both obligations of ‘conduct’ and ‘result’. The latter are predominantly embedded in
the Convention and as such they undertake the states to take appropriate legislative,
administrative measures and judicial decisions. On the contrary, the obligations of ‘conduct’
rarely occur therein. Principally, the obligations imposing to refrain from performing a
specific act are sparsely codified in the Convention. In this respect, continual activities are
mainly required to achieve the conventional objectives. Besides, from the standpoint of
methodology, such analysis cannot be elaborated in full therefore the selective approach
absolutely prevails. Evidences, of course, are not incidentally to the task freely taken.
2. An open chain of human values, conventional objectives and obligations
2.1 Last sentences of the recital to the Convention disclose twin purposes.1 As
indicated in parts in the title, the Convention stipulates the ultimate objectives: the elimination
of discrimination against women in ‘all its forms and manifestations’ and ‘full equality
between men and women’ in all walks of life.2 However, from the standpoint of reality, both
objectives appear quite infinitive and, for the reason of their reaching, they should be
perceived as an endless process in domestic societies. Since our world is nothing near perfect.
It is no place from which structural inequality has already been swept away by common
efforts of states. On this point, the term ‘structural inequality’ reveals imbalanced relations of
men and women to power. Women are often denied power over decisions that profoundly
affect them.3 The contracting parties are aware of this incontrovertible and incontestable fact.
2.2 Indeed, each party to the Convention either had full opportunity to share in their
formulation or to agree to them after mature consideration. In such sense, no objectives to the
1
2
3
General Aseembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979.
T Buergenthal, International Human Rights in a Nutshell, St. Paul, 1988, p. 57.
M. A. Freeman and A. S. Fraser, Women´s Human Rights: Making the Theory a Reality, in: L. Henkin and J.
L. Hargrove (eds.), Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century, Washington, 1994, p. 105.
Convention are independent from the objectives of the parties to the Convention. 4 Therefore,
one may fairly presume the endorsement of objectives by each contracting party and a free
association of the states parties as a whole. It ensues also from their motivation to become
conventional partners, faithful promises freely arrived at and, objectively, from the norm
pacta sunt servanda.5 Thus, the parties may mutually expect achieving the objectives and rely
on it. Of course, this endorsement has not given by the states parties with absoluteness and
unanimity inasmuch as those made the significant number of reservations, including such
which appeared to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.6
2.3 In the formalist logic, the objectives accepted among the parties may be qualified
only as erga omnes inter partes ends. But rather, they pace to a genuine universal dimension.7
Some vestiges of both objectives could be found in the Preamble to the Charter of the United
Nations that refers to ‘the equal rights of men and women’. As rightly reminded, in other
perspective, this reference forms a binding element of a ‘mini human rights charter’. 8 Besides,
the recital to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms this requirement. Bearing in
mind also their teleological relevance, the above-mentioned instruments are tightly
interconnected, even if, on the other side, the Convention remains a posterior result of
normative concretisation of both fundamental universal instruments.
2.4 Conventional objectives are determined and dependent on human values. The
direct link between the understood objectives and human values such as ‘dignity’, ‘equality’
or ‘justice’ is intentionally articulated in the above-mentioned instruments. Their recognition,
of course, is not restricted to these formal sources because each of them remains, by
definition, universal worth. The worldwide instruments are primarily in the position of their
binding recognition as such. In the context of the Convention and its observance, they cannot
be ignored inasmuch as they have abilities to serve as permanent vectors that have to be taken
4
5
6
7
8
M. Koskenniemi, What Is International Law for? in: M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law, Oxford, 2003, p.
91.
M. Lachs, Pacta Sunt Servanda, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. III,
1992, p. 853.
See General Recommendation No. 4 (6th session, 1987) made by the Committee on the Elimination of
Disrimination against Women, third sentence; General Recommendation No. 20 (11th session, 1992) made
by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
T. van Boven, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: What are the Challenges for the Future,
Dialog against Violence, Strasbourg, 21 March 2002, p. 19.
