Chapter 5
Guinea
Dominique Bangoura
Introduction
Security sector governance (SSG) is not well known in Guinea because few
studies have been carried out on the concept. It is still a taboo subject
reserved for the military, the uniformed corps, or even the president of the
republic himself. The principal reasons for this lack of knowledge and
suspicion are political: they go back to the dictatorship of Sekou Toure, who
ruled the country with an iron fist from 1958 to 1984 and then the
authoritarian military regime of General President Lansana Conté, from
1984 to 2008.
In order to understand current issues and challenges in this area a
review of the historical, political and geopolitical contexts of the sector is
required. This chapter therefore begins by providing a historical analysis of
developments in the Guinean security sector and how these have contributed
to the current state of SSG. It then focuses on issues of security sector
management and oversight. Finally, this chapter considers challenges to a
process of security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea before providing a brief
update on events since the time of writing of this chapter.
The military and security under Sekou Toure
Guinea has the singular honour of being the first and only Francophone West
African country to have claimed its independence on 2 October 1958, after
the historic ‘No’ in the 28 September referendum proposed by General de
Gaulle. In marking the break with France, President Sekou Toure declared at
the time: ‘It is better to live free in poverty than enslaved in opulence’.1
Influenced by socialism, he turned to the Soviet bloc to make up for the
departure of the former colonial authority
From that time, Sekou Toure established a government of absolute
power and an extremely repressive police regime. The system was based on
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the single party, the Parti démocratique de Guinée (PDG) which was
supposed to represent a united front against imperialist ambitions and also
work for national unity and state construction. According to Siradiou Diallo,
the party, which was designed as the steering body, the driving force and the
instrument for controlling national life, was placed at the top of the pyramid
of government. All other institutions, including the army and the militia,
were subordinate to the party and only represented organs of
implementation, instruments in the service of the party, which was the
cornerstone, the heart and the brain from which all parts of the social body
were irradiated and around which the life of the country gravitated.2 Thus,
the PDG was named the party-state, in line with its totalitarian and
omnipresent nature.
Sekou Toure used the party and the police system to influence
people's minds, keep citizens under surveillance and sow the seeds of fear
and terror. The country turned inwards, obliging thousands of opponents and
intellectuals to seek exile in neighbouring countries or in the West, while the
general population suffered from shortages.
During this period of dictatorship, the military remained strongly
linked to the political apparatus: following the model of ‘militants in
uniform’ which was common in socialist countries and was adopted by
Sekou Toure, the military became subordinate to the PDG. The president
mistrusted the army and decided not to provide it with the means of acting
beyond simply defending his regime, while also making sure that soldiers
lived in miserable conditions. The Guinean leader set up political
committees called military unity committees, thus reproducing within each
army unit the organisational structure of the party. These political bodies
were in competition with the military chain of command. The excessive
politicisation of the army led to indiscipline because on the basis of politics,
any soldier could question orders from a superior officer, or even humiliate
such an officer.
Sekou Toure himself was paranoid about his own security and
constantly denounced often imaginary plots supposedly organised from
outside with the support of foreign powers. The military like the rest of the
population were often victims of purges, leading to bloodshed. The
following may be cited among the victims in the military: Major Keita
Mamoudou, executed in 1965 during the so-called ‘traders’ conspiracy;
Colonel Kaman Diaby, deputy army chief of staff and dozens of his
companions, executed in 1969 as part of the Fodeba Keita ‘affair’; General
Keita Noumandian, joint army chief of staff; Colonel Diallo Mamadou;
Majors Barry Siradiou, Camara Diouma and Zoumanigui Kékoura, executed
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in 1971 during what was described as the ‘plot’ by ‘the imperialist and nazi
SS fifth column’ and Captain Lamine Kouyaté and Lieutenant Diallo
Assane, who were arrested in 1976 during the ‘Peulh conspiracy’ and died of
starvation at camp Boiro at the same time as Diallo Telli, former secretary
general of the Organisation of African Unity. In 1977, the death of the latter
while in prison led to strong reactions in the international community and
showed a clear picture of the harsh reality of this country.
The People's militia was established by Sekou Toure as his ultimate
protective shield, to provide close security. It also served as a deterrent force
for the military. Its mission was to maintain law and order alongside the
police, but in reality it was in charge of keeping watch over the military and
the population. Police officers, gendarmes, soldiers and civilians were
frequently victims of acts of violence committed by this political force.
Members of the militia were from the poorer social categories and were sent
to Cuba for training. Well trained and armed, they came back with the rank
of officer and in turn trained young recruits at the Kwame Nkrumah camp.
Towards the end of his life, Sekou Toure’s militia was a counterbalance to
the military in terms of numbers: 10,000 men on either side. However, the
militia was better endowed in all ways.
Sekou Toure died suddenly on 26 March 1984, leaving a country that
was totally drained, with the prisons full, hundreds of victims who had died
under torture and countless disappeared. The military, represented by
Lansana Conté, took over power a week later on 3 April 1984.
The military and security under Lansana Conté
Lansana Conté, who was the embodiment of the loyalty that Sekou Toure
had been seeking, took over the leadership of the Military Committee for
National Recovery (CMRN). This was the start of a new era for relations
between civilians and the military since the country was no longer run by a
civilian but by a soldier with combat experience. Indeed, Colonel Lansana
Conté had served in the colonial army in Algeria. When Guinea attained
independence, he came back home and had been slowly climbing up the
ranks of the military hierarchy. Having held the rank of deputy joint army
chief of staff for several years, he was chosen from among his peers to take
over leadership of the country. Apart from the fact that this put an end to
civilian control of the military, the period that started with the new leader of
the country was in many ways similar to the former regime in terms of
governance.
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There are three distinct periods in Lansana Conté’s regime.3 The first
of these, the exceptional regime, started on 3 April 1984 and ran to 23
December 1990. The CMRN banned the single party, dissolved political
institutions and suspended the 1982 Constitution. Between 1984 and 1990,
no institutional reforms were implemented. Power was in the hands of the
president and the CMRN and most decisions were taken by presidential
decree. The president appointed a prime minister in the person of Colonel
Diarra Traore, who had helped him take over power. However, following a
crisis of confidence between the two men the head of state abolished this
position. Feeling disgraced, Diarra Traore attempted a coup in July 1985. He
failed and was executed.
The second period marks the establishment of the democratic process
and lasted from December 1990 to the end of 1995. Under the pressure of
protest movements by school pupils and students, trade unions and political
groupings, the country on 23 December 1990 adopted by referendum a new
constitution introducing a multi-party system and respect of human rights
and public freedoms. The democratic process was put in place, but the
opposition was unable to impose the organisation of a national conference
similar to other African Francophone countries. Although political
liberalisation had occurred, it was solidly controlled by the existing regime.
The first presidential and legislative elections took place in 1993 and 1995:
Lansana Conté and his party, the Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès (PUP) won
those elections, but the results were highly disputed because of the lack of
transparency and the occurrence of many irregularities.
The third period, from 1996, marks the return of authoritarianism. It
has been accompanied by lasting political violence in the country. In
February 1996, the regime of Lansana Conté was threatened by a mutiny that
broke out within the army for corporatist reasons. To save his own life and
avoid a coup d’état, the general gave in to all the demands. This grave crisis
ended in a bloody repression within the army. A brief period of political
calm appeared possible with the appointment of a technocrat, Sydia Toure,
as prime minister with the task of giving the national economy a new start.
