WORKSHEET
Reading Theory, and Comparing Theorists
NICCOLLO MACHIAVELLI
Machiavelli wrote The Prince in the early 16th century, and it is widely regarded as a classic
text in politics. Machiavelli argues in his advice to the Prince, that rulers cannot always be
conventionally moral beings, since the survival and development of the state may require
extraordinary measures. In the extract here, Machiavelli develops the argument that the state
requires both on law and force and that while the ruler needs to be aware of the importance of
'civilising' measures, he cannot shrink back from the need to be brutal and violent as well.
Once you have read the extract, test your knowledge by answering the multiple choice questions.
Chapter 1
The State
T H E P R I N C E
Niccolo Machiavelli
On Those Things for Which Men, and Particularly
Princes,
Are Praised or Blamed
Now there remains to be examined what should be the methods and procedures of a prince in
dealing with his subjects and friends. And because I know that many have written about this, I
am afraid that by writing about it again I shall be thought of as presumptuous, since in discussing
this material I depart radically from the procedures of others. But since my intention is to write
something useful for anyone who understands it, it seemed more suitable to me to search after
the effectual truth of the matter rather than its imagined one.* And many writers have imagined
for themselves republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to exist in
reality; for there is such a gap between how one lives and how one ought to live that anyone who
abandons what is done for what ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation: for
a man who wishes to profess goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not
good. Hence it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain his position to learn how not to
be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity.
Leaving aside, therefore, the imagined things concerning a prince, and taking intoaccount those
that are true, I say that all men, when they are spoken of, and particularlyprinces, since they are
placed on a higher level, are judged by some of these qualitieswhich bring them either blame or
praise. And this is why one is considered generous, another miserly (to use a Tuscan word, since
‘avaricious’ in our language is still used tomean one who wishes to acquire by means of theft; we
call ‘miserly’ one who excessivelyavoids using what he has); one is considered a giver, the other
rapacious; ono cruel,another merciful; one treacherous, another faithful; one effeminate and
cowardly, anotherbold and courageous; one humane, another haughty; one lascivious, another
chaste; onetrustworthy, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving; and the like. And
1know that everyone will admit that it would be a very praiseworthy thing to find in a prince, of
the qualities mentioned above, those that are held to be good; but since it is
neither possible to have them nor to observe them all completely, because the humancondition
does not permit it, a prince must be prudent enough to know how to escapethe bad reputation of
those vices that would lose the state for him, and must protecthimself from those that will not
lose it for him, if this is possible; but if he cannot, heneed not concern himself unduly if he
ignores these less serious vices. And, moreover,he need not worry about incurring the bad
reputation of those vices without which itwould be difficult to hold his state; since, carefully
taking everything into account, hewill discover that something which appears to be a virtue, if
pursued, will end in hisdestruction; while some other thing which seems to be a vice, if pursued,
will result in his safety and his wellbeing.
On Generosity and Miserliness
Beginning, therefore, with the first of the abovementioned qualities, I say that it would be good
to be considered generous; nevertheless, generosity used in such a manner as to give you a
reputation for it will harm you; because if it is employed virtuously and as one should employ it,
it will not be recognized and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite. And so, if a prince
wants to maintain his reputation for generosity among men, it is necessary for him not to neglect
any possible means of lavish display; in so doing such a prince will always use up all his
resources and he will be obliged, eventually, if he wishes to maintain his reputation for
generosity, to burden the people with excessive taxes and to do everything possible to raise
funds. This will begin to make him hateful to his subjects, and, becoming impoverished, he will
not be much esteemed by anyone; so that, as a consequence of his generosity, having offended
many and rewarded few, he will feel the effects of any slight unrest and will be ruined at the first
sign of danger; recognizing this and wishing to alter his policies, he immediately runs the risk of
being reproached as a miser.