R. Wolfrum, Preamble, in: B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, vol. I,
Oxford, 2002, p. 35.
into due consideration by the contracting parties always when deciding upon policy,
legislation or choice of preferences how to achieve the agreed ends.
2.5 In the realm of human rights law, as usual, the objectives are realized through
obligations whose addressees are states. However, obligations in international law are
‘differently structured as regards determination of the ways and means by which the state is
supposed to discharge them’.9 Some of them, called obligations ‘of conduct’ or ‘of means’ ,
require the state to follow a specific course of conduct. In relation to them, two opposite
possibilities traditionally exist in law. The state either is bound to perform an active action or
to refrain from performing a specified act. Once again, the human rights obligation may
prescribe operative or agile action or conduct of omission. On the other side, international
norms may take in obligations, called obligations of ‘result’, which only require ‘to bring
about a certain situation or result, leaving it free to do so by whatever means it choose’. 10 In
consideration of human rights treaties, it means that such a conventional obligation requires
accomplishing a specific legal situation or social practices within the state. Both categories of
obligations are incorporated in human rights treaties, including the Convention fighting for
full equality of women and men. But the presence of both sorts of obligations therein is
frequently uneven. The nature of obligations of ‘conduct’ determines their regulatory role in
all sectors of international law. In most cases, they are appropriate to govern direct relations
between states.11 The Convention is not concluded, as indicated, to perform such fundamental
normative tasks. Its objectives inwardly relate to internal law of the contracting states and the
social practice. On this point, structure and nature of obligations of ‘result’ rather correspond
to essence of such aims.
3. Conventional obligations of ‘conduct’
3.1 For the reasons mentioned above, the obligations of ‘result’ themselves are
sparsely embodied in the Convention in question. But they are not omitted from the normative
content of the Convention inasmuch as their functions are in some respects irreplaceable.
Obligations of ‘result’ may precisely transfer legal requirements into internal legal orders. For
instance, Article 2, letter (a) places on the contracting parties the obligation ‘to embody the
principle of equality of men and women in their constitution or other appropriate legislation if
9
10
11
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-ninth session, 9 May – 29 July 1977,
General Assembly, No. 10 (A/32/10), p. 20.
Ibid, p. 21.
Ibid, p. 25.
not yet incorporated therein’. Distinctly, the obligation requires not only legislative action but
also specifies the juridical content of such a particular course of conduct. On the other hand,
the read commitment provides for the legislative option as regards formal sources to which
the principle of equality of men and women as a quintessential regulative idea shall be
inserted. In this regard, the option between the constitution and other pieces of legislation
should be elucidated in a formalist way. Some states parties have no written constitution12 and
therefore only their ordinary laws guarantee human rights. Of course, in such cases, it is
absolutely impossible to do so and the parties lose afforded options. If their constitutions are
in force or drafted, such states parties should rather prefer to incorporate this principle therein
for several cogent arguments. Primarily, this principle oriented to social good,
13
as expressed
in some places of the Preamble to the Convention, must be associated with the highest legal
force in the internal legal system. Not only for the reason that the principle obtains the
superior position in the hierarchal legal orders, such a status presumes conformity any norm
flowing from the inferior legislation to this rationale, but predominantly for necessary
practical consequences of such a position. The process and mainly final result of adoption,
interpretation and application of lower norms must be adequately in line with the
constitutional principle. Such a formally legal position of the principle may facilitate its
formative and trans-formative effects, if implemented. Besides, as regards the significance of
constitutions, they necessarily regulate fundamental social and societal relations and firm
legal foundations of any state. The placement of the principle of equality between
fundamental constitutional institutions reveals its significant social weight. But the
conventional obligation pursues its practical impacts,14 its ability to influence vertical
relations between the state and women and as well horizontal relationships whose subjects are
women.
3.2 For illustration, tightly before dissolution of Czechoslovakia, Parliament of the
Czech Republic again solemnly declared in the introductory provision of the 1992 Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms15 that ‘human are free and equal in their dignity and in
their rights’. An immediate analysis of this constitutional formulation discloses substantive
12
13
14
15
J. Filip, Ústavní právo České republiky. Základní pojmy a instituty. Ústavní základy ČR, vol. I, Brno, 1997, p.
74.
