Chapter 10
Togo
Comi M. Toulabor
Introduction
Throughout his long reign (from January 1967 to February 2005), General
Gnassingbe Eyadema exercised very strict control over the security sector in
Togo. With a few changes, Faure Gnassingbe, his son and successor, has
strived to follow the same example. The concept of security cannot be
separated from its opposite: insecurity. It covers very broad areas and even
extends to the right to life. In Togo both concepts are unequally distributed
between an extremely small, dominant minority and the dominated classes
that are subject to all sorts of tribulations. The security/insecurity pair
occupies a central position and plays a vital role in the development of
public policy within a holistic framework that encompasses both public and
private security.
Starting from 1990, the Eyadema regime began to use paramilitary
militias and sometimes also an armed guard service to counter the demands
for democracy and the strong protest movements. The security of the
government was largely supported by the Kabye elite (president Eyadema’s
ethnic group from the North of the country). Security sector reform (SSR) is
now a major challenge for democracy and a constantly recurring subject in
political debate, especially during elections and in particular the presidential
elections of August 1993, June 1998, June 2003 and April 2005. This was
also true of the general elections in October 1997 and the presidential
elections in February 2010, as shown by the General Political Agreement
(APG) signed in Ouagadougou on 20 August 2006 between the existing
regime and the opposition.1 In addition, the 29 October 2009 memorandum
for transparent elections in 2010 in Togo,2 drafted by the Union des forces
du changement, the main opposition party, focused on the security
dimension of what these actors themselves called the ‘Togolese crisis’.
Development policies, recruitment to the public services and to parastate companies, as well as promotions, are all marked by the ‘ideology of
revenge’ of the populations of the North over those in the South of the
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country who are purported to have benefited from the advantages of
colonialism and the Olympio and Grunitzky3 regimes, thus creating an
artificial, but deeply rooted and sustained bipolar vision of the two subregions of the country in the collective imagination. This has been the
backdrop to state policy and is reflected in the mode of functioning of the
security sector. It also undermines the theories of the creation of nationstates that were commonly held between the 1960s and the 1980s, which
claimed that African militaries were the only organised and truly national
institutions and should therefore serve as the vector for constructing,
developing and modernising the state.4 These theories were by nature
optimistic and neglected to include the component of sociological dynamics,
which would have highlighted the balance of power and conflicts of interests
that characterise them and often place them in opposition to the overall
society.
When he succeeded his father, Faure Gnassingbe stated his intention
of reforming the paternal heritage, whose pivotal component had been the
security sector, by presenting himself as the ‘man with a new spirit’, or to
quote Montaigne on La Boetie: ‘He is he and I am I’. This apparent intention
might not go down well with his internal interests and supporters, consisting
of the military, the Togolese People’s Rally (RPT) and his family clan; these
supporters are divided between the ‘hawks’, who are attached to the
authoritarian and repressive heritage and the ‘doves’, who are in favour of a
compromise with the opposition. At the same time, Faure Gnassingbe is
bound to uphold the 22 undertakings made by his father before the European
Union on 14 April 2004, under article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement, which
makes respect for democratic institutions, human rights and the rule of law
the underlying principle of the new partnership.5 In the same vein, within the
framework of the APG, he undertook to set up constitutional and
institutional reforms and above all to review security matters and the issue of
widespread impunity, which has been plaguing political life for decades.
Torn between these contradictory interests, will the Togolese
president be capable of convincingly undertaking in-depth reforms in the
security sector without setting up his own allies against him and without
giving in to the prevailing mood? In this chapter, we will be looking at the
security apparatus beyond its purely institutional nature, as a vital part of
security sector governance. We will then go on to show how the security
ideology sways constantly between regime security and human security (the
right to protection of property and physical integrity), which occupies only a
limited place within the political system. Finally, we will examine the need
to reform this sector and the inevitable resistance to be encountered. We
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shall conclude with some food for thought and a series of recommendations,
which should be included in any serious reform process.
The overall state of the security apparatus
The security apparatus in the strictest sense of the term comprises the armed
forces (FAT), the gendarmerie and the police force; in a broader sense it
includes militias and private watch companies. They work together in
synergy. The FAT, which resemble more a private than a public institution,
are the central axis around which the late General Eyadema built his
dictatorship, starting from 1967. In such an environment, public and civilian
control of the security apparatus is very tenuous, especially as the existing
regulatory institutions such as the National Assembly, the legal system and
civil society function very poorly.
In the organisational structure of the security apparatus, the army – the
largest body – is at the top of the pyramid with its specialised units such as
the presidential guard’s commando regiments, the paratroopers and above all
the formidable rapid intervention force. The army staff has set up a training
unit for militiamen, but the ethnic composition of this unit is such that it
blurs the statutory lines between the regular army and guard companies.
Human rights organisations often refer in their reports to this collaboration
within the FAT as the ‘militiamen in army fatigues.’6 The security sector is
no doubt the only public service where the principle of territorial continuity
is effectively applied, with its comprehensive coverage of the national
territory and in particular the capital. This is in contrast to other services
such as education, health, water, electricity, infrastructure and transport,
which are quite neglected.
The Togolese armed forces
The FAT represents the historic nucleus of the security sector. They are the
heart of the political system, relegating the RPT, the former single party, to
an auxiliary role.7 There are many portions of RPT statutes and programmes
where it appears that the party is a derivative of the military, which is clearly
above the former.8 As Dominique Bangoura recalls,9 in postcolonial African
countries, the military was the institution that in structural and ideological
terms (with regard to both physical and symbolic violence, as shown by
Mathieu Rigouste10) most closely resembled the colonial state.
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The FAT increased greatly after General Eyadema took over power.
While it is difficult to determine the exact number of its personnel, it is
certain that it represents the lion’s share of the state budget.11 In 2006 for
example, 25% of the budget was allocated to the FAT, which is by far the
highest item of government expenditure.12 At the same time, the ethnic
component in the FAT was developed strongly, in the name of the ‘ideology
of revenge’. Indeed, 77% of the personnel are from the northern part of the
country, with the remaining 23% from the South. Out of the 77% from the
North, 70% are Kabye, including 42% who are from Pya, the president’s
home town, whereas the Kabye only represent between 10 and 12% of the
population.13 In addition, the hierarchy is almost entirely in the hands of the
Kabye and not one of the command units that make up the architecture of the
FAT is entrusted to a Southerner.
