Chapter 3
Burkina Faso
Jean-Pierre Bayala
Introduction
Burkina Faso, the former Upper Volta, also called ‘the land of upright men’,
attained independence on 5 August 1960. It is bordered to the north and to
the west by Mali, to the north-east by Niger, to the south-east by Benin and
to the south by Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso is a landlocked
country with no maritime outlet and is a hub for trafficking in all sorts of
goods destined for and coming from the neighbouring countries, especially
small arms and light weapons, drugs, precious stones, livestock, wood,
coffee and cocoa. In addition to the smuggling trade, starting from the 1990s,
the country also appears to have been directly or indirectly involved in
several internal armed conflicts in the sub-region (Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Côte d’Ivoire). These conflicts no doubt contributed (and continue to
contribute) to the rise of insecurity in the sub-region.1
As a Sahelian country, the rainy season in Burkina Faso lasts from
mid-May to October. The structure of its economy has remained practically
unchanged for half a century and its principal resources are still agriculture
and livestock, which are easily affected by poor rainfall. This economic
situation places the country among the poorest in the world, with almost
43% of the population still living in poverty.2
Where education and health are concerned, the ineffective systems are
unable to develop the human capital that the economy sorely needs, instead
leading to large scale unemployment, which is in itself a source of growing
insecurity.3 Nevertheless, the principal wealth of the country still lies in the
courage and determination of its valiant population, which in the past
represented a valuable source of labour for neighbouring countries such as
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Ghana.
With regard to the political dimension, Burkina Faso is one of the
countries in the sub-region where the military has played and continues to
play a major role in the management of internal affairs. In fact, since
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independence, the country has experienced eleven regimes, four of which
were constitutional and seven of which were exceptional. This represents a
change of regime every four years.4
As far as the armed forces and security forces are concerned, the 4
August 1983 revolution seriously undermined military values such as
discipline and the established hierarchical order, by encouraging the
politicisation of military ranks. Indeed, the establishment of committees for
the defence of the revolution (CDR) within the general population and the
revolutionary service committees in the government apparatus undermined
the foundations of the military and paramilitary corps. This new politicomilitary order established to defend the revolution had a lasting effect, in
spite of the rectification that took place on 15 October 1987 and the changes
that have occurred since 1991 with the return of constitutional rule. The
famous slogan of the CDR, ‘a soldier without political and ideological
training is a potential criminal’ remains very vivid in the minds of the
military. The fact that some of them are openly active in political parties or
have been elected as members to the national assembly may have inspired
other members of the military and paramilitary corps to imitate them in the
political arena.
In addition to the politicisation of the armed forces and the police, the
effect of the creation of the people’s rapid intervention battalions, based on
the concept of a ‘generalised people’s war’ was the anarchical and massive
distribution of uncontrolled weapons of war, some of which are now no
doubt being used for organised crime in the country and even the sub-region.
With the Constitution of 11 June 1991, Burkina Faso returned to a
semi-presidential constitutional regime, marked by the separation of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of power. The regime is open to
a multiparty system and there are numerous private media that contribute to
political activities and significantly enrich the democratic debate.
The country is made up of a mosaic of ethnic groups, the main ones
being the Mossi, the Gourounsi, the Senoufo and the Mandingo. Many of
them engage in ‘joking relations’, as they are called in Burkina Faso, a
practice that contributes to the harmonious existence and peaceful
cohabitation of ethnic groups. ‘Joking relation’ days are sometimes
organised in the country, providing the younger generations with an
opportunity to learn about and cultivate this centuries-old tradition. This
customary practice is used by all the groups concerned. This ‘joking’ is one
of the reasons why Burkina Faso is considered a haven of peace, because it
is considered as a real valve for regulating social tensions, thus enabling
various ethnic groups to live together in harmony.5
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47
The security apparatus and its environment
The security apparatus in Burkina Faso is made up of the armed forces,
gendarmerie, the national police force, communal police and the fire brigade.
The security apparatus inherited from the former colonial authority has
changed little in its doctrine of use and its behaviour. By nature, it engages
more in repression than prevention.
From a security sector governance perspective, the security sector
should include the presidential security corps, the justice system, prison
guards, the customs service, forest rangers, as well as private guard and
security companies. Most of the forces in the Burkinabe security apparatus
are still unable to move away from their congenital and acquired defects that
manifest in the form of misconduct, which isolates them from the population
that they are supposed to be protecting. This is particularly true of the armed
forces, the police and the gendarmerie, for which it will take some time
before they are well integrated in the population. Furthermore, whereas these
institutions are meant to work together in synergy, they rather tend to engage
in conflicts of competence or demonstrate a superiority complex, which can
lead to confrontation.
The national armed forces
The national armed forces, which were created on 1 November 1961,
comprise the army, the air force and the gendarmerie. They make up the
national armed forces, organised in military and gendarmerie regions within
the framework of operational defence of the national territory. In addition to
their conventional missions, they undertake rescue missions, as well as
international peace and development missions. As third category forces, they
also participate in operations to maintain or restore law and order and
support the security forces in combating organised crime through military
security support units know as compagnies militaries d’appui à la sécurité.
Contrary to the other armed forces mentioned above, the gendarmerie is a
second category force where maintaining and restoring law and order is
concerned, intervening on the request of the civilian authority.
Due to the country’s lack of resources, the armed forces are not able to
carry out the necessary training properly and regularly, to keep the men in fit
condition. This has led to a relaxing of discipline and thus to forms of
behaviour that could potentially lead to disruptions in law and order.6
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National gendarmerie
The national gendarmerie is an integral part of the army. In addition to its
military missions, it also has the same functions as the national police force.
The gendarmerie is organised according to the breakdown of the country into
administrative and judicial zones. It is subdivided in two main branches: the
territorial gendarmerie and the mobile gendarmerie.
