Chapter 6
Mali
Mahamadou Nimaga
Introduction
After the March 1991 revolution and the inception of the Third Republic,
Mali initiated a democratisation process that was characterised by the
establishment of several democratic republican institutions. The process
continued with decentralisation and the holding of free and transparent
elections, which brought about a democratic change of regime. After the
2002 elections, the country found itself in an unusual political situation with
General Amadou Toumani Toure, an independent candidate, acceding to the
position of president of the republic. During his first term of office, there
was a general consensus about governance of the country. Today however,
given the divergent strategic interests of stakeholders in the political arena,
this consensus has all but disappeared. What we now see is the emergence of
an opposition that is attempting to carve a place for itself in the political
arena by adopting specific positions on various national issues.
The greatest security threat comes from the northern part of the
country, where the nomadic population periodically shows signs of a desire
to secede vis-à-vis the central authority and bandits carry out acts of violence
on the pretext of fighting for independence. There are also smaller scale
conflicts among different socio-ethnic groups, in particular with relation to
the control of land and water points (between farmers and cattle owners for
example).
The current political context has made it possible to establish a climate
that is favourable to the government, with the latter having crafted a new
national policy framework on security issues. This framework demonstrates
the government’s interest in enhanced civil society participation in the
management of major security matters. To this end, the minister of internal
security and civil defence worked with civil society organisations to organise
the estates general on peace and security, which took place between
September and November 2005. Similarly, through regional consultations
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and a national forum on peace and security, the government sought to
involve all components of the nation in drafting a new national security and
civil defence policy. With these consultations a real dialogue on security
issues was established among all stakeholders, including civil society.
According to participants, this was the moment when they started to really
feel involved. Since then, the ministry of security has been engaged in a
process of security sector reform (SSR) that is expected to lead to a national
strategy. It is quite clear that all the conditions are now in place to promote
the entrenchment of reform in Mali. Nevertheless, because it is difficult to
bring about a change in behaviour and mentalities, one wonders what
percentage of these stakeholders are really prepared for true SSR. Many
civilians believe rightly or wrongly that most security sector agents are
corrupt. Such prejudices constitute a real obstacle, but they have not
prevented the reform process from going ahead as it is part of national
policy.
Security sector reform establishes the order of priorities of issues to be
resolved through a strategy that defines the functions, roles and
responsibilities of different actors in the sector, with the aim of ensuring the
security of the state and its citizens.1 It must be pointed out that the security
sector includes all those institutions and organisations which, with the
approval of government, may legitimately use coercive force to respond to
threats (both external and internal) for the security of the state and its
citizens.
For civilians, including public servants, the issue of SSR is seen only
from the angle of public security. The majority continue to believe that
security is the responsibility of the police or the gendarmerie alone.
Although the regional consultations that formed part of the estates general on
security raised awareness, it is unfortunate to note that the concept is still in
an embryonic phase. As far as the military is concerned, thanks to the
implementation of the army Code of Conduct, the SSR process seems to
have been accepted.
The security apparatus and its environment
The security apparatus inherited from the French colonial power has been
improved through the different regimes, to reach its current form of a
republican force at the service of public institutions and the general
population. In Mali, the security sector is governed by various bodies and
institutions: the Presidency, the ministry of defence and former combatants,
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the ministry of internal security and civil defence, the ministry of territorial
administration and local authorities and the ministry of justice.
The president of the republic is the commander in chief of the armed
forces.2 In this capacity, he presides over the higher council for national
defence and the national defence committee.3 According to the terms of the
constitution, he may declare a state of siege or a state of emergency and take
exceptional measures to this end. He makes appointments to high ranking
civilian and military officials as provided by law. In the area of defence and
security, two departments are under his responsibility: the department of
state security and the private presidential staff.
The threats are numerous and varied: urban crime; banditry; armed
robberies; crimes along and across the borders; terrorism; intra-community
conflicts; drug trafficking; and the proliferation of small arms and light
weapons. In addition to this, the civil defence services are often called in to
deal with disasters, flooding and road accidents.
Apart from public or collective security, the security sector is also in
charge of ensuring human security in order to face all the threats that could
endanger the civilian population, whether or not these threats are
accompanied by acts of violence (banditry, armed attacks, thefts, flooding,
and natural disasters). This is where the general population truly appreciates
the role of the armed and security forces. Despite its inadequate resources,
the security sector obtains encouraging results. Nevertheless, efficiency
could be improved if more resources were made available.
It is generally accepted that the government has the responsibility for
ensuring the security of citizens and their property. This is the main function
of the security sector. Although citizens have the possibility of calling on
private companies to ensure their security (depending on their status and
level of income), the armed and security forces are nevertheless still
responsible for maintaining the security of the general population.
Furthermore, the government must face external threats. In this instance, it is
the fundamental mission of the military to ensure national defence.
In accordance with existing legislation, the security services comprise
the police force, the gendarmerie, the civil defence force and the National
Guard.
The armed forces
In addition to their security missions, the armed forces are in charge of
national defence and territorial integrity. The armed forces must protect the
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population against external threats or aggression, in particular by setting up
the necessary patrols.
In addition to its conventional mission, the military takes part in
development operations through the military engineers’ corps, thus playing a
valuable role in national development. It thus faithfully translates the spirit
of the orientation letter drafted by the president of the republic in 2002, in
which he emphasised the need for the armed forces to participate actively in
‘national construction efforts’ and the ‘security of the nation’. The head of
state felt that it would be a good thing to set up ‘new forms of
complementarity with the security forces’, with a view to ‘better integrating
the Armed Forces and security forces in their overall, proactive, human
security environment’. This new approach mainstreams internal security in
national defence.