The truce was however broken just before the presidential elections in 1998
when Alpha Conde, a member of the National Assembly and one of the
principal opposition leaders was illegally arrested and imprisoned.4
Insecurity in the sub-regions
After various incidents of internal protest both on the part of the military and
civilian forces, the regime was further weakened in 2000-2001 by a rebellion
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in the southern part of the territory.5 In addition to the erosion of power and
Guinea's isolation on the sub-regional scene, the regime was further
destabilised by armed groups linked to the rebels in Liberia and Sierra
Leone. Lansana Conté, who at the beginning of the 1990s had sent Guinean
contingents to join the ECOMOG troops to fight the rebellion by Charles
Taylor and his allies, now suffered the effects of his past political choices.
The regime nevertheless resisted and attempted to counter the attacks by
strengthening its military capacity and responding.
Issues and challenges
To sum up, ever since independence in 1958, Guinea has constantly
experienced political violence. After Sekou Toure's dictatorship, Lansana
Conté's authoritarianism led to a deep and generalised political, social,
economic, as well as military crisis. The country has never had the
possibility of holding free or credible and transparent elections, be they
presidential, legislative or local. In November 2001 the government
hardened its stance by adopting by referendum a constitutional amendment
abolishing the limitation on terms of office. Lansana Conté could therefore
stand for election in December 2003, December 2010 and so on.
Guinea certainly is endowed with enormous human and material
resources. But under what conditions can the country flourish? Is it possible
to envisage another form of governance, a new conception of power and
government, a republican army and security forces that respect human
rights? Is it possible to envisage security sector reform?
In 2006 and 2007, for the first time in the history of the country, civil
society, in particular trade unions, decided to fight en masse against the
deterioration of the living and working conditions of the general population.
Three major strike movements took place on the initiative of the main trade
union federations: from 27 February to 3 March 2006, from 8 to 16 June
2006 and from 10 to 27 January 2007. The leitmotiv during the strikes, the
demonstrations and the ‘dead city’ operations was a constant call for change.
Guineans fought to bring about social and political change. They paid
a high price, in bloodshed, to achieve this. The repression by the armed and
security forces against the youth was extremely violent. And yet, the right to
join a trade union, the right to go on strike and the right to resist oppression
are enshrined in the constitution under articles 18 and 19. After bitter
negotiations, the last strike led to the tripartite agreements of 27 January
2007, which were signed by trade unions, employers and government.
However, despite the appointment of a ‘consensus’ prime minister in the
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person of Lansana Kouyate following pressure from trade unions and civil
society, no change was obtained because state institutions (national
assembly, supreme court, government and the old military guard) put up
resistance and the opposition political parties gave in. The long awaited
change did not come about after Lansana Conté either. In violation of the
2007 agreements, the latter removed Lansana Kouyate from office on 20
May 2008 and appointed a loyal follower, Ahmed Tidiane Souare, in his
place. How then can one expect a peaceful and democratic future for this
country? How can one imagine the role of the armed and security forces in
these conditions?
The security apparatus and its environment
The security forces comprise the military, law enforcement and the
intelligence services.
The Guinean army was set up on 1 November 1958 with volunteers
from the colonial army who arrived from units based in France, Indochina,
the French Sudan (Senegal-Mali), Madagascar, Dahomey, Syria, Algeria and
Morocco.6 At the time France did not hesitate to destroy archives, heavy and
light weapons, equipment and buildings, rather than transfer them or even
make its military camps available to the new national army.7
Under Sekou Toure, the military was deprived of resources, training
and equipment; some of its non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers
were trained in eastern bloc countries and Cuba where they were provided
with Soviet equipment. As the victim of many purges, the military remained
traumatised, poorly organised and poorly managed.
Under Lansana Conté, the Guinean military comprised about 14,000
men. It is made up of the army, the air force, the navy and the gendarmerie.8
In theory, the mission of the military is to defend territorial integrity,
contribute to internal security and contribute to peacekeeping in the subregion and throughout the world. To this end, it takes part in operations
within the framework of the appropriate sub-regional and international
organisations (ECOWAS, UN, etc.). There is a two year military service
system.
The army represents the largest component of the Guinean military
forces. It is 9,700-man strong and has two types of units; the territorial units
situated in each of the four military regions (Kindia, Labé, Kankan and
N’Zérékoré) and the specialised autonomous units in the special zone of
Conakry. These are the independent battalion of airborne troops, the
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armoured battalion, the presidential security battalion and the Conakry
security battalion. The most famous specialised units are the presidential
guard,9 made up of the ‘red berets’ which are under the authority of the
president and the chief of joint staff and are based at the presidency, as well
as the Rangers, an elite battalion trained by the Americans at the high point
of the war against Charles Taylor. The army is equipped with heavy and
light tanks (T34), rocket launchers (Stalin organs), machine gun carriers,
towed guns and armoured cars.
The navy (400 men) provides surveillance of territorial waters and the
exclusive economic zone, participates in defending the Guinean coasts and
controlling maritime smuggling, as well as providing maritime police
services. It has a general staff and two buildings for ground forces (marines
and coast artillery defence). The coastline is divided into four maritime
operational regions (Conakry, Benty, Boffa and Kamsar).
The air force (800 men) guarantees air space security, provides
coverage and support to ground troops and participates in operational
defence of the territory, as well as international missions. The principal air
force base is in Conakry, with secondary bases in the interior. It owns Soviet
transport and fighter planes, but is currently poorly equipped and only has
two helicopters purchased from Ukraine.10 It has taken part in a number of
external operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
The gendarmerie was also set up in 1958. Officially, it is in charge of
ensuring public security, maintaining law and order and enforcing laws and
protecting individuals and their property. In its operations, it is under the
authority of the joint army chief of staff and is headed by a colonel. The
gendarmerie falls under the responsibility of the ministry of national
defence. It comprises two subdivisions: the territorial gendarmerie, spread
out in brigades in the interior of the country and the mobile gendarmerie,
which is made up of three operational squadrons stationed in Conakry. Like
the other army corps, it has participated in peacekeeping operations in
Africa. It is under the command of a colonel, the chief of staff. It is made up
of about 2,500 men.
Training for the Guinean army is provided by the Joint Forces
Military Academy (EMIA) in Conakry. The EMIA is the national officers’
academy, which is located at Camp Alpha Yaya Diallo, 15 km from the city
centre. Between 1961 and 1965 three classes were trained, including
Lansana Conté and the principal military leaders of the country. It was
closed down in 1965 and was only able to open once again in 1994 with the
assistance of French military cooperation. The initial training cycle lasts for
three years, with courses in both general and military subjects. Admission to
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the EMIA is through a competitive exam for candidates holding a certificate
validating 2 years of university education.
In addition to the armed forces there are other security forces in
Guinea, such as the national police force and in particular its mobile
intervention and security company (CMIS), as well as the intelligence
services, which fall under the authority of the ministry of security.
Military cooperation with France and the United States
After the break with France in 1958, Guinea fell into the ideological and
strategic camp of the eastern bloc countries and their allies. It was not until
diplomatic relations were effectively restored in 1976 and indeed until 17
April 1985, that a military cooperation agreement could be signed between
Conakry and Paris. Since then, the French military cooperation mission has
been involved in several projects to support schools, logistics, transmission,
the gendarmerie and military health. In 2005, considerable efforts were
undertaken to train trainers. Guinea also requested French support for
projects to open the national NCOs Academy at Maneah, as well as the
national signals school.11
Starting from 1999, when relations between the (socialist) French
government and Guinea had deteriorated following the Alpha Conde case,
President Lansana Conté sought to develop military cooperation with
increased support from the United States. Conakry and Washington had
worked together to fight against the ex-rebel Charles Taylor.