The gendarmerie in a département comprises all the territorial
brigades established in the main town of each département of the country. It
has the responsibility for police functions related to administration and
criminal investigation and is under standing orders to the appropriate
authorities as a first category force for all operations for restoring and
maintaining law and order. It can therefore take the initiative without waiting
to be requisitioned to carry out its missions. The mobile gendarmerie, for its
part, is in charge of both territorial defence and maintaining/restoring law
and order.
Because of the military character of the gendarmerie, its relations with
magistrates are not always easy as it carries out criminal investigation
missions. There are still some misunderstandings in spite of the legal
provisions that are clearly defined in the code of criminal procedure.
National police force
The national police force is in charge of administrative and criminal
investigation missions, as well as maintaining and restoring law and order.
Like the gendarmerie, it is organised according to the breakdown of the
country into administrative and judicial zones. Although police-gendarmerie
relations are quite good, this is not always true for relations with the rest of
the armed forces.
The concept of a local police force is a major innovation in the
organisation of the police force since the return to a constitutional order. The
process of establishing a local police force started in 2005 and provides the
basis for wider reforms. Apart from the partnership with citizens in the local
security committees, the security apparatus itself is essentially limited to the
police and gendarmerie. As to the resources required to set up this local
police force, they depend on the limited annual budgetary resources of the
three ministerial departments that are supposedly the most closely
concerned, namely, defence, security and local authorities. This seems to
explain why it is taking so long to establish the local security committees
and why the rapprochement between security forces and the population is so
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49
delayed. In this matter, experience shows that when such a mechanism is
established piecemeal, it inevitably either fosters the displacement of
insecurity from one place to another, or fosters its reorganisation, or both at
the same time.
In spite of some shortcomings, a local police force could be a form of
response, albeit limited, to insecurity in the country. The fact that
decentralised police services have been set up within a radius of about 60 km
from each other and that the security surveillance ratio has been reduced
from 3,386 inhabitants per police officer to 2,386 in 2010, with the support
of the local security committees, could help reduce insecurity. Nevertheless,
it is generally indicated that the optimum security surveillance ratio is 360 to
400 inhabitants per police officer.
Indeed, setting up a local police force is a lengthy process, with a high
financial cost. If the local police force is approached from a systemic point
of view, this should enable the national assembly to pass the necessary
programme laws, not to mention for development aid to be forthcoming
from some partners who are particularly interested in security sector reform
(SSR).
The justice system
In addition to the army, police and gendarmerie, the justice system is one of
the pillars of the security sector. Unfortunately, it is not included anywhere
in the establishment of the local police force, although it could have played a
major role.
The Burkinabe justice system emerged weakened from the August
1983 revolution and its people’s tribunals. However, with the return to a
constitutional regime in 1991, it started being reorganised. Courts were
created in each province and the former Supreme Court was divided into
four main structures (the Constitutional Council, the Council of State, the
Court of Cassation and the Court of Accounts), thus giving a new dimension
to the judicial landscape.7
In addition to these efforts, the criminal code was revised and
judiciary staff were recruited and trained, thus consolidating the numbers of
existing staff and also gradually enabling the newly created provincial courts
to be put into operation.
Meanwhile, and in spite of all these efforts, the Burkinabe justice
system still needs to show its worth. Indeed, like many other state bodies, it
has been affected by corruption and politicisation and has not gained the
trust of the citizens. A lot needs to be done to enhance its credibility.
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The presidential security regiment
The presidential security regiment is a military body in charge of protecting
the head of state and presidential infrastructure. It was established by the
exceptional regime and has gradually replaced all of the security forces that
in the past had responsibility for these duties. This institution sometimes
exceeds its security boundaries and requires a framework that clearly defines
its functions, responsibilities and relations with other components of the
security apparatus of which it is an integral part. Because of the importance
and sensitivity of its missions, it is important to avoid conflicts in
competence and unnecessary duplication that could be detrimental to
security.
Prisons service
The prisons service, which is under the authority of the ministry of justice, is
in charge of surveillance in prisons. Apart from the lack of resources, which
is found everywhere in the security sector, it does not encounter any major
difficulties in its relations with other security departments. Nevertheless, the
fact that prisoners under military jurisdiction are held in the same
establishments as those sentenced under common law and for which the
prisons service is responsible, could lead to difficulties. A better solution
would be to construct a military prison, to avoid any threat that could emerge
from the military side in certain crisis situations.
The fire brigade
The fire brigade is a military unit and is organised as such. It is made up of
companies that are established in the main towns of the country. It falls
under the responsibility of the ministry of defence but is placed under the
ministry of local authorities for their use. In peacetime it carries out civil
protection missions. In case of armed conflict, the fire brigade is expected to
join the other components of the armed forces to defend the national
territory, thus depriving the country of its civil protection. To avoid such a
situation, the International Civil Defence Organisation recommends that
member states create a civilian fire service. This would be an advantage for
Burkina Faso.
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51
The customs service
The customs service is under the authority of the ministry of finance. The
customs service is represented throughout the territory and mainly in major
urban centres and along the borders. In spite of the widespread corruption
that affects the customs service, it still remains a major provider of financial
resources for the country. However, its performance could be improved if
better anticorruption mechanisms were put in place.
Forest rangers
The forest rangers fall under the responsibility of the minister for the natural
and local environment. In particular, they are in charge of protecting the
country's forests and its animal and fish resources. The major difficulties in
this sector are improper woodcutting, deforestation, poaching and use of
prohibited fishing techniques. These are all issues to be resolved that require
the assistance of other security forces, something that has not yet been
organised.