This ethnic configuration of the military hierarchy is one of the most
noteworthy consequences of the system of recruiting along ethnic lines for
enrolment in officer schools.14 Whereas the recruitment policy launched by
Faure Gnassingbe between 2005 and 2007 considerably increased the
number of women in the gendarmerie and the police force (by 90 and 178,
respectively), it did not diversify them ethnically.15 This wave of female
recruitment was a return to a former policy that had been abandoned in 1985,
when female police officers were the first to experience a fall in their
numbers following the implementation of structural adjustment plans. What
remains to be defined, as we shall see, is whether this staff increase
contributes to or corresponds to the quality of security demanded by the
APG signed in Ouagadougou in 2006 and even before that by the 1991
national conference, which made a distinction between the mission of the
FAT to defend national integrity and the law and order and public security
missions entrusted to the gendarmerie and the police.
Paramilitary militias
These originally started out as pro-regime students’ associations and unions,
but in a wave of overzealousness, they shifted to armed support in order to
counter the demands for democracy and the various disturbances that
General Eyadema had to deal with at the time. In an authoritarian regime
with little room for liberty and autonomy, universities are considered as
potentially dangerous environments that need to be controlled and
monitored. This requires the establishment of a number of hired relays, some
of which, like the Togolese national students and interns’ movement, the
Association of Togolese Students of Benin and above all the Northern Togo
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Students’ Club, were practically created at the same time as the university in
1972 and are branches of the RPT youth movement.
In spite of the sponsorship of General Eyadema, the highly
controversial Northern Togo Students’ Club was torn apart by conflict and
division and in 1990 the radical wing founded the High Council of Students’
Associations and Movements, more commonly known as HACAME, and
placed itself in the exclusive service of General Eyadema. Later on, in April
2005, it played an important role in enabling the son of the late dictator to
accede to power, alongside other militias created by his clan. On the campus,
the ‘Hacamist’ movement included a number of small groups with rarely
more than a hundred members, such as the Togolese League of Students and
Interns, the Togo Students’ Union and the Federation of Students and Pupils
of Togo. In fact, members of HACAME were most often school dropouts,
the unemployed, petty criminals, soldiers from the ranks of the regular army
and above all, veterans.16 During the October 2007 general elections, both
the militia and the security forces refrained from getting involved, thus
making it possible to have a ‘peaceful’ election, a condition required by the
European Union as a prerequisite for resuming the cooperation that had been
suspended since the 1993 presidential election because of the ‘democratic
deficit’.
The phenomenon of militias is deeply rooted in Togo's political
history. In the southern part of the country for example, traditional self
defence brotherhoods such as the Abrafos and the Zangbetos were set up to
protect people and their property.17 What is new in the current situation is the
degree of militarisation, which makes the HACAME appear not only as an
armed group with military supervision, but also as an organic branch of the
FAT. The unclear status of this group, between formal and informal and
somewhere between public and private, gives it additional room for
manoeuvre in the acts of violence carried out against political protesters and
the so-called ‘internal enemy’.
Watch and guard companies
The third and final pillar of the security apparatus are watch and guard
companies. Not surprisingly, they began to emerge at the beginning of the
1990s at a time when demands for democracy were increasing, with in
particular the Société africaine de sécurité-Togo. About a dozen companies,
all established in Lome, currently share this very lucrative private security
market.
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These guard companies have links with the political authority, which
grants them the authorisation to set up business. They recruit their staff
mainly from social groups such as retired soldiers, veterans wishing to
supplement their income and sometimes para-militia members. The
explosion of acts of delinquency and crime led to a strong demand for
security by individuals and companies. The supply of such services also
increased proportionately, leading to an explosion of the market. After the
political and legal trials of Robert Montoya, which tarnished the reputation
of his different watch and guard companies (Société africaine de sécuritéTogo)18 and the death of Eyadema’s military advisor, Jeanou Lacaze, in
August 2005, who also owned a security company (L’assaut veille), the
market leader is now Germain Meba, a multimillionaire with more than one
string to his bow and a personal friend of Faure Gnassingbe. It is rumoured
that elements of his company, Optimal Protection Services19 lent a helping
hand to the FAT during the 2005 presidential elections.
Beyond the institutional aspects of security
Historically and institutionally, the security sector has been constructed
around the FAT (in particular the presidential guard, the parachute regiment,
the gendarmerie and the rapid intervention force). Whenever there are public
demonstrations, elections, or any other event considered a security risk,
elements of these different corps are mobilised. The ‘non-violent’ general
elections in October 2007 however demonstrated that the military and paramilitia forces that had been prepositioned to intervene could be controlled.
Since the outcome of these general elections was not very important, the
RPT could afford to leave a few seats to the opposition without losing the
essential part of its power, namely, the presidency of the republic. Even
more importantly, in doing so it could easily comply with the demands of the
European Union, which had conditioned the resumption of its cooperation on
the organisation of non-violent general elections.
This financial condition – non-violent elections for subsidies or more
generally, democratisation for money – gives the feeling that the reformist
commitment of the Togolese president has been extracted under moral
constraint and that without that reforms may not have been pursued. Fiona
Hall, the head of the European Union election observation committee noted
the following when she presented her final report to the Togolese authorities
on 3 December 2007:
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The October 2007 general elections marked a major step in pluralist and
peaceful democratic construction. Through their strong participation on
election day, Togolese voters have expressed their desire to participate fully
in the ongoing democratic transition. Despite certain shortcomings, the
conditions in which the CENI (independent national election commission)
organised the electoral process enabled voters to express their choice.
Nevertheless, a number of reforms need to be adopted to enable the next
elections to truly reflect the will of voters.20
In other words, in the electoral domain like in other areas of reform,
Faure Gnassingbe has given the impression that reform is taking place when
in fact the object of the reform has remained the same.
The February 2010 presidential election campaign highlighted
concerns by the military, police and even the militia groups about being
instrumentalised under the pretext of a process of clarification, institutional
modernisation and reconciliation of the Togolese with their institutions. Let
us demonstrate this by describing two significant events:
The ‘Kpatcha case’, named after the president's half brother, former
minister of defence and then a member of the National Assembly, who
sparked a wave of violence during his brother’s take-over of power in April
2005. Relations between the two men further deteriorated when it came to
sharing the family inheritance. Kpatcha was accused of incompetence and
lack of authority, his ‘biological’ legitimacy was called into question and he
was suspected of plotting a coup d'état as well as an assassination attempt.21
In order to do away with this fratricidal rivalry, he was arrested by the
gendarmerie in front of the US Embassy on 15 April and has been held in
prison since.22
A year before, the body of Atsutse Kokouvi Agbobli, the very popular
leader of the MODENA, an opposition party, was found on the beach in
Lome on 15 August 2008. Before any investigation could take place, the
minister of security and civil defence released a communiqué announcing
Agbobli’s ‘death by drowning’, which was repeated by the public
prosecutor. Faced with a public outcry, the latter ordered an autopsy, which
invalidated the official theory and concluded that the death was due to ‘drug
intoxication’. Under pressure from public opinion, the National Human
Rights Commission (CNDH) took up the case and ordered a second autopsy,
to be carried out by a United Nations expert. This autopsy invalidated both
conclusions.23 More than a year later, this suspicious death seems to have
been forgotten.