The Constitution confers legitimacy on special security missions of
the armed forces in these terms:
When the institutions of the republic, the independence of the nation, the
integrity of the national territory and the implementation of international
commitments are faced with a grave and immediate threat and when the
regular functioning of constitutional public authorities is disrupted, the
president of the republic shall take any exceptional measures required by the
circumstances, after consultation with the prime minister, the presidents of
the National Assembly and the high council of local authorities and the
president of the Constitutional Court.4
The close link between internal and external security determines the
new approach to security sector governance in Mali. Under the terms of the
new law on national defence, the mission of the armed forces is at all times
and in all circumstances to ensure the security of the population and
territorial integrity, as well as to protect the lives of citizens against all forms
of aggression.
The national police force
The national police force is headed by a director-general appointed from
among the police commanders by a decree adopted in the council of
ministers and signed by the president of the republic. It has competence in
urban areas with a high population density. According to article 2 of
ordinance n° 04-026/P-RM dated 16 September 2004,5 the missions of the
national police force are:
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To maintain law and order, safety, security and public peace;
To ensure the protection of persons and goods;
To ensure the observance of laws and regulations through its
administrative and criminal investigation functions;
To enforce regulations on arms and ammunition;
To control private security services;
To control gambling establishments;
To carry out border police missions;
To participate in protecting institutions of state and high-ranking
personalities;
To participate in the mission of providing information to the
government;
To participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
operations;
To participate in civil defence and national defence.
This redefinition of responsibilities takes into account not only democratic
requirements, but also the reforms that need to be implemented within the
national police force. It must be noted that under the different regimes, the
police force has experienced several mutations. Thus, it went from
conventional status immediately after independence to a militarised police
force under the regime of the military committee for national liberation.
With the advent of the third republic in 1992, the police force was once
again given civilian status.
The civil defence force
The mission of the civil defence force is to implement, coordinate and
control emergency operations in line with the national civil defence policy.
In particular, it is in charge of organising prevention and emergency
operations, drafting disaster management plans and implementing them and
managing the logistics resources allocated to carrying out such missions.
Management of the civil defence force is under the responsibility of a
director-general appointed by a decree adopted in the council of ministers
upon proposal from the minister in charge of civil defence. Candidates are
nominated from among public servants in category A of the general status of
public servants, police commissioners, or high-ranking military officers.
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The national gendarmerie
The commander of the national gendarmerie is a general or superior officer
of the gendarmerie, appointed by a decree adopted in the council of
ministers. Like the national police force, the gendarmerie has administrative
and criminal investigation missions, but because of its military status it is
often entrusted with territorial defence operations. It may participate in
combat as a constituted unit or alongside units of the defence forces as a
provost corps. It has competence over the armed forces in matters of
criminal investigation, that is, any violations committed within military
premises or involving military personnel may be referred to it. Although the
gendarmerie may be present in urban centres alongside the police, its main
area of activity is the countryside where it provides coverage over the entire
national territory.
The gendarmerie is the only corps of the security forces that carries
out multiple functions in policing (law enforcement, maintenance of law and
order, protection of persons and property), criminal investigation (recording
crimes and offences, contraventions, investigation to collect proof and
identify perpetrators of violations, etc.), administrative police (intelligence,
road traffic, border police, policing of ports and airports, crowd control, civil
defence and emergency) and defence (military obligations). In peace time, it
participates in the administration of joint armed forces bodies. In times of
crisis, it participates actively in territorial defence through its intelligence
services and by protecting the main sensitive civilian areas, as well as
through immediate intervention.
The various departments attached to the gendarmerie are the
inspectorate, the schools command, the criminal investigation unit and the
ministerial reserves unit group. The gendarmerie therefore has an
inspectorate, similar to the inspectorate service that exists within the ministry
of internal security and protection, which has responsibility for the police
and civil defence forces.
The National Guard
This is a military type force, which does not carry out criminal
investigations, but participates actively in administrative police missions
through maintenance of law and order, surveillance of sensitive areas and
intelligence gathering. This force has the most comprehensive coverage of
the country; there is a National Guard unit present wherever the
administration is represented. It is under the authority of the ministry of
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defence and former combatants for its administration and under that of the
ministry of internal security and civil defence for its deployment. It is
organised into a staff in charge of coordinating the activities of the territorial
groupings, which have platoons under their orders.
The mandate of the National Guard includes ensuring the security of
administrative and political institutions and authorities; public safety and
maintenance of law and order; general policing of territorial authorities;
operational defence of the national territory; border surveillance;
participating in peace operations and humanitarian activities; as well as
contributing to the economic, social and cultural development efforts of the
country.
The areas of competence with regard to internal security are clearly
assigned by existing texts. The police and the gendarmerie work together
and regularly organise joint patrols. In spite of the framework for
cooperation, relations among these agents have not always been very
friendly. There have been some unfortunate incidents involving the police
and the gendarmerie or the police and the military.6 These have always been
deplored by the political authorities who have indeed imposed sanctions in
such instances. It must be pointed out, however, that such confrontations are
due to personal conflicts among staff and are not the result of a poor
distribution of the roles and missions of each of these corps.
The intelligence service
An intelligence service gathers, analyses and uses intelligence. However,
only the Department of State Security and the military intelligence
department are involved in both espionage and counter-espionage. Because
of the secretive and confidential nature of their activities, there is very little
information available about them. There are complaints about these
departments from the general public who sometimes fall victim to abuse.