The internal security inspectorate or internal audit division
There is a police inspectorate division within the ministry of security.8 It is
in charge of monitoring, counselling and controlling the functions of various
departments and projects, as well as the application of government policy. It
is in charge of controlling the application of texts governing the use of public
security forces; of carrying out investigations on the administrative,
technical and financial management of police services and projects; of
receiving and examining complaints from police officers and the users of
police services and projects; and of verifying the operational readiness of the
security forces and suggesting the necessary adjustments to be made to
consolidate their capacities. In reality, however, this institution, which does
not have the required resources for its functioning, is simply a sinecure for
its members.
Since 1976, the Burkinabe gendarmerie has not had an internal
inspectorate division and the one that existed prior to that date was never
actually operational. The inspection of the various departments and units is
carried out within the chain of command. Each commanding officer carries
out inspections at their level of command, according to pre-established
annual timetables, or without notice. This practice, which makes the
hierarchical authority both judge and defendant, is severely flawed: instead
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of carrying out the planned inspections, they are generally taken as
opportunities to hold feasts.
Both gendarmerie and police have excessive powers, with insufficient
oversight for their right to hold individuals in custody, to search houses and
to arrest people. Since these services contribute to state financial resources,
there have to be independent inspection and control bodies put in place to
enhance their credibility and their sense of accountability under the rule of
law.
Private security companies
The law on internal security in Burkina Faso grants private companies the
right to carry out public security activities, on condition that these relate
exclusively to protecting persons and goods. They do not enjoy any of the
benefits of public law enforcement, although their agents, like any citizen,
can report crimes and offences and, if necessary, arrest the perpetrators. By
virtue of this law, more than sixty private companies now contribute to
consolidating public security.
Apart from these companies, there are no guerrillas, militias, or any
other form of private security organisations in the country. These types of
bodies are characteristic of countries experiencing internal armed conflict, or
in an advanced state of instability. In spite of the numerous exceptional
regimes, Burkina Faso has always enjoyed relative peace. This stability is
supposedly due in part to the spirit of tolerance of the Burkinabe people,
something that results from the cordial and beneficial practice of ‘joking
relationships’.
With the growing security needs around the world, governments are
now turning to private security agents. Indeed, the concept of SSR makes
them potential agents of public security. There is not yet a threat of
privatisation of public security in Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, the absence of
bold reforms aimed at enhancing the ability of security forces to control
public insecurity could lead to the excessive use of private companies, thus
jeopardising public security.
In the case of Burkina Faso, private security companies are a
necessity, which means that their rights and responsibilities need to be
regulated. If properly governed, they can be a tool for enhancing the activity
of the security forces in combating insecurity. Nevertheless, the
multiplication of private companies should not put them on an equal footing
with the security forces, or worse, tip the scales in their favour.
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53
As indicated above, security is first and foremost the prime
responsibility of the state. In Burkina Faso, although private companies are
not accessible to all citizens, they do allow the security forces to concentrate
their efforts in the dangerous zones where their presence is most needed.
Although there are no duly established statistics on the results obtained by
private security companies, it can be assumed quite reasonably that they do
have a generally positive impact that is encouraging for the public
authorities. Indeed, the increase in their numbers and the fact that none of
them has ever had to be sanctioned do tend to justify their existence.
The security environment
In Burkina Faso, the composition of the security apparatus is obviously
defined by its environment. In the government’s general policy statement
dated 10 October 2002, the national security situation is described in the
following terms:
Our fellow citizens are quite legitimately concerned about the increase in
crime. Insecurity is demonstrated in increasingly diversified forms. In urban
areas, crime is still widespread and mainly involves young people who are
more and more often seen as either perpetrators or victims. Major crime is
now organised and has become international, to adapt to economic and social
mutations. Insecurity is a challenge for our society that we must all face
together.
This summary shows not only the level of insecurity the country has
reached, but also the fact that the government is aware of the need to adopt
urgent measures. The manifestations of insecurity are diverse and complex.
Among the endogenous factors of insecurity, crime in the country stems
mainly from poverty and affects the security of goods and persons. This
growing phenomenon includes among others robberies, fraud and breach of
trust, embezzlement and assault. Organised crime is another concern which
is demonstrated by armed robberies, organised thefts and rape. This lack of
order also facilitates various forms of fraud and trafficking, in particular
drugs, small weapons, precious stones and children. Another source of
insecurity is white collar crime in the form of embezzlement and misuse of
public money and goods by civil servants and other agents of government.
Corruption is dangerously undermining the state apparatus, in particular the
customs service, gendarmerie, police and the justice system. These are the
services that seem to be most decried by the general public but, in reality, the
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scourge affects all sectors of life in ‘the land of upright men’. The situation
is made worse by acts of illegal enrichment and their corollary, money
laundering. More and more people die each year through violations of traffic
regulations because the government is incapable of reacting; the most recent
tragedy, a collision between a passenger bus and a lorry carrying goods
occurred on 15 October 2008 and led to 70 deaths.
Endogenous threats may seem easier to combat, but in reality, this is
far from being the case. Indeed, they require either substantial resources, or a
strong political will and commitment, or both at the same time. These threats
include, in particular, crowd control during operations to maintain or restore
law and order (which should be carried out without violating human rights);
politicisation and militarisation of security forces; nepotism; favouritism;
impunity; lack of transparency in managing careers; lack of professionalism;
and the lack of appropriate equipment for the different missions to ensure the
rule of law. Where professionalism is concerned, there are some tangible
efforts being made, but for the other cases, a lot still remains to be done.