These two events show the discrepancy between the apparent desire of
the Togolese authorities to carry out reform and institutional practices which
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are characterised by several instances of infringements of law and legal
process. And yet, in theory, the government has the tools available within the
gendarmerie to carry out investigations: the anti-crime brigade, the research
and investigation brigade, the processing and research centre, the
intelligence and investigation department, as well as the criminal
investigation department, a division of the general police directorate
(DGPN). In 1992, decree n° 92-090 of 8 April 1990 was passed to
reorganise the latter, which now includes five departments (public security,
criminal investigation, general intelligence, territorial surveillance and joint
services) and define its attributions.24 The DGPN covers all police
departments and is under the authority of the ministry of interior. It is a
paramilitary force whose mission is to protect individuals and their property,
maintain and restore law and order, defend territorial integrity by gathering
and using intelligence within the framework of internal and external state
security, control drug trafficking and consumption and contribute generally
to security and civil peace.
Its attributions are in competition with those of the gendarmerie as
defined by decree n° 95-064/PR of 13 October 1995, reorganising the
national gendarmerie.25 The latter carries out administrative police functions,
criminal investigation and serves as a military police force. Throughout the
national territory, it has the responsibility for ensuring law and order in terms
of public security, safety, tranquillity and peace. It is placed under the
authority of the ministry of defence, but because of the nature of its
functions it is also attached to the ministries of interior and justice and the
attorney-general’s office.
Within the organisational structure of the security sector, the police
force occupies a subordinate place beneath the gendarmerie, which is itself
beneath the military. There are however two unwritten rules that structure
the relations among the three corps: 1) a police officer may never stop a
gendarme, or even less a soldier for a check and 2) no police officer can ever
be appointed as the head of the DGPN. In terms of the popular sociological
definition shared in the barracks, a police officer is first and foremost a ‘fat
civilian’ (in military jargon) and can never wield any authority over a
gendarme or a soldier in the exercise of their duties.
On the other hand, when it comes to corruption, the military,
gendarmes and the police are able to come to an understanding and are
indeed involved in a corrupt game with customs officers and drivers’ unions
and with respect to roadblocks, which have become a real ‘cash cow’ where
insecurity wears the face of racketeering and bureaucratic red-tape.26 The
seminar on the Togolese police and corruption,27 organised by the public
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authorities in May 2009, shows for the first time that they are aware of this
visible and real phenomenon. Nevertheless, it does not deal with the thorny
issue of the link between the gendarmerie, the police and the military within
the security context, nor does it deal with the continued absence of statutes
governing the internal organisation of the police force. In this area, there are
complementary or sometimes competing initiatives undertaken by donors
such as the Reform and Governance Support Programme and the
Institutional Capacity Building Support Project, which held a number of
seminars in June and September 2009. Both are aimed at supporting ‘the
efforts of the [Togolese] government in the area of modernising public
administration and consolidating macroeconomic and budgetary
management, as well as economic and financial administrative bodies’.28
The Court of Accounts, which was enshrined in the 1992 constitution and
strongly demanded in 2002 by the West African Economic and Monetary
Union was finally established in September 2009, but many remain
unconvinced about its effectiveness.
‘Modernising’ the FAT
The FAT is not noted for its republican character or its sense of discipline. In
fact, this is a mono-ethnic army. It however played a vital role in the
succession between February and April 2005. The problem is to determine
how to reform an institution that is torn between clans and sub-clans and
between hawks and doves.
The various crisis resolution agreements, in particular the August
2006 APG, prepared the ground for instituting SSR and finding a solution to
the burning issue of impunity. Following the report by the United Nations
Human Rights Commission on the electoral violence of April 2005, it was
decided to replace all the heads of the army corps which had caused
problems.29 Thus, in October 2005, the commanders of about twenty corps
and specialised units were changed; some who were thought to be too close
to the former minister of defence were either dismissed or appointed to other
positions four years later, in July 2009, following the ‘Kpatcha case.’30
Just before that, the beginning of 2008 had been marked by a series
of decisions concerning the uniformed corps. A number of decrees were
passed, one after the other, reorganising the army (decree n° 2008-007 of 25
January 2008); the navy (decree n° 2008-009 of the same date); the air force
(decree n° 2008-014 of 11 February 2008) and also defining the specific
status of the army corps (decree n° 2008-013 of the same date). A higher
military council was established (decree n° 2008-011 of 25 January 2008)
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and the attributions of the army chief of staff and the director general of the
national gendarmerie were defined by decree n° 2008-006 of 25 January
2008. For its part, decree n° 2008-012 of 11 February 2008 defined the
functioning of investigative councils involving the military, etc. A detailed
look at these texts shows however that while they resolve practical, internal
issues, they do not touch on questions of substance, namely the links
between the security sector on one hand and society as a whole, or human
rights in general on the other.
For the Togolese military, any manoeuvres that bring them in
contact with their foreign counterparts are an opportunity to assess their
status, which is sometimes less favourable; at the same time, their principal
and humanitarian objective is to provide assistance to populations affected
by conflict. In this vein, increasing numbers of Togolese soldiers are now
participating in exercises within the framework of the RECAMP
(Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix) programme,
which prepares them for UN and peacekeeping missions in particular in Côte
d'Ivoire (MINUCI), in the Central African Republic and Chad
(MINURCAT), in Burundi (AMIB) and also in Darfur (UNAMID). These
exercises are led by France and take place in different regions of the country:
in 1997 in Nangbeto, in 1998 in Dapaong, in 2001 in Kara and in 2008 in
Zio.31 It was during these RECAMP manoeuvres and UN missions abroad
that Togolese soldiers became aware of their condition and started to
demand a real military status, a demand which had initially been put forward
during the earliest mutinies in the 1970s.32
While these reforming decrees are welcome, they are too timid to
uproot the deep-seated unease in the Togolese military, which is itself a
victim of ineffective security sector governance. Also, by appointing his
‘own’ men, some of whom have been accused of human rights violations
and other crimes including drug trafficking,33 to head strategic military and
gendarmerie units, the president has failed to give the general public a clear
signal of a break with the past and the credibility of his reform action is
being undermined.