Unlike the other components of the security sector, the intelligence service is
rarely sanctioned for any possible misconduct.
While intelligence is vital for sovereignty and the defence of state
interests, it is also important to have qualified, professional personnel who
are aware of the sensitive nature of their mission. To achieve this, the
security services would need to be educated on the importance of heightened
collaboration with the civilian population. These services would also need to
be equipped with information technology equipment and qualified human
resources. There have been instances of abuse and misconduct. It is however
difficult to give concrete examples, especially as such instances are managed
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internally by the security and judicial authorities in charge of taking the
necessary measures to sanction those found guilty.
A few years ago, the security sector had very little knowledge about
the concept of human rights; today, all military and police training schools
provide teaching on the subject, as well as on international humanitarian law.
Although the sector alone cannot guarantee that all its agents will respect
human rights, it can nevertheless contribute to limiting instances of abuse.
Security privatisation
Many private companies providing watch and guard services, transport of
funds and individual protection services were created just after the events of
1991; several others have proliferated in recent years. Under certain
circumstances, they are authorised to provide their staff with firearms for the
purpose of carrying out their surveillance and protection missions.
There are no traditional or political militias in Mali. The country is
however faced with acts of banditry carried out in the north by irredentists
and rebel groups. Finally, as the country achieved independence through
peaceful means, it has never had a liberation army.
Arguably, the proliferation of private security companies cannot have
a negative impact on the security sector because their activities are regulated
by law and they cannot be set up without prior authorisation from the public
authority. Indeed, the fact that there are private security companies does not
in any way signify privatisation of the security sector as a whole, because the
state still has the prime responsibility in this area. On the contrary, their
increased numbers has made it possible to cover the deficit in individual
security (night and day watch) to a certain extent. Private security agents,
who for the most part are unarmed, are required to inform the security
services or call on the latter for any offences that may come to their attention
in their area of surveillance.
In summary, there has been a noticeable improvement in relations
between the security services and the general population. With the creation
of a ministry for internal security and civil defence, coordination of the
activities of the gendarmerie, the National Guard and the police force has
improved. In reality, these relations are defined according to a certain
hierarchy, by the texts governing each organisation. In peacetime, each
department functions according to the statutory regulation. In times of crisis,
unrest and riots, the different services may be mobilised to maintain order
and security. There is no difference between those involved at the national
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level and those involved at local level but the hierarchy of the chain of
command is defined according to regions, districts and communes. In areas
where there is no police force, the gendarmerie and the National Guard are
present. The same actors are found at both the national and local levels with
of course different ranks, according to the degree of command in the unit,
brigade, or platoon.
Security sector management and oversight
Compared to other countries in the sub-region, the security situation in Mali
is quite enviable. This is due to the fact that over time, communities have
learned to live in harmony and in a spirit of tolerance. Today, security sector
oversight is carried out both by the executive, legislative and judicial powers
and by civil society.
Instruments of civilian management and control of the security sector
It must be recalled that relations between civilians and the security sector
were for a long time marked by suspicion and distrust. The armed and
security forces were convinced that anything related to security was their
sole responsibility. Today, serious efforts have been undertaken to bring the
two camps closer together. Increasingly, civilians participate in seminars on
security or human rights, organised by the ministries of defence and internal
security.
Civil society now has considerable influence in the area of security.
The number of associations working in the area of peace and security is
constantly increasing, as are the numbers of journalists wishing to focus on
controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons or in protecting
human rights. Cases of misconduct or abuse by certain agents have been
sanctioned, following reports from civil society. The fact that the press
shows real interest in the behaviour of security agents and also in the
behaviour of magistrates and senior officials has an influence on their
professional behaviour. Nevertheless, this type of control remains rather
weak.
It is quite clear that the 25 February 1992 constitution is the
cornerstone of the separation of powers of the executive, the legislature and
the judiciary. In theory, each branch of power is independent of the others
although there is not total independence, in particular between the legislative
and the executive branches. Since government is obliged to render account
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to parliament and since the president of the republic has the power to
dissolve parliament, both institutions are compelled to collaborate, in the
interest of the nation.
As indicated above, the rights and obligations of the security sector
are defined by law and regulatory texts. Any acts of abuse and misconduct
are thus brought to the attention of the hierarchy, which evaluates the facts.
Perpetrators are therefore required to answer for their acts, either through
disciplinary procedures, or before the courts. Finally, all rights and
obligations are subject to administrative and institutional control (security
services inspectorate).
The ministry of security and civil defence and the ministry of defence,
which are in charge of law and order and security, are responsible for
implementing the national security policy and best practices, as well as
ensuring that the armed and security forces comply with ethics and their
code of conduct. The inspectorate department is also involved in this control
mission. Finally, if an offenсe involves human rights violations, the case is
brought before the prosecutor, who has the authority to initiate proceedings.
The security sector is closely monitored by civil society. Human rights
protection associations, NGOs and women’s associations are active in Mali.
They are able to report irregularities through the media or by petitions sent to
any authority that they believe capable of redressing the situation. And they
have the right of oversight over all the activities of security agents, on
condition that they observe the confidentiality of procedures and ‘defence
secrecy’.
It must be recalled that civilian control is not like police control. It is
limited to noting, reporting and above all proposing solutions.7 Nevertheless,
the quality of civilian control of the security sector remains inadequate, due
to a lack of interest on the part of certain civilians in the security sector and
also because of the often ‘secret’ nature of security issues.8 Because of the
less than friendly relations that existed for decades between civilians and
security forces, civil society has demonstrated less interest in the sector.