A prince, therefore, being unable to use this virtue of generosity in a manner which will not harm
himself, if he is known for it, should, if he is wise, not worry about being called a miser; for with
time he will come to be considered more generous once it is evident that, as a result of his
parsimony, his income is sufficient, he can defend himself
from anyone who makes war against him, and he can undertake enterprises without
overburdening his people, so that he comes to be generous with all those from whom he takes
nothing, who are countless, and miserly with all those to whom he gives nothing, who are few. In
our times we have not seen great deeds accomplished except by those who were considered
miserly; the others were failures. Pope Julius II, although he made use of his reputation for
generosity in order to gain the papacy, then decided not to maintain it in order to be able to wage
war; the present King of France has waged many wars without imposing extra taxes on his
subjects, only because his habitual parsimony has provided for the additional expenditures; the
present King of Spain, if he had been considered generous, would not have engaged in or won so
many campaigns.
Therefore, in order not to have to rob his subjects, to be able to defend himself, not to become
poor and contemptible, and not to be forced to become rapacious, a prince must consider it of
little importance if he incurs the reputation of being a miser, for this is one of those vices that
permits him to rule. And if someone were to say: Caesar with his generosity achieved imperial
power, and many others, because they were generous and known to be so, achieved very high
positions; I would reply: you are either already a prince or you are on the way to becoming one;
in the first instance such generosity is damaging; in the second it is very necessary to be thought
generous. And Caesar was one of those who wanted to gain the principality of Rome; but if, after
obtaining this, he had lived and had not moderated his expenditures, he would have destroyed his
rule. And if someone were to reply: there have existed many princes who have accomplished
great deeds with their armies who have been reputed to be generous; I would answer you: a
prince either spends his own money and that of his subjects or that of others; in the first case he
must be economical; in the second he must not restrain any part of his generosity. And for that
prince who goes out with his soldiers and lives by looting, sacking, and ransoms, who controls
the property of others, such generosity is necessary; otherwise he would not be followed by his
troops. And with what does not belong to you or to your subjects you can be a more liberal giver,
as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; for spending the wealth of others does not lessen your
reputation but adds to it; only the spending of your own is what harms you. And there is nothing
that uses itself up faster than generosity, for as you employ it you lose the means of employing it,
and
you become either poor and despised or else, in order to escape poverty, you become rapacious
and hated. And above all other things a prince must guard himself against being despised and
hated; and generosity leads you to both one and the other. So it is wiser to live with the
reputation of a miser, which produces reproach without hatred,
than to be forced to incur the reputation of rapacity, which produces reproach along with hatred,
because you want to be considered generous.
On Cruelty and Mercy, and Whether It Is Better to Be
Loved Than To Be Feared or the Contrary
Proceeding to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince must desire to be
considered merciful and not cruel; nevertheless, he must take care not to misuse this mercy.
Cesare Borgia was considered cruel; none the less, his cruelty had brought order to Romagna,
united it, restored it to peace and obedience. If we examine this carefully, we shall see that he
was more merciful than the Florentine people, who, in order to avoid being considered cruel,
allowed the destruction of Pistoia.* Therefore, a prince must not worry about the reproach of
cruelty when it is a matter of keeping his subjects united and loyal; for with a very few examples
of cruelty he will be more compassionate than those who, out of excessive mercy, permit
disorders to continue, from which arise murders and plundering; for these usually harm the
community at large, while the executions that come from the prince harm particular individuals.
And the new prince, above all other princes, cannot escape the reputation of being called cruel,
since new states are full of dangers. And Virgil, through Dido, states: ‘My difficult condition and
the newness of my rule make me act in such a manner, and to set guards over my land on all
sides.’* Nevertheless, a prince must be cautious in believing and in acting, nor should he be
afraid of his own shadow; and he should proceed in such a manner, tempered by prudence and
humanity, so that too much trust may not render him imprudent nor too much distrust render him
intolerable.