Starting in September 2000, incursions by Liberian and Sierra
Leonean rebels provided a new opportunity for the Guinean military to
rearm its troops, diversify its weaponry, increase its numbers and modernise
its equipment. The country called on France and the United States, which
came to its assistance. Guinea nevertheless continued to maintain close
relations with its former allies Russia and Ukraine. The defence budget
increased significantly, but its management was shrouded in secrecy. By the
end of the first quarter of 2001, Lansana Conté had overcome these armed
attacks and emerged strengthened from this ordeal. He made clever use of
the feeling of national unity.
Nevertheless, neither the opposition political parties nor the national
assembly demanded any accounts from the government. And yet,
independent sources of information as a counter balance to the propaganda
by the regime and a parliamentary enquiry might have shed light on the
circumstances surrounding the numerous losses of human lives among the
young volunteers sent to the front. One example is the case of a local militia
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made up of more than 2000 young people, for the most part unemployed,
who were allegedly hastily enrolled in the Forecariah region and armed with
rifles; many of them never returned.12 Also, some oversight of military
spending might have made it possible to learn more about this period.13
Generally speaking, figures related to military spending and the
percentage of GNP or GDP allocated to defence are a carefully guarded
secret. Probably the only person who knows the truth is President Conté. He
has had control over the sector ever since taking over power in 1984 and it
has not been possible to have any form of transparency throughout his terms
of office.
Since the events of 2000-2001, defence and security cooperation with
external partners has been intensified both bilaterally (American
International Military Education and Training Programme, French
Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities Programme, etc.) and
multilaterally (European Union), in particular for military training and
exercises, capacity building for the government of Guinea and good
governance in these sectors.
A divided army
Although the army is the main pillar of the Lansana Conté regime, it is
undermined by its internal contradictions and divisions. It is often the theatre
of personal rivalries, generational conflict and ethnic tensions.
According to Mamadou Aliou Barry, there appear to be three groups
of officers that neutralise each other. The first group is made up of the older
generals, colonels and lieutenant-colonels who experienced the colonial
period and the Sekou Toure regime. They are from different ethnic groups
and due to their rivalry are incapable of deciding on any common action.
The second group is made up of subordinate officers who were promoted at
the time when the new regime took over power. They belong to the same
ethnic group as President Conté who knows that he can count on them. They
are seen as the undeserving beneficiaries of the regime's generosity.
Although their professionalism is often questioned, they nevertheless occupy
positions as prefect, sub prefect, or governor. The third group is made up of
young officers who have often been trained in the major military academies
of France, the United States or Morocco. They are from other ethnic groups
in the country, are viewed with suspicion by the regime and are not allowed
to advance in rank. Some have considered overthrowing the existing regime,
but they are closely watched, in particular by the second group. This
category was most affected by the waves of arrests in November 2003.14
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The military is thus paralysed by its mode of functioning. As is the
case for many African militaries,15 training and career development for
Guinean soldiers is not linked to their competence, since recruitment and
advancement are based on ethnic affiliation or allegiance to the existing
regime. Often assigned to protecting the existing regime whose discourse of
national unity is only an illusion, the military finds itself in a situation of
hidden crisis. The spirit of service to the republic that should exist in any
army is absent and patriotism, where it does exist, is more akin to a sense of
ethnic belonging.16
Finally, there are huge disparities within the military; whereas high
ranking officers who are closest to the circles of power enjoy great opulence,
the rank and file live in poverty. With the engagement of Guinean
contingents in the conflicts in Liberia (600 men), Sierra Leone (800) and
Guinea Bissau (200), soldiers were able to compare their living and working
conditions with those of other soldiers. The military suffered heavy losses.
This situation led to lasting frustration and discontent. This unease,
compounded by the impoverishment of the institution, was demonstrated
during the mutinies of 2 and 3 February 1996. Under the pressure of the
bombings, the president gave in to the demands of the mutineers. However,
he did not keep his promises and the issue of unpaid arrears in military
wages that was mentioned in the ‘Bulletin rouge’ still arises. Even worse,
General Lansana Conté carried out purges in the camps. Since then, the
corporatist demands of the soldiers are regularly brought up. These
movements sometimes take the form of mutinies (in particular in May 2007
and 2008), attempted coups (late 2003), rumoured coups (2006), or the
supposed imminent change of power or death of the president (2006). Each
time, demands are initially material, but soon move to the political domain.
And yet, in spite of all the problems, the military remains the most
privileged national entity. It enjoys the benevolent attention of the president
of the republic. While most of the country’s principal infrastructure is in
total decline, the military is benefiting from sustained efforts with the
support of French and American military cooperation. New recruits have
been taken on in recent years, whereas there have been no such recruitments
in the civil service. The military can purchase rice at unbeatable prices.
Compared to civilians, it enjoys numerous advantages.
If Lansana Conté has been able to escape unscathed after each military
threat and save his regime, it is because he is a master in the art of ‘divide
and rule’. What other explanation could there be for his longevity? Indeed,
he applied the same method to the political clans at the head of state (in
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particular in the presidency and in government), which are tearing each other
to pieces in an atmosphere reminiscent of the end of an era.
Indiscipline in the military and competition between the armed and security
forces
In this atmosphere of confusion, it is not surprising to note that in addition to
a flagrant lack of cooperation, there is strong competition among the
different armed and security forces in the country. Could there be
collaboration and coordination among these forces under such
circumstances? As illustrated by a number of events, this hardly seems
likely:
On 21 and 23 May 2008, discontented soldiers carried out acts of
violence and brutality similar to the earlier mutiny in May 2007, killing
many civilians outside their barracks. Demands included payment of arrears
in allowances and wages (the famous ‘Bulletin rouge’); amnesty for the
mutineers; freedom for their colleagues who had been detained since the
January 2007 events; promotions and a reduction in the price of rice. Shortly
before that, under the government of L. Kouyate, they had had to accept to
pay 60% of the market price for a bag of rice (as opposed to 10% in the
past). The first part of the arrears in allowances (1 million Guinean francs)
was paid at the beginning of 2008 and the second part (the same amount)
was paid after an agreement was signed with the ministry of defence, which
was to pay them a total of 7 million Guinean francs.
However, the delay in payment of the balance of 5 million for the
allowances promised led to dissatisfaction in several camps and ended with
the deputy army chief of staff, General Moussa Sampil being ‘taken hostage’
when he came to negotiate with the mutineers. During this protest
movement, which was led mainly from the Camp Alpha Yaya Diallo, the
spokesperson of the mutineers, Claude Pivi, alias ‘Coplan’ distinguished
himself with a display of indiscipline, disobedience to the military hierarchy
and disdain for the minister of defence.17
Once again, as in May 2007, in an attempt to end the crisis, president
Conté decided to sacrifice the second minister of defence in just one year,
General Baïlo Diallo,18 and removed him from office on 27 May 2008. And
as usual, he promised to pay the amounts demanded by the soldiers and free
those who had been held for a year on the island of Kassa, close to Conakry.
The measures taken by the head of state inspired the security forces.
On 16 June 2008, it was the turn of the police to follow the ‘example’ of the
military. Discontented policemen, who were demanding the payment of their
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allowances and their promotions,19 fired gunshots into the air and seized and
held several officers including the national director of police, Sekou
Mohamed Bangoura. Next, it was the turn of the customs service.
The military clamped down on the police protests, leading to
bloodshed. On 17 June, with the police protests continuing, the gendarmerie
was requisitioned to regulate traffic in the capital city. That morning,
military trucks from the Alpha Yaya Diallo camp in the suburbs of Conakry
were seen moving towards the city. A violent confrontation took place when
they arrived at the headquarters of CMIS, which had become the epicentre of
the police protest movement.20 This confrontation between the military and
the police led to about ten deaths and a number of seriously injured in both
camps. The soldiers wrecked the area and ransacked the premises.