One of the sovereign missions of any democratic state is to ensure that
its citizens, individually and collectively, enjoy protection of their life,
safety, and physical integrity. The first heading of the Burkinabe constitution
guarantees these rights to all citizens. But is this a reality? According to the
independent journalist Laurent La Plante, ‘sixty years after its adoption, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains a utopian vision in many
countries.’9 Between 2003 and 2007, the average number of assaults was
795, that is, at least 2 per day. For 2008, 423 cases were reported in the first
six months alone. The table below indicates the number of armed robberies
recorded in recent years:
Table 1. Police/gendarmerie statistics of armed robberies10
Order
Institution
n°
Gendarmerie
01
Police
02
Total
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
126
963
1089
127
610
737
320
675
995
215
469
684
204
278
482
2008: 1st
semester
109
314
423
In Burkina Faso, the police surveillance ratio, which was one police officer
per 3,686 inhabitants in 2005 is expected to go down to one per 2,686
inhabitants in 2010, with the establishment of a local police force.11
Although this is a significant reduction if it is indeed reached, it would still
be a long way from ensuring effective individual security, for which the
Burkina Faso
55
optimal ratio is arguably around 360 to 400 inhabitants per police officer.
Pending better times for individual and collective security, the security
forces would do well to avoid all excesses and misuse of their power and/or
mandates.
With regard to insecurity, similar to many other ills, there are no
borders between countries. That is why all governments must also take into
account any security threats that might emerge in the international
environment. For Burkina Faso, its central position in West Africa exposes
the country to numerous threats, namely corruption, terrorism, kidnappings,
illegal enrichment, money laundering, proliferation of trafficking in drugs
and precious stones, as well as cybercrime. All these scourges, which cannot
be tackled effectively by Burkina Faso alone, compound already existing
security problems and considerably jeopardise the government's efforts to
ensure the country’s security.
Relations among the various components of the security apparatus
Coordination and cooperation among the armed forces, internal security
forces and the gendarmerie are not enough by themselves to establish a
climate free of counter-productive competition. In fact, they would have no
effect without a review of the law on internal security and the adoption of
various legal acts that have been suggested many times in the past. Such acts
would need to include very clear provisions concerning the sovereign
attributions, missions, circumstances and areas of intervention of each of the
forces, while also setting the objectives to be met. They also have to be
given the necessary and appropriate means to carry out their missions, so
that each force can hold its place in the field without feeling disadvantaged
vis-à-vis the others. Beyond these precautionary principles, however, there
will still be the thorny issue of the trust that decision-makers place in each
force, given that politics has now become entrenched in this sector. From
that point of view, competition is now a major issue for security sector
governance in Burkina Faso and remains inextricably linked to the pace of
current democratic progress. In the meantime, the areas identified for
coordination and cooperation appear to be those that are easiest to develop,
in spite of their limitations.
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Coordination
In order to improve their effectiveness in controlling insecurity and because
they are made up of a broad range of agencies, the security forces are
represented by a commission, under the authority of the ministry in charge of
security.12 Its members include the permanent secretary of the ministry of
security, the chiefs of staff of the gendarmerie and the fire brigade and the
director general of police. Its tasks are as follows:



Draft a policy for combating insecurity and monitor its
implementation;
Organise and coordinate the activities of the public security forces in
carrying out their administrative and criminal investigation missions;
Coordinate the security forces’ prevention and emergency activities,
in particular in the area of security of infrastructure and crowd safety
and control.
This coordination process unfortunately appears somewhat
inadequate. Obviously, its members come from an incomplete security
apparatus and the four members are entrusted with the weighty responsibility
of drafting a policy to combat insecurity and monitor its implementation.
Because of its very nature, a policy to combat insecurity cannot be
limited only to security providers. The agencies should rather serve as
advisors in its drafting, in order to set up an ad hoc political authority. As far
as monitoring this coordination process is concerned, this is already under
the responsibility of the general inspectorate of the police and is not only
inappropriate but also a source of conflicts in jurisdiction, as well as
duplication.
Cooperation v. competition
Cooperation among the different actors in the security sector should be
automatic within any security apparatus because carrying out their missions
requires synergy. Generally, however, the situation is quite different.
For the police and gendarmerie, the question of cooperation during
administrative and criminal investigation missions, as well as law
enforcement operations is regulated by the code of criminal procedure and
decree n° 5005-025 of 31 January 2005, governing the maintenance of law
and order in Burkina Faso. In the specific case of maintaining law and order,
the issue of who commands joint army/police/gendarmerie operations, which
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57
was mentioned above, requires a revision of the aforementioned decree. As
to the relations between the other security agents, they could be defined
through a review of the law on internal security and the decree governing the
coordination of internal security forces.
During the revolutionary period, the roles and tasks of the different
armed and security forces and the revolutionary defence committees were
often confused, thus exacerbating existing rivalries, especially between the
police and the military. In spite of the fact that joint training programmes are
now organised in the military training centres, with a view of creating a
spirit of solidarity and the understanding that they belong to complementary
forces, this negative competitive feeling persists. The measures proposed to
enhance coordination and cooperation among the armed and security forces
are the same as those suggested to eradicate the rivalry among internal
security forces. The issue of competition is essentially a policy issue.
To sum up, in the case of Burkina Faso, texts alone will not be enough
to resolve the question of coordination, cooperation and competition among
the different forces. The intrusion of some of these forces into the internal
security apparatus highlights the forces in play at the moment. But here as
well, time will ease the way. Changing this situation will most likely be a
lengthy process, as it has been in the area of moving toward democracy and
good governance.
Relations between the police and the gendarmerie
These relations are defined under the code of criminal procedure, the law on
internal security and the decree organising the maintenance of law and order
in Burkina Faso.13 In particular, these texts stipulate their territorial
competences and their attributions. According to the provisions of the law on
internal security, the police and gendarmerie have competence over all of the
national territory to conduct policing activities. However the gendarmerie
carries out its functions mainly in the hinterland and on major road axes,
while the police operate mainly in urban areas. As far as the municipal
police are concerned, they are limited to the communes.