Such interest is however growing with the emergence of pressure groups,
associations and the media.
There is a strong imbalance between civilian control and institutional
control, as the latter has more resources and powers over the security sector.
With regard to intelligence activities or management of certain cases, things
are not always transparent. This situation is however accepted by some
civilians who believe that sensitive issues related to state security must not
be discussed in the public arena. This is one of the difficulties encountered in
civilian control, since civil society does not have sufficient investigative
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means. ‘Reasons of state’ or ‘defence secrecy’ are the factors often cited to
avoid responding to requests for information as part of civilian control, thus
often compromising transparency in the name of confidentiality.
Both institutional mechanisms and legislative mechanisms are quite
adequate, especially as the former are defined by the constitution. As to the
latter, it is obvious that compliance is required. The real problem lies in
actual practice, where there are often irregularities.
Parliamentary oversight
Oversight by the National Assembly is exercised through the government’s
obligation to report to this body.9 To this end, the constitution stipulates that
‘the government is accountable before the assembly under the conditions and
according to the procedures set out under articles 78 and 79.’10 In the
security sector, parliamentary oversight is exercised through different means,
in particular, through questions to ministers on topical issues or on issues of
concern relating to security; these may be in the form of oral or written
questions addressed to the ministers who are obliged to respond. It is quite
fortunate to see that increasingly parliamentarians put questions to the
authorities about ongoing security issues or policy. Article 26 of the
constitution stipulates that national sovereignty belongs to the people as a
whole, who exercise it through their representatives. Thus, since members of
the National Assembly are the representatives of the people, there can be no
reason not to subject government action in the area of security to the control
of the national representation, not even for reasons of state secrecy.11
Given the current security environment, which is marked by the crisis
in the northern part of Mali, most Malian parliamentarians show a keen
interest in security issues, including at local level. The National Assembly's
standing committee on defence and security is specifically responsible for
reviewing all security matters and preparing draft bills on these matters for
submission to members. It has been closely involved in resolving the crisis
in the northern part of Mali, but does not have sufficient human, material and
financial resources to propose draft bills.
The National Assembly (the single chamber of parliament) has the
right of oversight over the different activities of the executive and by
extension over the security sector, since draft budgets must be submitted to
and approved by its members. Adoption of the budget is one area where the
parliament truly has influence and control. Members do not adopt the budget
of specific sectors separately, but rather adopt an overall budget in the form
of a finance law. Furthermore, parliamentary control and supervision of the
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security sector is also carried out through the procedure of convening
members of government, including the minister in charge of security, to
come and respond to questions by parliamentarians.
Parliamentary authorisation is not required for deploying troops
abroad within the framework of operations to maintain or restore peace.12
The parliament is not involved in any decision by government to send
contingents abroad. Nevertheless, under article 71 of the Constitution,
‘declaration of war shall be authorised by the National Assembly meeting
especially for this purpose’. Thus, the president in his capacity as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces cannot engage Mali in a war
without the agreement of the National Assembly. Similarly, it is the National
Assembly that must approve an extension of a state of emergency or a state
of siege beyond 10 days, in order to ensure that such an extension does not
hamper public liberties.
The statement that ‘the government does not systematically send
reports to parliament, but cannot refuse to communicate them to us if we so
request’13 quite obviously means that reports are not sent regularly to
parliament. The executive cannot be blamed for this situation, in particular
as parliament has real powers to obtain such reports. The passivity
demonstrated by parliament with regard to receiving reports could also
explain why its oversight over the security sector is weak.
Although there is provision for parliamentary commissions and
enquiries, such occurrences are rare. The use of such methods could also
determine the level of parliamentary oversight of public action. It must also
be acknowledged, however, that parliament could call on experts to assist it
in enhancing its knowledge about specific security issues.
Judicial oversight
The judicial power has constitutional and legal prerogatives over the security
sector. According to the code of criminal procedure, the criminal
investigation department is in charge of recording violations (contraventions,
offences, or crimes), gathering proof, seeking the perpetrators and bringing
them before the courts. Criminal investigation services are under the
authority of the public prosecutor, who has direct control over officers and
agents of the criminal investigation department. The judicial power also has
control over the armed forces through the military tribunal.
There are numerous criticisms levied against security sector agents
and just as many complaints about magistrates, who are rightly or wrongly
accused by certain parties of being dishonest and corrupt. The system of
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justice is truly an area of concern for citizens, but there are nevertheless
honest, competent and upright magistrates. When the judicial system has to
deal with unethical behaviour, the quality of legal decisions and judicial
control is affected. Admittedly, the Malian justice system is truly engaged in
a process of reform, which goes from recruiting magistrates to creating more
courts and includes raising the moral standards of the extended legal family.
Justice well rendered goes hand-in-hand with legal security and respect of
individual rights.
A national human rights commission was created by decree n° 06-117/
P-RM of 16 March 2006. Apart from a few well-informed individuals, the
existence of this commission is little known to the general public and it is
often confused with the Malian human rights association (AMDH).
Another type of public control is the Democratic Question and
Answer Forum (Espace d’interpellation démocratique) organised each year
on 25 December. This is an innovative initiative similar to the ombudsman
and is a unique opportunity for Malian citizens to ask the government and
the security sector agencies questions about irregularities or human rights
violations. During this session, the government responds to all questions and
as far as possible, tries to provide immediate solutions. The jury, made up of
foreign personalities, makes recommendations to government and a
commission reviews implementation of past recommendations.