From this arises an argument: whether it is better to be loved than to be feared, or the contrary. I
reply that one should like to be both one and the other; but since it is difficult to join them
together, it is much safer to be feared than to be loved when one of the two must be lacking. For
one can generally say this about men: that they are ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers,
avoiders of danger, greedy for gain; and while you work for their good they are completely
yours, offering you their blood, their property, their lives, and their sons, as I said earlier,* when
danger is far away; but when it comes nearer to you they turn away. And that prince who bases
his power entirely on their words, finding himself completely without other preparations, comes
to ruin; for friendships that are acquired by a price and not by greatness and nobility of character
are purchased but are not owned, and at the proper moment they cannot be spent. And men are
less hesitant about harming someone who makes himself loved than one who makes himself
feared because love is held together by a chain of obligation which, since men are wretched
creatures, is broken on every occasion in which their own interests are concerned; but fear is
sustained by a dread of punishment which will never abandon you. A prince must nevertheless
make himself feared in such a manner that he will avoid hatred, even if he does not acquire love;
since to be feared and not to be hated can very well be combined; and this will always be so
when he keeps his hands off the property and the women of his citizens and his subjects. And if
he must take someone’s life, he should do so when there is proper justification and manifest
cause; but, above all, he should avoid seizing the property of others; for men forget more quickly
the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. Moreover, reasons for seizing their
property are never lacking; and he who begins to live by stealing always finds a reason for taking
what belongs to others; on the contrary, reasons for taking a life are rarer and disappear sooner.
But when the prince is with his armies and has under his command a multitude of
troops, then it is absolutely necessary that he not worry about being considered cruel; for
without that reputation he will never keep an army united or prepared for any combat.
Among the praiseworthy deeds of Hannibal* is counted this: that, having a very large
army, made up of all kinds of men, which he commanded in foreign lands, there never
arose the slightest dissension, neither among themselves nor against their leader, both
during his good and his bad fortune. This could not have arisen from anything other
than his inhuman cruelty, which along with his many other qualities, made him always
respected and terrifying in the eyes of his soldiers; and without that, to attain the same
effect, his other qualities would not have sufficed. And the writers of history, having
considered this matter very little, on the one hand admire these deeds of his and on the
other condemn the main cause of them.
And that it is true that his other qualities would not have been sufficient can be
seen from the example of Scipio, a most extraordinary man not only in his time but in
all recorded history, whose armies in Spain rebelled against him; this came about from
nothing other than his excessive compassion, which gave to his soldiers more liberty than
military discipline allowed. For this he was censured in the senate by Fabius Maximus,*
who called him the corruptor of the Roman militia. The Locrians, having been ruined by one of
Scipio’s officers, were not avenged by him, nor was the arrogance of that officer corrected, all
because of his tolerant nature; so that someone in the senate who tried to apologize for him said
that there were many men who knew how not to err better than they knew how to correct errors.
Such a nature would have, in time, damaged Scipio’s fame and glory if he had continued to
command armies; but, living under the control of the senate, this harmful characteristic of his not
only was concealed but brought him glory.
I conclude, therefore, returning to the problem of being feared and loved, that
since men love at their own pleasure and fear at the pleasure of the prince, a wise prince
should build his foundation upon that which belongs to him, not upon that which belongs
to others: he must strive only to avoid hatred, as has been said.
How a Prince Should Keep His Word
How praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word and to live by integrity and not by
deceit everyone knows; nevertheless, one sees from the experience of our times that the
princes who have accomplished great deeds are those who have cared little for keeping
their promises and who have known how to manipulate the minds of men by shrewdness;
and in the end they have surpassed those who laid their foundations upon loyalty.
You must, therefore, know that there are two means of fighting:* one according to
the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but
because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse
to the second. Therefore, a prince must know how to use wisely the natures of the beast
and the man. This policy was taught to princes allegorically by the ancient writers, who
described how Achilles and many other ancient princes were given to Chiron the Centaur* to be
raised and taught under his discipline. This can only mean that, having a halfbeast
and halfman as a teacher, a prince must know how to employ the nature of
the one and the other; and the one without the other cannot endure.
