\"llLFRID SELLARS 1 fJ.1HEORY OF LANGUAGE
\1
lu\!D 'l'HE PROBLEH OF' INTBl,:ttl'IONALI'l"'.{
I-'\ the~d.s submitted
in p<:1.rtial satisfaction of the
requir<::ments for the degree of Master of Art.~~ in
Philosophy
by
•.:r OS("!ph
!•landeD.K\r:g
-
June, 1978
CAl.IFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,
ii
l~OR~t'HRIOOE
Ab!;.tract ~
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In·trod.uction.
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The Psychological Thesis of Intentionality ••
I I I ..
Intentionality and Overt Verbal Behavior .... o~··
20
IV.
A Possible Objection to the
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Select(c!d Bibliography • ., .......... ,• • ~ ...... ., • .. • • • ..
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ABS TRJ.I.CT
WiLFRID SELLARS 8 THEORY 0!'' LA}'IGUAGE
by
Joseph Ma.ndelberg
.Master of Arts in Philosophy
The ccn>.troversy bet\.<Jeen the scienti f:tc realism of
Wilfrid Sellars and the Brentano-Chisholm psychological
thes:ts of intentionality is evaluated in te:.nns of their
explication of the notion of meaning in the context
.. • means
_ ..
fl
The intentionality thesis holds that the language we
use to describe or express mental phenomena such as beliefs" wishes, hopes, desires, etc.,, cannot be reduced to
~
c.:x: translated into a no:nmental or physicalist language.
Thus there are certain criteria which language
e~tpress
UEH:~d
to
or describe mental phenomena meets, but which
iv
language used to describe nonmental phenomena
f~dls
to
mee-L · These criteria then, constitute reliable standards
:Eor di.stingu:i.sh.ing the mental from the no:nmental..
The
intentionality thesis is therefore construed as a defense
of m.:t).'ld-body dualism and, while conceiving language to be
primarily the expression of though'c.., as providing no causal
account of ·thought ..
sciel1.tific real:tsr:n of Wilf:cid Sellars is
'I'~'he
con6~
· st:rued as an attempt to provide a causal account. of
l'hus Sellars' argum.errt is not directed against
1
thcnJ.<_:Iht o
the criteria established by the intention.ality thesis, but
towards euggest:Ltig non;,nental
~ou.rces
for the intentionality
Sellars does not deny t.hat an intentional
1 an.gu.;.! gc~
.
:t s
proper for describing or expressing mental
phenomenag but claims that once the semantical nature
of tl1is language is understood, it will be seen to be
c01npat:i.ble with a metalinguistic vocabulary that pe:rta:L:ns
fund~nentally
to overt verbal behavior.
Such compati-
bili.ty would help explain both the phenomena of mental
acts and mental actions and the propriety of an inten-
tional language in behaviorism.
v
La.ngua9e -- in the sense of overt linguistic beh~.vior ~D-·
and thought are so intimately related that any
plausible theo:t-y of language is bound to shed some light
on. the extrer11ely complex philosophical problem of t.he
la:tion between. mind and body..
DeBpite
wh.t:-~t
re~
seem to be
mm1'i.'im.e:ntal difficulties in defend.:i.ng dualistic theories of
rnind ar.td body and a widespread desire fi:om a F;ciant:!.f:i.c
vif3'1r;point to be rid of such notions,
persisted in one form or other..
th~se
theories have
'I"his persistence may be
traced t:o a continuat·.ion. o:t: the classi.cal
vie\~;'
in modern.
inheritors of Ca.rtesianism and classical empiricism that.
thought is prior to language: that lanquage is to be unders:rt.ood prirnarily as an
!Jfe.res~~
of thought..
For the
elassical empiricist, this notion stems from the view that
thoughts are, or are derived from, idaas which
1mpressions znade upon us by the external world.,
can~
from
Thus, the
classical empiricist as v.rell as the Cartesian assirrd.lates
sensations, feelings and thoughts, converting them into
purely mental phenomena to which the individual has com-
plete private access..
On this view :L t v.rould be absurd for
l
a:n incH. vidual to have a thought and not be a\¥are that he
he;.d one, or.· to Qexpx·ess a thought 63 in language and be unav.rare that he was thir.Jd.ng.
Such viEn...rs lead di:rectly to solipsism; and philo-
sophical behaviorism, which can be understood as a development in empiricism analogour;> to
count.er~t.heory..
phenomenalism~
arose as a
Philosophicac\l behaviorism, hovle.rver 11 in-
sd:ead of reversing the classical view of the relation of
thought to language \V'hile st:ill pex1.nit:ting private access
to thoughts ultimat•r:lly derived from language
-~
a vie'\!
that \'lould at least have smne intuitive force l::H3h:.i.nd it
to6.k the radical position of denying all privacy of a
~~-
the la.nguage of beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes,
reasons, etc. -- philosophical behaviorism holds tlu:.t all
EHJ.ch
•'~nt~ntal ~
terms can be analyzed in terms of beJhavi.or.
This implies th;:;\t all so-called mental fJtates are really
foxms of behs.vior and there fore overt and publicly observable..
'J!hur:::" since it makes no sense to talk about
entiti!f.ts vihich cannot be observed, mental states must be
regarded as "constructs" out of behavior.
The psychological thesis of intentionality with
\<-l~dch
t.his paper is concerned, and \.fhich vlilfrid Sellars 1
3
them.-y of language must x·efu.te if it is to challenge
dualist.ic mind,-body theories, must be seen as the answer
of the classical view to philosophical behaviorism$
The
thesis, as stated by Brentano and developed and refined
by Chisholm, seems, on its surface,
a powerful argu_ment
in favor of the vie\v that the mental cannot be reduced
tc i:he nonmental; that the language we use to describe or
exp:r:ess merJ.tal phenomena such as beliefs, wishes, hopes,
de~;;.ires
j'
E~tc ..
1
cannot be reduced to or i;ranslatt.'!!d. into a
nonr_n(;=.ntE:-1 or physicalist
language..
Its strength 11 ho\V"ever 6
lies in its confrontation wH.:h a philosophical behaviorism
that :ts uax:rowly conceived ..
Sellc:ct:l' argr.unent against the intentionality thesis
is neither a defense of philosophical behaviorism nor an
att.empt to prove that the language used to describe mental
phenomena can be reduced to a nonmental or physicalist
onee
Thus, he by no means wishes to abandon that core of
the intentionality thesis that seems to have the srtr<:.m.gth
of intuition and common sense behind it:
My immediate problem. is to see if I can recc;n-
cile the classical view of thoughts as iruLer
episodes which are neither overt behavior nor
verbal imagery and which are properly referred
to in terms of the vocabula.ry of intentionality,
with the idea that the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical categories
pertainil1.g to overt ve:~:;bal perfo:onances.l
4
Sellars' argument, rather, goes to the heart of th.e
:i.ntentionali ty thesis:
i t:s repetitior1 of the classical
empiricist and Cartesian mistake of forcing a \vedge
between language and thought; of making thought prior to
and supreme over language.
But his argument seems to me
to have v.rider applicatio11. tha.n that desc:d.bed in t.his
paper..
To the extent that thought: is conceived as prior
to language in ideational, cormn:unication and social
theorie.-3 of language, to
th~;).t
e,~ct
extent Sellars' a:cgm11C:nts
against tha intentionf<lity thesis are applica.ble to these
theories as \"!ella
l1y purpose in this paper is to desc:t~.i.be the cc.ntro~·
versy be·tween Sellars and Chisholm as ref'lected in their
correspondence published in ll!Intent.ionality and the
~lentall<',.
ment.
2
and to evaluate the success of Sellars' arqttm
Sect.io11 II is concerned with a presentation of the
Brentan.o-Chisholm thesis of intent.ion.ali ty.,
Th.e purpose
of Section II is not only to p:covide a background to the
controversy, but to indicate that the surface
sophisti~
cation and subtlety of the intentionality thesis seems to
hide a basic 'liveakness -- its great difficulty in being
formulated coherently.
But if this difficulty is not
symptomatic of a fundamental error in conception, the
thesis dem.onstrates the kind c>f argument that would have
to be faced if a Sellars:i.an type of argument fails.
Sec-
tion III deals vli th t.he controversy proper, and Sellars'
synthesis in terms of a methodological
behaviorism~
In
Section IV I shall exarni:ne a possible argument that might
be made against Sellars' theory and how this argt.1ment
might be
answered~
6
In contrast with philosophical behaviorism, and
indeed with any behaviox-istic theory, th{'! psychological
tht~sis
of intentionality (hereaft:er refe:x.·red to as. "the
thesis") holds t:.b:.at
intent:ionalit~y
is a characteristic
vlhich is pE:culiar to certain mental phenornena, in particulc;.r conceptual thinldng, a.nd under proper analysis
px:ovides criteria by which
cer~cain
properties of concep-
tucll thought" since they cannot be :!:educed to or asso·ciab:!d vd th physical ox· nonmental phenomena, must there-
.A.ll mental act:i v.ity above t.he level of mere sensoxy
consciousness
~qu'!;;,
~.seems
some·thing..
that is
a
to have the characteristic of being
It is this characteristic of
~o.:g~~r!
mental activity's intentionality ..
A defense of the thesis is best made from the stand-
point:. of language use -- specifically, the language used
to
dE~scribe
psychological phenomena -- but first the
concept of intentionality as exhibited in language use
ne~=.ds
to he
clarified~
Since,
f:~:·om
the viev1point I am
t.::onsidering, language is the expression of thought, every
sentence reflects the abontness of the thought it expr.essese
Thus the
~h£U~~~
expressed by the two sentences
(1)
Socrates is wise
(2)
Jones believes that Socrates is wise
are both about something; both are intentional..
However,
sentence (2) is to be distinguished from sentence (1) in
that the forrner ey.hibi ts what may be termed an
tional
use'~
ill
inten-
of language vvhereas the latter does not..
Sen.~
tenc:e (2) raay be said to e:xpress a ''-b'llo=fold aboutness Iii 1
bei11,g about a belief which in turn is about sornething..
In
sentence (2), moreover, vJe may discern that its primary
~tabcH:rtn%~~•s&'
cor.;.cerns the mental phenomenon of belief,
while it:s seco11dary
beli.(~ f,
~aboutness"
concerns the object of that
nrunely that. Socrates is wise.
It is this in·ten-
tional use of langua9e that is held by the proponen.t:s of
the thesis to be necessary to desc:t:ibe physical or llonpsychological phenomenao
Thus, a sentence V.Jhich truly
describes a psychological phenomenon is said to
ipten~i9R§bl ~e~,
ar~
b*.~
an
one of the criteria for being an
intentional sentence is that the sentence features an
intentional use of language.
in~ediately
3
So sentence (1) is
ruled out as an intentional sentence, whereas
sentence (2) eJiliibits at least one of the criteria for
being an intentional sentence.,
Thus to describe ouch
mm.1tal activity as believing, desiring, intending, loving,
hating, reasoning and the like involves at least an inten-
tional use of languageo
Intentional sen·tences then, are held to have certain
logical properties which sentences used to describe nonpsychological phenomena do not havea
Ho"VIever, it has
turned out to be a rather difficult enterprise to esta-
blish \vha.t i exactly
are.
Q
the crit.eria for intentional zentences
'rhe difficulty lies in the fact that an intent.iona1
use of language may be contained in sentences that describe
nonpsychological
ph<:~nomenae
'rhus, in ·the course of itm
dev81opment under Chisholm, the thesis has had to revise
con.t"d.dE~rably
it:s cor1cept of intention;;.1.l.i.ty to weed out
those mental phenornena that turned out to have obvious
. ]
. 'I, SOC1a.
•
J 1:JedaV10~e
1
•
4
W1tti
1 1DtS
culty to
bt3
Since I believe this diffi-
h::i..ghly significant for the purposes of this
essay, I will desc:eibe bot.h the early criteria of
inten~
tional sente11.ces as stated in 1'Sentences about Believingt'
and their later development in
'~on
Some Psychological
. 0 o f -Lntent1onal1ty
.