Within the ministry of justice, there is the judicial services
inspectorate, which is not under the authority of the hierarchy. It was
established by ordinance n° 00-057/P-RM dated 28 September 2000 and its
mission is to:
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Ensure the smooth functioning of legal services and all other services
under the ministry in charge of justice;
Contribute to improving the working methods of magistrates and
personnel of the public justice system;
Inspect traditional services, with a view to improving the functioning
of various institutions;
Carry out, on the request of the minister in charge of justice, any
investigations or specific missions within the framework of its
attributions.
Police officers are under the authority of the public prosecutor, who
has the right of oversight over their work. Also, it must be recalled that the
public prosecutor decides on criminal proceedings. In this capacity, he has
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real control over the police force, the gendarmerie and other officers of the
criminal police.
The code of criminal procedure guarantees the right of defence. People
who are arrested or accused have the right to be assisted by a lawyer at all
stages of the procedure, right up to the ruling. Court-appointed lawyers are
only provided in criminal cases. In Mali, this procedure is seldom used,
because some lawyers do not take cases seriously when they are appointed
by court.
Public oversight
Civil society, which is very proactive, is made up of several components: the
media, associations and organisations that are active in combating the
proliferation of small arms and light weapons,14 the press, NGOs and
academics. In addition to the dynamism of these different actors, there is the
remarkable contribution made by religious and traditional leaders as well as
other influential figures in resolving certain crises. The private press is
prolific and covers all areas. There are however very few specialised
institutes dealing with security questions alone, although the University of
Mali does contribute to stimulating research on all subjects including
security, by the topics that it offers to students.
There are 103 officially declared political parties in the country, but
only about 20 of them are active by their presence in decision-making bodies
at both local and national levels. No less than 30 newspapers (magazines,
daily newspapers, bulletins, etc.) are published each day, covering a wide
range of issues. Undeniably, in spite of some problems of internal
coordination, civil society remains very active. Indeed, civil society was a
key player in the 26 March revolution and the subsequent inception of the
third republic.
If participation essentially means understanding the major thrusts of
SSR, then it is not certain that civil society has fully assimilated the concept.
This is quite understandable to the extent that the sector is a sensitive one,
requiring a certain amount of caution. Nevertheless, it would be desirable for
civil society to have a good knowledge of security matters so that they can
provide a view different to that of security sector ‘insiders’. The organisation
of seminars and workshops, as well as the regular consultations between
civil society and security agents should make it possible to enhance the
feeling of civil society being a real stakeholder in the security sector.
Over the past few years, there has been a clear interest on the part of
researchers, teachers and consultants on issues related to security. Many
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studies have been published on topics such as conflict management, urban
and road insecurity, small arms proliferation, terrorism and democratic
governance of security. Although there are no institutions specialising only
in these areas, most consultancy firms and several associations work on
various similar subjects: the Malian Human Rights Association, the
Women's Legal Clinic, the Association of Journalists for Peace and Security
Issues and RASALAO Mali.15 Several non-governmental organisations such
as Oxfam-GB, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Amnesty International have
also commissioned studies on security in Mali.
It must also be recalled that on the initiative of CONASCIPAL, a
forum on civil society governance was organised for the first time in Mali in
2005. The event brought together political and administrative authorities,
local authorities, representatives of the armed and security forces, as well as
technical and financial partners who all engaged in fruitful dialogue: ‘This
first forum enabled all those involved in security to establish
communication, which is indispensable for any reasonable and effective
action. This exercise in communication is no doubt a basic tool for
consensus in the management of democratic security sector governance in
Mali.’16
Looking back on the road travelled with respect to democracy, peace
and security and in particular the inception of democracy and managing the
conflict in the north, it is quite clear that the extremely positive contribution
of civil society to social peace must not be underestimated. However, civil
society organisations need to continue to strengthen their competences and
experience. In order to exercise effective control, civil society needs the
support of the armed and security forces, the political authority and the
judicial power. Improved collaboration amongst all stakeholders would
enable it to play its oversight role effectively and promote better
collaboration.
Its readiness to engage in dialogue and its dynamism prove its sense of
responsibility. Indeed, civil society has always spoken out against
infringements of democracy and freedom of the press. It has often supported
the executive in implementing certain public policies (road insecurity,
controlling small arms proliferation, etc.). Although it often receives funds
from government or financial partners, it cannot be said that civil society is
manipulated. Politicians regularly use the media to get certain messages
across, but such contacts are not synonymous with manipulation.
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Challenges of security sector governance
Varied and sometimes complex problems remain to be resolved in Mali.
They range from armed robberies to premeditated murders, transborder
crime, organised crime, the acts of rebellion and banditry in the north, drug
trafficking and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
These challenges are further compounded by some intra and intercommunity
conflicts, as well as widespread corruption.
Other problems include: inadequate territorial coverage for public
security; the absence of a consistent, specialised border control system;
inadequate operational capacities in the existing units; shortfalls in personnel
numbers; insufficient infrastructure and equipment; daily recurrence of
excesses within the forces, both in terms of moral conduct and professional
ethics; the lack of a security orientation and programming law; poor
coordination between the central management and local units (especially
those based in the north); and the lack of coordination between the different
security forces.17
We must not however overlook the fact that it is difficult for the state
to control the entirety of its national territory and impose its authority,
because the borders are extremely porous and the populations in the northern
part of the country are nomads. The ‘great northern desert’, an area that is
ideal for all sorts of illicit activity, is considered by some to be a ‘no man’s
land’. In addition to this, the armed and security forces are insufficient in
number and intervention capacity in all the sectors along the border with
Algeria, although efforts are currently being undertaken to strengthen the
patrols in the Kidal region.
