Cocking, C. (2007). Crowd behaviour in emergencies: Research findings and implications for emergency planners. Presentation to Emergency Planning College, July.

advertisement
Crowd behaviour in
emergencies:
Research findings and
implications for emergency
planners
Presentation for the EPC 10/7/2007
Dr Chris Cocking
University of Sussex
cpc20@sussex.ac.uk
Outline of Presentation



1) Background and aims of research
2) Examples of how behaviour in
emergencies support our theories
3) Implications for emergency planners
Context of research




Crowd behaviour theories have
developed over time
19th Century- Le Bon irrationalist
approach
1960s - 70s more rationalist approachENT
From 1980s to present- The Social
Identity Model
Poll Tax riot London March
1990
Portugal, Euro 2004
The ‘Panic’ model





Part of the irrationalist tradition in
crowd psychology
a) Threat causes emotion to overwhelm
reason
b) Collective identity breaks down
c) Selfish behaviours- pushing trampling
d) Contagion-these behaviours spread to
crowd as a whole
Problems with the panic model

Mass panic is rare in emergencies and
disasters
London ‘Blitz’, and atomic bombing of Japan during
World War II
Kings Cross underground fire (1987)
World Trade Centre evacuation, Sept 11th, 2001:
‘classic panic action or people behaving in an
irrational manner was noted in [just] 1/124
(0.8%) cases’ (Blake et al. 2004)
Social attachment model





Developed by Mawson (2005)
Derives from Bowlby’s attachment theories
In times of stress, people seek out
attachment figures- known as affiliative
behaviour
Social norms rarely break down
But these ties can have fatal consequencespeople tend to leave or die as a group
Social attachment model



Improvement on panic model, and
supported by evidence from disasters,
(Cornwell, 2001) but problems remain
a) Implies that panic in a crowd of
strangers is more likely
b) Neglects possibility that previous
strangers may co-operate with each
other
The self-categorisation
approach




Disasters can create a common identity or
sense of ‘we-ness’- Clarke (2002)
This common identity can result in orderly,
altruistic behaviour as people escape common
threat
Increased threat can enhance common
identity
Evidence so far supports this
Scope of research project



Project funded by ESRC that ended in
April 2007
Can existing psychological models of
crowd behaviour can be applied to
emergencies?
3 different areas of research;
interviews, room evacuations, and VR
simulations
Interviewing disaster survivors
Sinking of the Jupiter, 1988 & Oceana, 1991
Hillsborough football stadium disaster, 1989
Ghana football stadium ‘stampede’, 2001
Bradford (UK) football stadium fire, 1985
Fatboy Slim beach party, 2002
Harrods bomb, 1983
Canary Wharf (UK) evacuation, 2001
Results from interviews



Common identity quickly emerges
Co-operative rather than selfish
behaviour predominates
If selfish behaviour happens, it is
usually isolated and rarely spreads
Hillsborough 1989
I don’t think people did lose control of their
emotions [ ] they were clearly in control of
their own emotions and their own physical
insecurity, I mean [] you’re being crushed,
you’re beginning to fear for your own
personal safety, and yet they were [ ]
controlling or tempering their emotions to
help try and remedy the situation and help
others who were clearly struggling
‘Fat Boy Slim’ Brighton 2002


People were helping people up and helping people
down it was it was a very different atmosphere from
any other gig that I’d ever worked before.
It was like a massive rave party where everybody felt
they knew each other where they could go up to
each other hug total strangers and they were in such
close proximity to each other and all you could see
was people sticking their arms round each other and
grinning and you know it was oh god it’s a bit packed
isn’t it that sort of…those conversations were going
on but not complaints about it
Room evacuation studies



Simulated role-plays of room
evacuations with smoke and time
pressures
Some evidence of common identity
emerging in response to shared fate
But study suffered from lack of realism
VR evacuation programme




Joint project with computing scientists at
Universities of Nottingham & RMIT (Australia)
Many simulations of crowd flow, but ours was
first to consider psychological theories of
crowd behaviour
Evidence for link between sense of groupness
and helping
Discussions with potential users (e.g. Home
Office/SciTech) to market it as a training tool
Research into 7th July




Gathering data from Press reports and
web-logs
Web- based questionnaire study for
eye-witnesses of bombings;
www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/panic/
Interview study of survivors
Results so far support our theories
Rough chronology of events
on the tube on 7/7




1) Blast followed by darkness and silence
2) Screams of fear and distress- passengers
try to find out what’s going on
3) Smoke & soot clear- attempts to help/
comfort others, & escape- some delay
because of fear that tracks are live
4) Passengers wait approx 30 mins. for
rescue, and walk in orderly fashion along
tracks when directed
Response to 7/7



Individual fear and distress, but no
mass panic
Evacuations characterised by orderly,
calm behaviour
Many reports of altruism, co-operation,
and collective spirit of Londoners/ UK as
a whole
The myth of Panic




Many accounts of ‘panic’
But what actually is panic, and what is
logical flight behaviour?
Need to look at what people actually
do, and decide if it is indeed ‘panic’
More than just semantics, as it could
affect emergency evacuation planning
Panic?