.
ti8
6
Concep t s and t h e 'Log1c
5
What is
e8pecially noteworthy about the attempt to establish
criteria for intentional sentences is that in an age so
5
9
thouqht was given to the, possib:i.li ty of a common. origin
for bc;th kinds of sentences thr:tt: exhibit an int.ent:ional
use of language; :Le., those that a:re strictly about
mental phenomena and those that are not.
In nsentences about Believin.g 18 and essays of the
7
sarae period, any simple declarative sentence is held to be
intenti.on;:~.l
if it meets at least one of three criteria.,
The fi:r.si.: criterion :Ls rnet: by a sentence if tha'c senten.ce
uses
~'
/)(,c
st.1bstanti va Ei:x;}.?ression (a name or description) in
such a vl'ay t:ha·t neit.her the sentence nor its negation implies either that t.he::r:-e is o:r:· is not soinething to vlhich
the SlJ.bstanti.ve expression. applies..
'rhus of the two
se11~
tences
(a)
He is thh1king of the Dnieper Dam
(b)
Their car lacks a spare wheel
sentence (a} is intent.ional since neither it nor it:s
negat.ion implies there is or is not such a dar.:1, whe:r·eas
sent:ence (b) is no·t in·tentional since its negation implies
there is a spare wheel somewhereg
~1e
second criterion is met by certain simple
declarative sentences the principal ·verb of which takes
as i.t.s object a phrase containing a subordinate verb
in
such a v..ray that the suborclina.te phrase can be treated
prepositionally.
Such sentences are said to be inten-
tional if neither the sentence nor its negation implies
either that. the subordinate phrase, treated proposition...
ally, is true or that it is false..
Thus of the tvm
following sentences
~1emtence
(c)
He accused John of stealing the money
(d)
He prevented J'ohn from stealing the money
(c) is :tnte:nticJnal because neith.er it nor its
ne<;Fltion implies John did or did not
stE~al
the money 1
while (d) is not intentional, sir.1.ce it implies John did
not st:eaJ. the moneye
The third criterion mal-.:es use of F'rege • s concept of
~~tindixe:ct
re:EerenceuG
A simple declarative sentence meets
this criterion of intentionality if it contains a narne or
description which has an indirect referel7.ce in that sent.ence.
'f'ne criterion is stated by Cb.isholm as follovJs:
If E is a sentence obtained merely by putting
the identity sign bet1.veen tvlo naHJ.es or descriptions of the same thing, if A is a sentence using one of these nrunes or descriptions,
if B is like A except that where A uses the one
na\me or description B uses the other, then the
one natne or d(!Scription may be said to have an
in£!,pact.:. ~~~2e in A provided the conjunction
of A and E does not imply B.8
To illustrate this criterion, suppose the sentences
i)
E3
A and B are as follows:
E:
George El:i.ot = Mary Ann Evan.s
A:
Tom knm.vs that
Marner 1
B:
Tom knm-v's that 1'1ary Arm Evans wrote • Sila_s
Marner 1
Geo:~:ge
Eliot wrote
1
Silas
Sen'ct'3nce A is intentional because in it "George Eliot"
has indirect reference ..
Fi11ally, a compound declarat:i ve sentence is said to
be intentional if and only if one or more of its component
sentences is in:te:ntional according to t.he above criteriao
With the above criteria in hand, the thesis may be
formulated under the follo\iling tv?o tenets (Hereafter I
shall use the terms
guage..,, to mean the
u int:entional u
and ttintentional
i~;L, .Y§!?..
lan~
of language as des-
cribed above):
to describe nonpsychological or
~physical~
phenomenao
All
that is known or believed about nonpsychological phenomena
rr,a.y be .:n-::presse,d in language vJhich is not intentional.
(2)
'fhere. is a class of psychological phenomena,
1.'iamely a. class that includes believing, knowing, \vanting,
hoping, intending, reasoning and tb.e like v.rhich can be
described only by either
•
12
(a)
using language which is intentional, or
(b)
using a vocabulary which is not needed to
describe nonpsychological or
"physical'~
phenomena.
~~at
is to be understood under the first tenet is
not that intentional
lan~JUage
cannot be used to describe
n.ox.1p!':-:!ychological phenomena, but that any intent:Lon.al language so used can readily be transformed into language
~:hat
is not intentional..
nnonp~1ychological m
In other
s<~nt:ence
v.rord~:; c
any
o~tensibly
that is intentional can be
transfonued into a sentence that is either not intentional
or else a sentence that is upsychologicalo"
vfuat. is to be understood under the second tenet in
that if an attempt: is made to avoid the int:.entiol"lal use
of language in talking about perceiving, believing,
expecting and the like, a vocabular<.t is needed '\·Jhich is n.ot.
needed in talking about nonpsychological factse
Thus
suppose in order to avoid intentional language, we were to
take the psychological verb
e~expects«
and its object
~~food~'
in the sentence •Hrhe rat expects food, " and devise the .
technical term
m~food-expE:~ctant.,
111
Then we may supposedly
describe the rat as being "food-expectant 111 or ha.ving e.
~;ood·
expectancyo"
The sentence
~I
perceive a cat 111 , by
13
the same formula, becomes •ir am cat-perceptive .. "
By the
voca~·
second tenet of the thesis not only ar·e v.re using a
bulary t.hat is not needed to describe nonpsychological
phenomena, but in order to
E~xplicate
this vocabulary we
mu.st make use of intentional language again.,
As indicated earlier, the dif:f:iculty \vith this
version of t.he ·thesis is its failure to deal
'll;.ri th
ar(:1!
t.he
int~en·tional
nonp~zychological..
c:~dequately
use of language in SEH1tences t.hat
Tl1e thesis breaks down if we attempt:
to use the third criterion, that of
~Wi,.nd:i.rect
reference,
to de·tel.!aine vlhether a sentence :i.s intentional..
till
Using
the criterion, sent;.ences exh.ibiting refere11.t:i.al opacity
and not1.ext.ensio:nal occurrence 'V'lould turn out to be intentional although they might be nonpsychologlcal..
9
For
exmnple, suppose:
E:
Tl'Le nmnber of planets
A:
It is necessarily ·true that 9 is greater
than 7 ..
B:
It is necessarily true that the number of
planets is greater than 7 ..
~
9
By the third criterion, sentence l\ is int:entional: but it
is n.o11psycholo9i. ca.l..
The failure of the criteria of in-
te:ntionality, with r(sspect, for example, to sentences
containing
11
ought" as well as .unecessaryu, led to the
14
sug-gestion -- by· l\lonzo Church 10 among others
·that intentional language can be characterized
only aB intensional language having a psychological subject matter., If this suggeHtion is
trueu t:hen we can.not claim any pal~ticu.lar significnn.ce for the thesis that int,::nti.onal langu.age pertains to the psychologicaloll
The suggest.ion led, rather, to the search for neftv
c:citeria and the subsequ.ent development of tv/0,
criterion rno.y be tenl'tOd a
~~crH:~rion
The first
of contingencyll1 and
proceeds wit:h an examina.tio:n of the propositional clausew
of ordinary English, or 8-itha.t IJll clauses.,
in parentheses o
there are
'rhus the sentence
tigers~~
tenc!;:l is te:rmed a
"~Jon.es
becomes l'IJones believes
'~simple
Suppose
\'le
bel:i.eves that
(then~
sentence prefix .. "
are
In Chisholm's
words:
A simple sentence pre fix may b.e said i.:o be an
expression that contains no proper part that
is logically equivalent to a E:H.~ntence m: to a
senb:;nce function and that is such that the
result of prefixing it to a sentence in paren..~
theses is another sent:enceo i1V'e may say that a
simple sentence prefix M is intent.ional if, for
eve~y sentence E' ~ is logi;ally~~tingentol2
Thus such phrases as "it is impossible" and *1 it :i.s
right 11 are
ll(.)t
intentionaL.
a sentence that is
The first, when prefixed to
contradictoL~,
yields a sentence that
15
is necessaz:y and therefore not contingent..
The second
ma.y be prefixed to a sentence to yield one that is selfcont:radictory and therefore not contingent.
Hov1ever, v1ith
regard to such simple sentence prefixes as ll!IJ·ones believest~,
00
Jones desiresu, or
~!Jones
questions 11 , every
sentence to which they are prefixed 0 whether that sentence
vms log:i.c.:dly contingent: or not, result.s in a logically
cont.ingent sentE;nwe.
l1)gica1 phenomena to
This critE.n:-ion thus enables psychobfl
dig·tinguished front nonpsycho-
logical phenoxn.ena as follovnJ:
an a.dequ.a.te description
of psychological phenomena requires the use of intentional
prefixes ..
fl'he cri.t<:;;rion thus understood establishes a :nt::?.cessary
but not sufficient condition for the determination that a
sentence is :i.ntentioi1.al..
Th.e secm1d criterion. establishes
a logical relationship among four related sentencet;; that
is
uni~1e
for intentional sentences, and thus amounts to
a sufficient condition for a sentence's intentionalityo
Suppose we consider some universally quantified sentence,
for example ' 1 For every
a tJ=statement..
~,
3S. is material, e• and term this
We term the corresponding e::Kistentially
quantified sentence, "'fl1ere exists an
·,
\\.
:ma:terl.al ~ an E-statement o
~
such that 2£ is
Now consider the intentional
16
prefix "Jon(;il'S believesu ~
~ve
insert this prefix in both
the U-statement and the E-statement so a.s to form four
quantified statements, UC, UD, EC and ED, as follows:
(1}
UC vvill be the reE:n.:Alt of inserting ' 1 Jo.nes
believes rn at the beginning of a U-st.ate-·
ment.,
(2)
UD will be the result of inserting UiJonet'l
believes 11 immediately after the quantifier
of a U-state1nerri: ~
( 3)
EC \'lill ba the result of inserting
belic.wes" at
the.~
beginning of
~1:n
111
Jone£'t
E-st.ate-
ment ..
(4)
ED will be the result. of inserting ~~Jones
believes" irtunediately after the quantifier
of an E-statementel3
The resultant statertrents
UC:
cU:'c£.~
as follmvs:
Jones believes that for every 2£ 1 .2i is
material.,
UD:
For every .?£, Jones believes tha:t 2f is
material"
EC:
,Jones believes that there exists an lf. such
that 1£ is material.,
ED:
The:ce exists an. .?f such that Jones believes
that
~
is
material~
According to Chisholm, these sentences are related
(l)
Neither UC nor EC implies any of the other
statements.
(2)
UD implies EC and ED but not
uc .
17
(3)
Ho'""~~ver,
chztsed
~d.:
BD implies
this
gc
but neithE;r
uniquener.:.~s
a considerable price..
uc
nor trD .. 14
seems to have been purThe pattern seems to
hold for ~~Ji~yj~g and also for l9l9~~~ but not for such
concepts muong others, formerly thought i:o be psycho1.ogical 1
Nor does it hold for the modalities of
s~g 9
for the deont:Lc
modalit:tl':~s,
nor the causal modalities ..
From an extensio.nalist (Quinian) point of view, the
obvious
critici~m
to be leveled a.t this c:d.terion is that
it is illegitimate to quantify into opaq·ue contexts..
legitim.acy of doing
BO
is
def<r~nded
Th-;;
by Chishohn; hov.tever
the point is a co:n:t:roversia.l one, and since it is noi.:
relevant to ·the problem that intentionality presents to
the Sellar.sian theory I am
ex~nining
Qu:tnian extens:tonal.ist at any rate),
it..
(Sellars is not a
I
will not discuss
If Sellars' theory of language (a:nd thm.Jp thil1king)
is to be successfully defended, it must have an answer to
th~~
psychological thesis of intentionality
ba~:;ed
on c:d.-
teria. other than those of a strict empiricism ..