On 27 June the police buried their dead. They were torn between
mourning and humiliation, while the army chief of staff only described the
acts as ‘unfortunate incidents’. Soon after he took up his position, the new
minister of security and civil protection, Mohamed Damba, appointed by A.
Tidiane Souare, took one of his first decisions and granted the promotions
demanded. The other points were to be negotiated.
These movements of protest and demand among the ranks of the
armed and security forces are further proof of the poor living and working
conditions of men in uniform; of the fact that rules on recruitment and
advancement are not applied and of indiscipline in the barracks. The general
public does not understand why these forces attacked the civilians that they
are supposed to protect and are shocked by such acts. They are convinced
that all Guineans share the same poor conditions. The citizens also counted
their dead and condemned the rapes and plundering. They could not
understand why all these forces did not join the trade unions and civil society
during the three major strike movements in 2006 and 2007, which had been
massively followed by the public, private and informal sectors. On the
contrary, at the time the military, the presidential guard and the police
engaged in a violent repression of demonstrators, in particular the youth. The
chasm between civilians and those in uniform therefore widened further
between 2006-2008.
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Security sector management and oversight
The constitutional framework
In Guinea, the 1990 constitution has never been revised to bring about
reform. On the contrary, several articles were amended by the November
2001 referendum, marking a regression in democratic terms since there are
no longer any limitations on the number of presidential terms of office, their
duration and the age of candidates. Due to the authoritarianism of the Conté
regime, this constitution which stipulated a presidential regime has
degenerated in practice into a regime where the president holds absolute
power. Under article 41 of the constitution, the president of the republic is
the guarantor of national independence and territorial integrity. He is
responsible for national defence. He presides over the higher council for
national defence. He is the head of the armed forces. He makes appointments
to all military positions. Anything related to defence is his responsibility.
This is why for many years (following the events of February 1996) he
jointly held the positions of head of state and minister of national defence. In
April 2007 when Lansana Kouyate formed his government and probably
also due to his age and ill health, President Conté ‘gave way’ to General
Arafan Camara. He personally chaired the handing over ceremony21 at the
Almamy Samory Touré camp.22 However, he removed General Arafan
Camara from office in May 2007 during the mutiny and replaced him with
General Baïlo Diallo.
Since the dismissal of Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate and the arrival
in the prime minister’s office of Ahmed Tidiane Souare, who is close to the
Conté regime, there has nevertheless been a major innovation; for the first
time, a civilian has been appointed minister of defence. His name is Almamy
Kabele Camara, an economist by training. Some military personnel who are
used to having one of their own in this position will probably find it difficult
to adapt to this change. The principle of subordination of the military to
civilian authority will be difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, in his inaugural
speech, the new minister tried to reassure them, indicating that he was ready
to listen. He announced a training and modernisation programme; recalled
the major principles to be respected, namely strict recruitment practices and
discipline in the ranks and spoke about the need for reconciliation between
civilians and the military.23 These initial remarks could make it appear that
reform of the armed forces is imminent; it must not be forgotten, however,
that the government is still under the leadership of Lansana Conté. And as
the latter has often recalled: ‘I am the boss, the others are subordinates’.24
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Indeed, no prime minister has ever been able to carry out the envisaged
reforms to term and all of them have been dismissed,25 with the notable
exception of François Lonseny Fall who resigned in April 200426 when the
head of state rejected his programme of economic and judicial reform.
Separation of powers
In Guinea, the democratic principle of separation of powers is enshrined in
the 1990 constitution. It is part of the presidential regime, which in theory
comprises four essential characteristics: 1) indivisibility of the executive
power, which is exercised and embodied by the head of state and president
of the republic, who is also the head of government under whose authority
ministers do not have any intrinsic autonomy; 2) election of the president of
the republic through direct universal suffrage, which grants him his
legitimacy; 3) mutual independence of the president and parliament; and 4)
independence of the judiciary. In principle, each branch of power carries out
its functions fully and does not intervene in the functions of the others.
In practice, however, these principles are not observed. First of all, the
head of state exercises the executive power absolutely; he appoints prime
ministers, (a function not stipulated in the constitution) who are thus easy to
dismiss. Even Lansana Kouyate, the only one to have been appointed prime
minister and head of government27 under pressure from trade unions and
civil society after the 27 January 2007 agreements, was dismissed in 2008.
Secondly, since Lansana Conté took over power, none of the elections held,
whether presidential (1993, 1998, 2003), legislative (1995, 2002) or local
(2000, 2005), have been free, credible and transparent. The same may be
said of the November 2001 constitutional referendum. All the results of
these elections have been disputed by opposition parties and by observers.
All the appeals brought before the courts have been rejected by the Supreme
Court whose president, Lamine Sidime (one of the authors of the 1990
constitution) is loyal to Lansana Conté. Thirdly, the national assembly is
dominated by the ruling PUP party and those affiliated with the president.
Fourthly, the president of the republic is the first to interfere in judicial
affairs. Proof of this was shown in December 2006 when Lansana Conté
went in person to free his friend Mamadou Sylla, the president of the
employers’ association, from prison where he was being held for corruption
and embezzlement of public funds. This forceful and intolerable act was the
straw that broke the camel’s back and trade unions and civil society
protested strongly, starting off the demonstrations that resulted in the events
of January-February 2007.
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Parliamentary and judicial oversight
Under such conditions, the principle of civilian democratic oversight or
oversight by the legislative or indeed the judicial power can hardly be
effective. In order to understand the position of the national assembly in the
Conté regime better, a few reminders are necessary. The parliamentary
elections that took place in 2002 brought about strong divisions in the
opposition and most opposition parties boycotted the elections, with the
exception of the Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau (UPR), the Union
pour le Progrès de la Guinée (UPG) and the Parti du Peuple de Guinée
(PPG). Officially, the UPR, led by Siradiou Diallo, obtained 20 seats (out of
114) and is represented in the National Assembly; the UPG, led by JeanMarie Dore, obtained 3 seats but refused to sit in protest while the PPG, led
by Pascal Tolno, failed to win any seats. The Rassemblement du Peuple
Guinéen (RPG), led by Alpha Conde, opted for the boycott, as did the Union
des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG), led by Mamadou Ba
(recently replaced by Cellou Dalein Diallo) and the Union des Forces
Républicaines (UFR), led by Sydia Toure. As a result they have no
representatives in the assembly.
Consequently, since 2002, only the UPG, led by Ousmane Bah has
had seats in the assembly alongside personalities of the regime. Furthermore,
the speaker of the national assembly is yet another Lansana Conté stalwart.
He is very unpopular in Guinea for having served both the Sekou Toure
regime and the current one. The term of office of members of the national
assembly ended in July 2007 and has been extended. The parliamentary
elections have already been postponed several times. The former prime
minister, Lansana Kouyate, seemed in no hurry to organise these elections
because having himself arrived at his position without the backing of a
political party, he feared being dismissed by the president after such a vote
and the election of a parliamentary majority.
One of the major achievements of this period was the adoption by
members of the national assembly of the law setting up the independent
national electoral commission (CENI) in May 2007. At the same time they
adopted three other laws governing the status of political parties, the
modalities for subsidies to be granted to such parties and amendments to the
electoral code. The text on the CENI nevertheless contains a number of
uncertainties and has led to strong concerns about the independence of this
commission vis-à-vis the government, in the electoral process.28 On several
occasions, the president of the commission, Ben Sekou Sylla, who is also the
head of the national council of civil society organisations (CNOSCG), has
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Dominique Bangoura
drawn attention to the functional and operational difficulties that plague this
fledgling institution.