Since, then, a prince must know how to make good use of the nature of the beast,
he should choose from among the beasts the fox and the lion;* for the lion cannot defend
itself from traps and the fox cannot protect itself from wolves. It is therefore necessary to
be a fox in order to recognize the traps and a lion in order to frighten the wolves. Those
who play only the part of the lion do not understand matters. A wise ruler, therefore,
cannot and should not keep his word when such an observance of faith would be to his
disadvantage and when the reasons which made him promise are removed. And if men
were all good, this rule would not be good; but since men are a contemptible lot and
will not keep their promises to you, you likewise need not keep yours to them. A prince
never lacks legitimate reasons to break his promise. Of this one could cite an endless
number of modern examples to show how many pacts, how many promises have been
made null and void because of the infidelity of princes; and he who has known best how
to use the fox has come to a better end. But it is necessary to know how to disguise this
nature well and to be a great hypocrite and a liar: and men are so simpleminded and so
controlled by their present needs that one who deceives will always find another who will
allow himself to be deceived.
I do not wish to remain silent about one of these recent instances. Alexander VI
did nothing else, he thought about nothing else, except to deceive men, and he always
found the occasion to do this. And there never was a man who had more forcefulness
in his oaths, who affirmed a thing with more promises, and who honoured his word less;
nevertheless, his tricks always succeeded perfectly since he was well acquainted with this
aspect of the world.
Therefore, it is not necessary for a prince to have all of the abovementioned
qualities, but it is very necessary for him to appear to have them. Furthermore, I shall
be so bold as to assert this: that having them and practising them at all times is harmful;
and appearing to have them is useful; for instance, to seem merciful, faithful, humane,
trustworthy, religious, and to be so; but his mind should be disposed in such a way that
should it become necessary not to he so, he will be able and know how to change to the
contrary. And it is essential to understand this: that a prince, and especially a new prince,
cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, for in order to
maintain the state he is often obliged to act against his promise, against charity, against
humanity, and against religion. And therefore, it is necessary that he have a mind ready
to turn itself according to the way the winds of fortune and the changeability of affairs
require him; and, as I said above, as long as it is possible, he should not stray from the
good, but he should know how to enter into evil when necessity commands.
A price, therefore, must be very careful never to let anything slip from his lips which
is not full of the five qualities mentioned above: he should appear, upon seeing and
hearing him, to be all mercy, all faithfulness, all integrity, all kindness, all religion. And
there is nothing more necessary than to seem to possess this last quality. And men in
general judge more by their eyes than their hands; for everyone can see but few can feel.
Everyone sees what you seem to be, few touch upon what you are, and those few do not
dare to contradict the opinion of the many who have the majesty of the state to defend
them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is no impartial
arbiter, one must consider the final result.* Let a prince therefore act to conquer and to
maintain the state; his methods will always be judged honourable and will be praised by
all; for ordinary people are always deceived by appearances and by the outcome of a
thing; and in the world there is nothing but ordinary people; and there is no room for the
few, while the many have a place to lean on. A certain prince of the present day,* whom
I shall refrain from naming, preaches nothing but peace and faith, and to both one and the
other he is entirely opposed; and both, if he had put them into practice, would have cost
him many times over either his reputation or his state.
QUESTIONS
1) According to Machiavelli, the Prince
should prefer reality to:
a) Science
b) Imagination
c) Society
d) The state
2) The Prince should strive to be:
a) Prudent
b) Relaxed
c) Good
d) Avaricious
3) The Prince should seek to avoid
excessive:
a) Thoughtfulness
b) Altruism
c) Wealth
d) Taxes
4) A Prince should be concerned with the
well-being of the:
a) Many
b) Aristocrats
c) Few
d) Everyone
5) A Prince should not worry about being:
a) Joyous
b) Frivolous
c) Hated
d) Miserly
6) It is important that the Prince be reputed
to be:
a) War-like
b) Tidy
c) Merciful
d) Rapacious
7) A Prince needs to be:
a) Feared
b) Deified
c) Despised
d) Loved
8) A Prince should particularly avoid
taking:
a) Hostages
b) Fruit
c) Medicine
d) Property
9) It is vital that a Prince:
a) Keeps his word
b) Shows compassion
c) Accomplishes great deeds
d) Displays integrity
10) A Prince should not shrink back from
using:
a) Religion
b) Force
c) Machines
d) Mathematics
11) The two beasts that the Prince must
emulate are:
a) The elephant and the snake
b) The lion and the fox
c) The crocodile and the mongoose
d) The wolf and the jaguar
12) In Machiavelli's view, the ordinary
people are:
a) Simple-minded
b) Courageous
c) Virtuous
d) Trustworthy
13) A Prince has to be:
a) Flexible
b) Noble
c) Cruel
d) Ostentatious
14) People judge the worth of a Prince by:
a) His intellect
b) Appearances
c) His wealth
d) The way he speaks
JOHN LOCKE
Locke is one of the great 'contract' theorists (although he is sufficiently different to Hobbes to be
regarded as a representative of a distinct stream of liberal thought, one that stresses moral
rights). The first set of questions (1-9) is concerned with the 'state of nature', and the second set
of questions (10-15) with the contract: the legitimacy of what is created; the nature of consent;
private property; and political obligation.