The security situation in the north of Mali and throughout the SaheloSaharan belt has long been a problem, due to the presence in the region of
armed groups and traffickers. The events in December 2008 and January
2009, however, marked a turning point in security management, with the
kidnapping of Canadian and European diplomats. The arrival of the Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb movement, which has found a sort of rear
base in the north increased awareness in western countries on the security
concerns in this part of the Sahara (with its attendant risks of terrorism and
transborder crime). In addition to Algeria, which supports the Malian forces
with logistics as part of the countries’ military cooperation, several European
countries have decided to draft a security coordination strategy for the zone.
The United States, for their part, are already engaged in joint exercises
alongside the Malian military. This extremely worrying situation also led to
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the intervention of other parties, in particular the signatories of the Algiers
agreement and Libya.
With respect to assistance received from outside Africa, the positive
aspects are the transfer of competence and know-how, as well as assistance
in building infrastructure. The negative aspects are the risks of interference
in the internal affairs of the country and unhealthy competition, which would
be harmful to Mali. Dependence on external aid provides the donor countries
with an excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of beneficiary countries. It
is up to the government to prove its capacity to resolve certain problems and
only call on partners for development operations, if necessary.
Security is at the heart of all discussions and mobilises actors on the
international scene. On 11 November 2008, on the occasion of the
ministerial meeting on peace, security and development in the SaheloSaharan space, Mali called on the countries involved to examine the security
challenges and draft a plan of action, which would require considerable
financial resources for its implementation. Partners would be asked to
contribute to its implementation once the needs had been identified by the
countries themselves. The aim of this approach is to minimise external
interference.
The role of the state, the security sector and agents of democratic control
Roles are clearly defined by the constitution and other texts establishing or
organising each of these services. Under the terms of article 53 of the
constitution, ‘government shall define and conduct national policy’. To this
end, it must be sufficiently and properly informed to be able to take the right
decisions at the right moment. It appears that the fact that there is confusion
about roles and that various sectors encroach on the competence of others is
rather due to insufficient knowledge of these texts. Since the constitution
clearly separates the executive, legislative and judicial branches of power,
each has a means of action over the others.
Convergence of law and compliance with standards
The existence of multiple standards is no justification for disorder or
violation of fundamental texts. In the Malian system, all standards must be in
compliance with the law, which itself must be in compliance with the
constitution. Failing that, such texts can be brought before the Constitutional
Court, which rules on their constitutionality. However, duly ratified
international texts are integrated into the national legal apparatus and take
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precedence over national laws. Therefore, in order to strengthen the
convergence of law and compliance with standards, the capacity of the
judicial power must be consolidated by providing it with the necessary
means and resources.
Relations between security sector agents and citizens
The security sector is not very familiar to the general public, or may be of
little interest to it. This lack of knowledge about the sector and its agents
does not help to build trust. In order for confidence to be restored, all
categories of society have to be involved. Also, a real dialogue must be
established amongst the various agents and the missions and responsibilities
of each have to be defined. Once the various stakeholders have understood
that their role is to ensure human security in addition to that of the state, it
will be possible to establish a certain level of trust. To this end, the new
security policy in Mali has been organised around six main pillars, in order
to adapt to the reality of the country:
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
Focusing on a policy of prevention;
Laying the foundation for a neighbourhood police service;
Clarifying and coordinating responsibilities in the area of security;
Adopting a policy of rational use of the means available;
Consolidating and strengthening the policy of openness to the outside;
Adopting an appropriate communication strategy.
Speaking of restoring confidence suggests that it was lost at some
point. However, although there may be some legitimate questions about the
way in which certain situations were managed at the national level, it is not
certain that security sector agents as a whole suffer from a negative image. If
this were the case, however, communication would have to be improved and
reasons given for some decisions taken. Feelings of frustration are often due
to a lack of information or inaccuracy of such information. These are
shortcomings that can be corrected.
It must be recalled that, fortunately, the Malian Armed Forces are
neither organised on the basis of ethnicity nor politicised, that is, they are not
in the service of one clan, nor a single political party. Obviously, within the
context of a democracy, they remain subordinate to the political authority. In
Mali, members of the military are never recruited on an ethnic or regional
basis. The only exception is when former rebels were integrated into the
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different military corps following the 1991 rebellion and within the
framework of implementing the DDR programmes.18 In addition, no ethnic
group or region is predominant in the chain of command of the armed and
security forces. This state of affairs has certainly helped the country to avoid
civil wars.
Other challenges
The challenges with regard to SSR are enormous. They range from a lack of
public trust in the security sector, to the need to improve the moral conduct
of this sector, the need for capacity building, professionalism and the control
of corruption – bribes or sourôfin.19 The renewed strong presence of the
military in the Malian administration is also seen by some as a nonnegligible problem. In spite of the political change and democratic progress,
there appears to be a return of senior military officials in civilian garb to
positions such as ambassadors, governors and directors of public
departments. The appointment of a high ranking defence official (all army
colonels) to every ministry has also led to some reservations on the part of
the population, which is not happy to see the military in the spheres of
administrative and civilian command.