It is also important to note the behaviour of the speaker of the national
assembly and the president of the Supreme Court during the time when the
president of the republic was ill. The head of state was suffering from
several serious diseases. He had been treated in Morocco and Cuba and was
transported urgently to Switzerland on two occasions in 2006. Terrible
rumours about his state of health circulated at different times. In addition to
the erosion of power after 24 years in office, Lansana Conté has become
very unpopular and Guineans came out onto the streets in 2006 and 2007 to
demand change in both the political and social spheres. In spite of this, he
was not ready to resign nor to retire (for him, a general does not retire; he
carries on to the end) and his term of office was supposed to run until
December 2010. In the face of this situation, which had worsened as a result
of the infighting at the summit of state, a series of contradictory decrees and
the deterioration of the living conditions of the population, the national
assembly and the Supreme Court remained totally passive. They did nothing
to implement article 34 of the constitution relating to a power vacuum,
which stipulates that following a death or resignation or any definitive cause,
this is noted by the Supreme Court on information by the speaker of the
national assembly. The heads of these two institutions were incapable of
declaring that there was a vacuum of power in spite of the pressure from the
street, the letter from trade unions29 and the appeals from several opposition
political parties, etc.30
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that in Guinea there is no
culture of free democratic debate within the national assembly, especially
with regard to defence and security issues. And yet, under the terms of the
constitution (article 59) and its own rules of procedure, the assembly passes
laws on defence, law enforcement, the status of the military, etc. It also
adopts the finance law (article 61) and the state budget (including the
‘Bulletin rouge’). Through its committee on defence, it may initiate
parliamentary enquiries or fact-finding missions. However, this control
remains limited and superficial. On 27 September 2006 at the start of the
legislative session, the speaker of the national assembly made a lengthy
speech looking at both past events and future prospects and indeed was quite
critical about the situation of the country. However, not once were the
expressions ‘armed forces’, ‘security forces’, or ‘defence’ ever pronounced
and no mention was made of reform in this sector although the speech was
supposed to review all the required reforms.31
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Now that the minister of defence is a civilian, maybe in future the
question and answer sessions between members of the national assembly and
competent ministers will be more open. Better results in the area of
parliamentary oversight may only however be possible after the next
parliamentary elections and the election of new members of the national
assembly with the arrival of several opposition parties, which are preparing
for this task.
There is another substantial issue that arises with relation to
parliamentary and judicial oversight in Guinea. This is the issue of the
investigations into the massacres of 2006 and 2007, which took place during
the repression by the armed and security forces against demonstrators.
International and regional organisations, as well as development partners
have all unanimously condemned these acts of violence and the summary
executions. Guinean and international human rights organisations have also
called for independent investigations.
According to eyewitness accounts of the events of June 2006, there
were more than 90 deaths and hundreds of seriously injured in particular
among the youth. An investigation report drafted by a group of Guinean
human rights NGOs and associations on the acts of violence perpetrated
between January and February 2007 speaks about 186 deaths, 1188 injured,
940 arrests followed by detention and torture, rape, plundering and
burning.32 Those who fired their guns were essentially from the presidential
guard, the gendarmerie and the mobile intervention and security company,
which is a part of the police force. Apart from the chief of staff General
Kerfalla Camara, who has passed away, those in charge of these forces are
still in their positions or have been transferred and are enjoying total
impunity. According to the International Crisis Group, the refusal to
recognise the seriousness of the crimes committed by the armed and security
forces is an indication of the enormous efforts that the national enquiry
commission will have to undertake to shed light on these events and set up
the necessary processes to bring those responsible to book.33
On 18 May 2007, the national assembly adopted a draft bill presented
by the Minister of Justice34 establishing an independent national enquiry
commission charged with investigating the massacres.35 The question is
whether this commission, which according to article 1 is required to
investigate the crimes, offences and serious human rights violations
committed during the strikes of June 2006 and January-February 2007, will
be able to do its work independently within the current context where the
judicial system has been undermined by corruption and its close ties to
government.36 The commission is made up of 19 members, mostly judges
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Dominique Bangoura
and lawyers, who were appointed on 21 September 2007 by decree of Prime
Minister Lansana Kouyate37 and swore an oath of office on 31 December
before the court of appeal of Conakry. However, three months later, the
commission still had neither premises nor means of functioning. In addition,
some Guinean associations have appealed to the International Criminal
Court. The question is to determine whether this court has competence.38
Finally, further light has to be shed on the role of the national
assembly. On 12 February 2007, at the height of the crisis, President Conté
declared a state of siege for twelve days,39 under the terms of article 74 of
the constitution and after consultations with the speaker of the national
assembly and the president of the Supreme Court. The powers of
maintaining law and order that are normally attributed to the civilian
authority were thus conferred on the military authority. Fundamental
freedoms were suspended, a curfew was imposed throughout the national
territory and armoured cars took up positions in the streets of Conakry. On
23 February, the state of siege was either to be cancelled or extended by the
national assembly. President Conté therefore turned to the national assembly.
Quite unexpectedly, the latter decided not to extend the state of siege. This
was a great relief for the citizens of Guinea. Observers have wondered what
could have led to this decision. It is most likely that assembly members from
the PUP and affiliates of the presidential movement feared the repercussions
from an angry population in neighbourhoods and within the country.
Challenges of security sector reform
There has been some little progress in the area of defence and security, but
this still remains well below the expectations of the population. There is no
need to recall that the general population are victims of violence and crime,
not to mention deplorable living conditions (soaring inflation,
unemployment, social insecurity and lack of running water and electricity).
The challenges facing them are accordingly enormous. First among
these is to set up a culture of democracy and observance of all manner of
established rules, starting with the constitution. Such a culture inevitably
requires education, training and excellence. These are almost vain words in
Guinea where on the one hand, the adult literacy rate does not exceed 40%
and only one out of two children is enrolled in school and on the other hand,
students each year demand better living and study conditions.40 One of the
after effects of Sekou Toure's dictatorship and the obscurantism under
Lansana Conté has been that the elite has been decimated and that anybody
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can now set themselves up as specialists without any real competence;
anything can be ‘fiddled with’ due to the lack of professionalism and a wide
spread practice of ‘wangling it’. A demonstration of this was given during
the negotiations for the 27 January 2007 agreement. In January, it appeared
clear that the current proposals could not produce the expected results
because they were still oriented towards a continuation of the Lansana Conté
regime and the post of prime minister was still not enshrined in the
constitution.41 And yet most of the discussion focused on setting up a broad
consensus government under the leadership of a prime minister as head of
government.42 Among other things a constitutional amendment would have
been necessary to guarantee this new institution. Although the balance of
power remained in favour of the presidential camp, for the first time ever,
civil society, in particular the CNOSCG and trade union federations had an
enormous capacity to mobilise and undertake action. Indeed, the latter had
moved from the field of labour demands into the field of politics, with the
demand for change.
It must be added that during this period, Guinea was deprived of the
committed support of the international community which had adopted a wait
and see attitude and was monitoring the situation from a distance, whereas a
few months later, in January 2008, the international community had not
hesitated to give a mandate on behalf of the African Union to the former
secretary general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, to go to the rescue of
Kenya, which was wracked by post-electoral violence. One of the principal
acts undertaken by this experienced mediator in Nairobi was to have the post
of prime minister included in the constitution.
Reform of the armed and security forces cannot take place without a
reform of government and another conception of power. It is clear that no
change is possible without democratic rule of law and a legitimate and
accountable government.
