RUSSIAN LAWS RATIFYING NUCLEAR ARMS TREATIES
Jean-Pierre Stroot
The two laws under scrutiny here are those ‘On Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty’ and ‘On Ratification of the Treaty between the RF and the United States of America
on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons’, have been proposed in
their English translated versions. They concern START-2 and CTBT respectively. Both laws
date from April 2000. Since that time neither START-2 nor CTBT have been submitted to the
US Senate for ratification. Furthermore, in June 2002, USA and Russia have signed a new
bilateral treaty. It is known as the Moscow Treaty. At least both parties have ratified this one.
The law of ratification by the Russian Duma and the Congress of the Federation dates May
2003.
The Moscow Treaty (MT) is rather peculiar. It requires a reduction of nuclear weapons that are
in a state of launch readiness to or slightly below the level that was foreseen by START-2, but it
does not include destruction of the weapons that should be disarmed nor a system of
verification. It is a very short treaty compared with the previous ones that involved detailed
description of the arms dealt with the treaty as well as a thorough description of inspections and
verification. Also, MT does not provide any provision for elimination of weapons that are
removed from state of readiness. Warheads and missiles may thus be stored and reactivated
when the treaty expires in 2012!
One more curiosity is that MT does not refer to START-2 but to START-1 only. START-2 is
clearly ignored, in line with the absence of US ratification. It has become a "non-treaty". This
has now been recognised by Russia, which has nullified its ratification of START-2.
CTBT is another interesting case of study. Contrary to START-2 it is a multilateral treaty that
has been signed by a vast majority of countries as a counterpart for the approval of indefinite
extension of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Its peculiarity is that it may enter into force after
ratification by all 44 nominally designated countries, which are either nuclear or are most likely
to have the capacity to become nuclear. Amongst these are India and Pakistan. There is little
hope to get a rapid ratification if any by these two countries which are not parties to the NPT
and are actively involved in developing nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the actual USA
administration is observing a moratorium on nuclear tests, but it has decided not to ratify the
CTBT and it has approved a reduction of the time necessary to resume tests in case. Its new
doctrine is based on the study of new nuclear warheads and also it remains under pressure of
stewardship of the existing arsenals that are said to require regular control explosions. The
Russian ratification is a positive action, although CTBT entry into force is still a very far-fetched
if not an impossible goal.
The paradox, that is faced by an analysis of the demise of both START-2 and CTBT, is that of
arms control in general today. Both ratification laws involve lots of detailed considerations.
These concern the preservation of the Russian national nuclear force as a fundamental element
of its security. They do not contradict the texts of the treaties, but they multiply the warnings
towards their partners. It is the same practice as that used by the USA.