Furthermore, while in the past the FAT had sometimes intervened to
provide assistance to populations affected by small-scale natural disasters,
after the floods in July 2008 and in particular in 2009, which were the most
serious that Togo had ever experienced, the humanitarian and modern image
that the military sought to portray was seriously tarnished. This image was
enshrined in the new defence partnership agreement signed between France
and Togo on 13 March 2008. However, the floods in 2008 and 2009 with
their wake of deaths and disappeared, broken bridges, damaged roads and
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devastated houses and farms, etc. demonstrated the negligence of the armed
forces.34 This was offset by the support provided by France through its
Licorne operation in Côte d'Ivoire and by Ghana, China, the European Union
and the United Nations.35
Security sector management and oversight
Security is a state of mind that is both subjective and objective. The weak
point of the security ideology has been its human security dimension and
prevention of threats, incivility and infringements on the life of ordinary
citizens, their property and their well-being.36 As a result, there is a palpable
increase in insecurity in all forms (material, psychological, environmental
and moral) in cities but also in villages. The 2002 constitution enshrined this
fundamental right under its article 49, which stipulates that ‘the mission of
security and police forces, under the authority of government, shall be to
protect the free enjoyment of rights and freedoms and guarantee the security
of citizens and their property’. Given the security gap, it is quite clear that
for the majority of the population this article is far removed from their
reality.
Faced with increasing crime, the general public feels unfairly treated
and abandoned and has decided to take their security into their own hands.
The methods used can be just as summary as those of security agents, as
illustrated in the press, where there are reports of thieves who are burned
alive in front of witnesses who only express general approval and
satisfaction over ‘a job well done’.37 They do not seem to share the point of
view expressed by General Eyadema in a public statement in October 1979
where he established a scale of priorities between ‘material’ rights and grand
principles in the following terms:
This group of men [the Third World], is denied the most basic right: the right
to life, whereas the same right is recognised for animals who are entitled to
protection. Do human rights mean the right to die of hunger, ignorance and
disease? What does freedom of expression mean, when one cannot read or
write? No, it is time that we substituted this theoretical notion of human
rights, which is understood as the ability to do anything that is not prohibited
even when you lack the means do so, with the concrete right to dispose of the
minimum required to live.38
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Attempts at judicial and parliamentary oversight
The State’s security ideology has reached a point where the problem is no
longer security, but rather the insecurity and impunity that it brings about.
Thus, in February 2006, in a report on the topic, the United Nations
underlined ‘the need to bring an end to the culture of impunity, which had
prevailed during the 38 years of the reign of the former president of Togo’.39
Achieving this would have meant placing security policy under institutional
control, in particular of the National Assembly and the legal system. In spite
of being a subject of grave concern, the combination of security, insecurity
and impunity has never been the subject of any official debate to date.
Indeed, none of the 81 members of the National Assembly (of whom
31 are opposition members elected in October 2007) has ever dared to put
either written or oral questions on security to the executive, although
opportunities have been provided by a number of events such as the
suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of the leader of the
Movement for National Development discussed above. The National
Assembly has been criticised for never calling the government to account
about the difficulties facing the general population, especially as it is not a
monochromatic assembly.
The assembly is very poorly organised, making it ineffective, with an
administrative staff that is insufficient in number and poorly qualified or not
qualified at all. It has no clear legal framework, as there are several
overlapping rules of procedure and financial and administrative rules, with
the result that they are never applied. The budget allocated to the assembly is
so insufficient that members have no means to carry out their missions either
within or outside the country. There is no organisational link between
members of the National Assembly, their Parliamentary groups and their
political parties, which is why they never take any legislative initiative. The
electorate is neglected and even forgotten and increasingly, members seem
to aspire to adopt the attitude of civil servants, whose status is seen as more
gratifying and more secure than the uncertain status of people's
representative that prevails among most assembly members.40 In addition,
some members of parliament are not very comfortable using French, the
official language, to engage in political debate, which is the very essence of
parliamentary life.
All this negatively affects the ability of parliament to control the
activities of the executive, which can demand the cancellation of the
parliamentary immunity of any member at any time, in particular those of
the opposition. Furthermore, government does not feel compelled to enforce
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the few laws that are passed (barely 20 a year). It is doubtful that the
numerous seminars organised for members of parliament by international
institutions in order to develop their ‘skills in parliamentary work’ will truly
change this order of things. The National Assembly may be pluralist in terms
of party representation, but its structural and ideological mode of functioning
is monochromatic and still bears the mark of the single party system.
On the other hand, where judicial oversight is concerned, the analysis
of a former prime minister is quite clear:
The system of justice is an instrument used for political purposes and subject
to the untimely intervention of special decrees. Thus, honest citizens are held
quite illegally well beyond the legal custody period without any legal
assistance, while others are sentenced to heavy prison sentences by an
invisible hand that does not hesitate to corrupt magistrates in order to
overcome their resistance against the ignominy of such iniquity.41
And yet article 113 of the constitution stipulates that the judicial
power is independent of the executive and the legislative powers and that as
the guarantors of ‘individual liberties and the fundamental rights of citizens’,
‘judges shall be subject only to the authority of the law in discharging their
duties’. Political influence over the judiciary dates back to colonial times and
worsened at the beginning of the 1990s, at the time when the regime was
extremely weakened. Between 1990 and 1993, General Eyadema readily
promoted law students who were activists in the RPT and HACAME and its
various offshoots. After a short training period and without any prior
experience, these students were appointed to positions of responsibility, in
violation of the requirements of the profession. In order to counterbalance
the weight of the South in the judicial apparatus, most of those promoted
were from the North. They took control of the presidencies of the courts, the
courts of appeal and the position of deputy public prosecutor and prosecutor,
not to mention the strategic bodies such as the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Court and the higher council of the judiciary (CSM), etc.42 By
their sheer numbers, they dominate the professional association of Togolese
magistrates, the APMT, by far the most important association of judges,
which has been considered as the judicial arm of the regime ever since its
establishment in 1996.
