Government Policies for Environmental
Protection
(c) 2010 by Peter Berck
Public Health is the Reason
• To clean up.
• Health depends on the breathed air
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Table 12.1: National Ambient Air Quality
Standards Under the U.S. Clean Air Act.
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Where should the government regulate? Why?
• Ability to Observe
• Multi media problem
• Align Incentives
• Provide Flexibility
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Figure 12.1:
From Inputs to Damage.
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One Price for Pollution
• Requires One marginal benefit from abatement curve, not one for every place in the US
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Figure 12.2:
Spatial Variation in Pollution.
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Sacred Cars
• NOx abatement by cars and power plants
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Figure 12.3: The Marginal Costs of Abating
Nitrogen Oxides (NO x
).
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Politics, yes that is the reason….
• But it is also the uncoordinated system
• USEPA or CA/EPA/ARB controls car emissions
• States control Powerplant emissions
• Outcome depends on a regulatory process with
TBES being set, plus New Source
Performance Standards, etc.
• So not entirely Machiavelli
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Figure 12.4: Deadweight Loss When
Standards Are Not Well Chosen.
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Table 12.2: Comparison of Command and
Control Approaches.
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Let’s see a tax at work…
• We charge 45c/lb for NOx
• Firm sets MCA(abate) = 45 cents/lb
– WHY?
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Figure 12.5:
Using a Pollution Price to Reduce Pollution.
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Yeah, you knew that right?
• But have a gander at the magnitude of the tax take!
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Figure 12.6:
Taxing Power Plants.
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Makes you long for metric
• 6 million tons x .93c per lb
• 12,000 million lbs x $1 (close enough)
• 12 billion dollars in tax take.
• To get 6.7 billion dollars in abatement done
• Wow: tax take is 2x cost of doing the job
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So suppose we do it with a subsidy for abatement
• US pays powerplants for their abatement instead of charging them for emissions
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Figure 12.7:
Using a Subsidy to Reduce Pollution.
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So you gotta find 13 billion bucks
• Maybe that isn’t so crazy.
– Industry takes your money and does the job
– You don’t end up discussing it in court for 40 years
• But you will have to tax something to do it.
– Deadweight loss of taxation = 16-25% or so of amount, so figure a 16 billion bucks
– Unless you can find an undertaxed bad, like
– cars, and then you get a gain.
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Taxes have one more subtle advantage
• Over standards
– Another black triangle
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Figure 12.8:
The Incentive to Innovate.
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A bit of summary
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Table 12.3:
Comparison of MBI Approaches.
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Table 12.4: Comparison of Standards to
Market-Based Incentives.
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An Aside on Actual Policy: CWA
• Clean Water Act
– Goal of NO emissions to water
• National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System. NPDES. A TBES program in which all who discharge must have permits.
– Not enough to keep water clean
– Too many permits
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The State Federal Dance
• States set “designated uses” like boat able and not necessarily drinkable.
• Once and if they set a use (or potentially but not really the Feds set one for them)
– If don’t meet standard, states establish
– Total Maximum Daily Loads of emissions
– Then must regulate to make it so.
• But they hate doing this as it might mean regulating agriculture or further regulating point sources
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No real forcing mechanism
• In practice states aren’t made to regulate water
– Missouri river has so much Nitrogen in it in
Montana that you can’t purify it or drink it on a canoe trip.
• From ? (before 1972) to 1980 CWA subsidized sewage treatment.
– Worked
– Killed off by left and right. (why the left was against)
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Cheating and Bad Government: Chapter 13
• Firms cheat because of the money
• Firms behave because of the expected penalty
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Penalty
• 1. Government expends money on monitoring. Sends inspectors. Mounts devices. Hears citizen complaints.
• 2. Monitoring leads to probability of detecting cheating.
• 3. Once cheating is found it must be proved. Administrative law procedure.
• 4. Penalty is determined and firm pays
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• 5. Or firm litigates for a decade or two.
• Expected penalty = prob of being caught times fine if caught.
• ?Why did Macy’s open on Sundays when it was illegal?
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Figure 13.1: The Marginal Benefits of
Polluting Curve for a Power Plant. (Again)
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A Standard backed by an expected penalty
• Emit more than the standard and we will find you and fine you
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Figure 13.2: Penalty Is Greater Than Benefits from Emitting.
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Lag regulatory climate
• Aka Houston Tx.
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Figure 13.3: Penalty Is Less Than Benefits from Emitting.
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Notice that the standard plays a different role here
• Isn’t important anymore. All the firm cares about is the penalty, which is a “tax” on emissions above standard.
• In practice there are also criminal penalties for plant managers who commit
“intentional violations.”
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Are you a Goo goo?
• Like Fiorello Laguardia? (good government)
• Many agencies responsible for banking system:
Federal Reserve, Sec. of Treas., Comptroller of the Currency, Fannie May and Freddie Mac.
– Yet totally unpayable loans generated in the billions/trillions for housing.
• Why did the regulators sleep (and who is
Barney Frank and why is he partially guilty)
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Captive Regulators
• Stakeholder process
• Fisheries Management Councils are charged with regulating fishing.
• They are made up of fishers and processors plus some others
• Will they be goo-goos?
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Captive regulators
• How many politicians did the big four own?*
• Where people right to be wary of the railroad “interests”
• *Someone name the big four.
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“voluntary” environmentalism
• Either regulate yourselves or the EPA will do it for you. (Eat a vegetable or your parents will choose which vegetable.)
– Bargaining in the shadow of the law.
• TRI
– Toxic release inventory
– “Voluntary” sort of.
– Top 10 punished in the market place
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