Z. Kühn, Aplikace práva ve složitých případech. K úloze právních principů v judikatuře, Praha, 2002, p. 90.
Č. Čepelka, Odpovědnost států. Návrh článků 1 až 35 kodifikační úmluvy (s komentářem), Praha, 1985, p.
66.
Resolution No. 2 of the Presidium of the Czech National Council of 16 December 1992 on the promulgation
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as Part of the Constitutional order of the Czech Republic.
philosophical background downing to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his mighty work on social
contract.16 The legal phrase is written in abstract terms and, in particular, refers to both
permanence and continuity of equality in dignity and rights. 17 The general clause on equality
is expanded in further constitutional provisions. It could be therefore wrong not to mention
Article 3 of the Charter guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms to everybody without
distinction to gender. Though the term ‘women’ is not taken in express words, the purpose of
transposition of the principle in the Czech Constitution is entirely attained. A pragmatic
stance should be accepted in its transposition to the internal legal system.
3.3 Nevertheless, constitutional provisions are shaped frequently with the high degree
of abstraction and indeterminacy. Although Article 3 of the Charter is assumed by legal
theory and practice as an anti-discriminatory clause covering gender, the word
‘discrimination’ is not used therein. Likewise, the opposite term ‘equality’ remains aside.
Both terms are exceedingly significant not only for the living legal language but also for
practice and thus they must be carefully clarified in laws or judicial judgements. Generally
speaking, equality in law amounts to a right to equal treatment of comparable situation18 or a
right to be free from discrimination while, by contrast, the term ‘discrimination can be
construed as illegitimate adverse treatment.19 In legislation, usually, twin legal forms of
discrimination are prohibited: direct and indirect discrimination. Moreover, jurisprudence
refers to structural discrimination linked to living faces of oppression of women consisting in
their exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness or violence against them. But up to now, in
the Czech legislation, the principle of equality men and women is enshrined in some parts of
legislation like the Employment Act,20 the Act on Official Territorial Self-Government
Units,21 the Labour Code,22 the Act on Professional Soldiers,23 the Service Act,24 the Act on
Wages25 and the Act on the Service of Members of the Security Corps. 26 As apparent, the
dispersed legislative condition prevails over its unification. The above-mentioned laws bring
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
J.-J. Rousseau, O společenské smlouvě neboli o zásadách státního práva, Praha, 1949, p. 12.
J. Filip, Vybrané kapitoly ke studiu ústavního práva, Brno, 1997, p. 65.
Ch. Tobler, How to Use the Experience with Sex Discrimination for the Other Grounds, in: Protection
against Discrimination and Gender Equality - how to meet both requirements, 2003, p. 18.
E. Holzleithner, Faces of Discrimination: the Case of Sex Equality, in: Protection against Discrimination and
Gender Equality - how to meet both requirements, 2003, p. 7.
No. 9/1991, the Law Gazette.
No. 312/2002, the Law Gazette.
No. 65/1965, the Law Gazette.
No. 221/1999, the Law Gazette.
No. 218/2002, the Law Gazette.
No. 217/2000, the Law Gazette.
No. 361/2003, the Law Gazette.