The most plausible future scenarios are those of a military government
or a joint government.43 Among the former, there are three possible types of
coups d'état: conservative, redemptive and by filiation. Among the second
type one could envisage a civil-military transition after a civil-military
putsch, with the possibility of an alliance between the speaker of the national
assembly as interim head and the military. Any of these cases of a forceful
takeover of power would represent a threat to the reestablishment of
democratic process after Conté. Any de facto power is by definition antidemocratic and the political history of Africa since independence has shown
that when the military takeover power it is never easy to ask them to step
down and hand over power to civilians. Other scenarios (insurrection,
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rebellion) are not reassuring either, but they must not be neglected.
Furthermore, the authorities have always prevented the possibility of a
sovereign national conference similar to what was held in Benin, which
would lead to a political transition and new institutions.
Finally, the scenario of a negotiated constitutional transition seems to
be the ideal, because it includes observance of constitutional provisions
(civilian) in case of a vacuum of power, while at the same time limiting the
powers of the interim president for the benefit of a transition prime minister
who would organise free, credible and transparent presidential elections
because he himself would not be a candidate. Such a transition scheme could
provide sufficient guarantees for obtaining a democratic electoral process. It
should include a review of the constitution in order to restore the articles
amended in November 2001; enshrine the post of prime minister in the
constitution; limit the powers of the interim president; extend the duration of
the interim period; and amend article 26 on the monopoly of political parties
in order to make it possible to renew and rejuvenate the political class
through the presence of independent candidates. This revision could take
place after a tripartite national dialogue involving all groups, which would
identify a national consensus on the transition after open debate and
negotiation.44
One of the means of preparing political and institutional reforms,
including reforms of the defence and security sectors, is to organise a
platform bringing together all the living forces of the country: civil society,
government institutions and political parties. An open national dialogue
established within a permanent framework appears to be a constructive and
lasting means for preparing the future of the country. Such a tripartite
dialogue does not yet exist in Guinea. To date there have only been episodes
of bipartite dialogue between government and political parties prior to
elections; or between political parties and civil society during the national
consultation (March 2006); or between trade unions and government
institutions (strikes in 2006-2007), but all three groups have never been
brought together at the same time.
And yet, the democratic process cannot begin without interaction
among all these stakeholders. This is why after the withdrawal of opposition
political parties in 2006-2007, their re-emergence on the political scene in
2008 is noteworthy. The new prime minister, Souaré, invited the opposition
to join his government, an unprecedented occurrence under Lansana Conté.
While the RPG opposed this idea in principle and the UFR declined because
the conditions were not favourable, the UPR, the UFDG and the UPG
accepted the offer. Mr. Bah Oury (UFDG) was assigned the very important
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sector of ‘national reconciliation’. This is a first in Guinea, where there has
never been any official mention of these two words; the truth about the
crimes and massacres committed by the authorities from 1958 to date has
never been revealed. Although there have been some improvements, we
must not forget that, once again, the Lansana Conté regime remains in place.
Any real change or reform is therefore unlikely and subject to caution.
The idea of a national dialogue is growing. It made progress starting
from the national consultation in March 2006 and the setting up of a joint
monitoring committee. The 27 January 2007 agreement also led to the
establishment of a monitoring and evaluation committee. In addition, there
has been a start to civil-military dialogue since 2005 with a number of
analysis and discussion meetings being organised and held with the support
of development partners.45 Furthermore, in 2006 and at the beginning of
2007, meetings were held between the army general chief of staff and the
minister of security, with their respective departments. A meeting was also
organised between the armed and security forces and the media from 11 to
13 June 2007.46 Finally, between April and July 2008 a series of public
consultations took place in the four natural regions of Guinea as well as
within the communes of Conakry. The idea is to promote national dialogue
starting from the grassroots and to discuss all issues of concern to citizens.
Conclusion
The defence and security sectors in Guinea have been plagued with
enormous difficulties since 1958. These are linked to the illegitimate use of
power and the serious dysfunctions of the government. Credible reforms and
the change for which some Guineans have sacrificed their lives cannot come
about without a change of the political regime. The dismissal of the former
prime minister, L. Kouyate, in May 2008 only strengthened the power of
President Conté, but there were no protests against this forceful act from
civil society47 or trade unions48 and much less from opposition political
parties.49
More than ever before, Guinea needs an open national dialogue to
manage the post-Conté period. All internal and external efforts must urgently
converge towards organising and holding such a forum, which is the only
way to avoid another bloodbath. It is also important to prepare the electoral
process in the best possible conditions: both the parliamentary elections that
should have taken place at the end of the term of office of members of the
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Dominique Bangoura
national assembly in July 2007 and the presidential elections, which raise
several crucial issues.
Reform of the military and security sector is therefore not really on the
agenda for Guinea. It is in a stalemate. The same applies to the system of
justice, for similar political reasons. In the meantime, some hard work has to
be done to enable all civilian, political, military and security forces in the
country to come together, speak to each other, listen to each other and have
an open debate. This is possible and has already got off to a timid start. The
effort must be sustained. Failing that, the existing bad situation will become
even worse.
Epilogue (1): December 2008 – August 2009
During the night of 22 December 2008, the announcement of the death of
President Lansana Conté on national television sounded the knell on an
authoritarian regime that had been in power for twenty four years. In the
very early hours of the next day, a military junta led by Captain Moussa
Dadis Camara seized power by force, putting an end to any attempts at a
constitutional transition.50 The very first communiqué51 that was read out on
radio and repeated throughout the day against a backdrop of military music
announced that the National Council for Development and Democracy
(CNDD) had effectively taken over power; suspending the constitution, the
government and other state institutions, as well as political and trade union
activity. On 24 December, Captain Camara took over the leadership of the
CNDD and proclaimed himself president of the republic. A page of the
political history of Guinea had just been turned and a new transition has
started.
The questions that arise are the following: what is the nature of this
putsch? Is it conservative or redemptive? As the new commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, will Moussa Dadis Camara be able to undertake security
sector reform? Would this be the right time in the new political context?
What is the future of SSR in Guinea? Three elements could help to answer
these questions:
1. In principle, Moussa Dadis Camara is in favour of reform
As has been proven by the recent events in Guinea, Captain Camara was
nothing like Amadou Toumani Toure, his actions being similar to those of
former regimes. In several interviews, he referred to his links to the late
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president, the respect that he had for General Lansana Conté and the fact that
this was the reason why he did not attempt to take his place earlier. His coup
d'état was therefore a conservative one.
Nevertheless, Captain Camara is aware of the serious divisions that
exist within the military and the defects that are increasingly difficult to deal
with and to tackle. He has inside knowledge of its limitations and is aware of
the negative image the population has had of men in uniform since the
bloody repression of 2006-2007.With his friend Claude Pivi, he participated
in the damaging events and repeated mutinies that have rocked Guinea in
recent years. He knew that his power was not yet stable. For all these
reasons, he believed that reforms were necessary and did not hesitate to state
this publicly.52
2. Political limitations
Dadis Camara entrusted to a loyal follower, General Sekouba Konaté, the
minister of defence, the task of touring all military barracks starting from
January 2009 to demand discipline and obedience to the hierarchy,53 as well
as respect for all citizens in the neighbourhoods and an end to acts of
violence. This did not prevent repetitions54 of such acts and new blunders, in
particular with members of the presidential guard assaulting General Toto
Camara, the minister of security and an influential member of the CNDD
when he entered Camp Alpha Yaya on the night of 21 July. Elsewhere, the
captain made a public apology to the police for the deaths of June 2008.