However, the threat that the thesis holds for em-
p-l.r:lcism should not be mlderestimatedo
Even if it turned
18
p •
the result -vwuld be devastating for empirical science:
~ ., "Chisholm • s views about: the irreducibly nonexte-miido:nal character of discourse about psycho=
logical phenomo€~na are <~xtn~mely explo~ive. If
the language of science .-ii1 ideally extensional,
Chisholrrt• s vievl has the consequenceJ ·that a
science of psychology ···- to the ~:lxtent tlu~t it
:ts a science of the mental -- is strictly im~4
possible~
the:-t:e \<Jould be mental phenomEum
cJ.bmrt which v.re could not construct a proper
scien.1ce, The shock value of this sta:t.emEnlt for
any empi:r:ici~>t philosopher ou(lht to be sufficient to indicate the magnitude of the~ issue
that. t:he m:L1d \<J(n:dr:: of Chisholrn rt::Hs_lly gen.er=
ate~ 15
Al thov.qh some
conce~pts
formerly thought to be
strictly psychological can no
longc~r
be so considered by
the ne\..r cr.:i:t.eria, some of these concepts must: still be
be conceived as implying
exemplified unless
R.~k~J}S!e
b~d.,~
or that they cannot be
is also exemplified.,
l''inally, since semantic concepts· are central to the
ve1.y notion of conceptual t.hot.1ght, semantical sentences,
as such, must be considered intentionalc
Thus an expli-
cation of the notion of meaning is crucial both for the
thesis of intentionality and foi: Sellars• theory of lan-
guage and
thins~ing e
According to Chisholm,
~9!!,iQg
ls
19
strictly psychological; according to Sellars, its psychological
a~:Jpects
are derived from nonpsychological conte::l-..'ts;
and it is to this controversy that I will now turn.
20
Sellars 1 argument is not cU'l attempt to refute any
criterion of the intentionality thesis.
Sellars does not
deny that an intentional language is proper for describ·:tng mental phenomena, but claim.s thc.t: once the semantical
nat:ure of this language is understoodu it. will be seen to
be compatible vii t.h a metal:i.nguist.ic vocabulary that per-
tadns fu.ndametltally to overt verbal behavior,.
Such corn-
patibili ty must be seen as having revolt!.tionaxy irnplications for the philosophy of mind; fo:t" it e:A-plains at
once the phenomena of mental
aGtt:J
and Ir.en.tal actions
~·­
phenomena v1hich are in,explicable and foreve1:- mysterious
on the classical viGn,.q =- and the propriety of an
inten~
tion.al lang-txage :tn behaviorism, v.Jhich has been the insurmountable barrier bet\veen philosophical behavioriBm El.nd
the intuitions of common senseo
Sellars' argwnent then,
amounts to a defense of behavioriam, but of a broadly
conceived scientific behaviorism which is opposed to
philosophical behaviorism..
N.oreover, by questioning the
psychological or nonbehavioral purH::y of intentional lan-
gu.age itself, Sellars seems to construe the apparently
st::con.g cr:U:eria of the Brent.an.o-Ch.isholm thesis as
irrelevant: if the intentional language itself is derived
from behavioristic sources, such crite:t:'ia obviously do not
serve any useful pu:tpose e
The central issue then, bet\veen Sellars' theory of
lm1gue1ge and the Brentano-Ch.isholm thesis of
intention~,
ali t:y, .i.s vvhether th.e metaling"..::tistic vocabulary in v1hicl1
we talk a.bout 1;he meaning of sentences can be analyzed
\<Ji thout
p:n?.supposing mental phenome11.a, in particular con-
cept.ual thinking.,
To gain better focus on the issue,
suppose we stat:e a
Inf"lix:t
thes:i.r1 of Sellars as :follm·;s:
[ 'r]he metalinguist.ic voca~bulary in which '1.17e
talk about lin;;uist::Lc epi.sodes can be analysE!d
in terms wl'1.ich do not: presuppose the frrune\vork
of mental acts; in particular, that
( 1)
u..
..
.. "
means 12.
is not to be analysed as
( 2)
u.,
•
., "
expresses
where :£ is a thought.
Th~::m
~.
and .!:_ is about E.
16
i:he intentionality thesis of Chisholm may be ex.-
pressed as precisely the converse:
( 1) .:ls to be analyzed
as (2).,
Ho'!t.r is the issue to be decided?
'l'his question is
22
dec:tsio:n mus-t ultimately r,:;st, all things being equal,
on \eihere each thesis leads us first, in our quest to
c~xplain
the phenomena of
conce.~ptual
th:ixiking and thus
ourselves, and second, in. our attempt to gai1:1 insights to
related philosophical
problem~~
such as the mind-body
problem and the relationship betv1een science and con1mo:n
tory t.hes.i.s over one that. lee:1ds to ·ultimate inexplicability~
As a first step towards settling the issue, what
must be examined is the notion of meaning in the context
( 3)
'h'lhat is puzzling to Chisholm is how Sellars can
hold. to his thesis and yet maintain bot.h that "mean81ill in
the above context is to be taken as a primitive term
(i .. e .. " a term that does not presuppose a framewoxk of
thoughts)
c'll'ld
that it is not constructible from a
calist or €tbehavioristicsa vocabulary..
17
phys:i.~
Thus he interpret.s
nmeans t! under the Sellars ian thesis as stand:tng for a
characteristic that marks and noises (" ..
~~~1~~~
e
separated from their producers.
.. " )
have~
He believes
this results if (1) is !l£t analyzed as (2), and since it
runs count:er to our intu.i tions of comrnon sense, rr.n.1.st
23
On the other hand 1 if (1} is analyzed as (2), umeans"'
clearly stands for a characteristic of thoughts:
If we think of a word as a class of sounds or
of de~dgns, \'l}e may be tempted to say,
at first
consideration, that: intentional sentences about
t:he xn~H::~.nings and uses of words are exarnples
which rt.:m counter to ou:r. general thesis about
intentional sentences., For he:ce we have sent.ences which seem to be concex·ned, not with
anyone's thoughts, b~iliefs or desires, but
rather v.rith the properties c)f ce:t"tain patterm~
of marks and noises~ But 'VJe must rernin.d ot1x~
selves that such sentences are ellipticale
If I say, of the noises [<:t!'ld marks of the German
\vord R Riese 8 u that they mean giant, I mean
something like this: •When people in Germany
talk Hbout giants, they use the \'17ord nRiesf~!~
to stand fm: giants 1 or to refer to giants • ...... .,
And, in general, \vhen we use the intentional
locution wpeople use such and such a word to
mean so-<u'ld· So 0 , part of what \V'e mean to say
is that people use that word when they wi.sh to
express or convey something they kn£~ or ~~~y~
-- or ~g----~"=
t)sn:cei ve or ~t.aJ~e -- with respect to so~
0
and-so .. ·
Under this
i.nterpre~tation
the charact.eristic that umeans"
stands for can be nothir1g but the nboutness of thoughts u
their reference •
.,'Vithout considering other reasons why "meanf; 11 should
not be cotlstrued as standing for a charact:eristic (about-
ness) of thoughts (consider, for example, in what sense
t&zneans ri stands for a characteristic in such contexts as
24
primary reason such an interpretation must be rejected is
that it is empty of theoretical explanation, and leads
.
us back to our sta:cting po1.nt.,
20
uP1eans" is being in-
terpreted as having a purely assertive function; but if
so 1 it seen>s capable only of making us aware of an essen•w
tial featu.r.e of all conceptual thought.
Th:o.s,
sine~
its
assert:l. ve sense is comp1.etely devoid of the causal content
that. a function conceived for the purpose of theoretical
explanat.ion vmuld
hav€~~..
we are
pm>le:Cl<~ss
to explain in-
tentiona1 langt1age; why it is that intentional language
expresses the aboutness of thought..
•rherefore,
undr~r
S\.lch au interpretation, our attempt t.o explicate r'mearts ~~
in the co:n:t.ext of ( 3) can not advance.,
Reject.ion of the idea that l!ameans 11 has a purely
assertivf::. function, that it stands for a charact.er:Lsti.r.::p
indicates t".<Jo important factors relat:i ve to our discussion:
(a) that the classical view (represented here by Chisholm)
is unable to give a causal account of the nature of language, including intentional language, and (b) that
Sellars is J:?.X"OEOt?..iJ:lq a concept of "means" in the context
of (3) which
£2~1d
lead to a causal account:
1\iy solution is tha1c "•
o
.,
• '
means
__ " is
the core of a unique m.ode of discourse which
25
is as distinct from the description and
explanation of empirical fact, as the language
of
.
.
~~Ej~}-93.1
and
.
t'f'
.
..J.E.§.....;;"l:.d<:.at.~on.
2· 1
That Cllmeans" involves description broadly conceived
as part of its sense is obvious from its ordinary metalinguistic usage; what must be explored is in what sense
and to \'lhat extent description enters into ·the concept
proposed by Sellars..
Once we underst:t:;.nd this aspect of
t.he concept, we \'lill begin to grasp the uniqueness of the
It is probably best t:o begin by pointing out the
descrip·tive senses that "lmeans 11 does no·l: possess, senses
that are la.rgely der·i ved from the classical view of
thouqht and
languagE~.,
r_ro tna.ke a trivial point. first,
•"means" is not to be thought of as a
61
descriptive" term
in the context where it is contrasted with a mlogical"
term as, for example, in the coni.:ruction of artificial
languaqes by logicians, in \lvhich all e}t.--pressions are
classified as either descriptive or logicale
hov1ever, indicates that an ordinary sense of
'ft1is point,
111
describet•
is what Sellars has in mind$
Secondly, "means '11 is not to be thought of as a
descriptive relationo
Actually, the view that it
~
a
descriptive relation is not shared so much by the Car-
26
tesian adherents to the classical view (including
Chisholm) as by the empiricist.
Suppose
~re
were to con-
sider the two sentences:
If
llllmeanst:~
"'l::.allmt
(4)
•Rot' means
~
(5)
•Unds means
~
were a descript.ive relation, as for example
than~,
nto the left of" 1 "father of 41 1 etc a, the
"meaning relation'11 of (4) v.rould be the same as that of
( 5) , vihich it clearly is not..
So:nt:.ence ( 4) tells us that
the 'vJ'ord r-•rc.)t n plays the role of an observation \oJord in
German, in fact thfC> same role as the observation
"redm in English.
~Jord
Sentence (5) tells us that llllund" plays
thf'll p1.arely formal role of a logical CCJm1ect.i.ve in German,
in fact the same role as the logical co:rm.ect:.ive "and" in
English..
Thus 'Ji1hile (4) and (5) tell us that some rela-
tionship exists between the words connected b:\r
•~means n 1
t.:he relationship is functi.onally diffe:;rent. in each case
and it. is misleading to cons·true this relationship as
descriptive in the senses exemplifieds
The mistaken no·ti()n that meaning is a relation stems,
ultimately, from the classical empiricist view that
*~observation
sentences 11 eA.rpress "simple concepts" which
are logically il"ldependent: that is to say., unlearned,
27
\\l'hich in t:u:r:n is to say not rule-g-overned, therefore independent of public or community links at the most basic
learning
sta~re.
These last remarks are rnade more or less
parenthetically, since it is not this empiricist view
v1ith which ou.r discussion is mainly concerned ..
'l'he third way that nmeans., is mistakenly conceived
as
bt.~ing
primari.ly descriptive emerges from consideration
of a sentence such as
1:10\'IT for Chisholm,
to say of any sentence that it is not
descriptive is to mean that the sentence is neither true
But since (6) is true, it is therefore
nor falseo
defJ~
cripti.vec
This notion of the descriptive content of a semantical statementu however, blurs the distinction between
tinction that is important for Sellars' theory of. language.
