Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Defence Budget Analysis TEODORA FUIOR What is the State Budget? Allocation of resources for the fulfilment of purposes: SECURITY FREEDOM JUSTICE WEALTH 2 WHY a Role for Parliament? “Taxation without representation is tyranny”, James Otis, 1761 To represent people and foster consensus on budgetary choices To influence national strategy and policy “The state will perish when legislative power is more corrupt than executive power.” Montesquieu, 1748. To ensure accountability and transparency 3 WHEN to play a role? 1. Formulation Ex-ante facto 4. Evaluation Ex-post facto Budget cycle 2. Approval 3. Execution 4 Budget Formulation appropriate, affordable, acceptable Actors : Actions: Executive Budget proposal Parliament Government Policy National Security Strategy Multi-annual budgets Motions Recommendations 5 Budget Approval government proposes, parliament disposes Actors: Actions: Specialized Committees Budget Committee Amend the budget proposal Plenary Adopts the Budget Law 6 Budget Execution Actors: Actions: MPs Questions, interpellations Committees, Public Accounts Committee Hearings, Inquiries, Reports National Audit Office Plenary Reports to Parliament Motions, Recommendations 7 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Role of Southeas Asian Parliaments in Defense Budgeting (results of survey 2008) Questionnaire – distributed to 5 countries • • • • • • • 38 questions investigating: Legal framework Budgeting system, actors and format Level and priorities Public accountability Public auditing Role of parliament Respondent’s personal opinions Legal Framework commonalities • Defence budget is part of State Budget Law • Constitution provides for a role of parliament in budget Relevant legislation adopted Legislation on: CB •National Audit Office •Anti-corruption and fraud •Freedom of information •Official state secrets •Defence procurement •Compensation/ off-set clauses X - ID MY PH TH X X X - X X X X X X X X X X - Budgeting System CB ID MY PH TH Performace based - X X X Input based X - X - Information on line items - - X X Actors involved CB ID MY Most Influential PM, MD, PP PM, MF Moderately influential MF, CS, P, DI, IG M MD, CS HS PP Not influential No role PH TH HS,P PM M P MD, P DI CS,P MD, P MF, PP, M, IG P, M MF CS DI, IG HS Defence spending levels (2005, US$m) CB ID Defence Budget DE - US$ per capita 111 2470 2470 837 2021 259, 112 111 8437 2930 837 2021 259, 112 8 37 122 10 31 457 DE - % of GDP 2 Defence Expenditure 3 MY 2.3 PH TH 0.8 1.1 EU 1.8 Public Accountabilitycommonalities • Reduced /selective public interest in defence budget issues • Reduced public expertise • NAO has legal framework • NAO assesses legality of spending • NAO reports to parliament and government Public accountability & audit CB ID MY PH TH Defence budget is a public document Information is revealed on request (Freedom of Information Act) NAO director is appointed by parliament NAO has sufficient resources/ independence/ information NAO reports are public - X X X - - - X - - X X - - X X - X X X Role of parliament commonalities • No involvement in budget formulation • Approve budget proposal • No formal role in defence procurement but MD provides info if requested • No approval for international missions budget • Limited use of external expertise • Limited access to secret budgets Parliament role & powers CB ID MY PH TH Approves rectifications - - - - Access to classified info - - - - Has a Defence Committee ? - X X Use of Hearings X - X X Use of questions X X X X Use of field visits - - - X Time spend to approve budget (days) ? 20 90 60 NAO director appointment - - X X Challenges - commonalities • Insufficient parliamentary expertise • Insufficient public awareness of the importance of defence issues • Insufficient executive transparency • Corruption in defence sector Respondents opinion commonalities • More parliamentary involvement is necessary • Important procurement contracts should be approved by parliament • More political will is essential!