The role of the CSM is to regulate the judicial power by assisting the
president of the republic in his constitutional role as the guarantor of the
independence of the judiciary. It also acts as a disciplinary body for
magistrates and is required to give an opinion on nominees proposed by the
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Keeper of the Seals and minister of justice for appointment as judges to the
courts, by decree adopted in the council of ministers. The CSM comprises
nine members appointed for a term of four years and is chaired by the
president of the Supreme Court. The clause that stipulates that ‘sitting
magistrates shall neither hold other positions of public office nor carry out
private lucrative activities other than those prescribed by law, nor engage in
political activities’43 is often disregarded and for many years now the
judiciary has been viewed by the general public as one of the most lucrative
(and also one of the most discredited) in the public service, after the customs
service.
In December 2006, with the support of the European Union, the
UNDP and France, the authorities drew up a very ambitious project for the
modernisation of the justice system, with the aim of enhancing the capacities
of all actors in this sector. The overall cost of the project is 15 million
Euros,44 but by April 2007, only 1.5 million Euros had been received from
France for training the judges of the two courts of appeal in Lome and Kara
on administrative justice.45 All the other components of the programme, such
as consolidating the rule of law, human rights and the establishment of a
reliable legal environment are moving ahead, although the progress made is
slower than planned. In the meantime, a constant succession of seminars,
evaluation meetings and validation workshops are being organised. In order
to demonstrate his will to ‘modernise the system of justice’, on 12 December
2008, to the surprise of all, the head of state appointed the former president
of the Lome court of appeal, Abalo Petchelebia (who had been named and
publicly condemned by the president of the Constitutional Court, Aboudou
Assouma, as the ‘most corrupt’ judge46) as President of the Supreme Court,
the country’s highest judicial body. Reflecting a general feeling at the time,
one newspaper wrote: ‘The crisis within the APMT that some hoped would
enable magistrates to carry out some self-criticism and allow the authorities
to clean house was only a storm in a teacup or even a pure and simple
diversion.’47
Attempts at political and public oversight
One phenomenon that has always characterised the political history of Togo
is that political parties (94 recorded to date) and NGOs and associations
(over 500) have not been deeply committed to or involved in fighting for the
right to security and good governance in the security sector. From this point
of view the case of the CNDH and the association Ligue togolaise des droits
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243
de l’homme (LTDH) is quite exemplary;48 their history is closely tied to this
struggle, which is also the reason for their existence.
The CNDH was created in 1987 and up to 1992 it contributed
significantly to raising awareness about human rights violations lato sensu
within the population. Then in November 1992, the government directly
took over control, after its president, who was considered to be in the
opposition, fled into exile. The commission thus lost its credibility and the
number of complaints brought before it began to go down steadily,
especially as its activity reports too often spared the perpetrators of acts of
violence and those guilty of causing insecurity.
On the other hand, its competitor, the LTDH, which is seen as
independent, was highly successful right from its establishment in 1990,
because it worked hand in hand with the CNDH, which would send sensitive
and compromising cases to them in an attempt to escape the vigilance of the
regime. This was the glorious period for human rights as demonstrated by
the major social movements and collective action that were undertaken
throughout the country. However, in the face of constant harassment and
threats and following a serious crisis within their ranks, these movements
practically disappeared from the public eye.
The LTDH and the CNDH define the expression of the need and the
right to security, as well as the way in which their action is recognised,
which may vary according to the political situation of the time and their own
leaders. The first, which is a non-governmental organisation with limited
resources, derives its credibility from its critical and independent spirit as
well as the quality of the work that it carries out and its international partners
(the International Federation for Human Rights of which it is a member,
Amnesty International, the World Organisation Against Torture and the
International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture
and Reporters Without Borders). On the other hand the second, CNDH, does
not even attempt to change the image it has had right from its establishment;
that of a governmental agency endowed with considerable resources. Its
local partners are often associations set up by the regime and its foreign
partners are too often governmental or intergovernmental institutions.
While it enjoys the support of government, the CNDH is nevertheless
practically the only association that systematically promotes human rights
throughout the country through the media and schools and organises
seminars and awareness-raising campaigns for target groups. These are
supposed to serve as relays with the population – prefects, mayors,
traditional chiefs and religious leaders, etc. It is worth noting that this policy
is limited mainly to topics that are considered less sensitive, such as women
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Comi M. Toulabor
and children's rights and HIV/AIDS control. Two thirds of its activity reports
cover these topics while other issues related directly to security are
neglected.
Political parties for their part do not consider the right to security to be
a particularly important part of their combat, which hardly ever exceeds the
quite legitimate emotion that is keenly felt when such rights are violated.
This is understandable on the part of the former single party, which is still in
power. The main opposition parties compete with each other, at best through
communiqués that are quickly forgotten or at worst by a silent wait-and-see
attitude. Of course, this is a bit more than the former single party, which
prefers to maintain a certain distance from issues related to insecurity. The
opposition did not support the group of associations against impunity in
Togo, which was set up following Faure Gnassingbe’s succession to power
to encourage victims to lodge complaints against the perpetrators of acts of
violence and exactions committed during the election period. Although the
premises of the association were robbed on several occasions and its
computers carried away in 2008 and 2009, both the association and most
serious humanitarian organisations do agree that there has been a relative
improvement in freedom of expression and movement since Faure
Gnassingbe took over power. There was not much mobilisation around the
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission that was set up in April 2008
after the APG, which brought together various political actors to end forty
years of human rights violations. This commission, which has the blessing of
the international community, found it difficult to start its work following the
presidential elections and indeed is viewed with suspicion by most Togolese
people who are not readily inclined to believe in the good intentions of a
regime that is considerably removed from the life of the ordinary citizen.
Challenges of security sector governance
All these obstacles to SSR show how much the country is sorely lacking and
remains incapable of managing administrative affairs. This government
receives poor support from weak institutions and has limited sovereignty.
Thus, legitimate reforms that it has not decided itself are imposed upon it
and are implemented without the benefit of an assessment of previous
reforms.49 While there appears to be a consolidation of the security ideology,
the public administration in the sense of public service (that is, service to the
majority) is gradually disappearing.50 This dynamic first stifled and then
eliminated the middle classes, who are supposed to be the vector of
Togo
245
democracy and social progress. Security sector reform would require taking
into account this deep-rooted pathology, which has been identified since the
post colonial period.51
Resistance to reform
SSR was included on the political agenda in July 1991 during the national
conference. Its Commission VI, ‘Defence and Security’, underlined the fact
that the armed forces had been created ‘for the exclusive protection of a
single individual’ and emphasised ‘its excessive politicisation and ethnic
nature, as well as the fact that nepotism [remained] the golden rule.’52 The
commission's recommendations that the military be overhauled were met
with hostility by General Eyadema and fear by many soldiers. In particular, a
recommendation was made for ‘improved military training’ and a reduction
in numbers in order to bring the military within a ‘dimension proportionate
to the size of [the] country’. The gendarmerie was also to be redesigned to
give it its initial vocation of being an auxiliary service of the justice
system.53 These recommendations were poorly received and the FAT rose up
against the population, plunging the country into further turmoil and
emphasising the old divide between the military and the nation that had
obviously not been bridged with the various reconciliation days.