Security sector reform needs to be tackled using a comprehensive and
integrated approach. But when should it start? It requires considerable
resources for reorganising, demobilising a part of the troops, education,
training, equipment and practical training for the armed security forces. It
has to go hand-in-hand with reform of the system of justice and special
services. However, looking at the way in which Dadis Camara has been
exercising power ever since he took over, in particular maintaining the
exceptional regime, concentrating all powers (executive, legislative and
judiciary) in his own hands, the lack of effective transition institutions
(prime minister, government, parliament), as well as his daily turnabouts, it
was doubtful that this reform would be introduced in 2009.
Let us not forget the concerns about the fate of officers who were
detained and transferred to Kassa Island, far from sight and with no contact
to their families.55 Finally, the national commission of enquiry on the 20062007 massacres is still ineffective.
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Dominique Bangoura
3. Support to the junta
Dadis Camara restated his desire to carry out military reform during a visit to
Conakry by the International Contact Group on Guinea on 16 and 17 July
2009. At the end of the meeting, the African Union commissioner for peace
and security, Ramtane Lamamra stated: ‘We warmly welcome the request of
the Guinean government with regard to the need to reform the military. We
shall undertake to satisfy this request in the very near future, with the United
Nations.’
What is most important for the transition period is that it should lead
to free, credible and transparent presidential elections which will make it
possible to elect a new civilian leader who will bring about change in Guinea
for the first time since independence in 1958.
Support to the junta for this purpose will strengthen the transition. In
order for the CNDD and the armed forces to accept to hand over power, a
number of measures have to be taken to improve the living and working
conditions of soldiers and officers, while also guaranteeing a better future for
high-ranking officers and generals in power or close to the power structure.
Ideally, SSR as a whole whould have been implemented by a civilian
president of the republic elected during free, transparent and uncontested
elections. However, tragic events marked the ascendance to power of the
CNDD and led to a very different transition than the one that even the most
experienced observers of Guinean politics or Guineans themselves could
have anticipated; neither was it the transition Dadis Camara had planned.
Epilogue (2): September 2009 – May 2010
In September 2009, it became evident that the leader of the junta was
determined to run for president at the upcoming elections organised by the
transition regime, despite having promised to step back from power once the
transition was completed. To protest against Dadis Camara’s plans, which
were viewed with great concern by both national and international actors, a
rally was organised by his opponents on 28 September. Dadis Camara
perceived this manifestation as a challenge to the junta’s power and a
personal attack. The intervention by the armed and security forces against
the participants of the rally led to a blood bath. At least 157 people were
killed, hundreds wounded and dozens of women raped. This tragedy
provided irrefutable proof of the severe dysfunctions in the armed and
security forces of Guinea and the urgent need to reform them.
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119
While Captain Dadis Camara and his regime were doing everything
they could to justify themselves, limit the damage done and avoid
responsibility for what had happened, an assassination attempt was
committed against the leader of the junta by the head of the presidential
guard. Camara required hospitalisation and had to radically rethink the
junta’s strategy, especially with regard to its most influential members.
On 15 January 2010, the Declaration of Ouagadougou was signed
between Captain Dadis Camara, who had been significantly weakened by the
assassination attempt that almost cost him his life, the General Sékouba
Konaté, his deputy within the Junta, as well as the Burkinabe President
Blaise Compaoré, who had been selected by ECOWAS as a mediator in the
Guinean crisis. Under its third point, the Ouagadougou Declaration made
provisions to reorganise and reform of the armed and security forces, in
addition to fixing a transition period of six months. This declaration opened
a window of opportunity for Guinea to finally engage in the crucial reform
of its defence and security institutions.
Immediately after the signing of the document and at the invitation of
the then Government of Guinea, a joint mission of ECOWAS, the African
Union and the United Nations, directed by the retired Senegalese General
Lamine Cissé, set off on an evaluation mission to evaluate the possibilities
for reform of the security sector in Guinea. An inclusive process of
evaluation of the security sector followed, in which many Guinean
stakeholders took part, including civil society from all parts of the country.
At their insistence, the mission was later extended to include representatives
from the European Union, the Organisation Internationale de la
Francophonie and the United States. The mission report was handed over to
the interim Head of State and Minister of Defence, General Sékouba Konaté,
on 4 May 2010.
The joint mission has undoubtedly contributed to significantly
improving civilian-military relations and increasing acceptance of security
sector reform and governance in Guinea. What remains to be seen is whether
the recommendations it made with regard to all aspects of the security sector
will be put into practice. The political stalemate in which the political
transition is currently finding itself has certainly delayed the implementation
of the necessary first steps. However, the mistakes made with regard to the
political transition should underline the necessity to push forward the SSR
process. This would relieve some of the pressure the armed forces are under
in the current situation and help prevent it from further degenerating as has
been the case in Niger.
Dominique Bangoura
120
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Sekou Toure, speech on the occasion of General de Gaulle’s visit, Conakry, 25 August
1958.
Siradiou Diallo, ‘Les relations entre l’armée, l’Etat et le parti, et le problème des forces
civiles (milice, parti)’ in Les armées africaines, ed. Dominique Bangoura, 111-117 (Paris:
Economica, 1986).
On these three periods, see Dominique Bangoura, Guinée: L’alternance politique à l’issue
des élections présidentielles de décembre 2003 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 29-33.
Under the terms of Article 52 of the Constitution, the candidate Alpha Conde enjoyed
immunity as Member of the National Assembly.
Dominique Bangoura, ‘La Guinée face aux rébellions au sud de son territoire’ Afrique
contemporaine, no. 200 (October-December 2001): 17-33.
‘Aperçu historique sur les forces armées guinéennes’ Horoya, 20 December, 1993 and 31
December, 1993).
Keite Fedoba, speech of Keite Fodeba as new Minister of Defence, cited in Horaya, 1
November 1961.
Pascal Boniface, ed., L’Année stratégique 2005 (Paris: IRIS & A. Colin, 2005), 434.
Major Mounie Donzo is the commander of the presidential security battalion. Recruits to
this special unit are usually from President Conté’s ethnic group, the Soussous.
Ministry of Defence, Republic of Guinea (April 2003).
Frères d’armes, no. 247. Direction de la Coopération militaire et de défense - Dossier
Guinée. Available at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr
‘Guinée’, Le Monde, 6 October 2000; ‘Guinée: une semaine meurtrière le long des
frontières du Sud’, Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, 6 October 2000.
‘La Guinée est déstabilisée par les conflits voisins’ La Croix, 15 February 2001. Another
source indicates that military spending increased from 50 to 70 billion Guinean francs
between September and December 2001 and that the 2001 budget stipulated an amount of
100 billion Guinean francs (about 400 million FF), according to Les Echos de Conakry,
no. 28/01 (Conakry: Ambassy of France), 2.
Mamadou Aliou Barry, ‘L’armée face aux défis démocratiques et au changement’ in
Enjeux et défis démocratiques en Guinée (février 2007–décembre 2010), eds. Dominique
Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, 31-94 (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2007).
Dominique Bangoura, Les armées africaines (1960-1990) (Paris: La Documentation
française, 1992).
Mamadou Aliou Barry, ‘Quelle va être la position de l’armée?’ in Guinée: L’alternance
politique à l’issue des élections présidentielles de décembre 2003, ed. Dominique
Bangoura, 53-55 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004).
Interview with CWO Claude Pivi, spokesperson of the mutineers: ‘Quiconque m’attaque
aura perdu…’, Guineenews, 6 May 2008. Available at: www.guineenews.org
See also Aboubacar Sakho, ‘Bruits de bottes dans nos garnisons: Ce n’est pas fini!’ Dixit
Claude Pivi, L’Observateur, 7 June 2008.