under their binding control only normative fragments of the principle of equality men and
women. Naturally, such a statutory situation inevitably generates legal lacunae, shortcomings
and defects what endanger the worth of legal certainty. Furthermore, this rationale is
expanded only within the own purpose of those laws. To change this disadvantageous
juridical condition, thus a single act on legal means for protection against discrimination and
on equal treatment (called an anti-discrimination act) has been recently started drafting. As
soon as it will come to force, it may become much more visible for public. Mainly, the draft
does not exclusively aim at equal treatment of men and women or at fighting against
discrimination of women. Its scope of application is a broader one inasmuch as it comprises
all grounds of discrimination that are not put in whatever hierarchy amongst them.27
Therefore, sincerely speaking, the inclusive ambit of the bill is entirely amplified. For
example, discrimination on grounds of sex also incorporates pregnancy, motherhood or sexual
identification. As regards the content itself, the draft embraces the definition of key legal
concepts, in order to counter indeterminacy, as the ‘right to equal treatment’,28
‘discrimination’,29 direct discrimination,30 indirect discrimination,31 harassment,32 sexual
harassment,33 persecution,34 instruction to discriminate,35 or incitement to discriminate.36 In
the civil system of law where judgements have no legal effects as its formal sources, such
legislative definitions become binding guidelines of legal and social practices not only for
judicial or executive organs but also for natural and legal persons. No doubt, the principle of
equal treatment is not understood in absolute terms, it cannot be applied under all
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
A. Sporrer, How to implement EU Law on Protection against Discrimination and Gender Equality in National
Law, in: Protection against Discrimination and Gender Equality – how to meet both requirements, 2003, p.
31.
‚Right to equal treatment‘ shall mean prohibition of any discrimination for reasons laid down in this Act.
‚Discrimination‘ is direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment, persecution,
instruction to discriminate, or incitement to discriminate.
‚Direct discrimination‘ shall mean such conduct, including neglect, where one person is, has been, or would
be treated less favourably than another in a comparable situation…
‚Indirect discrimination‘ shall mean such conduct or neglect where apparently neutral provision, criterion or
practice would a person at a disadvantage compared with other persons for any reasons specified, unless that
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that
are appropriate and necessary.
‚Harassment‘ shall mean conduct justifiably perceived by the affected person as unwanted, inappropriate or
offensive, and
(a) with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, or of creating a hostile, degrading, or
intimidating environment, or
(b) which might be justifiable perceived as a condition for a decision affecting the exercise of rights and
discharge of duties under labour relations.
‚Sexual harassment‘ shall mean conduct of sexual nature under the foregoing paragraph.
‚Persecution‘ shall mean such unfavourable treatment of a person inasmuch as he asserts his rights.
‚Instruction to discriminate‘ shall mean the conduct of a person who abuses the subordinate position of
another to discriminate against a third party.
‚Incitement to discriminate’ shall mean the conduct of a person who persuades, goads, or incites another
person to discriminate against a third party.
circumstances, exemptions therefore are specified by this bill in many provisions.
Incidentally, unequal treatment on grounds of pregnancy and motherhood is expressly
permitted, i.e. maternity leave or a different retirement age for women. For the principal
reason of achieving full equality of men and women, positive actions are allowed by the draft
as well. Temporary special measures may be taken in cases of ensuring access to health care,
education, or goods or services, including housing, i.e. when a single woman with the child
seeks a flat. Besides, the draft provides for in part two legal means of protection against
discrimination. First, the person affected by discriminatory conduct is entitled, in particular, to
seek judicial protection. As the direct victim of discrimination, he may claim before a court
the cessation of continuing discriminatory conduct. The function of cessation is to make an
end to such an illegal act. Very close to cessation, there is a further legal consequence of the
breach resting in reasonable satisfaction. Satisfaction is rather the remedy for those injuries
being frequently of non-material character.
Claims for satisfaction may consist in an
acknowledgement of the breach, a formal apology or another appropriate modality, if
necessary, they may include financial compensation. Second, the bill goes further in the legal
protection of victims inasmuch as it lays down actio popularis, of course, conceptualised in a
narrower personal scope as concerns those who may sue. Only legal persons are entitled to
defend a larger of number of persons affected by discriminatory conduct. In such cases, as a
rule, the breach is quite evident but it could be individually proved with difficulty. In terms of
institutional dimension, the bill brings novelties. The Centre for Equal Treatment shall be set
up as an independent body enjoying relative autonomy from government. By definition, it will
not be incorporated in the administrative structure of government. The independent and
impartial status of the Centre is fundamentally determined by due performance of its
functions. Broader competences and mandate shall be delegated to the Centre operating as an
advisory, informational, and enlightening body in matters of equal treatment and protection
against discrimination.37 This institution will provide effective assistance to victims of
discrimination, prepare independent studies regarding discrimination, publish analysis in the
field of equal treatment, and submit recommendation as regards discrimination. As a
necessary condition, free access to the Centre shall be secured. Anyone may contact the
institution with a proposal delivered in two ways: in writing or orally. If a submitted proposal
meets simple requirements, the Centre institutes proceedings with that proposal.38 The draft
37
The bill on legal means for protection against discrimination and on equal treatment (anti-discrimination act),
pp. 49-51.