That (6) makes a se:mantica.l assertion in the
sense that
means dog in
means dog in Gennan
~"Hun.d'
is no·t to be doubtedo
German~ 8
is true
_ 'Hw.1d 9
That (6) does not make a descr·ip-
tive assertion becomes clear when we realize that for it
to be a descriptive assertion, the speaker or producer of
28
(6) must understand English
~-
must be able to
usE.~
14
dog 8
as meaningfully and correctly as a speaker. of GeJ:TI.la.:n. uses
Thus if (6) is a descriptive assertion,
"Hund"o
(6}
~aundw
means £.gg in German
must be taken as E<q-ui valent to t.he assertion
(7)
But (6)
"'Hun.d'" plays in Germe-m the same role as
"dogw plays in Engli.sh.,
and (7) are: clearly not equivalent&
·~vrlile
it is
true that :i.n order for a person to understand (6) correctly, given
t1u~t
he uses the wo:r:d elldogt', he \'lould have to
know that (6) is true if and only if (7) is true, a person
could know that (7) is true \'lithou.t kno\'.ring that (6) is
true.,
A pi:i.rallel exa.mple is the case of o. person knm"iing
out knowh"lg what either Jones or Srnith is like ..
The reason that (7) can be mis't:akenly taken as
equivalent to ( 6} is
syrr~.:>toraatic
of the classical vievJ in
v1hich. it is an Ja Er;zi truth that a sema:ntical sentence
can only be analyzHd as expressil1g a thought..
The origin
of the mistake lies in the failure to distinguish between
two radically different senses of a sentence such s.s (6):
a sense in which verbal behavior can express thoughts
without being used to express them, in which case they
peY:tain to mental acts; and a sense in "Vlhich they £!'6
.2q
~
used to expres3 thoughts, in which case they pertain to a
verbal performance, to an intended action.
22
'.rhus we can
distinguish between two senses of "means tt in ( 3)
(3I
)
Utterance of
qa.
•
•
11
g
means
~..Tones,
by uttering ". • • " means (to
convey) __ ~
Chisholm takes as his sense of :a1neans" the context of
(3"), thus telling us that for an expression to have
corresponding thought (see passage quoted on page 23).
But on Sellars' viev1, it is (3') that should be the
con·~
text appropria.t:e for the explication of umeansll!: it is
beca:uE'H'.l an expression has a
cert:~:Ln. mEH~ning
•
be effect1vely used to convey the
t.h.at it can
•
correspond~ng
thought.
23
description (in a sense to be explained in a mome11.t)
rather t;,han asserting oneo
That "means•e is to be under-
stood as en."'PtY of descriptive assertion is extremely
important for Sellarsti theory of language; for as long as
it is seen as asserting a description, it cm.1 be taken as
expressing a thought about the thing described in such a
v;r<:!Y as to link •che expression and the thought analytically
;:-:md i::hus pr<:Jvent: a causal account:.,
24
Thus, v1hile
30
lan9u.age is, in an important sense, the express:ton of
thought, the relationship between them, on Sellars'
acconnt, is not to be understood in logical terms such as
"propertyll<l,
111
relatione', "att:ributeu,
"dE.H.H:~riptionu,
etc.,
hu.t as a causal one ..
To consider novr Sellars 1 theory in some detail, vle
may begin by e:h.rpanding on Sellars 1 proposal Jchat
( 3)
...... • means
should be vie'li>!ed as
cou.rseu~
~the
core of a u.niq'll(;l lttode of dis-
On this view, e}q_n·essions such as (3) are best
viewed as a translation rubric..
'l'hey are shorthand \'lays
cf conveying ·the information that a certain. mentioned
expressionu i .. e .. , the expression between the quotation
marks, has a certain linguistic usage, this usage being
indicated by the expression exhibited (by means of emphasis) on the righthand side of "meansn..
In other words,
the expression mentioned plays the same role in. the language of \1hich it is part as the term being used plays in.
the language of the stat::ement itself, which happens to be
Englisho
'VIfuen meaning is construed in this wayf stat.ements
(4), (5) and (6) are all seen to be consistent in their
conception of meaning, \'lh€1reas they are not consistent
when meaning is construed as a relation or a descriptive
31
assertion ..
Bu'c nm\' \<!hat rrrust be explicated is the concept of
wrole plt'lyt.'lr".,
If Sellars 8 theory of language is not to
be ultimately circular 1 the explication of a lingt1istic
expression's "playing a rolen must not involve a hidden
refe:z::'·ence to mental acts or actions, in the sense that
t.hese mental acts or a.cti.ons are conceived as prior to
lan(:ruage in the order of knot.ring; concomitantly, a referp(~rmissible
ence to menta.l acts or actions is
is conceived,
JJ:L:Y!?_j:.h~,
:i. f la:ng>.:J.age
as prior to thought in the
order of knowing (although the t.heor.1 may, of course,
conceive of mental ep:i.sodes as prior to language in the
order of being)G
1!-l"ovJ to determine what role a linguistic e:A'Pression
is pl&ying is to classify it as a certain kind of linguistic terrn.,
•J:•hus "means" in
Iilla
o
.,
• •
means
_" is
perforrning a. classificatory function, and ".vhat must be
determined is the ling:y..iill£ nature of the item on its
right-hand side.
We observe first that placing an e:K-
pression in quotes transforms it into a general term, in
fact a common noun; thus:
There are four 'and•s in this paragraph ..
An "and n, ho'Y.>ever, need not have the specific visual sh,ape
32
Q •
illustrated between the quotes.
It can have an auditory
shape, indeed different aud:l. tory shapes and
visual shapes such as
~~
~~
&, and so
ind(H:~d
onu
other
But for
some linguistic design, auditory or visual, to be an
''a.nd~a
it :must function vJith other linguistic designs in a way
that parallels the functioning of
Qandt~s
in English.,
Thus,
by construing the role of quotes in this vmy, we have
ere a. ted a distrubuti ve singular tern-at much t:he same as i:he
common. noun swbishop'' in:
(In chess) bishops move along diagonals
is perceived to be a distributive singular t<;;rm when this
sentence is formed as:
TJl~J:Jsh,Q£
'11 o
~
moves along diagm:1alse
exhibit an expression as a
§ist.E.i_J:?'I.:~,ti.YSt ~JJ~
and thus e•free" it from it:s tokening, Sellars makes
use of dot quotes such that an uandes becomes the
distri~
butive singular term
the •and"
25
With this device in mind, we can. see that "und"s, "et"s
and "and"s are all •a:nd•s, and that the distributive singular term can function as a sortal predicateo
·this insight to
(8)
'Hund'
(in German)
mean~:;
s!_og
Applying
33
we can form the sentence
(9)
'Hund's (in German) are "dog•s
where, of course,
"•dogo~
is a linguistic entity, not to
be confused with the natural Jdnd
~.9.9:·
As a linguistic
entity then, the predicate of (9) implies that the v.rord
nhun.d" is used by speakers of German in the same
object,
word~word
word~
and word=behavior correlations as
speakers of English use the word "'dog·n e
But now· when we st:op to considtilr vlhat such correla-
tions entail, the most we can assert about them is that
they are normative in nature, that is to say, determined
and governed by rules internal t.o a specific l.inguh1tic
comrnunit:y.,
In a translation rubric then,
\Ole
can
~Y..
the information that the same rules are observed in the
srune correlations in two different linguistic corrrnunities.
The information is
~
in the sense that while we
may know what linguistic rules are generally observed,
and thus what
~
be done linguistically
legitimate, permissible, or sanctionable
~.li
what is
we cannot
that these rules are actually followed.
26
We come now to what I think is the crucial point at
issue between the Brentano-Chisholm thesis of intentionality and Sellars 0 theory of languagee
Since, by the
3•i/'
above analysis, the intentional use of language seems
completely noni''lati ve in nature, Sellars' argument '-"lOUld
seem .in outline to be as follo"flS:
First~
it is conceiv-
able for a semantical vocabulary to be used to describe
and classify overt verbal bel&avior (that is, as be:i.ng true
or false, as !!!lli!r!!F£t such and such, as saying
and such, and so on)
iill'i thout pJ:.~estlpposing
men'l:.al acts or thoughts.,
t.his same
;r:~em.;u1tical
Second, :i.t is
!Jl?.J:,
such
a frame\vork of
conceivablti~
that
vocc:<bula.ry can be 'i.1sed to describe
and classify thoughts, and that this latter usage is one
derived from the f'ormer a
Suppose then we accep·t as a hypother.ds the f.;jds;·tence
at a sta9e in human prehistory of a primitive linguistic
27
.
.
.
.
con1munJ.. ty comp 1 ete 1 y b e11.av:tor:ts·t:x.c
:tn
nature.
It is
important to notice two essential linguistic :features
about the community at its most primit.ive stages
Firs-C.,
its descriptive vocabulary is limited strictly to public
pr<:)p€;?Jrties and public objects (but not necessarily observ-
able) located in space and enduring in time.
properties and objects, of
course.~
These .public
include the members of
the community and their behavior (including overt verbal
behavior) as this behavior is exhibited in v.rord-object,
word-word and word-behavior correlations..
But even at
this most primitive stage it must be granted that the
linguistic resources include not only the logical operations of conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification, but also the subjunctive conditional, without
destroying the concept of the com."lmni ty as a strictly
havioristic
lan~~age
one~
b€~-
Thus despite its meager resources, the
has great
e~~ressive
power and consequently a
potentiali -l;,y of growthG
Tl1e second essential feature to
the~
b~"\
n.oticed is that
primary mode of discourse is thinking=out-loud where
this is const1.-ued as candid, spontaneous verbal behavior ..
We may characterize thir::J
thir1king-~ou1:~loud
in behavior-
istic terms as the expression (in some "causal" sense) of
episodes of thought
af:l
these
~:2£!s:s
are conceived in
•
the classical view, including tha.t of Ch:uJholm
28
; so t:hat
is simply an actualizat:ion of a
(11)
short-term proximate disposition. to thinkout-loud that·-.E,· 29
Thus thinking-mxt-loud is a manifest at ion of
,t]:lin:Js.i.ng, and such mental act:s which
~
construe as per-
ceptual taking, trying, inferring, willing, and so on
correspond,
011.
the primitive linguistic level we are con-
36
ferring=out.-loudl!ll, and
~'vlilling-out-loud~1 ~
It is impor-
tant to emphasize that the concepta involved in
out-loud are not our present-day concepts, which
thin1-~:.ingspre~·
suppose a framework of thoughts, but less sophisticated
counterparts
d(~manded
of the primitive behavioristic
frarttework; what Bruce Aune has described as
~~proto-con=
ceptsP.:
'I'o proto-see lf, for instance, ·v1ould involv-e
training your eye on it, having some kind of
!:Jensory experie:tJce, and tb.en ut:.tering or
gainh1g a short-term disposi.ti.on to t."i.t:ter the
t4ords ~ !£ is .. ., ., • n To prot.o-=try to secure Y
would involve uttering or being disposed to
u·tter the words «J: want ye~, moving in Y' s
direction, groping at: it·; and so one 30~1
Similar descriptions could be given of such
prot:.o~concepts
is important to note about such descriptions is first,
that they are made using only a behavioristic vocabulary 1
and second, that they can be made ''l.ri th the descriptive
resources available to the primitive lingl:d.stic community
we are considering.
Thus an inten:t.ional use of language
is already involved at the most primitive lingu.istic level;'
and this intentionality does not refer to or presuppose a
framework of thoughtse
N0\'1 what of the rules in the metalinguistic vocabu-
lary of such a cornmunity?