The security situation in the North, which is characterised by
trafficking in weapons and drugs, remains an area of national and regional
concern. The self-defence group, Ganda-Koy, has threatened to take back
territory if the authorities do not accede to its demand to be involved in
managing the crisis in the North. Given this situation, there is a need to find
the right way of educating all parties to respect the Algiers agreements.
Another point that needs to be raised is the recent interest shown by
various partners in the Northern region. The US has been organising military
exercises within the framework of the Pan-Sahel Programme and France
intends to organise a meeting of ministers of defence of certain countries in
the Sahelo-Saharan zone. The diversity and sometimes the antinomy of the
ambitions of these different partners proves how important the issue of the
North is for the region as a whole. Mali is aware of this and has opted for a
regional approach, focusing on a process of integrated development.
Security sector reform is just as important as the reform of the
educational system, the public service, or inter-institutional relations. The
public service is severely affected by corruption. However, considerable
efforts have been undertaken to effectively control corruption, in particular
with the establishment of the office of the Auditor General and a number of
measures taken within the framework of overhauling government action.
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Other challenges to be met in terms of democratic governance of the security
sector are in building capacity and enhancing professionalism.
If a concept is not well disseminated, people are obviously reluctant to
implement it. Similarly, if the main stakeholders are not involved in reform,
opposition only increases. Obviously, reform has a financial cost that needs
to be assessed. Whenever there is resistance to reform, it mainly comes from
those areas in the sector where corruption is strongest. The best way to
overcome such resistance is to adopt a participatory approach, which instils
confidence in stakeholders and to clearly indicate the objectives of the
reform. Furthermore, since excesses by these agents are often due to their
poor wages and working conditions, reforms must necessarily include
measures to improve their situation.
The security forces’ budget is drafted within the respective institutions
and then subjected, quite transparently, to the normal procedure for adoption
within the national budget. There are several phases to the procedure: budget
draft by the department concerned; adoption in the cabinet of the competent
ministry; transmission to the ministry of finance; inclusion in the national
budget; review and adoption by the council of ministers; transmission,
discussion and final adoption by the National Assembly; and proclamation
of the finance law by the president of the republic. There is therefore a whole
series of stages at which the security forces’ budget may be screened, thus
guaranteeing transparency.
The success of a reform process can be measured by the relations
established with civil society; the professionalism of agents in this sector
(compliance with the rules of ethics and respect of human rights); the quality
of services provided; and finally, the relevance of security sector control by
civil society, the National Assembly and the judicial power.
Spaces for dialogue
Opportunities exist for formal or informal dialogue between the security
sector and the general public; for example, open days and joint seminars on
respect for human rights. The fact that various security services have now
appointed officials responsible for communication demonstrates an
awareness of the importance of such dialogue between civilians and the
armed and security forces.
Where training is concerned, Mali works in collaboration with several
countries. There are trainee exchange programmes with national and subregional schools (Senegal, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire
and Cameroun). This platform could be used to set up a framework of
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coordination through existing sub-regional organisations, in order to
establish common rules and partnership agreements in the area of security
(on the right of pursuit, for example).
Collective security mechanisms
Mali understood very quickly that its own security could not be guaranteed
as long as that of its neighbours was threatened. This understanding has led
the authorities to adopt a global and regional approach. Thus, a number of
bilateral agreements covering international judicial cooperation and
assistance, as well as transborder and military cooperation have been signed
between Mali and its neighbours. This sub-regional cooperation includes
tripartite or bilateral meetings on security and transborder issues.
Furthermore, the country has ratified the Convention on Small Arms and
Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, adopted in
Abuja in June 2006 and has acceded to the Protocol Relating to the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping
and Security, as well as the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.
It is also a party to the CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States)
convention on a mechanism for conflict management, prevention and
resolution.
Mali's security policy is thus perfectly in line with the security
objectives of ECOWAS, in particular regarding conflict resolution, the
control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the
promotion of good governance and human security.
Assistance from outside Africa
Conflict prevention and peaceful resolution are the main pillars of Malian
diplomacy. The positive results recorded by Mali in conflict resolution, its
active participation in peace keeping operations and its involvement in
resolving certain conflicts in Africa have enabled the country to mobilise
additional resources for peace and for security sector reform. When requests
for assistance are made on the basis of the country's needs, there is less
likelihood of failure or a negative impact because the objectives are defined
in common.
Mali has received the support and assistance of bilateral and
multilateral partners in the area of democratic governance. Financial and
technical assistance is always well appreciated by the population who see it
as a sign of dynamic cooperation. International organisations and technical
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and financial partners could also offer their assistance in setting up the
enabling environment for institutional capacity building (justice, parliament,
police, armed forces, gendarmerie, etc.).
While national authorities are responsible for drafting a national
defence and security policy that is designed to include human security,
respect for human rights and legality, external partners or agents must
accompany the process of SSR, by providing technical assistance and also
by financing certain projects. In order to promote recognition of state
authority and sovereignty, the government must educate and inform,
promote relations between civilians and the military, ensure that legal norms
are complied with and provide continued training to all stakeholders.
As far as major reform programmes are concerned, Mali certainly
needs external partners, but the latter should not be involved in identifying
priorities or in drafting the plan of action. People would indeed be reluctant
to accept SSR that has been dictated from outside. The population therefore
has to be involved in identifying and defining the needs and partners must
not be involved at this stage.
Success is more likely if the roles are clearly defined between national
stakeholders and external partners. If the latter are truly to be considered as
partners, then they must be involved in the reform policy because their
contribution is still essential for effective implementation. No reform is
viable if all those involved do not have the same vision and understanding of
the issues at stake. This is why reform has to be initiated using a
participatory approach.