Towards the end of his regime, an ill and weakened General Eyadema
and the military hierarchy, accepted if not to reform, at least to organise
seminars. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament
in Africa regularly organised such seminars for example, between October
2001 and May 2002. The general's son, Faure Gnassingbe took up the baton
in March 2007 and in March and August 2008, when the military and
political parties met to debate their ‘partnership’54 under the auspices of the
American centre for civil-military relations, the German Konrad Adenauer
foundation, the United Nations Population Fund and the International
Committee of the Red Cross.
In the lead up to the presidential elections in 2010, many training
workshops and seminars were organised, as well as awareness raising
campaigns on democracy and good governance: dialogue with the security
and presidential forces; consolidating the competence of magistrates and
even parliamentarians and lawyers, on electoral issues and a refresher from
the West African Network for Peacebuilding, to remind them of their ethical
duties. Without the same means of resistance as his father and under pressure
from the international community, Faure Gnassingbe accepted a reform that
was not likely to offend the military that had placed him in power. Thus, the
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Comi M. Toulabor
draft bill adopted in February 2007 on the status of military personnel
restates the republican and apolitical55 nature of the armed forces, which is
not new because this is already stipulated in the 1992 constitution. The most
important new aspects are the inclusion of women in the military and the
new statutes of the military corps, including the subsidiary material benefits,
not to mention the fact that the delay in formalising the police statute was
also taken into account.56
Potential entry points
Reform can only be successful if the actors concerned are fully involved. For
this purpose, the remaining members of the Association of Democratic
Soldiers who spoke out against the practices of their institution at the
national conference could be the foundation stone of any potentially credible
security sector reform.57 They represent the ‘silent majority’, which is also
found within the gendarmerie and police force and whose spokesperson is
the commander of the gendarmerie, the former minister of interior and
security. His refusal to give his stamp of approval to the election in April
2005 that brought Faure Gnassingbe into power forced him into exile and
made him the central figurehead of the ‘democratic military’.
Within the highly dispersed community of civil society organisations,
the Jeunesse unie pour la démocratie en Afrique (JUDA), the group of
associations against impunity in Togo and the Groupe de réflexion et
d’action pour le dialogue (GRAD), created respectively in 2003 and 2005,
have been making their voices heard. They have published reports on
various topics to educate the general public, question the regime and have
adopted bold positions on a number of sensitive subjects such as corruption,
insecurity, impunity, the high cost of living and youth unemployment. They
have also organised highly successful lecture fora, with external support.
These organisations seem to be playing the traditional role of trade unions,
which are practically prohibited from organising strikes (the last significant
strikes date back to 1992-1993) and are stating demands that the regime has
acknowledged as being justified. JUDA achieved something for the general
good when in March 2008 it condemned the hounding and harassment
inflicted on certain private radio stations and newspapers by the high
authority on audiovisuals and communication, which is in charge of
regulating the media.58 This was also the case when it drew the attention of
the general public and public authorities to cases where law enforcement
agencies shot individuals and then presented them to the media as criminals
without any proof.59 These recurring allegations of extrajudicial executions
Togo
247
put the abolition of the death sentence, adopted on 10 December 2008 and
welcomed by the international community, into a different perspective.
Needless to say, in the coercive environment of a regime that needs a safety
valve, the very existence of the GRAD and JUDA demonstrates the need for
security sector reform and indeed a reform which goes well beyond this
sector alone.
Mention must also be made of the analysis and action group Femme,
démocratie et développement (GF2D)/Centre de recherche d’information et
de formation pour la femme (CRIFF), one of the longest existing civil
society organisations, which was established in 1992 and is still active. The
GF2D/CRIFF, whose members are women from various professional and
political backgrounds, is a network that is working slowly but surely to
promote and defend women's rights and an improved status for Togolese
women.60 It carries out in depth work to promote civic education for rural
and urban populations and attempts to raise awareness among the political
authorities and decision-makers in Togo and other African countries ‘of the
need, as democratic societies are being established, to make the participation
of women in managing public affairs a reality; to educate and mobilise
political parties for the same cause, [and to strive] for the emergence of
women decision-makers in all areas of national life, etc.’
Its field of activity is awareness raising and empowering women by
educating the public on the electoral process, an extremely sensitive subject.
Through its information campaigns and by disseminating publications and
handouts, it provides information to the general public on the right to vote
and the use of this right. This is also one of the rare existing NGOs that
requests that the population assess the impact of its activities. The regime is
therefore understandably suspicious of its activities and exerts pressure on its
members through all sorts of intimidating manoeuvres. Its credibility was
however seriously undermined when it was co-opted into the different
governments of Faure Gnassingbe, who has managed to stifle its thus far
highly appreciated actions.
Conclusion
Security sector reform is an immense, highly complex and long-lasting
undertaking. The major obstacles to be overcome are the predominant role of
the elite and the absence of any institutional control or a social
counterbalance. This relates in fact to the separation and balance of powers
so dear to Locke and Montesquieu, which are necessary steps in moving
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Comi M. Toulabor
away from the political archaism that has been aggravated by the manifest
lack of political will.
SSR must go hand-in-hand with an overhaul of the public
administration system, which is quite deficient, if not inexistent and must be
done both overall and sector by sector. This requires real determination on
the part of the main national actors (particularly the head of state who is also
the head of the armed forces), as well as France whose role in this area
cannot be underestimated, without neglecting the most important issue:
financial means. This way, it would be possible to avoid a repetition of the
case of the ministry of administrative reform, which was established at the
beginning of the 1970s and has since become a vast graveyard of reforms.
Educating society
Because it is lost within the broader context of human rights, associations
fail to make specific demands for the right to security. The concentration of
forms of violence (physical, symbolic, state and societal), has led the
enjoyment of this right to be considered marginal, in a society where the
leaders have brought the population down rather than building it up.
