INTRODUCTION
Ralitza Mateeva and Philipp Fluri
Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become a key issue not only for the international
discourse on governance, but also very concretely for European integration and
Transatlantic security cooperation. What started in the early 90s of the previous century
as defence reform programs to provide more transparency, to introduce democratic
oversight of the armed forces and to provide for interoperability in international peacekeeping programmes has become in many countries a planned, concerted,
comprehensive effort to reform all security providers (including the democratic legal
infrastructure and political oversight and guidance of such) in an effort to democratically
and efficiently address contemporary challenges to individual (human) and state
security. It is thereby understood that European and Transatlantic security is a
cooperative effort and requires therefore not only international agreements, but a great
deal of interoperability and qualified exchange on both the political and the technical
levels. Whether Security Sector Reform Works in an individual country is thus a question
which can only be answered with a view to the challenges to regional and global security
which need to be addressed cooperatively.
Nor is security sector reform a merely technical affair. Security Sector Reform as
understood in the context of contemporary Transatlantic security cooperation entails
strong
elements
of
democratic
transparency.
Without
parallel
and
adequate
democratisation, improvements and adaptations in the security sector of a flawed
political and social order will only make repression better. Security Sector Reform
implies thus not only an updating of techniques and technical artefacts, but a genuine
change in political and security culture. Such an interoperable security culture will
necessarily be democratic.
Security sector change from above – decreed by an authoritarian ruler or junta – may
eventually lead to greater compatibility with the technical equipment of the states or
alliances which are intended to be impressed by such decrees. But only a democratic
permeation of the whole society will eventually make these changes reforms.
NATO expansion designs and the European integration process have clearly created
incentives for neighbouring states to contemplate and seek inclusion in such processes.
Such plans were accommodated by various organisations and institutions in varied
ways.
This book deals with the experiences in Security Sector Reform made by new NATO
members (Poland and Hungary) and invitees (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia) which will
eventually become NATO members in 2004; we propose to also look at MAP countries
Albania and Macedonia, unilaterally declared NATO membership hopefuls Ukraine and
Georgia, and Moldova, adjacent to a very probable future NATO member, yet still
plagued with the aftermaths of a civil war.
Does Security Sector Reform Work?
One would like to believe that once a country is accepted to full NATO membership it
has been found equal to the old members, which again would imply that it has reached
maturity in its technical and political reform efforts, that it has not only gone through
certain rites de passage, but also truly internalised and en-cultured values, norms
procedures, been inspected and not found wanting, and is now technically and politically
interoperable with its peers which had founded or joined the organisation earlier.
All of the countries under discussion in this volume have gone through a series of
reforms. Membership Action Plans and similar devices helped to streamline and improve
certain aspects of the security sector. Closer scrutiny will, however, reveal that though,
for example, democratic and civilian oversight of the armed forces may have been
understood and implemented to very high degrees, democratic and civilian oversight of
the other security providers may not yet have become an issue, and that therefore legal
provisions for oversight adapted to the new political situation may not even exist yet.
While the armed forces may have been streamlined and put under strict oversight and
transparency rules and regulations, the powerful ministries of interior affairs and the
services subordinate to them may have become bloated and may still be mainly
overseeing themselves, if at all. There may even be a dichotomy within the armed
forces, i.e. reforms may have reached only a part of the armed forces: that part which
interacts and cooperates with international counterparts and participates in international
peace-keeping operations.
This volume asks whether Security Sector Reform as a planned, concerted,
comprehensive effort to reform all security providers (including the democratic legal
infrastructure and political oversight and guidance of such) in an effort to democratically
and efficiently address contemporary challenges to individual (human) and state security
is successful in the countries under scrutiny. The Partnership for Peace Consortium of
Defence Academies offers unique possibilities for such comparative studies. The
present volume is one of the first products of the newly founded Working Group on
Security Sector Reform under the aegis of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, in this case in cooperation with the George C. Marshall
Association of Bulgaria.
The Approach
In order to help authors to work out comparable answers to comparable questions, the
following systematically structured questionnaire was put at their disposal. Not all
authors have chosen to go by the questionnaire, or to answer all questions.
Authors were asked to answer the following questions:
•
What are the challenges, threats and risks to which your country’s national
security policy answers, and are they identified in official documents? Is there a
divergence between official and public perceptions of threats and risks to
security?
•
Which institutions are assigned to address which risks and threats, and what
legal and procedural provisions exist for their interaction and cooperation on the
local, national, regional and international (identify institutions) level?
•
Does the existing network of institutions and their cooperation leave important
problems untouched (e.g. corruption)?
•
Analysis of the SSR in key areas of Civil-Military-Security and Inter-agency
Cooperation. How is this cooperation developing, whom are these institutions
reporting to, and who intervenes in the case of problems?
•
Is there an asymmetrical development of institutions and are all these institutions
democratically accountable? (e.g. Ministries of Interior)?
•
Are there problems in civil-military-security and inter-agency cooperation typical
for your country/region, how would you describe them, and how could they
eventually be overcome?
•
Assessment of the current state of the SSR and SSR Action Plan. Is Security
Sector Reform successful? Only in parts? Which institutions are the most
successful, and why?
•
In conclusion: would you claim that SSR in your country is comprehensive,
adequate and transparent, and what reporting mechanism on progress would
eventually need to be introduced to create such comprehensiveness, adequacy
and transparency in due time? What international and domestic institutions would
eventually need to be involved in such oversight functions? What role is there for
civil society?