Computer Science Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks Stephen Thomas Acknowledgement: Portions of this presentation have been donated by Dr. David Evans Situation: Ad Hoc Beacon Routing 1 0 2 3 Nodes select parents based on minimum hops to base station Computer Science 4 Wormhole Attack B A C D S Y X Attacker needs a transceivers at two locations in the network, connected by a low latency link Attacker replays (selectively) packets heard at one location at the other location Computer Science Wormhole Attack on Beacon Routing 1 0 2 2 1 0 X Wormhole attack disrupts network without needing to break any cryptography! Computer Science Y Possible Solutions • Packet Leashes [Hu, Perrig, Johnson 2003] – Requires tightly synchronized clocks (temporal leashes) or precise location information (geographic leashes) – Signal is transmitted at speed of light – Calculate if packet could travel distance between nodes in packet lifetime • Packet Arrival Direction Computer Science Directional Antennas 3 2 4 1 5 Directional Transmission from Zone 4 Computer Science North 6 Aligned to magnetic North, so zone 1 always faces East Omnidirectional Transmission General benefits: power saving, less collisions Assumptions • Legitimate nodes can establish secure node-node links – All critical messages are encrypted • Network is fairly dense • Nodes are stationary • Most links are bidirectional (unidirectional links cannot be established) • Transmissions are perfect wedges • Nodes are aligned perfectly (relaxed in paper) Computer Science Directional Neighbor Discovery 3 2 B 4 A 5 1. A Region 2. B A 3. A B 1 6 zone (B, A) = 4 is the antenna zone in which B hears A HELLO | IDA Sent by all antenna elements (sweeping) IDB | EKBA (IDA | R | zone (B, A)) Sent by zone (B, A) element, R is nonce R Checks zone is opposite, sent by zone (A, B) Computer Science Not Detecting False Neighbors 3 2 4 1 5 A X zone (A, B [X]) = 1 Y B zone (B, A[Y]) = 4 Undetected False Neighbor: zone (A, B) = opposite of zone (B, A) Directional neighbor discovery prevents 1/6 of false direct links…but doesn’t prevent disruption Computer Science 6 Verified Neighbor Discovery V A 1. A Region 2. B A 3. A B 5. IDV | EKBV (IDA | zone (V, B)) B 4. INQUIRY | IDB | IDA | zone (B, A) Announcement, done through sequential sweeping Include nonce and zone information in the message Check zone information and send back the nonce 4. B Region 5. V B 6. B A Same as before Request for verifier to validate A If V is a valid verifier, sends confirmation Accept A as its neighbor and notify A Computer Science Verifier Analysis 3 3v 2 1 4 X A 5 6 Region 1 4 2 B 1 Y 5 6 Region 2 Wormhole cannot trick a valid verifier: zone (V, A [Y]) = 5 Not opposites: verification fails zone (A, V [X]) = 1 Computer Science Worawannotai Attack v 3 3 2 2 B 4 5 1 X A 6 Region 1 5 6 Region 2 Computer Science V hears A and B directly A and B hear V directly But, A and B hear each other only through repeated X Preventing Attack 1. zone (B, A) zone (B, V) 2. zone (B, A) zone (V, A) 3. zone (B, V) cannot be both adjacent to zone (B, A) and adjacent to zone (V, A) Computer Science Connectivity and Routing 10 Network with density = 10 9 Average Path Length 8 7 Strict Protocol Verified protocol: 0.5% links are lost no nodes disconnected Strict protocol: 40% links are lost 0.03% nodes disconnected 20% path increase from verified 6 Verified Protocol 5 4 Trust All 3 2 1 0 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Omnidirectional Node Density Computer Science 18 20 Vulnerabilities • Attacker with multiple wormhole endpoints – Can create packets coming from different directions to appear neighborly • Magnet Attacks – Protocol depends on compass alignment of nodes • Antenna, orientation inaccuracies – Real transmissions are not perfect wedges Computer Science Conclusion • An attacker with few resources and no crypto keys can substantially disrupt a network with a wormhole attack • If you know your neighbors, can detect wormhole • Need to cooperate with your neighbors to know who your legitimate neighbors are Computer Science Future Work • Analysis of protocol vulnerabilities to other attacks – Magnet for disruption (not pertaining to wormhole attacks) – Flipping nodes to disorient north from south • Expand protocol to handle dynamic ad hoc networks Computer Science Thank you! Questions? Computer Science