It would be helpful if the few associations that work on the specific
topic could consider coming together to pool their logistic, human and
financial resources, thus doing away with repetitions and needless
competition. This would also enhance the visibility and credibility of their
mission focusing on security rights, which require specific awareness raising
campaigns targeted at the population. There is no doubt that through this,
collective action will finally be effective. This ‘ideological’ work within
society is just as important as the economic aspect of security sector reform.
Short term steps: initiate and carry out security sector reform
The following measures need to be adopted urgently:



Abolish specialised units of the army such as the rapid intervention
force and the presidential guard, as well as militias, which have no
legal existence;
Ensure closer monitoring of the activities of private security
companies, which must not become auxiliaries of the public security
forces;
Apply constitutional standards to the military, namely, submitting to
the ‘regularly established constitutional political authority’ and ensure
Togo



249
that it complies strictly with its assigned functions: territorial defence
and carrying out works of public utility. Overlapping functions
between the gendarmerie and the police force must be clarified;
Increase the numbers of police officers, who must be better trained
and equipped to be able to carry out their missions of ensuring law
and order and security and draft a statute governing the police force;
Reduce the numbers of the gendarmerie, which could be transformed
into an elite intervention unit to deal with cases of armed crime and an
auxiliary service for the justice system, for criminal investigations;
Group the intelligence services together in two distinct departments;
one under the army for military security and the other under the police
force for civilian security. In this case, soldiers and gendarmes must
no longer occupy civilian or political positions as continues to be the
case in spite of a succession of decrees.
The longer term: undertake an in-depth reform of the FAT
This overhaul would include various areas of intervention but must be led by
a ‘rightsizing’ programme:



Establish a five-year freeze on recruitment of ordinary soldiers, many
of whom are currently retiring after 20 years of service, aged only
between 40 and 45 years on average and without any training.
Between 3,000 and 5,000 men are expected to retire during the period
under consideration. They risk to further increase the number of
armed criminals in the country in order to make a living, if they are
not dealt with properly;
At the same time, if they were encouraged to go on early retirement
with the payment of some money, it can be estimated that between
1,000 and 1,500 people would be interested;61
Over the next five years, establish a policy of reorganising and
professionalising with recruits learning both a military and a civilian
profession, which is not the case at the moment.
Security sector reform in Togo is an immense undertaking that cannot
be separated from reform of the state, without which an overhaul of the
sector would be meaningless. The security sector is faced with several
internal challenges that have resulted from the tensions caused by the
‘privatisation’ and ethnic exclusivity of the military institution. These
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Comi M. Toulabor
tensions affect the security/insecurity pair differently for different actors, in
some cases drawing its components closer and in others pulling them apart,
in a situation made even more complex by the reigning impunity. However,
while security sector reform is required, it can only be achieved effectively
with the participation of its actors and the reestablishment of institutional
and social counterbalances. The 40-year dictatorship of General Eyadema,
whose legacy remains pervasive, was based principally on the security
sector. How then can the sector be reformed when the leaders who derive the
greatest benefit from it have no interest in change and only undertake reform
without any conviction, due to international pressure? To quote Michel
Foucault, the effects of the security sector are insidiously, silently, inscribed
on institutions, on political pluralism, on the balance of power, on bodies and
in minds.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
The full text of the agreement is available at : www.icilome.com
The memorandum is available at www.togocity.com/article.php3?id_article=4250
Wen’saa O. Yagla, a former professor at the University of Lome and the ideologist of the
regime, develops and justifies this ‘ideology of revenge’ throughout his book,
L’édification de la nation togolaise (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1978).
See for example Dimitri G. Lavroff, ‘Régimes militaires et développement politique en
Afrique noire’, Revue française de sciences politique 22, no. 5 (October 1972): 973-991;
and especially Bernard Asso, Le chef d’Etat africain: l’expérience des Etats africains de
succession française (Paris: Albatros, 1976), 382.
European Council Decision 2005/599/EC of 21 June 2005 (Cotonou Agreement).
Available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
For example, Amnesty International, ‘Togo: Immunity for killings by the military’. AI
Index: AFR 57/13/93F (London, October 1993); Amnesty International, ‘Togo: Rule of
terror’. AI Index: AFR 57/01/99/F (London, 5 May 1999).
Pepevi A. Lodonou, Le Rassemblement du peuple togolais (RPT): instrument de
légitimation du pouvoir militaire, Phd. Thesis (Bordeaux: S.N., 1988).
Ibid.
Dominique Bangoura, Les armées africaines: 1960-1990 (Paris : CHEAM, 1992).
Mathieu Rigouste, L’ennemi intérieur. Généalogie coloniale et militaire de l’ordre
sécuritaire dans la France contemporaine (Paris, La Découverte, 2009).
The strength of the FAT stricto sensu is estimated at between 7,000 and 14,000, with the
army and the gendarmerie alone representing the majority and occupying pride of place,
well ahead of the air force with its 250 men and the navy, with 200 men. There are about
2,300 to 3,000 police officers and about 400 prefectural guards, 130 forest rangers and
5,000 men who have joined the veterans’ association at the end of international
peacekeeping missions to which Togo contributes regularly. See ‘Togo’ in The Military
Balance 2009 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009); ‘Togo’ in
Togo
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
251
Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments (London: Jane’s, 2009); Tido Brassier, ‘TogoFMI: à propos des consultations 2007’, available at: www.letogolais.com
Tido Brassier, ‘Togo-FMI: à propos des consultations 2007’. Available at:
www.letogolais.com/article.html?nid=3072
Ayayi Togoata Apedo-Amah, ‘Le tribalisme dans l’armée’ (Presentation at the national
conference, Comité d’action contre le tribalisme et le racisme (CATR), Lome, August
1991).
Ibid.
See ‘Les forces de sécurité togolaises renforcent leur effectif’, available at:
www.presidencetogo.com
These former combatants are young enough to blend easily into the student population,
some of them with fake student identity cards.
Nicole Kanhonou, Les Zangbeto, gardiens de nuit (Bordeaux: IEP de Bordeaux, 1992).
Gérard Davet and Fabrice Lhomme, ‘Robert Montoya, un ‘plombier’ en Afrique’, Le
Monde, 11 January 2006; Thomas Hofnung, ‘Robert Montoya rattrapé par ses trafics
d’armes en Afrique’, Libération, 16 December 2005.
See La lettre du continent, 563, 23 April 2009.
European Union, ‘Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union européenne au Togo.