38
Ibid., p. 52.
also provides for mediation as an amicable method of solving dispute as to direct or indirect
discrimination. The precondition of using mediation is a consensus of both parties and their
permanent cooperation. Indeed, the consensus of the parties to the dispute forms an
inescapable prerequisite of successful out-of-court solution. One of the results of efficient
mediation rests on achieving an agreement between the parties on submitting a petition for
conciliation to a court. Nevertheless, the dispute may be solved without an intervention of
judicial power. As such, mediation operates as a rather integrating method channelling to
reconciliation.39
3.4 As suggested above in paragraph (2.5) of this contribution, the specific course of
conduct may consist in omission. Such obligations requiring non-active conduct are quite
exceptionally embodied into the Convention. Perhaps, one obligation of this sort should be
revealed as follows. Article 2, letter (d), as an astonishing provision within the normative
context of the Convention, which above all mobilizes, exhorts and stimulates the contracting
parties to permanently shape social and legal practices, encompasses the obligation to refrain
from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women. The passive course of
conduct is addressed to the legislative organs of the state just as well as to the executive or
judicial organs at all level of state machinery. Any legislative acts must correspond to the
objective of eliminating any forms or manifestation of direct and indirect discrimination
against women. In this regards, such lawmaking organs are undertaken not to enact laws or
regulations that have the effects of creating or perpetuating discrimination against women.
When passing the discriminatory law, the legislative organ is consequently obliged to cease
the continuing illegal act by amending, rescinding or nullifying this law or its provision. By
analogy, the executive or judicial organs are obligated not to make discriminatory decisions
directing against women, if discrimination is caused, those organs or their superior bodies
must redress such grievances, annul or reverse such decisions. This strict legal requirement
flows from the secondary obligation to cease any illegal act.
4. Conventional obligations of ‘result’
4.1 Obligations of ‘result’, which are much more common in international law than in
internal law,40 are mostly involved into the Conventions.
39
40
By comparison, conventional
Ibid., p. 53.
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-ninth session, 9 May – 29 July 1977,
No. 10 (A/32/10), p. 38.
obligations of ‘result’ do not require a particular course of conduct on the part of specified
state organs.41 They imposed upon the contracting parties the achievement of the required
result provided for by the conventional norms. The states parties are free to choose
appropriate means that are necessary to fulfilling the commitments. Such freedom of choice is
profoundly codetermined by a plethora of social, political, economic or legal circumstances
existing in a given state. Beyond doubt, women find themselves in heterogeneous positions in
every particular society. It cannot be overlooked that their social and societal situation differs
from one state to another state, from one region to another region. Each party cannot ignore
this far-reaching fact at all. Hence the state may choose whatever means it deems most
appropriate and optimal for achieving a concrete legal or social situation prescribed by the
Convention.
4.2 In view of the Convention, the specific obligations under Article 5-16 are
schematically formulated as obligations that require achieving the final result consisting in the
full realization of the rights of women in the domestic sphere or the specific situation
concerning them. The framers of the Convention employed the simple legal technique resting
upon the using of the phrase ‘states parties shall take all appropriate measure’ repeated very
often in the normative text. In such cases, the state may deliberate what to do and how to fulfil
a conventional commitment. In preparing and making decisions, the party to the Convention
takes into account important social circumstances, including the matter of legislation. Some
obligations explicitly indicate legislative means as proper for achieving the commitment in
question. For instance, Article 6 of the Convention stipulates that ‘states parties take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all form of traffic in women an
exploitation of prostitution of women’. Legislative measures are not specifically or
exclusively required. The state may employ some other means if it so desires inasmuch as
those means are enable to achieve in concreto the obligation.42 The permanent performance of
the obligation to suppress all forms of traffic in women requires the states parties to have at
their disposal an adequate and effective system of police, law enforcement, and civil and
criminal justice. Certainly, the proper legislation must be also enacted in criminal, civil law,
including other branches of law. The institutional system and the legal framework primarily
aim at repressing social phenomena as such. But, on the contrary, the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women prefers to deal with social causes as poverty
41
42
Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., p. 43.