Here are three excerpts, the first for 1-9, the second and third for the last six questions
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.
IN THE FORMER THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND
FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE
DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN.
THE LATTER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL
EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
CHAPTER. II.
OF THE STATE OF NATURE.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider,
what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions,
and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more
than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties,
should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord
and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and
confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and
sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself,
and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love
amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives
the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to love others
than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I
cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto
his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be
careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same
nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve
them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others
should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire
therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a
natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality
between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason
hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that
state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty
to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than
its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which
obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker;
all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business;
they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's
pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there
cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one
another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's.
Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like
reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to
preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or
impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to
one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all
mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby
every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its
violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in
vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and
thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may
punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality,
where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in
prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no
absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the
passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far
as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so
much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man
may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of
nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common
equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so
he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence,
being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the
peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right
he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things
noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may
make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing
the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT
TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF
NATURE.
Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they
condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to death, or
punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of
any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: they
speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by
which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those
who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian,
but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every
man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see
not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in
reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over
another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of
reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of
human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or
other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath
received any damage, has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a
particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it
just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so
much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and
preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of taking
reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by
being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the
public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by
his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he
has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and
he alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or
service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the
crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and
doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state
of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which
no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body,
and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the
common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter
he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed
as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor
security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by
man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to
destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth
me, shall slay me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that
law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each transgression may be punished to
that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender,
give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be
committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far
forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter
here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there
is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of that
law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to
be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden
interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are
only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and
interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive
power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to
be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends:
and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing
others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath
certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that
civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must
certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined,
that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn
himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute
monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily
follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to be
endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the
state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own
case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to
question or controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by
reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein
men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in
his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a
state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers
of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world
never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of
independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every
compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing
together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and
compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises
and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de
la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are
binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for
truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I will not only
oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says,
The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men absolutely,
even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn
agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we are not by
ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things, needful for such a life as
our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and
imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced
to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was the cause of men's uniting themselves at
first in politic societies.
But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own
consents they make themselves members of some politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of
this discourse, to make it very clear.
CHAPTER. V.
OF PROPERTY.
Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a
right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature
affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made
of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says,
Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this
being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have
a property in any thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out
property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is
impossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have any property upon a
supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the
rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a property in
several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express
compact of all the commoners.
Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to
make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is
given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And tho' all the fruits it naturally
produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the
spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest
of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of
men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can
be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes
the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so
his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any
good for the support of his life.
Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a
property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and
the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state
that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common
state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the
common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no
man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as
good, left in common for others.
Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered
from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the
nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat?
or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain,
if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between
them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all,
had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those
acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make
them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a
consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.
We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is
common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without
which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part, does not depend on the
express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has
cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others,
become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that was mine,
removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one's appropriating
to himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat,
which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one
his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt,
but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of
nature, where it was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby
appropriated it to himself.
Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to
be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of
every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made
and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning
of property, in what was before common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any
one catches in the ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise
any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in,
made his property, who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us, the hare that any one is
hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase: for being a beast that is still looked
upon as common, and no man's private possession; whoever has employed so much labour about
any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature,
wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the
earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much as he will. To which I
answer, Not so. The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also
bound that property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason
confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can
make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his Tabour fix a
property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was
made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions
there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that
provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others;
especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use; there could
be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.
Sect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts that
subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is
plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants,
improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does,
as it were, inclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body else has
an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of
all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind,
commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his
reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay
out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of
God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his
property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.
Sect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any
other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could
use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for
himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at
all. No body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good
draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of
land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.
Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and
the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he
meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious
and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the
quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement, as was already taken
up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's
labour: if he did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to, and
not the ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof there
was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his
industry could reach to.
Sect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country, where there is plenty
of people under government, who have money and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate
any part, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by
compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in
respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this
parish. Besides, the remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the
commoners, as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the
beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite otherwise. The law
man was under, was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his wants forced him to
labour. That was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it.
And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined together.
The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to
appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on,
necessarily introduces private possessions.
Sect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men's labour and the
conveniencies of life: no man's labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment
consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench
upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who
would still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as
before it was appropriated. This measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate
proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the first
ages of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their company,
in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in. And
the same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems:
for supposing a man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the
children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places of America, we shall find
that the possessions he could make himself, upon the measures we have given, would not be very
large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or
think themselves injured by this man's incroachment, though the race of men have now spread
themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the
beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of so little value, without labour, that I have heard it
affirmed, that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without being
disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use of it. But, on the contrary,
the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his industry on neglected, and
consequently waste land, has increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it
will, which I lay no stress on; this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that
every man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without
straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants,
had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced
(by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, I shall by and by
shew more at large.
Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed
had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of
man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or
decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to
appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could
use: yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still
left to those who would use the same industry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates
land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the
provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated
land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre
of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses land, and has
a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred
left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him
with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. I
have here rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is
much nearer an hundred to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of
America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield
the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten acres of equally fertile
land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated?
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or
tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so imployed his pains about any of the
spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in,
by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they
perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified,
before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to be
punished; he invaded his neighbour's share, for he had no right, farther than his use called for any
of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.
Sect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too: whatsoever he tilled and
reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he
enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the
grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without
gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be
looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might
take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough to Abel's
sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve for both their possessions. But as families increased,
and industry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with the need of them; but yet it was
commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of, till they incorporated,
settled themselves together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out
the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their neighbours;
and by laws within themselves, settled the properties of those of the same society: for we see,
that in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even
as low down as Abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which was
their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country where he was a stranger.
Whence it is plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued
it not, nor claimed property in any more than they made use of. But when there was not room
enough in the same place, for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot
did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and inlarged their pasture, where it best liked them. And for the same
reason Esau went from his father, and his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.
Sect. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and property in Adam, over all the
world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one's property be made
out from it; but supposing the world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see
how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein
there could be no doubt of right, no room for quarrel.
Sect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the property of
labour should be able to over-balance the community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the
difference of value on every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is between an
acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same
land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of
labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to
say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour:
nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expences
about them, what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in
most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.
Sect. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the
Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature
having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil,
apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want of
improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of
a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in
England.
Sect. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life,
through their several progresses, before they come to our use, and see how much they receive of
their value from human industry. Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty;
yet notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing,
did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth
than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing
to labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature
furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how
much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how much
labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground
which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small
part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no
improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find
the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of dominions; and that
the increase of lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that
prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection
and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of power and
narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by.
To return to the argument in hand.
Sect. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America,
which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the same natural
intrinsic value: but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from
the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be
valued, and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth. It is labour then which puts
the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: it is to
that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that
acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which lies waste, is all
the effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man's pains, the reaper's and thresher's toil,
and the baker's sweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the
oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber employed
about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast number, requisite to this
corn, from its being feed to be sown to its being made bread, must all be charged on the account
of labour, and received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost
worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue of things, that industry
provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace
them; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar,
masts, ropes, and all the materials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the commodities
made use of by any of the workmen, to any part of the work; all which it would be almost
impossible, at least too long, to reckon up.