Conclusion
A number of problems need to be tackled urgently: promoting transparency
in institutions and accountability of agents; controlling corruption and
financial crime; and establishing a results and merit-based culture and
respect of individual rights. Other issues including capacity building and
setting up a dynamic policy to ensure that SSR is accepted by the population,
who should be its principal beneficiaries. In addition to the points raised
above, the following recommendations can be made:

Set up an independent structure for the organisation, consultation and
coordination of civil society activities in order to support and
accompany government in its efforts to establish democratic security
sector governance;
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147
Set up a formal framework for collaboration between civil society and
the appropriate government technical departments in order to enhance
synergy in their efforts;
Draft and implement strategies aimed at ensuring that civil society
takes ownership of the new national security policy;
Ensure that all components of civil society accept the concept of SSR;
Establish an observatory on corruption and public liberties;
Enhance the capacities of the National Assembly, by establishing a
professional and effective parliamentary administration system;
Enhance the capacities of the ministry of foreign affairs’ centre for
strategic studies and establish partnerships between the centre and
universities;
Implement the recommendations of the estates general on corruption
and financial crime, which were held in Bamako from 25 to 28
November 2008;
Provide the intelligence service and criminal investigation department
with professional training;
Involve academics in drafting public policies on corruption, in
particular through specialised reviews, investigations on financial
transparency and symposia.
The adoption of the human security concept places the individual at
the ‘heart of security’.20 It also emphasises the intrinsic relationship between
security and development. This vision is certainly very much in line with the
expectations of the population, because there can be no development without
security and vice versa.
In the Malian environment, there is a need to create mechanisms for
consultation and dialogue in which the interests of all are protected; this
should make it possible to enhance democratic governance. Only through
dialogue and consultation with civil society can the legitimacy of security
services and trust in them be strengthened.
The best school for security agents, whether from the military, the
police force, customs service, or magistrates, is the school of loyalty and
respect for institutions and the public service. As far as the military is
concerned, it must be noted that the regional peacekeeping school is based in
Mali. It prepares officers to participate in peacekeeping operations. There are
other schools in Mali such as the EMIA (Ecole militaire inter-armes), the
EMA (Ecole militaire d’administration) and the OEGM (Ecole des officiers
de la gendarmerie nationale) which also receive foreign trainees.
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Regional cooperation for security sector training should be
encouraged through exchange of experience and training grants. This type of
cooperation indeed already exists at regional (Ecole de maintien de la paix,
Bamako) and sub-regional (War College, Nigeria, Ecole de la magistrature
in Porto-Novo, Benin) levels. The police force, the customs service and the
military all benefit from training outside the country, within the framework
of bilateral cooperation.
In Mali, security sector reform has become imperative if the
requirements of democracy and good governance are to be satisfied. To this
end, the international community, which seeks to promote SSR, must
provide assistance in implementing the process that has already been
initiated. Civil society, political parties, opinion formers and religious
leaders must all be involved and active in this process. ‘In the light of the
major undertakings that have been started in the ministry of security in
recent years, security sector reform in Mali cannot be postponed.’21 It
appears that the political authorities are determined to promote this reform,
which will determine the effectiveness of good governance. Nevertheless,
were this reform to be postponed, the consequences on democratic security
governance, as well as the confidence of the population in the security sector
would be enormous. Security sector reform is doomed to fail if there is not a
strong political will, real commitment on the part of the actors involved and
the support of external partners.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Syllabus, ‘Senior Leaders’ Seminar’ (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington
D.C., 29 June - 11 July 2008), 931(French version).
Article 44, Title III of the Malian Constitution of 25 February 1992.
Decree no. 98-285/P/PRM from 7 September 1998. See Art. 2 and 3 on the composition
of the National Defence Council.
Art. 49 and 50 of the Constitution.
Ordinance ratified by law no. 04-AN-RM of 28 April 2005.
An incident that occurred during a police patrol, which degenerated into a confrontation,
at Niamakoro.
Zeïni Moulaye, Gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali: un défi au
développement durable (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2005), 165.
Interview with a security sector journalist.
Zeïni Moulaye and Amadou Keïta, L’Assemblée nationale du Mali sous la troisième
République: guide à l’usage des élus, des citoyens et des partenaires extérieurs (Berlin:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2007), 96.
Art. 110 of the Malian Constitution of 25 February 1992.
Mali
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
149
Communication by Pr Aliou Nouhoum Diallo, Member of the National Assembly, former
Speaker of the National Assembly and the ECOWAS Parliament, during the first civil
society forum on democratic governance of security in Mali.
Interview with the Chairperson of the National Assembly Standing committee on security
and defence, 6 August 2008.
Ibid.
National civil society coalition for peace and control of the proliferation of small arms and
light weapons (CONASCIPAL), Civil society and security governance: Actes du premier
Forum de la société civile sur la gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali (CTB,
2008); Association des femmes pour les initiatives de paix (AFIP - Women’s association
for peace initiatives).
West African Action Network on Small Arms.
Paul Van Impe, resident representative, Speech ‘Coopération technique belge au Mali’, 1st
Civil society forum on security governance.
Zeïni Moulaye, Gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali.
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.
Malian expression for bribes.
Communication by the Inspector-General of police Mahamadou Niakaté, Chief Inspector
of the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Defence, during the first civil society forum
on security governance.
Interview with a police commander.