and unemployment increasing opportunities for trafficking in women.43 Its rational
consideration is a preventive one because it focuses on both phenomena being at the root of
trafficking in women. In this context, for example, in the Czech Republic, there was approved
the National Strategy for Fighting against Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation in
2003.44 The Strategy also includes a program entitled Model for the Support and Protection of
Victims of Human Trafficking’, which was tested experimentally till May 2004.45 Moreover,
in the legislative sector, Parliament amended the Criminal Code as regards elements of the
crime of trafficking in women.46 Compared with previous legislation, which only covered
trafficking from the Czech Republic to abroad, the new definition criminalizes trafficking
both to and from abroad.47
4.3 Systematic active approaches to the fulfilment of the conventional obligations are
imperative as it results from the normative text. The word used in many conventional
provisions is the term ‘to ensure’. As language feelings shows, this verb calls for permanent
and uninterrupted activities made by the contracting parties in the public and private sectors.
Otherwise, the normative text cannot genuinely come in life. In the formalist line, the states
parties are undertaken to ensure the realization either the equal rights of men and women or
the same rights of both. In such a case, men quite serve as a crucial comparator of equality.
Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Convention, for instance, places on the states the undertaking to
grant women with equal rights to acquire, change or retain their nationality. To call to
memory, traditional international law was in full harmony with the patriarchal structure of
family in which women were subordinate to men. The principle that the woman must follow
her man was rooted in the classic international legal system. In the case of option connected
with cession of territories on the basis of bilateral agreements, the head of the family decided
on changing or retaining the nationality as to his spouse and children. Women did not share
neither autonomous nor equal position with men. Or, for instance, Article 11, paragraph 1,
letter (d) of the Convention places the obligation to ensure the implementation of the right to
equal remuneration. In the Czech Republic, where is high levels of employment among
43
44
45
46
47
General comments on specific articles of the Convention, Article 6, paragraphs 14 and 15.
Resolution No. 849, approved by the Government, of September 2003.
The third periodic report on the fulfilment of undertakings under the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Czech Republic, paragraph 98, p. 22.
Act No. 134/2002, the Law Gazette.
The third periodic report on the fulfilment of undertakings under the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Czech Republic, paragraph 97, p. 22.
women, there wage discrimination still persist in spite of establishing due legislation.48 To this
end of the elimination of wage discrimination, the Labour Code imposes upon employers as
natural and legal persons the obligation to ensure equal treatment of men and women. This
piece of legislation also lays down remedies in the event of a violation of this right. The
woman is entitled to demand to cease such a breach and to receive adequate compensation. In
addition, the Act on Wages, Remuneration for Work Stand by and Average Earnings49
comprises the principle of the same wage for the same work or for work of the same value for
men and women. In spite of a number of laws, problems still survive and social stereotypes
are stronger than efficacy of internal norms and of administrative and judicial systems
responsible for their implementation.
5. Conclusions
5.1 Active actions are imperative for the persistent implementation of the conventional
obligations. Their essence is room for improvement of legal and social situation of women in
each place of the globe. Abstractly, each standard appears to be open to improvements and
vice versa. Of course, worsening may happen, but rather temporarily. The realization of the
agreed obligations carefully aims at improvement. Indeed, full equality of men and women
and the elimination of discrimination against women are not static objectives, but rather
endless processes requiring active actions.
48
49
See the Labour Code (No. 65/1965), the Law Gazette.
No. 1/1992, the Law Gazette.