Sect. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet
man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of
it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of
what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the
conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.
Sect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleased
to employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet
more than mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with
what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the
world, (where the increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce,
and so of some value) the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and
by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, by
compact and agreement, settled the property which labour and industry began; and the leagues
that have been made between several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning
all claim and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent, given up their
pretences to their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and so
have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels
of the earth; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof
not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie
waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in
common; tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use
of money.
Sect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and such as the necessity of
subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after, as it doth the Americans now, are
generally things of short duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and
perish of themselves: gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put the
value on, more than real use, and the necessary support of life. Now of those good things which
nature hath provided in common, every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much as he
could use, and property in all that he could effect with his labour; all that his industry could
extend to, to alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a hundred bushels
of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as soon as gathered. He
was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than his share, and
robbed others. And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he
could make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselesly in his
possession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away plums, that would have
rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he
wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others,
so long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of
metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or
a diamond, and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up
as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just property
not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it.
Sect. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without
spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but
perishable supports of life.
Sect. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different
proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them:
for supposing an island, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein
there were but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses and cows, with other useful
animals, wholsome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but
nothing in the island, either because of its commonness, or perishableness, fit to supply the place
of money; what reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his
family, and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or
they could barter for like perishable, useful commodities, with others? Where there is not some
thing, both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to
enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take: for I ask,
what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready
cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where
he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of
the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again to the
wild common of nature, whatever was more than would supply the conveniencies of life to be
had there for him and his family.
Sect. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so than that is now; for no
such thing as money was any where known. Find out something that hath the use and value of
money amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his
possessions.
Sect. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food,
raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in
great part, the measure, it is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal
possession of the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way how a
man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in
exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to any one;
these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. This partage of things in an
inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of society, and
without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of
money: for in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is
determined by positive constitutions.
Sect. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, how labour could
at first begin a title of property in the common things of nature, and how the spending it upon our
uses bounded it. So that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt
about the largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together; for as a man had
a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than
he could make use of. This left no room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on
the right of others; what portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as
well as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more than he needed….
CHAPTER. VII.
OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.
…Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an
uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any
other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his
property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to
judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves,
even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But
because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the
property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there
only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power,
resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing
for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular
member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules,
indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the
execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of
that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath
committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy
to discern, who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one
body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide
controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but
those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each
being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before
shewed it, the perfect state of nature.
Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall
belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the
members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to
punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power
of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that
society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and is
become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences,
against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of
offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the
magistrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of
the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own
judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original of
the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far
offences are to be punished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to determine,
by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from
without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, when
there shall be need.
Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every
one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is
a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of
nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government;
or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for
hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for
him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance
(as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a
commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies,
and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is
the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men,
however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state
of nature.
Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only
government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civilgovernment at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies
of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by
setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury
received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey;*
where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any
difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every
absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.
(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society; and the
principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in such cases we
must obey, unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason,
or of God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself
alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and
indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be
expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so
that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the
state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with therest of mankind: for where-ever any
two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the
determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature,
and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or rather
slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge
of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is
invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society
ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a
liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies,
that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with
flattery, and armed with power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the
state of nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst
themselves, by ordaining some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject
thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace,
tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that where force
and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may
seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be
suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man
might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own
determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and
them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless,
except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree
upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him to be
lord or judge over another, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood, and corrects the baseness of
human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary.
He that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be
much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that
he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what
the protection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to
be and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of
government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may easily
see.
Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects
have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that
may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks
necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who
should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and society,
and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than
what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep
those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his
pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but
love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is
there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question
can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety.
Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their
mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such
circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To
ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do
it, is presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature
entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of laws,
but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made
licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what
mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be
devoured by lions.
Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's understandings, it hinders not men
from feeling; and when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds
of the civil society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm,
they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in respect of
him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and
security in civil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it.