These rules, like all meta-
37
ling~.:d.stic
rules, fall into two categories, categories
\vhich Sellars has described as .!:'9.-~£ o~ £Eit!£iJ?.!!! or
1m
ought-to-be • s
n
and
~1..~1! .e.f ~£?.!1.
or
~ought-to-doe san" 31
ti'hese rules of CO'L'l.rse are. not available to all membe:t:-fz of
the corrnnu:ni t:y, but only those \f.rho have mastered the lcmrrhose who have not yet mastered the language,
guageG
children for example, cannot forrrn.1late any of the :rules,
thot::.gh t.hey are subject t;o tltemp especially rules of
Ru.lr.~s
of c:cit:icism, applied by those who
underst:and both that. rules of crit.:i.c:tsm imply rules of
.
act:t.on
and ru1 es
.r.·
OJ:
32
. 1 y ru1 es o ..f cr:ttJ.c.J.sm
. . .
ac t.
.1.on 1.mp
,
have as their aim linguistic conformance in the co:.t:·rela···
But since the criteria of conformance o.re in
behavior..
terms of the overt linguistic and other behavim:.· that
define the proto-concepts involved, it is clear ·that these
rules cannot logically refer to or presuppose a frrunewor.k
of thougl1:l:.s.,
Here one might \.Yant to dwell on how the ling-uisJcic
resources of the
corr~unity
are
e~~iched
so as to enable
aemantical discourse to take place, that is, discourse of
the type
"
1
\'JB
have considered above in st:atements like
Hund 1 means dog'a and "'La neige est blanche' is true if
and only if snow is whiteu.
But such r~nrichment is al-
rea.dy at hand given the logical
language.
resourcE~s
of the prinli ti ve
First, in being able to talk about each other's
verbal behavior, the language users can talk about each
other• s predictions as causes and e.ffects, and thus as
indicators (\vith greater or less reliability) of other
verbal and nonverbal states of. affairs@
say of th.e:ir verbt.il output: ·that it
ill.~?!.
They are able to
such and such;
or that it says _that such and such; or that it is true
or :f::alse, and so on.,
33
rrhus the notion of "means"' as
explicated above (see pp., 21-35), together with its implying a cause and effect relationship of utterances to
other u.ttert1nces and behavior, is incorpozated into the
metali:nguistic vocabulary, \"Jithout reference "'co any
ch.aracterist.ic of th6u9h'l::. o
It seems that
n.ov1
we have all the ingredients of
thought before our eyes, so to speak, but: still lack the
concept itself.,
First, with an intentional l."!Se of lan·-
guage the sentences uttered by the meniliers of the contmunity
already exhibit the intentionality of thought, although
the language does not presuppose thinking nor do the me:mber.s of the co:mmunity knm'l that they are thinking.
the la.ngua<Je has been enriched with the resources of
Second,
39
p •
seman.tical discourse, aga:i.n \vithout this discourse pert.aining to mental phenomena.
Nmv it is not: necessary to suppose that with t.he
passage of time
thinking~out-loud
mode of discourse..
remains the primary
We may suppose the development of the
notion of silent or «ilu1er*' speech, the form of which is
modeled on overt discourse o
'fhis notion of '"inner" speech;
already present .in Plato's notion of a t-ldialogile in the
soul", could plausibly dr3velop from tvvo such factors as
the following: first, the prior development of such a
proto-concept as
~~Z£,~£ain:i~~Jr£m=!Ji.iE1sJng-.Q~!'t=.lo}!,ge
which of cou.rse would
follo\v-ed
h:~r
f~ innerm
.~l:t:§,eli 1?~.
a
th.in.ldng=out~loud
spe:ech; and second, attributing t:o 'che
speaker (or flrefraining 11 speaJ..:er) silent cotu:Yterparts to
those thixlld.ngs-out-loud. that would normally occur in
\vord-object. 1 word-word and word-behavior correlations in.
which the
"refraining~
speaker is involved and which he
eyJ>.i.bi ts it1tel.ligent verbal and nonverbal behavior..
We
are now on the verge of introducing the notion of thought,
but for the purpose of
Sellar:;;;~
• argn•'nent, the leap must
be made in the context of a scientific theory that the
mern.bers of the novJ
~J2i:E.9:
linguist.ic community -- that
is to say, a community which, while not quite as primitive
lingu.istica.lly as first described, nevertheless possesse1s
only· a behaviori:Frl:ic vocabulary
selvt-~~1$
-~·
can for.arui,a.te them-
In such a theory, thoughts, or "inner
ep:i.sodes~
are first postulated as the theoretical. entities upon
Hhich the theory is const:ructed.
We have seen that enrichment of the primitive langt_.tage with semantical discourse was possible bec;:n1.se, with
the logical resources
percei Vf,;; a causal
availal.:,~le,
!."E~lat.ionship
the language users could
in va:r'ious behaviors..
Thus
they are obviously capa.ble of developing a theoret.ical
discourse '1.'\ihich, no rnatter ho'Vl hli tially crude and
has the
pob::~ntial
of becoming quite
Bophisticated~
sketc.~hy,
But
once ths developJ:nent of such theoretical discourse is
granted, as indeed it must be, it is not incompatible with
such discourse, considering its subject matter, that a
theory be developed in which il1.n.er episodes,
j:}l.0'-':11±.t~t,
are postulated as tb.eorE-;tical entities.,
But
110~1
we must digress a bit to consider what the
requirements of a scientific theory of this kind a:t·e and
whether such a t:.heory could be formulated given the behavioristic vocabulary available.,
And this in turn intro-
duces important issues in the philosophy of science which
Sellars a argurnent must face.
I can do no more than touch
41
on these issues to ma};;e Sellars v points, since a de ...
tailed discussion lies outside the scope of this essaye
The first point Sellars makes is to distinguish
sharply betv1een the
~-
practice of scientists in
theory const:ruction and the
th~~s
of theory construc-
tion formulated by Carnap, Reichenbach, Hempel, Bra:Lthwaite and simila.r philosophe:rs of science who believe
that
wh~!pothetic-deductive"
.feature of a
expla:.:nation is the essenti<.'l.l
~.:;ophisticatod acie:nc<~..
Thus~
whilt.1 it is
essential in theory constru.ct:i.on to distinguish cle,lrly
between the language of theory and the language of observation, the
nK~thod
of physical sciEH'lce has not been
first to develop logical ca.lculi from postulates relating
to unobserved e:nti ties and then deriving general lav1s in
the observcltion langua.ge from them..
Rather it must be
seen as integrating two, by no means separable, considerationso
n1e first has been to construct a model which
describes a domain of familiar objects behaving in familiar
ways~
The purpose of the model is to help us 1.:mder·stand
hm'l the behavior to be explained would arise if the ob-
jects exhibiting this behavior consisted of the entities
postulated by the theory..
In othe1: words, a model se:rvEH1
to introduce theoretical entities by way of an analogy
between familiar
obj,~cts
and the theoretical entities.,
But in order for the model to serve a truly sc:i.entific
purpose, it is essential that it: be accompanied by what
Sellars calls a rucoxnmentary"" o
This commentary is to be
understood, not as a f:Jet of sentences fb{ed and precise
at the very out. set, but as undergoing continual
ment.
develop~·
•.rhe pu:cpose of the cowmentaxy i.s to qualify and
limit t:he analogy in certain, but not all, rEH;;pect:s in
t.he process of developing ·the trieory@
rlTtl.e com:nv.3ntc.i:t:y 8
then, will come to consist of descriptions of the fu.nda_,.,~-
domain behave, these desc:r:ipt:ions corresponding to the
picture of the behavior of the theoretical entities g.:i.ven
in the post.ulat.es of the theoretical la.nguage,
In oJcher
v.rords, the purpose of the commentary is to ensure that the
·theory has the featur•&C!S we want it to have and that i'l:
lacks the features we don 6 t want. it to have.
The second major
sidE~r,'ltion
consideration.~
and a primary con-
for Sellars 0 theory, is that science taken as
a vJhole must be continuous \·lith common sense.
must be seen as
h!.§l:ofir.ii!11.Y bound up with the \vays in
l'lh:i.ch corr.raon people have ah'lays
environment and
Science
themselves~
attempt~ed
to explain their
'I'he w·ord l)!historica1ly-n must
43
be emphasized, for obviously \,\That is co:ncei ved at any
particular time is, in an importa:n:t
upon and
'-U1
exi:ension of ,..,hat
ha~;
\<J'(:ty,
both dependent
been conceived up to
that time ..
No\tJ' the behaviorism that Sellars defends, given his
vie:vJs as to the important role theory must play in any
science of psychology, as v¥ell as that i.nn.er episodes <t:.t:e
theoretical ent.ities, is obviously not that of philosoph=
• .r•
b eaav1or1sm.
1.
•
•
t 1~1c
Sellars 8 defenBe is tha.t. of methode-
logical beh.aviorism, wh:Lc.::h is compatible with a behavior-
i.sm seen in proper scientific
pers.:pective~
I t¥i11 not:
dvtell at an.y lcngi:h on the differEmt schools of Behavior-
:I.smu for 'II'Jhile the
sn.~bject:
t:he controversy I am
i.s importt-1nt as background to
c'h:~scribing,
a detailed account must
lie out: side th,;3 scope of the presen:t: paper..
point out tl'1at on Sellars u view
tht."~
I
\<\~'ill
merely
rnetl1odologica:L tl'1eS!1is
he is defending is not a conunitment to any existing psy-
cholog.i.cal
of existing
conct~pt
nor is it: a.ny Jcind of an.alyHis i:n terms
concepts~
'J.t}1e
essential point is that the
methodological thesis is compatible i.'ITith a truly
sci.en~
tifi.c behavim::-:i.sm, though not one narrowly conceived as
the requirernent that all concepts must be explici t~ly
defined in terms of ov<:::rt:
b€~havior.
In Sellars' \vords:
The behavioristic requirement. that all concepts
should be ~~20~~.E29:ll~()~ in t:erms of a basic voca.bu=·
la~r pertaining to ov~2!rt:. behavior is compa.tihle
\'<!·it:h the idea t;hat sc.)me behavioristic concepts
are to be introduced as theq£~w~£~~ concepts~
I t is essential to note thL">t ·the theo:r·etical
terms of a behavioristic psychology are not only
not: de? fined in terms of ove:r.~t bel1avior, they are
also n.o~t de:t:ined i.n terms of nerves, f5ynapsesp
r1.eurC1J. impulc~es, ~:::t:;c., etG., l\ behav:Lorist:ic
theo:cy of behavior is not 4 as such, a. physiological explanation of bGhavioro ':fhe a.bilit:.y
of a fr.o.mr~vmrk of theoretical concepts and
proposit:.i..ons succes:Jfu.lly to eJ::pla.i.n behavioral
pflf~n.c)ntE~llLl =!. s lc)~fi.~ c,~~ l ]~:v~ .i. n.(£Gt?·2:J~~~.c::!f~l1.t <) f t:hE1 ide11t.if::tcc:rd.on of these theoret:Lcc1l concepts '\..'dth
concepts of neu:cophysiology .. 34
r.rb return to the t:heory propc1r, \ve have noted that
the rx::ople of t.he prind ti v.-.;: linguistic community 've
hav~:
been considering, at least the scientists am.ong them, are
c:ornpletely capable of dE1veloping a theory in which iru'ler
episodes arc postulated as
is where Sellars
<:•
l•,., t.,_)
e.x_pret~ses
thc~oxet. ical entiti~s.
tv.ro major in;:dght.s e
No\'l hex·e
The first
that. it is hiqhly plausible, co:nsidering the n.a-ture of
thei.x:' bE-;haviorit3tic vocabulary and the likely stti.t.e of
their
thE~oretica.l
science, that the :model for the inner
episodes is that. of overt verbal behavior itself:
In. other vToJ:xls, using ·the language of the model,
the t1wory is to the effect that overt verbal
behavi.or. is t;he <.::ulmin<:ition of a process v;hich
hegins w:i. th • inner speech 8 .. 3 5
The model then is an analogy bet:t·:een the familiax
45
I
objects of overt linguistic behavior and the entities
introduced by the theory -- inner episodes, or thoughtr'.,
It is importc:m.t to realize that \1h.:i.le the analogy is
one.,:~ to-one
formal, there is not a
correspondence betv1een
eve:t:y feature of the familiar object (overt spe0lch) a.nd
the t.heoretical entity (thought): the c-mc:z.logy is not meant
t.o hold :i.n every respect o
Thus while a thought is
con~·
C(d.ved as inner speech, it is not conceived as involving
or silently 1noving onets lips...
as verbal inaageryR 'tPJith
Nor is it to be conceived
disc:n~te
vmrds in
th<~
actual order
is to he conceived as functional rather than material;
functicm.;;1l in that thoughts play roles analogous to their
cou.nterpart:s in overt speech..