Elections législatives du 14 octobre 2007. Rapport final’. Available at: www.eueomtogo.org
Christian Dubois, ‘La guerre des frères Gnassingbé est ouverte’, 15 April 2009. Available
at: http://www.africatime.com/Togo/
Dimas Dzikodo, ‘Présentation du supposé corps du délit : des armes et beaucoup de
questions sans réponses’, Forum de la semaine, 20 April 2009.
E. Pablo, ‘15 août 2008-15 août 2009: Atsutsé Agbobli’, Liberté Hebdo, 15 August 2009.
Journal officiel de la République togolaise, 2 May 1992.
Journal officiel de la République togolaise, 5 January 1996.
See the Report of the Observatory on Abnormal Practices along the transport corridors
linking Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Togo: ‘Observatory of Abnormal Practices on
Inter-State corridors’, Results for 1 October to 31 December 2008, Accra, 2009.
Watch the video at
http://www.youtube.com/user/TOGOISBACKTV#p/search/0/RGPQTQ9njjQ.
Lambert Attiso, ‘Projet PARCI : Le document validé mardi lors d’un atelier à Lomé’,
Savoir News, 30 September 2009. Available at: http://www.icilome.com
La Lettre du continent, 479, 6 October 2005.
‘Faure Gnassingbé coupe des têtes au sein des Forces armées togolaises’. Available at :
www.focusinfos.com
Luc Abaki, ‘Ali Nadjombe : « Préparer nos soldats pour le Darfour »’, République
Togolaise, 20 February 2008. Available at: www.republicoftogo.com
‘Fronde des lieutenants’, Politique Hebdo, 25 March 1971.
Dimas Dzikodo, ‘Analyse du rapport Gnofame. Le cœur du pouvoir est-il impliqué dans
le trafic de drogue ?’, Forum de la semaine, 6 July 2006.
See ‘Togo-inondations: incurie du gouvernement qui prend l’eau de toutes parts!’, 17 July
2009. Available at : http://togo-presse-liberte.over-blog.com/article-33930039.html
See Communiqué from the Council of Ministers, 7 August 2008. Available at:
http://www.tvt.tg
252
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
Comi M. Toulabor
See the various definitions of this concept in Fen Olser Hampson, John B. Hay et al., ‘The
Many Meanings of Human Security’, Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and
World Disorder (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
A few headlines from the local press: ‘Vive les voleurs et hommes à la machette’, Tingo
Tingo, 15 October 2008; ‘Deux braqueurs arrêtés et brûlés vifs’, Le Canard, 7 November
2008; ‘Hier à Totsi, un voleur a échappé à la mort’, L’Indépendant Express, 11 November
2008; ‘Quatre présumés voleurs soumis à la vindicte populaire’, Xinhua; 17 March 2009.
General Eyadema, as quoted by Minister of Interior Théodore Laclé, in Livre Blanc, La
vérité sur les complots contre le people togolais et son guide le général Eyadéma (Paris:
ABC, 1980), 9.
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights - Impunity, Report of the Secretary-General, Document No. E/CN.4/2006/89, para.
41, 15 February 2006.
See an article by D. Sylvestre in L’Union, 30 August 2008, which describes the
dysfunctions of the Togolese parliament.
See Agbeyome Messan Kodjo, ‘Déclaration d’Agbeyome Kodjo: Il est temps d’espérer’,
Le Togolais, 2 July 2002. Available at: www.letogolais.com
See M. A., ‘Turbulences à la justice de Lomé’, Liberté Hebdo, 13 November 2008.
See ‘Le Pouvoir Judiciaire togolais’, available at: www.presidencetogo.com
See ‘Appui au Programme de Modernisation de la Justice (APJU)’. Available at:
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr
Raphaël De Benito, ‘Togo: le don que l’œil de la justice ne verra sans doute pas’, Billet
d’Afrique et d’ailleurs, no. 158, May 2007.
See ‘Leurre: la réforme de la justice togolaise selon la logique du système RPT’, Forum
de la semaine, 17 December 2008.
See ‘Politique: la réforme de la justice togolaise à l’épreuve de la duplicité du pouvoir’,
Forum de la semaine, 18 December 2008.
For further details on the CNDH, see Human Rights Watch, ‘Les Commissions
gouvernementales des droits de l’homme en Afrique: protecteurs ou prétendus
protecteurs? Togo. Commission nationale des droits de l’homme’, 2001. Available at:
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/reports/hrc/togo.html.
Dominique Darbon, ‘De l’introuvable à l’innommable: fonctionnaires et professionnels de
l’action publique dans les Afriques’, Autrepart, no. 20 (2001): 27- 42.
See Nadim Michel Kalife, Pourquoi le Togo va si mal? Un schéma de sortie de crise
(Lomé: Roitelet d’Afrique, 2008).
On these issues, see ‘Réformes des Etats africains’, L’Afrique politique 2001 (Paris:
Karthala, 2001); See also Achille Mbembé, De la postcolonie: essai sur l’imagination
politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine (Paris: Karthala, 2000).
See Banafey Assih, ‘Conférence nationale souveraine’, La Nouvelle marche, 16 August
1991.
Ibid.
Alain Nococo, ‘L’Etat de droit au Togo: partis politiques et forces armées en séminaire de
formation à Lomé’, AgoraPress, 25 August 2008. Available at: http://togoforum.com
See http://www.republicoftogo.com/central.php?o=5&s=79&d=3&i=272.
R. Kédjagni, ‘Maintien de l’ordre public: statu quo sur les réformes de la police nationale
togolaise’, Liberté Hebdo, 20 August 2008.
Togo
57
58
59
60
61
253
See ‘Conférence nationale souveraine: l’horreur à son comble’, La Nouvelle marche, 9
August 1991.
JUDA, ‘Restriction inacceptable à la liberté d’expression au Togo’, Communiqué, 6
March 2008.
JUDA, ‘Des exécutions sommaires et extrajudiciaires au Togo’, Statement, 20 February
2009.
GF2D/CRIFF, Etudes d’impact des services juridiques du GF2D en direction des femmes
au Togo (Lomé, June 1999).
Applying these two measures to the plethoric army of 12,000 men will bring about a
minimum reduction of 4,000 men (3,000 and 1,000), i.e. a corps of 8,000 men and a
maximum reduction of 6,500 (5,000 and 1,500); i.e. 5,500 men in military service. Over
five years, the complement of the military would be reduced to between 5,500 and 8,000
men, a relatively acceptable size in line with the size of the country’s population. This
number is more than enough to carry out its national defence functions and additionally
participate in UN peacekeeping missions. This would also make it possible to provide
quality equipment to this army that is vulnerable in all ways and lacks just about
everything.