‘There was no real panic - just an
overwhelming sense to get out of the station
quickly’
‘almost straight away our packed carriage
started to fill with smoke, and people
panicked immediately. Thankfully there were
some level-headed people on the carriage
who managed to calm everyone down’
Unity


‘I felt there was a real sense of unity. We
were all trying our best to find a way out of
there and reassure each other’.
‘One of the things which struck me about this
experience is that one minute you are
standing around strangers and the next
minute they become the closest and most
important people in your life. That feeling
was quite extraordinary’
Co-operative behaviour



‘Many people kept calm and tried to
help one another to see if anyone was
injured’
‘I was very aware of people helping
each other out and I was being helped
myself’
‘Passengers with medical experience
were found, I found a tool box and we
smashed a window, allowing the
medical guys to enter the other train’
Orderly evacuation
Lasting benefits of shared
identity?
Panic in New York on 9/11?
New Orleans Sept 2005
Recent terrorist attacks:
Panic or habituation?
Research on emergency evacuations:
General conclusions




The image of the panicking crowd is
overdone
The ‘panic’ model should not be used in
designing emergency procedures
The evidence is that people exit quicker when
kept informed
When people don’t help each other it is often
due to physical constraints rather than
‘selfishness’.
Possible applications of the
research
More information rather than
less



Very little evidence supports idea that people
will panic if they know severity of the
situation and some shows exact opposite
(e.g. Proulx & Sime 1991)
If information is given in clear ways that
people can safely act upon to escape threat,
they usually do
Consequently, deliberately withholding info
could cause problems in any future
emergencies, as people may not trust
accuracy of messages
Evacuation Posters
Carriage Evacuation Procedures
Pleasetake a momentto read over the instr uctions
Listen Carefully to Instructions
from the dr iver
Talk to the driver using the
system located by the main
doors
Utilise the first aid kits located
under the designated seats
When the driver is ready
to evacuate the train,
foll ow the lighted arrows
o exit the
If the carriage is in any way
Do not attempt t
carriage via the side doors
in risk, move to the nearest
safe carriage
Transport for London
Making Your Tube Safer
How information is relayed and by whom
affects whether it is acted upon



Information needs to be clear and
unambiguous, delivered confidently, and
come from believable source that crowd
identifies with
This could depend on type of crowd; e.g.
commuters, football fans
Representative leader figures may also
emerge from crowd that are influential, and
can be useful rather than a hindrance!
Spontaneous leaders emerge
on July 7th
Appeal to the crowds’ collective identity/
common humanity
Having a common fate can encourage cooperative behaviour- ‘we’re all in this
together’
Both PA and physical presence should be
used
Don’t appeal to commuters as atomised
‘customers’
Practice emergency evacuations





Don’t say ‘don’t panic’!
Practice makes less imperfect
Train all stewards in knowledge of each
venue, and how to relay information
effectively in emergencies
Different rates of evacuation of WTC in 1993
and 2001
Owners/managers need to take the possibility
of emergency seriously- don’t think ‘it
couldn’t happen to me!’
Summary



1) Crowds in emergencies behave in
ways that are consistent with their
social identities and governed by the
social norms of the situation
2) The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth
3) Evidence gathered from many
different emergencies supports our
theories
References:







Blake et al (2004). Proceedings of Third International
Symposium on Human Behaviour in Fire.
Clarke, L. (2002). Contexts, 1, 21-26
Cornwell, B. (2001). The Sociological Quarterly, 44,
617-638.
Jones et al (2006) Journal of Risk Research 9 (1) 5773
Le Bon, G. (1968)The crowd: A study of the popular
mind. (Originally published 1895)
Mawson, A.R. (2005) Psychiatry, 68, (2) 95-113.
Proulx, G. & Sime, J.D. (1991). Fire Safety Science:
Proceedings of the Third International Symposium,
843-852.
Download