The analog'.f j_s not material
in that inner speaking obviously does not have the phon.·*
emic or orthographic features of overt
clarify the concep·t by
of wmeans lW in the
rE~calling
contt~xt
Ja s
speech~
We can.
our earlier d.bJcussi.on
Hund • (in Gerrnan) meansj
.92.9.~·1
in which we introduced Sella:r:·s v conception of distributive
singular terms and the use of dot quotes (see Pe 32)e
we
were.~
If
to narne the inner language in vlhich thoughts axe
involved A'Mentalese", and recall that placing quotes
'
sinqular term .. a "snovl is
which
(.~an
white~ becomE'~s
fu.nct:i.on as a sortal predica.te..
the distributive
Thus frorn
'Snov? is vih.ite 1 (in. Mentalese) me<:1ns
l~1ll!:£
eB.2.."!~:!:..?:.
'""e can form the sentence
csnovJ is white's (in .HeJ;'l.t<ilese) are esno\-.r is
'itlh:i.t:.e .. s
is vihi te ~~ e
'I'b.us the 1'1entalese
expres~don
is an C1nalogue
and again it must be emphasized that th.ese correlations
are normat:i ve in nature.
Thus
om.~
of the major points of Sellars' ·theory ;b:}
that by giving s.n account of thought. in terms of overt
behavior 1 thought loses the sense of :i. ts having pri va:te
acc:ess
only~
On the contrary, the basic concept of
thought is that it is :i.ntersubjective, and the notions
of silEL1.t ·thi&..:ing c-m.d priva:t.e access are derivative concepts ..
47
'l'he second maj o:c :i.nr.dght of Sellars follovJs from
It is that the semantical categories of the
epi.~3odes c
Thus vlhe:r-e t.he. people of the corn.mun.i ty have
or be:i.n.q- about thif3 or that, thE;y. nov1 speak
~~~~~
muni ty to
spE;;;tk
of overt:
behZ~.vio:r.
of~
the inner
as the culmination of
p:c0cesses that begin vd th inner episodeB or 'choughb] ..
9ible' and not accompanied at every poin.t by overt verbal
bt;;:havio:r· ..
The essential feature of the theory as :i.t pertains
to t.h.e
Brentr:>,:no~Chisholm
psychological thesis of
int~m-
It is this usage t.hat is tl1e model for the in.tentionality of thought:s.,
Thus .. even though according to the
theory overt verbal behavior char:acter:i.zable in seman.tical
terms is e:::cplcdli.ed
in te:t1xts of th.ouqhts
which are also
.
-·
"''"'"~
behavior
in.t.ent::i.onality of thouqhts.,
t:herd~,~
Thi.s :ls thEl point of Sellars 1
\<i'hich C...''hisholm could not accept (see p® 21).
But. there is still an alternative interpretation t.o
consider regm.:'ding how a prirni ti ve linquist.ic comrntu1i t.y
S'.1C'h
as the one desc:cibed
of t:h.ought ~
above.~
could acquire the concept:
'1-vhis al ternati V(:."l :Lnt:erpretat:ion, v.rhich
Bp:i.r;;odes o.s 'l:hought:s which they had,
m.;:,;anin.q of verbal perfor.ma:nces..
and could
pr~rceive
'l"hus, both t:honghts i!xnd
\vould be ·vn~ys of beii~g intentional, the intention<:'l.lity of
t:lF-; sernant.J.cal discourse
be
compleb~ly
~reflecting';
the prior int.ention-
rejected, given the type of
sible in. that comrrm.ni ty o
discou:r.s~~ pos~
Such a community could conceive
of thoughts on the model of overt behavior,
h'LI.Jc
not (JcqgJ=
.s:.aJ:.ly could not) overt behavior on the 1nodel of thoughts.
Th.e conclusion of tb.e
Sellars~Chisholm
controversy
tt;)
by Sellcl.rtJ in the passage quoted in Sect.ion
vih,ich is a proper use of
lan.gt;w.g(~,
J:
above;
vJ'ith prior overt verbal
behavior0
gories of :l.ntentionali.t.y are I.L<2t~ ll]:timately to be conceived
as scHr.l.;;:n;.l.t:ical cab~qories pertaining t:o overt verbal beha~
be1:wvio:d.s1:ic or nonpsycho1ogica1
lan~Juage.,
According to
h.aviorism posed by the Brentano-Ch:i.sholm thesis is a
~~
' ]...
pEHiH.l<J.o~proo
' r •b
h''
'
'::~•'
em :l.J.:
e av1.or:u:un
:ts
conceJ.vect
:tn :1.t:s p:eoper
scientific forme namely the thesis of methodological be.m
havior.isxn; second, that int:entional langt.l.age., no ma.tt:er
how d:i.scon:tinuous with overt
b~.;!havior
it may seem to be,
is at bottom completely con:tinuous with it and seems inexplicablE1 without such continuity.
con~dder
I would like now to
Sfdlars &
thE~ory
a type of objection. to
of language v.rhich is not actually td.med
at any feature or prin.ciple of the t.heory
~ _§~,
but
of opposl"l:ion to t:he scienti fie
at: least as tl':d.s methodology has
developed in recent centuries.,
st:ronqest in opposing-
thi~J
While the objection iD
meU1odology in the social sci-
ences, it implies that a similar thcmgh \V'eaker objection.
could be leveled at its
physical sciences as
uncruc~stionE1d
vn~ll
o
Hm~ever,
exnployment; in the
for the purposes of
the present discussion, I w·ill assu.me that the objection
applies pr:i.rnarily to using scientific methodology in the
social sciences.
This object: ion, then,
rJ'he success of
Sellars~
(;is
it pertains to
theory of lanquage in solving
the problem of intentionality obviously depends on the
justific;;rtion of extending a type of theory heretofore
co:n<::ei V<&!d and developed within the physical sciences to
51
include
psy~hology..
For Sellars very consciously modeled
his theory on the actual practice of physical scientists
in formulating their theories..,
Thus it is conceivable
tht:J.:l:: proponents of t.he Brentano-Chisholm thesis might:
okriect: t:o Sellars 8 theo:r.y on the grounds that it presumes
eith~:~r
( 1), that a physical-science
typ~F;
of: theory is
appropriate to psychology or (2), that psychology is to be
taken as one of the physical
sciencE~s..
On either presu111p-
tion, :ts not Sellars taki!:<9 the thEK>retical entities of
f'~2n1~~
psycholo9y to be physical in nature?
If so 6 is not.
j;h:i.ug being left:. out of the picture?
For example, in the
pr·oceEH3 of developing t.he theo:r.yi s model, or :!:'ather ·!:he
model's "com.rnentary<t', the decision that v.ras made as to
which features of the familiar objects and the entities
to be e),."]?la:tned were forrnally analogous and which not,
seems arbitrary to some extent.
Let us explore the ax·gument in more detail..
'll"f1e
last: statement of the above paragraph makes us av.rare of
an. element present in the forn:m.latio:n of theories of so=
cial sciences that seems hidden or of no consequence in
the formu.lation of physical=acience type theories, narnely
the hi a:::;, conscious or unconscio·us, of the scientist
selfo
Thus, while it may be trivial to question the
htm~
Q •
a:~::·hitrariness
th<-::or~~tical
of a physical scientist in const.ructing his
modelp it is by no means t:civial to question
the arbitrariness of a social scientist in constructing
~ie
need only witness the radical differences be·t\'leen
uscientific~'
economic,
sociolog:i.~al
and political theories
as propounded by Marxists on the one hand and their oppo=
nents on the other..
'l"he social ties of a scien1.tist are,
after a.ll, what :made him decide to become a
scienti~lt
in
the first place, and sl:rrely are infinitely stronger cu"ld
completely different in kind from those t:hat bind him to
the
nor~uman
objects of the worldo
But consider the value-laden cormotc1.tions of the
vlO:t:d flscien.tific"'.,
Its
usr~rs,
t¥hen attaching it to some
concept:, theory or inquiry, thereby stamp tha.t concoptR
theory or inquiry with their approval, whe:t·eas anything
labeled
nunscientific~
is stamped with disapproval.,
But
then \vhy !,! a scientific or objective inquiry of value?
If we limit ourselves only to the results and conclusions
of the inquiry and don.ft consider at all its overall
purpose (i.e .. , vlhether the results of the inquiry are to
serve a cgood" rnoral pu1.-pose or an wevil n one), it can
only be concluded that the value of a scientific or objective inquiry lies in its furnishing th(;;: inquirer \'lith
53
"reliableu knowledgeo
ledge of value'?
One
But then why is f'lrel.i.able" kno1.va!1SWE:~r
is that it permits the scien-
tist to predict or othervdse have some control over
events o
'llJ1us ultimately the ability to predic:t events, to
control or alter the physical environment -- in other
'1.'\f'ords, the achievement of pmver over the EH.1.virorm:tent
-~
would seem to be the real value that incites the quest in
tions" ·within the quest for pm;rer which u.nderrnine the
notion of «objective purityc1J in scientific inquiry, but
the pur})Ose here is o:nly to indicate \vhy, given the suecess of the physical sciences in terms of the above-stated
values, philosophers of sci.erice are driven to require of
all inquiry that it be "'scien.tific;'IS, meaning thereby 21!
structing a
fi~H::ientif:tc
the term a theo:r.y
1~
theory;' Sellars underst.a:nds by
a theory of the physical sciences.,
At this point, so the argmnent goes, Sellars 8 methods reauire two kinds of ·hmti ficat:ion*
~
~
'I'h.e first is
the justification of blurring the distinction between a
physical and a social science.
On the one hand .. the
asstu:nption that a physical-science type of theo:cy is
appropricrt.e to psychology seems to imply that there is
some u:ni versal, call it utheory-ness", that stands above
the theories of pa:t·ticular disciplines and of v.rhich the
theory of t:u1y particular d5.scipline is an embodiment ..
But all we have in reality ax,·e the theories of the physi-
cal sciences.
~my
should these particular theories be
taken as the type appropriate for. all disciplines?
On
the other hand, it is vn:ong to take psychology to be a
physical science: since it Beems clearly to be a social
science.
Can the distinction betweEHl a social science and
a physical science be obliterated or ignored?
can, does not the entire ir,{sue of the
·cm1.troversy become academic?
And if it
Sella:CEi·~Chisholm
'I'hus, Chisholm could have
objected ·that Sellars e assim:Llati:nt;;r physical-science type
theories to psychology 8 or psychology to t.he physical
sciences was, in a sense, to prejudge the issue
them: the c"ntities
pE~culiar
\vere to be treated
~
.!.!.
betwe<~n
to psychology in ed:l:he:r case
tl:},~J.::
wer.§l physical or nonm.ental ..
The second kind of justification required of Sellars
is ·that of maint:aining his theory is "scientif:tcw because
it is likll a scientific
tio:n are needed heree
th~)01."1f..
Two kinds of justifica-
First, the stJ.:"cl.cture must be justi-
fied as being like the structure of a scient:i fie theory,
and second, what the theory does must: be justified as
being what a scientific theory does.,
As regards the
problem of structure, Sellars has provided only an analogy
between t.lt.r..tt of his theo:x:y and that of a physic:al·=science
But this type of analo9y is a notoriously weak
theory..
form of justification.,
It: is generc1lly quite arbitrary
as to vihere and 1::.o what extent t:he
and to
\~lhat
extent it does noto
a:rn~logy
holds and V'lhere
Are inner episodes, taken.
as unobservable entitiEH3 1 rec:1lly analogous to molecules?