The national police force and the gendarmerie are in charge of
enforcing regulatory measures related to security, health and safety as well
as maintaining and restoring public order. They are in charge of territorial
surveillance, protecting institutions, persons and goods and also carry out
criminal investigations in line with the legal provisions, in particular those of
the common law code of criminal procedure, the code of military procedure,
as well as the decree organising law enforcement. In the specific case of
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maintaining and restoring law and order, article 32 of decree n° 2005-025,
dated 31 January 2005, stipulates the following:
Where several units from different categories of forces are called on to carry
out the same mission, it is necessary to establish a close link immediately
between the commanding officers. To this end, an operational staff shall be
put in place, comprising representatives of each of the forces. Overall
command shall fall to the longest serving military officer of the highest rank.
These provisions lead to a few comments: except in the case of a state of
siege or of emergency, entrusting the management of operations to maintain
and restore law and order to a military commander rather than a gendarme or
a police officer could seriously jeopardise the smooth running of the
mission. Indeed, the use of force and arms during such operations is
governed by some fundamental rules that the military commander may not
be familiar with, or worse, may not know about. These are in particular the
principles of self-defence and the proportional use of force or arms. When
the military is called in as back-up, not being specialists of law enforcement,
the difference is not always made between the concept of an enemy in
combat and a simple demonstrator. This confusion or grave misconception
can have tragic consequences and even lead to greater disruption of law and
order. There are many examples of this throughout the world.
The municipal police service is mainly in charge of carrying out the
policing functions attributed to the mayor, and which relate to public safety,
security, health and peace. All security agents must be subject to
constitutional and institutional control, as well as to oversight by civil
society, to enable them to carry out their responsibilities and respond as best
as possible to national security needs. The inspections and checks put in
place within the different forces themselves are often inoperative.
The difference between the national dimension and the local dimension
As far as internal security is concerned, that is, police, gendarmerie, the fire
brigade and the prisons’ service, there must be a clear distinction between
the national level and the local level. The national police force and the
gendarmerie operate at the national level. At the local level, they are
subdivided into units that as decentralised bodies have limited powers.
Powers in certain areas could be devolved to them, to enable them to act in
some instances without having to refer to the national level. With respect to
the fire brigade and the presidential guard, although they are under the
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authority of the national level, their decentralised institutions are authorised
to take certain initiatives in carrying out their missions, since they need to
find immediate responses at the local level.
Where security is concerned, any delay in making decisions and
reacting can lead to disastrous consequences. It is important for national
services such as police and gendarmerie to be truly decentralised. The
concept and establishment of a local police force are well in line with this
requirement, although this is not an end in itself.
Excesses and misuse of mandates
The security forces need to act within a legal framework that clearly defines
the tasks and responsibilities of each force. Overzealousness and ignorance
very often lead to excesses and/or the misuse of powers and mandates while
carrying out their duties. The following examples are quite significant:



The case of David Ouedraogo (a driver who was arrested, detained
and tortured to death by soldiers of the presidential guard for having
stolen cash) was brought before a military tribunal in Ouagadougou on
19 August 2000;
Summary executions during ‘clamp downs’ against organised crime in
the eastern part of the country, in Boulpouré on 6 December 2005 and
in Piéla on 28 October 2006;
Confrontations on 20 December 2007 between soldiers and
policemen, following the refusal of a group of soldiers from the
military garrison in Ouagadougou to submit to a simple police check.
These events led to two deaths and seven injured among the police as
well as major destruction of police equipment, estimated at a total of
more than 1 billion CFA francs (vehicles and premises destroyed
through gunfire). The group of soldiers continued their punitive
campaign against the police by breaking down the doors of a civilian
prison, thus allowing many detainees to escape.
Human rights and the security services
The fact that there is a ministry in charge of promoting human rights implies
that the Burkinabe government accords importance to human rights related
issues. This ministry has set up a national human rights commission whose
mission is to disseminate information about and defend such rights. In
addition to the efforts of this commission, certain non-governmental
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organisations and associations such as the National Red Cross, the
Burkinabe movement for human and peoples’ rights and the International
Committee of the Red Cross organise seminars for members of the armed
and security forces. Within the armed forces, there is a department in charge
of disseminating information about human rights and international
humanitarian law. In spite of all these training programmes, there is still a lot
to be done to ensure that human rights are scrupulously respected by the
security forces.
Security sector management and oversight
The Constitution of 2 June 1991 established a semi-presidential regime with
a clear separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. Thus, in
the area of security, organisation and management of the sector falls under
the responsibility of the executive power, while the power of oversight lies
with the legislative and judicial branches.
The bodies in charge of managing the security forces are the general
directorate of police, the gendarmerie general staff and the general staff of
the fire brigade. Under the responsibility of their respective ministers, they
are in charge of the organisation, functioning and management of the various
security forces. They also carry out internal control of the services through
permanent technical inspection missions or ad hoc inspections.
Constitutional and legal control
In accordance with the constitution and the code of criminal procedure,
oversight of the security forces falls to the national assembly and the judicial
branch of power. Under the terms of article 84 of the constitution, the
national assembly passes laws, approves taxes and monitors government
activity. According to the provisions of the code of criminal procedure,
courts and tribunals lead and control the security forces in carrying out their
criminal investigation functions.
The national assembly and its foreign affairs and defence commission
(CAED) are the main mechanisms available to the legislative branch of
power for oversight of the security forces. The national assembly carries out
its functions through oral questions, requests for information and enquiries.
The CAED deals with questions of international relations, foreign policy and
cooperation under international treaties and agreements, as well as general
organisation of defence and security and military cooperation policy.
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61
Judicial oversight of the security forces is carried out by public
prosecutors, the attorney general and the courts of criminal appeal. Due to
the fact that there is no hierarchical link between judicial police officers,
agents of these forces and the magistrates, such oversight is not always easy
to carry out. Putting in place mutually binding working relations would help
to resolve some of the difficulties that exist among these different agents.