General Baïlo Diallo was appointed Minister of Defence to replace General Arafan
Camara, former Deputy Army Chief of Staff, following the May 2007 mutiny.
The platform of demands drafted by the police mediation commission included twelve
points: liberation of police officers, promotions, supply of rice, cancellation of deductions
on salaries, recruitment of 6705 additional police agents, appointment of a serving police
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officer as director general, continued training and equipment, recall of the class of 2003,
training to be initiated for applicants who had passed the exam, cancellation of arbitrary
transfers of those who had participated in the strike, and no sanctions against striking
police agents.
Interview with second lieutenant Alphonse Saa, ‘If the police attempt to detect the secrets
of the military, we will demonstrate our striking force’, Guineenews, 23 June 2008.
Available at: www.guineenews.org. Second lieutenant Alphonse Saa belonged to the
Conakry special battalion on duty at camp Alpha Yaya Diallo and was charged by his
peers to carry out the operations and instructions of the military demand movement.
Lansana Conté, speech at camp Almamy Samory Toure, 5 April 2007: ‘I have held too
many positions for too long: President of the Republic, Chief of Staff, Minister of
Defence. I am now reducing them. I am reducing them to try other people. From this day,
you now have a different Minister of Defence… I am appointing General Arafan in my
place. The longest serving officer remains as Army Chief of Staff that is General
Kerfalla…’ Speech reproduced by Ibrahima Sylla, 7 April 2007. Available at
www.guineeconakry.info
Camp Samory Toure is the headquarters of the Army General Chief of Staff and the
private residence of President Conté.
Almamy Kabele Camara, the new Minister of Defence, speech at Camp Samory Toure, 24
June 2008: ‘I shall endeavour to develop respect for the concept of discipline…’,
Guineenews, 25 juin 2008. Available at www.guineenews.org. See also Maséco Conde,
‘Le nouveau ministre de la Défense Kabélé accueilli dans l’enthousiasme’, Le Diplomate,
26 June 2008.
Interview with Lansana Conté, ‘I am the boss; the others are subordinates!’ As
broadcasted by Radio France Internationale - Dossier Afrique Soir, Paris, 15 June 2007,
at 20:40 (local time).
Former Guinean Prime Ministers dismissed by Lansana Conté were Sydia Toure, Lamine
Sidime, Cellou Dalein Diallo, Lansana Kouyate.
François Fall, ‘Lettre de démission’ (dated 24 April 2004), Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent
(May 2004) and in L’espace de la société civile, no. 6 (17 May 2004): 9.
Dominique Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, eds., Enjeux et
défis démocratiques en Guinée (février 2007–décembre 2010) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007).
Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, ‘Comment obtenir une véritable Commission électorale
nationale indépendante?’ in Enjeux et défis démocratiques en Guinée (février 2007–
décembre 2010), eds. Dominique Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha
Diop, 97-106 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007).
Lettre à l’honorable président de l’Assemblée nationale dated 16 January 2007, handed
by trade union federation to the Speaker of the Assembly, requesting him to ‘duly record
the vacuum of power due to the ill health of the Head of State and his inability to govern.’
The opposition political parties in favour of the constitutional arrangement are: the UPR,
the UPG and the UFD, led by Baadikko Bah. The parties belonging to the radical
opposition wing, the RPG, the UFDG and the UFR, are not in favour of implementing the
Constitution.
Intervention by M. Somparé, Speaker of the National Assembly, during the budget
session, Conakry, Wednesday 27 September 2006. Available at: www.nlsguinee.com
Investigation report presented by Thierno M. Sow, President of the OGDH, on behalf of a
group of eight NGOs, 11 December 2007. Available at: www.kababachir.com. See also
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Dominique Bangoura
Amnesty International, Guinea:‘Soldiers were shooting everywhere’. The security forces’
response to peaceful demands for change. Index AI: AFR 29/003/2007 (London:
Amnesty International, 27 June 2007).
International Crisis Group, ‘Guinée: le changement en sursis’, Briefing Afrique, no. 49 (8
November 2007): 10. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org
The draft bill by Paulette Kourouma goes further than the proposal by her predecessor, the
outgoing minister René Alseny Gomez, who had set up an enquiry commission simply on
the basis of an administrative note. He took this step, which was contested by the Bar
association, to prevent the arrival of an international enquiry commission as demanded by
civil society. A. Somparé, Speaker of the National Assembly, expressed serious
reservations about the possibility of his institution initiating a parliamentary enquiry,
because the matter was already before the courts. This statement contradicted his previous
assertion from 15 June 2006.
‘Act establishing the organisation and the function of the National Commission for
Independent Enquiry’, Guineenews, 25 May 2007. Available at: www. guineenews.org
The court of appeal of Conakry was very lenient with Mamadou Sylla, Head of the
Employers’ association, in May 2007.
‘Order no. 51/PM/SGG nominating the members of the National Commission for
Independent Enquiry Commission’, Conakry, 21 September 2007. Available at:
www.guineenews.org
Amadou Thidiane Kaba, ‘Les dossiers brûlants de la Justice’, in Enjeux et défis
démocratiques en Guinée (février 2007–décembre 2010), eds. Dominique Bangoura,
Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, 107-134 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007).
‘Presidential Decree D/2007/011/PRG/SGG of 12 February 2007 declaring the state of
emergency in Guinea’. Available at www.waati.com
Dominique Bangoura, ed., Quel avenir pour les jeunes de Guinée? (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2005).
Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Dominique Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, Quelle Transition
politique pour la Guinée ? (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006).
Minutes of the negotiations following the general strike of CNTG-USTG extended to
l’ONSLG-UDTG, Section I, Conakry, 27 January 2007.
Dominique Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, ‘Chapitre III: Les
scénarios’ in Quelle Transition politique pour la Guinée? (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006).
Ibid, 107-176, 261-266.
Richard Stirba, ‘Workshop Promotes Democratic Dialog between Military, Civil Society’,
7 July 2006. Available at: www.usaid.gov
Interview with Dr Thierno Maadjou Sow, President of l’Organisation guinéenne des
droits de l’homme, ‘La Guinée n’est pas un Etat de droit’, 28 June 2008. Available at:
www.guineeactu.com.
Through the CNOSCG, civil society ‘took note’ of the dismissal of the Prime Minister in
a communiqué dated 21 May 2008.
In a statement dated 22 May 2008, the trade union federation deplored the fact and ‘noted
flagrant violations of the tripartite agreements signed on 27 January 2007’.
Opposition parties did not react. They had not been invited to take part in the Kouyate
government.
The response to the first question: ‘Has constitutional succession been aborted or
prevented?’ is dealt with in an article analysing the putsch by Dominique Bangoura, ‘Le
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coup d’Etat du 23 décembre 2008 en Guinée’ in Enjeux diplomatiques et stratégiques
2009, 107-111 (Paris: Economica, 2009).
Press release no. 001/CNDD from 23 December 2008 announcing the take-over of power
by the National Council for Development and Democracy (CNDD).
Moussa Dadis Camara declared: ‘We must carry out a radical reform of the military, but
to do this, we need funds’ stated before about one hundred journalists, 12 May 2009.
Available at www.kababachir.com
Hamidou Sow, ‘Le CNDD, par la voix de son ministre de la Défense, veut assainir
l’armée’, Guineenews, 29 January 2009. Available at www.guineenews.org
Human Rights Watch, Le Gouvernement guinéen doit discipliner les soldats, 27 April
2009.
Amnesty International, République de Guinée: des soldats placés dans un lieu de
détention illegal. AFR 29/002/2009 (Toulouse, 4 August 2009).