Ho\~
can this be justified?
Molecules have a· strict uni-
formity; a molecule of water has the oame internal properties as any other mol<:;cule of watt:il:C"
It is this uni-
fo:r..Tnity tha·t permi·ts their postulation. as theoretical
entitiese
But how are we to justify the
inner episodes?
11
Uniformit:yu of
And if inner episodes do have a unifor-
mity, \vhat do we mean by this
'~uniformityu'?
It is obvious-
ly not analogo1J.s to the uniformity ( :i. .. e., , a uniformity of
quant~itative
measu:r·e) required by the physical sciEn1ceso
Again, is the ucommenta.ry" of Sellars' model really ana·logous to the Mco:rm:nentary« of
?.
physical-sciencE; model?
Hm" vmuld it be possible not only to acquire the data for
the
'3 cormnEm·tary~,
but on the bf>sis of the data, to make
predictions or Gontrol events (behavior) and thereby
This leads to the justification of the theory as
doing -v-lh.:,it: a rJcient::Lfi.c theory does..
Now as indicated at
the b(=:ginni.ng of tb.is secti.cm., what has given scientific
inquiry the respE:ct and a\ve it. has in the t\ifent.:J.eth century has been its reliability; i$e., its success in predieting events and controlling the environment.,
If
Sellars e t:heory is a scientific theory, it must have this
.
.
]
Claracter1st1c
a_sc.
1
claim :.tt is
~:1cientific
In
otlH~r
words, :i. t v1ill not do to
bu1: c;;tr.,.,.n.ot (at least) ·make reli<:tbJ.,..;:.;
predict.ions, for then the analogy wit:.h a sciexrtific
'i.vould most certainly fail, or
t:ra.:~:J.ly
h.a·qe to claim that the
hold in this respect e
~1lse
th.E.~ory
Sellars v1oul.d arbi=
analo~ry·
does not have to
But when we examine Sellars • them:y,
it seems that nothing follm.,rs fr.om ito
It is not clem:
from ·the ·theory as to what direction vve sho-uld proceed
to'ilard making test
ca.SE1S
for or agr.d.nst it.
In answer to the above argument,. i'c might: be initially
poi.nt~~d
out that on the one hand it blurs certain
importa:nt distinctions crucial to an unde:r.·standing of
Scc:llars 1 theory,
and on the other peJ:ceives obstacles to
explanation and understanding, . the existence of ·v1hich
cannot be jtwt.ified.,
p:r.iatE~
In a sense then, once the approclarified~
dist.inctions arE! made and the perceptions
the arsrument will have been answered.
be~
Surely t:he first distinction t:.hat must:
~chat
hetW<';;len the sciences as
§j::."-z£:J:Ell-E.:~.@.
ma.de is
on the one hand,
including under t;hat head the social sciences as well as
the physical, and philosophy on the other..
'l'hus
sophy is not to h:;: unde:cstood as a discipline of
}2£.?£.
!f!...'ff:_,
but as critical of all d:i.scipli11es
does use the term
11
scier1J:.if:Lc~
truly to
philo~~
sciencl1'~
If philosophy
G
desc:eib~~
its
approztch in criticism, the t:erm is e1dmittecUy value-laden
for the simple reason that such c:lpproaches expJ.;,:dn at"ld
clax·i:Cy~"
whf:::r.e e:xr->lanation and
cla:t.~:i.fication
in cont.rast. with unscientific approaches..
thua the value of rationalityo
is possible;.
Its value is
It :I.s indicative of an
essent.ia1. ch.aract.eristic of a 1:-ational being -- to accept
rai:i.onal c)Xplanat.ion as against obscurant:Lsme
In the
present context of the ·te:r.na H: vmuld be misleading to
infer
"~ulterior'"i
purposes from it in the sense that the
control and prediction of events implies
pu~~oseful
mani-
pulation for private or ot.her political or economic gaine
The fact "!.:hat the
~wiexrt:ific
approad.1 was conceived and
developed first in the physical sc:i.ences v'lould. seem to be
irrelevant in the present case..
I·t: is conceivable that
the approach could have developed first in t.he social
sciences, but this simply did not happen..
1\t any rate,
the ftict t:hat a scientific approach is used to develop a
theory p(::rtaining to a social science does not imply that
the theoretical ent:Lties postulated by the theory are
tl1e,!~~~l:?.Y
to be understood as physical in contrast to
physical..
UfJ
non~
If the entitic:ls postulated are to be understood
physical., t.h:Ls rnust be
argu<:~d
on separate grounds o:tJ.d
:not by mere irnp1:Lcation of an approach that is the only
ratiom'l.l
. mean.s of inquiry and explanat.ion ava.i.lable.
What is the alterrmtivt-': to usir1g a scienfific
approach?
d~:;~nied
ObviouE:ily obscu.ra:K1t.ism..
Once t:he approach is
as appropriate to the social sciences, these dis-
ciplin.es a.re denied access to e:;..-planation.,
More pertinent
to the present: discussion, the Brentano-Chisholm t.hesis
prese1.1ts two negative aspects to one sefJking philosophical
insight: on the one ha:nd, it has no explanation for the
phe.HK)mena
of thought and language save Cartesian dualisrn;
on the other hand 8 if t.he thesis is successfulc it rules
out the possibility of a science of psychology
(sec~
p. 18)
and thus by implication, of any social scienceo
Sellars' theory then is :not to be thought of a::1 a
theory of psycholos'Y as such, but.
O.f:J
a J211!d.2.~hillJ.:..
approacJ1 t.oward an explanat:ion of thought: and
that
F'21bl~fl
la:nguag{·~
k?d,, not only to a science of pt3ychology
6
but
eventually to tlw solut:ion of such complex metaphysical
puzzles as the mind-body problem..,
'!'he thEwry then, while
it presumes that a scientific theory is app:r.op:r.iate to
psychology (what:
oth0~r
kind of theory cot1ld there be?),
:i.t does not presume t:hat psychology is to be
of
thl'::~
takE.~n
as one
physical sciences nor tha·t the theo:r<:Ytica.l entities
postulated are physical rather than psychological, if indeed ·this dist.inction. is pertinent.
Nm,.r another distinction the arg'l.unent blurs is that
between the social mo·ti vations of pr·esente.day scientists
togat;ht~r
theories
with th.e relat.i vely soph:tst.:i.ct:ited social-science
they may develop and the §091£:11¥,. primitive
scientist£.; of the primitive linguistic con:mmnity vie have
been discussing together \vi th the type of theory they
could developo
In the latte:c commur.d.ty, since the primc;n:y
mode of discourse is initially think.ing-out.§loud and the
only concepts the people have axe proto-concepts pert:aining
to overt linguistic and other behavior, such notions as
bias on
thE~ part~
of a scientist, or dishonesty,
insincerity,, etc., in general are not available..
duplicity~
These
60
must be lmderstoocl a.s concepts
derivE~d
at a lu.tex· stage of
develop1.nent (social as well as linguistic) froiil. the sim'
.
.
37
.t;)ler notJ.on
o.f J.ngenu.ous
assert:tono
1~us
it is entirely
plausible to assmne minimal bias on the part of the scien-
tist in the cil:cumstances conceived ..
NovJ with regard to the st.ructure of Sellars' theory
(\'lfe are now
ll\lroally~
speaking about the theory conceived
by the scientists of ou:t· prirnitive linguistic community),
mi.sconceivedo
Fii:s·t, it must again be emphasized that
while the theory
respect to its
science..
i£~ ),.;j.~
app:~:oach,
a physical-sci(?.nce theory \..rith
it is .llS?.t a theory of cl physical
Thus the analogy
tial to the
~~cienti fie
of any new concept..
involvc~d
is an analogy
essenN~
t&.pproach, indeed to the formation
To develop new conceptsr
r.u:~w
insights,
we must alv1ays go fJ:-ont the familii1.r to vlhat iH to be
ex~
plained.,
'rhe naturals most ra:i:ional bridge is that of
analogyG
In the analogy some isomorphism is readily
apparent or readily formulated between the familiar and
the theoretical..
h1-lere such isomorphism does not hold,
theoret:ica.l properties must be postulated compat:ible with
an explanation of why the analogy does hold
(~l~;;ewhere~
61
further qualification
a~:;
subsequent events \•!arrant:.
Second, t·he argu.rnent
i~{
misleading where it. disput:es
the u.niformii.:y of in.ner episodes
episodes..
This is precisely
wha~c
l:::E~u~=;,
t:hey are inner
the theory rejects..
It
is essential to an und(2!rstc.nding of the theory to realize
that. the overt linguistic and other behavior on 'VJhich the
inn.er ep:b:wdes t:t:ce rnodeled are
intf~rsubjective
and are
unifonn in the sense of being :t"egulated by the com:n:n:.unity• s
they are
unifo:~::m
a.nd regular
·that~
p:r.:·t:=dict:ions of them and
from them C,E!! be made and that .i..nner episodes ci'.m be postulated as theorf:;tical ent:U:ies o
NOTES
1
wi.lfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and ·the Philosophy of
Mind" r i:n £H.l}DE!.~.C?·ta __~t.udi£:SL-.tn. tl:?:§t..RhtiS:!~EE.bY_S>L.:?SJ,~!?ci!.~,
Vol o I 5 ed e Herb<:~rt Feigl (:U1d Nichael Scriven (Jv:\inneapolis:
University of I'-linn.esota Press., 1956} 8 311; rpto in V>.Jilfrid
Sellars 8 §..£2:.?rl!;_'S.t.~E££P~t;Jgn -~.nc;LB~<:tJj ty (Londo:ag Routledge & Keqan Paul; NevJ' York: 'I'he Humcu::dt:ic-;)s Press, 1963),
p., 180o
2
'sintentionelli ty and the Me,nt:<::ll £If in !~l:!liE~Ui:!£t~
§t\!~9:i~it£L...iLL..:fl1'l~ Pl!.i~.9..;?..S"::>l?J2:Y.:...£J. ~S1J9n.£§.t Vol o II, ed o Herbert
Feigl, 1'4ichae1 Sc1:J. ven axid Grover Naxwell (.CvlinnE-'~apolis ~
University of I'1inm::sotijl. Press, 1958), pp., 52lnm539.,
3
'l'here should be no confusion. be·tween the tw·o senses
of inten:tionality being used6 In its first use at ~che
beginning of thE' section, it is thou9hts and t.hi.nking
which have interl"tionality.
In its second use, it is a
certain use of language which gives the sen'l.:ence in which
' t occurs a c:t~scJ.nc
',l'
~·
t l...Jd1S>t11.§..!;.1:£
'
. ,. proper t·y o·.·f .J.nt ent::.:torl.a
~.'
l :1.' t.y.
~
..
At any rate it v.ri11 b<0 clear from the contE;;xt of the discussion 'tvhich sense of intentional.i:ty is being usede
4
We are speaking here of rnent~ll phenomena as reflected in sentences that exhibit an intent.ional use of
lan.guage.,
5
Roderick li1., Chisholmu 10 Sentences about Believingi!V,
E_rose:§di!1SJJ1L..2f_j;: 11}? -~·r tfi.t oj;siLi.?rL.S!-2£1S~tlZ~ LVI ( 19 55~ 19 56 ) ,
125~-148; rpt
with revisions by the. au·thor as part o:E
~rnten-tionalit:y and the Mental~", in ~~iHrEt~g!.:?.. Stt;~.d~52_§_i-~B:
1:1},~~JL'l}j]:,£~3S?J;::~!TIL.~qf_,..Sc,!s;p.g~, Vole II, edo Herbert Feigl,
lViichael Scriven and Grovet.~ Haxv-,rel.l (Minneapolis :Uni vGrsity
of ZVJ.in:nesota Press, 1958), pp., 510~520. References are to
the revised version in "Intentionalit.:y and the Mental $1.,
G
6 Roder:t.c
. k H. Ch:t.sholm,
.