In the national legal arsenal, there is no single instrument that defines
the functions, rights and obligations of the security apparatus. Each agency
defines its own area of competence without taking into account the issue of
complementarity. This shows that security is not seen as being a part of the
national apparatus. The law on internal security, which was supposed to
provide the legal framework, says nothing about the functions, rights and
obligations of the various agents in the security sector.
In order to ensure coordination of the internal security forces, it would
be appropriate to set up a legal body in charge of implementing best
practices with a view to building the capacity of the security forces and
enabling them to fulfil their responsibilities. All these gaps must be filled
within the framework of a holistic SSR process.
Civilian oversight
Civilian oversight is carried out by the national assembly, the judicial branch
of power and the general government inspectorate. Civilian control of
security forces has been and remains an extremely sensitive issue for young
democracies, in particular when the executive branch holds a large
parliamentary majority. It becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
carry out such control, as a result of the political choices of the authorities.
Events have shown that Burkina Faso is no exception to this rule.
Parliamentary oversight
The national assembly is the body that has oversight over the executive
power and consequently over the security forces. It must therefore ensure the
smooth functioning of security services, which requires enormous resources,
both in terms of quantity and quality. It is in charge of voting the budget and
passing laws aimed at guaranteeing general peace and tranquillity for all
citizens throughout the national territory. In addition, it controls the activities
of the security forces and ensures that they carry out their responsibilities in
observance of human rights and in conformity with national laws and
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policies, as well as the treaties and conventions to which the country is a
party.
The national archives do not contain any records of enquiries, audits
or reports drafted by the successive parliamentary majorities that relate to
oversight of the internal security forces. The armed forces and security
forces seem to be granted implicitly the privilege of ‘auto-control’ in this
area. Nevertheless, on three occasions between 2005 and 2008, the ministry
in charge of security was called to question on issues related to organised
crime, the impact of the establishment of a local police force on insecurity
and the state of progress in setting up this force. The assembly must be
commended for this.
In order to play its role of overseeing the executive and in particular
the security forces fully and effectively, the National Assembly must possess
special mechanisms and adequate means for its effective functioning.
Judicial oversight
Judicial oversight is carried out by a technical inspectorate within the
ministry of justice, which falls under the authority of this ministry. However,
like many similar government bodies, it exists in a vegetative state. As to
judicial oversight of the security sector, it is governed by the code of
criminal procedure, which places security sector staff under the management
and control of the public prosecutor’s office and the court of criminal appeal,
with respect to their criminal investigation functions. The criminal appeal
chamber, which is established within each court of appeal (Ouagadougou
and Bobo-Dioulasso), is in charge of controlling the activities of officers of
the judicial police. If criminal proceedings are brought against them, they
may be assisted by a lawyer and if necessary, a lawyer is appointed for them.
The criminal investigation department and the prosecution departments of
the police and gendarmerie are completely outside any control by the
judiciary. Given their key role with regard to human rights, there is a need
for them to be under the oversight of the courts of appeal.
The courts of the land must have unfailing control over internal
security forces. In practice, the only control is through preliminary legal
proceedings, that is, reports by the police or gendarmerie. It is indeed rare
for prosecutors to carry out any control of security services. Prosecutors and
investigating magistrates almost never go out in the field. Neither do they
tour prisons or detention centres in the gendarmerie brigades or police
stations. This laxity leads to people being held overly long in custody;
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sometimes as long as a month or even more, without the knowledge of the
public prosecutor.
Government inspectorate general
The government inspectorate general is in charge of controlling all
government and paragovernmental departments, as well as national
institutions that receive government subsidies. In order to improve its
effectiveness, it would need to be endowed with the power to bring cases
directly to the courts. Many of its reports have piled up in the offices of
certain ministers because of the alleged or actual sensitivity of the topics
they cover. More stringent rules in governance, as stated in recent general
declarations from government, should enable this institution to be given the
right to bring cases to court as part of its functions. It is also the duty of
every citizen to report any criminal violations that they may be aware of.
Public oversight
Public oversight is the responsibility of civil society. In Burkina Faso, this is
carried out by a number of NGOs,14 as well as certain media and trade
unions. Given the general climate of distrust and suspicion between civil
society and security actors, such oversight is carried out through sporadic
and specific visits to police stations and gendarmerie brigades when
information is received about cases of human rights violations, proven
corruption and/or other reports.
It is not easy for civil society institutions to carry out public oversight
because they have limited resources and in particular because they are faced
with a lack of cooperation on the part of the security forces who often refuse
to respect certain rights: the right to visits, communication and information
for the families of people who are being held in custody or have been
arrested.
The role of civil society in SSR
Civil society cannot participate productively in reforming the security sector
if it does not have a good knowledge of the relevant issues. Unfortunately, in
Burkina Faso the SSR concept is far from being well-known due to a lack of
research in this area.
Civil society can nevertheless play a positive role in terms of
democratic oversight. In order to do this, its activities should be coordinated
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better and civil society should demonstrate greater determination in fighting
against insecurity and scourges such as corruption, politicisation, impunity
and all the other evils that undermine the security forces. Their participation
in an SSR process also requires that the general population be informed and
trained about individual and collective rights and in particular the obligations
upon the security forces and the government to render an account of their
activities. To this end, civil society organisations must be more closely
involved and show proof of greater cohesion in fighting to promote and
respect human rights, by refusing to give in to political intimidation and
manipulation.
Challenges of security sector governance
According to the statements made by government in the recent general
policy declarations mentioned above, the major challenges to be faced are in
fighting growing insecurity and organised crime. However, after analysing
the country's security environment and apparatus, it appears that other,
equally important challenges also exist: security sector reforms to improve
management and oversight of the security forces.
Meeting these challenges means first and foremost defining the
respective roles of government, the security sector and the various bodies
that exercise democratic control, in particular the national assembly, the
justice system and civil society.