And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the
following part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency
amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural
authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into
his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom;
yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) sacredness of customs,
which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in
successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government,
as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of* property) could
never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in
collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please. By which means
every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he
himself, as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid
the force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption,
thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.** No man in civil
society can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there
be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be
not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society;
unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I
have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.
(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther
thought upon for the manner of goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were to rule,
till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a
remedy, did indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man's will,
became the cause of all men's misery. This constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their
duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore over-rule each several part of the same body.
Hooker, ibid.)
QUESTIONS
1) The state of nature is a situation of:
(a) Subordination
(c) Equality
(b) Injustice
(d) Subjectivity
2) The state of nature is a situation of:
(a) Amorality
(c) License
(b) Liberty
(d) Starvation
3) Why should human beings preserve
themselves?
(a) They have a biological drive to selfpreservation
(b) They have entered an agreement with one
another to do so
(c) They have a duty to God, who created them,
to do so
(d) They have a duty to their parents, who
created them, to do so
4) Who in the state of nature has the right to
punish law-breakers?
(a) Duly constituted legal authorities
(b) Powerful elites
(c) Nobody
(d) Anybody
5) What actions in the state of nature can
legitimately be taken against law-breakers
(i.e., ‘private justice’)?
(a) Anything can be done to law-breakers
(b) Actions which 'retribute' and deter lawbreaking
(c) Only actions which deter law-breaking
(d) Only actions which 'retribute' law-breaking
6) What is the point of Locke's analogy of
punishing aliens?
(a) Individuals under a sovereign state are free
to do whatever they want in order to defend
their interests
(b) Aliens have no political obligation, but they
are still bound by the laws of nature, and
that is why they are punished – likewise,
individuals in a state of nature can punish
those who violate the laws of nature
(c) Since aliens have no political obligation, the
exercise of sovereign power is arbitrary –
likewise, the exercise of individual powers in
the state of nature is arbitrary
(d) Aliens are in a state of nature, yet we still
punish them
7) Locke suggests that there are certain
'inconveniences' of the state of nature.
Which one of the following is not among
them?
(a) Human beings are partial to their own
interests – they need impartial judges
(b) In the absence of a state, life will be 'nasty,
brutish, and short'
(c) Human beings are vengeful – punishment
should be the preserve of judges
(d) Human beings lack a moral sense – they
can only be socialised under a state
8) For Locke, living under an Absolute
Monarch is which of the following?
(a) Preferable to living in a state of nature
(b) Worse than living in a state of nature
(c) Much the same as living in a state of nature
(d) Whether it is better or worse depends on the
personality of the monarch
9)
(a)
(b)
(c)
The state of nature:
Is an imaginary place
Existed in the past
Still exists (d) Has never existed
10) How is a legitimate state ('community')
created?
(a) Conquest and submission
(b) Agreement of a majority of subjects
(c) Agreement of a wise minority
(d) Agreement of all subjects
11) The 'community' must act as 'one body' –
how can it legitimately make decisions?
(a) Decisions must be unanimous
(b) An elite makes the decisions
(c) A majority makes the decisions
(d) Decisions are made by a two-thirds majority
12) How does Locke respond to the criticism
that no state was created in the way he
suggests – that is, by contract?
(a) The contract is a thought-experiment
(b) The contract expresses what 'ought to be'
and not 'what is'
(c) The contract is a fable
(d) The state predates the records of its
creation
13) Who can be said to have tacitly consented
to the state?
(a) Everybody
(b) Those who declare their consent to the state
(c) Those who use the state's resources
(d) Nobody
14) What is the difference between 'land'
(property) and its 'possessor' (propertyowners, or people) in terms of their
relationship to the state?
(a) The state has legitimate power over property
but not people
(b) The state has legitimate power over property
but only people insofar as they enjoy
property
(c) The state has legitimate power over people
but not property
(d) There is no difference
15)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Aliens living in a state are:
From outer space
Citizens
Obliged to obey the law, but are not citizens
Not obliged to obey the law