Definition of roles
In the absence of effective oversight of the security forces, there is a need to
set up the appropriate legal framework to govern all constitutional and
institutional bodies that exercise democratic control over the security sector.
Generally speaking, existing legal and regulatory texts related to the security
sector all have shortcomings that need to be corrected. This applies
particularly to the law on internal security and the decrees setting up a plan
of action for implementing a local police force, as well as maintaining and
re-establishing law and order. Where the aforementioned law is concerned, a
sound review should define not only the security apparatus as a whole, but
also the role of the executive in relation to the national assembly, the justice
system and civil society. This text should also clearly define the highly
sensitive concept of confidentiality, which has become a catch term used by
the security forces to justify their total refusal to submit to external control.
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Finally, harmonising the texts governing security would facilitate
management and oversight of the sector.
In addition, it is up to the government to set up the necessary
mechanisms to ensure functioning and control of internal security forces
after having defined the functions and tasks of each actor. Such measures
will make it possible to lay the foundation for establishing links of
collaboration and trust amongst the various security forces.
Improving relations
It must be acknowledged that there has never truly been an atmosphere of
trust between security agents and civil society. Indeed the security forces
have usually been seen as a tool of repression to protect political regimes,
which has always been an obstacle to good relations between the forces and
civil society. There is no universal panacea for improving these relations.
Nevertheless, in this specific case, the rights and obligations of all
stakeholders have to be defined through an exhaustive and appropriate
legislative text. This text should also provide for the mechanisms for
consultation and communication, which are indispensable for establishing a
dialogue that will prepare the way for a change of behaviour.
In any event, there is a need for a national framework for reflection on
the security sector, to resolve all these issues. It appears indispensable to
organise a forum to examine the various sensitive aspects of security.
Sensitive aspects of SSR
The sensitive points that could be covered within the framework of reform
are corruption, speculation, politicisation, militarisation, ethnicity, nepotism,
favouritism and impunity, which all dangerously undermine the internal
security forces. Obviously, issues related to professionalism and capacity
building for the security forces, as well as the establishing the priorities of
reform will all be at the centre of the debate.
Although SSR is brought about by political will, it must take into
account democratic progress, good governance and the rule of law, which it
aims to enhance and consolidate. Indeed, any reform brings about a sudden
change, which is imposed; in other words it ‘goes against the grain.’ An SSR
process goes against all types of interests and must be expected to encounter
resistance, because reforming also means losing some advantages or taking a
leap of faith.
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In the case of Burkina Faso, the first source of resistance could be the
political authorities themselves; it is not easy in a young democracy to depoliticise the security forces and to assure that their first priority is their
service to the population. The second could be the security forces, which
might fear losing certain privileges and advantages, especially if they are
obliged to submit to civilian and public oversight with the attendant
accountability requirements.
Finally, implementing SSR in Burkina Faso also means bearing the
financial and political cost and carrying it out within the context of economic
crisis and democratic consolidation. In order to bring this forward, a
cautious, pragmatic and realistic approach must be adopted.
Spaces for national and regional dialogue
Security sector governance is currently at the heart of debates within the
international community. The growing interest in the subject has placed it on
the agenda of all national and international meetings that include security in
their areas of interest. As a result, institutions such as the national assembly,
the economic and social council, political parties, trade unions, humanitarian
and development NGOs, as well as international bodies such as the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African
Union parliament and the African Union (AU) itself constitute important
fora for debating security sector governance.
In a country with many borders like Burkina Faso, security cannot be
provided without a minimum of transborder and even international
cooperation and collaboration. In the area of security cooperation, the
country has signed agreements with France. In the sub region, ECOWAS has
a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping
and security, which is provided for under the Lomé protocol of 10 December
1999. Within the AU, security is governed by the Durban Protocol Relating
to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, dated 9 July 2002.
Burkina is a party to all these instruments, which serve to strengthen its
internal security arrangements. Periodic meetings of police and gendarmerie
authorities are also organised in the region to allow them to exchange
experience and information. Finally on the international scene, the national
police force is a member of the International Criminal Police Organisation.
In addition to these collaboration and cooperation efforts, there are
also inter-country exchange training programmes. Thus, certain members of
the Burkinabe security forces are able to benefit from opportunities in
countries such as France, Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal and Ghana.
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For its part, Burkina also hosts trainees from Niger, Gabon, Togo and Benin.
With regard to training for peacekeeping operations, the Koulikoro centre in
Bamako and the Kofi Annan centre in Accra provide good examples of
international cooperation.
As far as SSR is concerned, external assistance is indispensable.
Burkina Faso cannot undertake its reforms by itself. The country requires
funding through development assistance, but in observance of its
sovereignty. Such assistance is based on the Bamako and Paris declarations
relating to democracy and good governance for the first and development aid
for the second. These instruments, which require that assisting countries
respect the choices of assisted countries, both provide opportunities to be
seized.
In the absence of any in-depth studies on SSR in Burkina Faso, it is
difficult to draw even immediate conclusions. The subsequent section
therefore takes a critical look at current security practice while including the
concept of SSR, identifies the country’s security needs and proposes
solutions that will enable government to undertake real reforms (both
generally and targeted on security), which will serve as a lever for
development.
The SSR process and different options
Burkina Faso is not a country emerging from a recent conflict as has been
the case for Sierra Leone, Liberia or Côte d'Ivoire where SSR has come
about or become necessary as a matter of urgency. As far as Burkina Faso is
concerned, the factors that could lead to inciting a process of security sector
reform are the long history of political instability, the level of poverty and
the sharp rise in insecurity that has been mentioned above.
The following measures therefore need to be taken very urgently:




Organise a national forum on the security sector;
Redefine the security apparatus and include all agents of security;
Define the functions, rights and obligations, as well as the
responsibilities of each of the components of the security apparatus,
including the role of the different oversight mechanisms;
Set up real mechanisms for control and coordination, which are
reliable and viable;
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Adopt fully fledged policies on fighting crime and internal security;
Adopt strategies and action plans for implementing such policies.
Measures to control insecurity, as well as SSR both include short, medium
and long-term aspects.
Short term
In the light of the growing insecurity, the following measures could be
envisaged:





Intensify the control of organised crime by enforcing the prohibition
on summary executions, which undeniably worsen the situation of
insecurity;
Continue and strengthen existing measures: establish the local police
force within a holistic approach and set up local security committees
throughout the national territory;
Expand the concept of a local police force to include all components
of the security apparatus;
Hold workshops on the concept of SSR;
Establish training programmes to educate the security forces on the reestablishment and enforcement of law and order, as well as respect for
human rights and international humanitarian law.
The court system should accompany these measures by dealing with cases
speedily. Without being hasty, the courts should rule on such matters with
the appropriate degree of urgency required for prevention and deterrence and
in all fairness, legality and independence.
The resources made available for the establishment of the local police
force must continue to be improved, not through the budget of the three
ministries as stipulated in the action plan, but through the adoption of
substantial programming laws. There is also a need to review the law on
internal security in such a way as to allow it to take account of all private
and public security actors.
Thus, in the short term, it is essential to organise a national forum
aimed at setting the foundations for an adequate security sector reform
process by developing a systemic and effective national approach. This
forum will also make it possible to identify priorities among reforms which
all appear urgent. It will indicate the measures that need to be taken in the
medium and longer term.
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Medium term and long term
Medium and long-term measures will cover the following:









Entrenching the concept of SSR within the national security discourse;
Review of the law on internal security in the light of the previously
adopted policy on fighting crime and the internal security policy;
Defining the security apparatus and the functions and responsibilities
of each of its components, including the different mechanisms for
democratic control;
Adopting strategies and action plans that are in line with the concept
of SSR;
Continuation of the recruitment and training of internal security force
personnel;
Improving national security coverage by reducing the police
surveillance ratio and the range of action of the security forces to less
than 60 km;
Strengthening the operational capacities of the security forces;
Harmonising texts governing security;
Further SSR measures as identified during this process.
At this stage, the national assembly will need to adopt three-year or five-year
budgets and programmes, aimed at consolidating the rule of law and
ensuring the security of human development, which are both based on the
efficiency and efficacy of the national security forces.
Conclusion
Given the level of insecurity in Burkina Faso, an urgent reaction is needed,
requiring the adoption of a systemic approach. The measures indicated above
are those that are recommended as a priority. Nevertheless, we must not
neglect the fact that insecurity is a transnational phenomenon, which can
hardly be controlled by one country alone no matter what means it may have
at its disposal. Indeed, due to the porosity of our borders, the effects of
globalisation, as well as the different economic and financial crises that are
affecting countries, it is not possible to fight in isolation against global
scourges such as corruption, drug trafficking, smuggling and various types
of trafficking, organised crime and the circulation of small arms and light
weapons. In order to be effective, governments, in particular those that share
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borders, must set up frameworks for cooperation. In addition, they should
consider the possibility of jointly establishing schools, sub-regional or
regional centres and modules for training subregional or regional security
forces. The centres in Bamako and Accra are praiseworthy examples in the
sub-region.
Since security affects all citizens of Burkina Faso, it cannot be
entrusted only to the police force and gendarmerie. External agents have an
important role to play which they must act on. This role falls as a priority to
the executive branch, which is in charge of guaranteeing individual and
collective rights and freedoms and also to the legislative branch of power,
which is in charge of drafting laws and controlling the executive power and
thus the internal security forces.
Development cannot wait, but insecurity is not biding its time either.
Any hesitation or delay in fulfilling commitments made to control insecurity
reduces the chances of success, because this promotes the spread of
insecurity and increases both the financial and human costs of combating the
phenomenon. The measures suggested above must be implemented urgently
in order to halt the spread of the scourge. Considering that there is no
country in the world with absolutely no insecurity, these recommendations
are not a universal panacea but should rather succeed in limiting insecurity
to proportions that are not detrimental to development. Burkina Faso can
achieve this with its legendary bravery, the determination of its inhabitants
and the clear support of the international community to help the country
implement the reforms of development sectors, including the security sector.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Government general policy statement (4 October 2007).
In 2007, 42.6% of the population was living below the poverty threshold, ‘Tableau de
bord social du Burkina Faso 2008’, Direction de la démographie, Secrétariat général,
Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Institut national de la statistique et de la
démographie (December 2008), 72. Available at: www.insd.bf
Government general policy statement (4 October 2007).
Burkina Faso government portal:
www.primature.gov.bf/burkina/histoire/précoloniale.htm
These events take place every two years either in an even or an odd number year.
Collective demands for an increase in housing allowance for soldiers in the military
garrison in Ouagadougou in June/July 1999; military and police clashes in 2007.
Reorganisation of the Supreme Court, J.O. special, no. 001 (14 August 2001).
Decree no. 2001-296 (25 June 2001).
Burkina Faso
9
10
11
12
13
14
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Laurent Laplante, L’utopie des droits universels: l’ONU à la lumière de Seattle
(Montreal: Éditions Ecosociété, 2000).
Statistics sources of the Ministry of Security/studies and planning department.
Government general policy statement (2 October 2002).
Different ethnic groups organise joking days.
Law no. 032 - Internal Security Act, (14 May).
For example, Burkinabe movement on human and peoples’ rights (MBDHP), National
human rights commission (CNDH), Christian Association for the abolition of torture
(ACAT), Burkinabe movement for emergence and social justice (MBEJUS), Burkinabe
movement for peace (MPB), and National anticorruption network (REN-LAC).