.
tion Some Psycholog:tcal
Con1
Ct,!pt.s. and the Logic e of Intentionali tyn, in !.~l"t!f211:i£!!­
E:JjJ~y.L._fi~~-!:~9§....2.Llf!:.w,Pq,~~tpn, ed. Hector·-Neri Castaneda
(Detroit~ l.v·ayne State University Press 1 1962), pp. 11-57 ~
62
63
See Roderick He Chisholm, P~.~;!:.Yil!.S! (Ithaca:
Cornell Univers:i:ty Press, 1957), ch .. 11 c
7
8
chisholm and Sellars,
Menta1" 1
91
I:nt:en.tionali'cy and the
p~520~
9
•rhe third criterion would have to be expa:n.df.~d to
include, in addition to nam(~S and descriptions, phrases
having- t:r.:"'uth values, Ln. order to be applicable to instances
of nonextensional occurrence~
10
Quot:ed in Chish.o1m, '11 0n Some Psycholoqi.cal Concepts
and. the 'Logics of In:tentionalitys•, Pe55, as follows:
21
And it 'hrould seem that intention.ality is merely that
special case of obliquEn1es:£~ in v.rhich the oblique contE;zt
is introduced by a vvord (such as believe) that has a
psycholo,~r.ical J::-€>fr::n:·cmcc:;" ~·~ Alonzo Church, l!lLogi.c and
l;,nalysis w, Proceedinqs of the XIItb. Ixtt.e:rna~cional Congress
of Philosophy (Florence: Sansoni, 19S8·-1961) ·IV, 77-fH~
11 f""t
•
l
1m,
... t~:u3L10
u On
~
-·~ " 1. c-onceptr-3 and t.h e
.;>Jome
Psyc110 l .og.tca
'Logic 1 of Intentionalityu, Pe lL
12 r .: ~
• k JVi
· ,_ ..
] m,
.d.ov.er1.c
.1. C""'!l:i.SllO
J2..r=.s::'Lq:t2J't~J!~~"'L.£fw!)hjJ~£2.9I?!Iic
r• In...~... e·~ l"t·
...., 1 -·"·.l
i ·!o1cr" , 1.' n .;;;.;;._.;..
'~-'he."'
......;, o'
-'-'·"'Vol., 4, ed.. Paul Ed\va:r.ds {New
York: Ivlacrrd.l1an, 1967), p., 203.,
13
r.rh.e lett.ers vacn and
WDII
ir, t;h(~ initials nucn u
11
'00 11 ,
from the medieval t.erms :i.g,_ ~Ht~~l
Cf'E!E.0~;1.t£. and .!JL..:SEiJl.~.1L.£?-iy;1&c_?..
For a fuller account of
their symbolism, SfH:! Chisholm, non Some Psychological
Concept;s and the Q Logic~ of Intentionalityn, pp .. 13~14.
"EC" and "'E:D
14
sc~e
are
31
R.,
11
'RejoinderM in
PP~
c ..
takc~n
Slei9h Jr.,
~~comm.e:nts~
and R ..
M~
Chisholm,
Int~~n~~Ji.t;y..t...1,~~~,.,.,21}J.l P~c~ti:pn,
36-54.
B:ruce Aune, KnJ?.??le1sL~-"-}-1JJ?.(:1_a!JsL~t,l:g-e (New York:
Random House, 1967; rpt .. Reseda., Califg Ridgeview, n .. d.,),
p .. 199$
15
16 ch.
'!.
.J.SLlolm a:nt..t Sellars 6
Nent.allfl, Pu 522.
..;!
17
I'J?.,id.
1
P• 523o
•
•
~"'Intent:t.onalJ.ty
and
tht~
18
.
ll?.;Lg,,?..l PP e 5161 517 e
191bid..!., 526.,
20
In other words, the notion is rejected for our
purpofle,, Vlhich is that of C}-.'}1licntione Additional
reason.t:z for reject:ion 6 along the lines in.dica·b?.d, would
require argumen'cs leading us too f.:ar afield.
pr€~sent
21
chisholm and Sc:;llars, ul:r1tentionality and i:he
Nental i~, p o 527 ..
22
see Wilfrid Sellars,
Communication"
.. !LangtU:l.g{~ as Thought and as
Pb}.19~3S!J21:';Y:..~~t,BfLJ'll~J1S!~rK::nolg_.£1S.~.!-.B.Sl~~~.ll£91}_.
Q
523; rpt~ in Hilfrid Sellar~:~ .. EsJ?...~~yp i:!~
.~1tbl2,~S?J!JJY_.?~B~U~~X;.. _!i}:.-~~c~!:~Y (Dordr(~cht, Holland; Bost:on::
De Reidel, 1974), p. 112.
29 (1969)
u
23_
.
..:!:.!~
sella:es hold~:~ t:he connection bet::WE*en thoughts and
their expn.!!ssi.on. in linguistic beht-lvior to be t'synthetically !1(~ct:;ssa:cy, " w'here this ph.rase is to be~ underst:ood
as un.ecessary t:t:u:t.h v.rhich is su.bjE~ct matter dependv-.n"l.t, cu
24
See W:D. frid Sellaxs, ;~:tsA~D2.9...~<3n9.:..~t1!2!::::::.i?1;1Y~~2:.S::l2. (London.g
Rou.tl<~dsre & Keg-an Paul; l'Jev..r York: T.he Ht:t.m.::mities Presr:b,
1968), p .. 68
.
~
'I'he concepts of the Sella.rsaan. a.:Lstr:tbutl. ve s:Lngular terms and do·t quotes arE-) fm.nili.ar in ·the literat:ureo
See for example H:i.1frid Sellars, uAbstra.ct Entities 11 ar:td
t'Not;t:~s o:n In.tentiona.lityu rr~prin.ted in Wilfrid Sellars,
Phlli2gpbJ~:?.i~l~~~. ~;r~F2£9.!:.!~s (Sprinr;Jfield: CJ:tarles C 'I'11omas 1
1967), "-YLi:;;.ngu~l.ge as Though·t and as Corm.n1.:rn.ica.tionn, a.nd
.§.£~l'lES{£_C<r.J9~!:1~·t:<'.1:£ll"V~d,c:;s_, ch.. 3; .:Jeffrey Sichi'.:t, A .:M~J-~~·
EEY.l?.}.:..S:.§__Q,;L.¥!d:.£rt~Q!?:.t.£rY..J(,~~::'SFE;!J!fiti£:~, (l.'lmherst: Un:L versit:y of
Ma~:wad1usetts Press, 1974) 1 cbs~ 1 and 2; Bruce Aun.e 1
1~n~l9dq~~~~-'tvliq£._f.~Xl? 1:~at-qre, ch~ Bo
25
t
27 ·m-..
'..~.ul.s
"
•
•
•
ex:tsi::.<:n-lce of course is not meant in the actual
or l1istoricnl t:H~nse, but for th<:!
~rhe hypothesis is not refuted by
no such comnn.u:d ty ever existed.
and the Philosophy of Mind"', pp.,
sake of the argmnento
showing empirically that
See Sellars, "Empiricisn1.
178-180, 186-189.
28 That :ts,
.
wh.J.lE!
""
.
, .
can Ci.la:t:·acte:r:J.ze
t h.
IU1KJ.ng-outlou.d in this VNiY s th.e members of the community, a.t this
sta.ge of their lingui~~tic dev<~lopment cannot. 'l'hey have
as yet no co:ncept:ion that they ar'~ ~th;h!22i.:LDEi.-ou.t-loud ..
298 ee Se1lars
1
31
Sel~
Sellars,
wr:_~
uLanguage as 'l'hought and as Corrrmur.d. ·~·
~Lang·uage
as 'IiJ:10nght and as Cornmuni-
cation", PPc 93-101.
32
'J:he .§12.l?.:1Jc§.!:£Jqll of rules of criticism to leaJ::ners
of the lcU'19uage (as vlfdl a.s to oneself) is, of course, a
man:J..fes'ca·t:ion of rule::> of action, which is understood by
onr;::: who has mastered the language~~
33
"'
s e.'ll_ ax·s,
see
I•i.i.nd n~ , p ., 1 7 9 o
.!£.:td~.'
34
35
36
"Ernpiri.cisrn and
p.. 185.,
th(~
Phiiol'.c;ophy of
Emphal:1is in origial@
Ibiq._, P• 186e
'
see ChJ.sholrn and Sellars, 6'Int.entio:nalit.y a1:1d the
1Vlent.al u e PPe 534-537 e
37
See Aune, ~l,_e£q~.i~}d_N~a.;.E_:t:!;[&_,pp, 192-193~
SELECTBD BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aune J' Bruce., 1SDS.2~.S1£g..~-J'Itnd .§;n~LJ~a:tt~2~Z~.L-~-l\~l _!J:lt.E:2.s!l!c·l;;_~;;.gz1
j;o. •J1J:§:pr~Y~.-2..t ~!!S~Y~~.§L_[:;!!fl :sJ~hi,l£fi::?J2.llY~2.f ~l~iL¥:1 ~
Nmv York~ Random House, 1967. Rpt. Het';eda, CaliL ~
Rids:;eview, n~d.
In 'I'JJ.§!~ll.::?.Y.Sd2£!:ld ~~~J::h:f:12.~0£hY• Vol •
New Yorlc~ N.acmilla.n, 1967 ~
Ed6 Paul Edwardse
Pp., 100-104.,
'*'l.'hir!lcinq 11 •
8..
Castaneda~
I-Iec:tor~"Neri, ed ~
f?.£;.t.:£:~1217:JC?l~"
1.Pts!.n:t!i?l:§}::.:ttx~."l1L~19-s ~ a]J[~
Detroit: Wayne State Unive_rsity P:r·,'!lsa,
1962.
Chi t:::holm p Rodo x-i ck H..
Ithaca~ Cornell
E'.~J.::.£.fl:l .v!:':b'1Lf~l:hJ~.1.S?E.?J?.J1h9. aL§' t~~~tiY:.
Uniw:::r~::dty
Press,. 1957.,
"Sentences about Believi.ng~., Pr:oc~:§QJ..115J£'~L:t1l:f!
Aristotelian
Societv, LVI (1955-1956), 125-148e
..............
Rpte \·lith revisions by the author as part of nrnten'cionality and the Mentallli o
In t'l~l~~-o·t,£~..Jil:;}:.ld:i.~~'f?.
--...-.....,~~'0"<<>5>=
-=~~ ""-=.,~-...a:.-
J.:.!.L..!J,!SL.,Ehllq.£.<?Ph.:z__C?f.,:2_ci£!1S~,~ Vol .. II. Edo Herbert
l"eigl, Michael Scriven and Grover Haxvvell.. Hin:nea~
polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958a
510~520
Ppe
..
1ntentionalit.y" o
Vol., 4..
Ed. Pau.l
Pp., 201~204.
11
In :.rJ?&._£L.!!£..11:cloJ?.~.ip., £f._ P@.:£E.2Ell)~r
New York: .IY1.acmillan, 196'7
Edwards~
and Wilfrid Sellars.,
urntentionality an.d the Mental" ..
In IJJ.i:nnesota
St:udies .. in. the Philosophy of Science,
......
-Vol. :u:.
Ed~ Herbert: Fei91, Hichael Scriven and
· Grover r.1axv1ell.. J.1irn:;.eapolis ~ Uni vex:si ty of Minnesota
~
.,.~_.,.,.==wo-•-t>-$~~.:~-=-=-~·--...,-...,....,..~...,_....,.,,
Press, 1958.
Pp~
&
._....,..,...~BU>-._.~=~·,=~--.r.:o:.:>::..·=~~~~~,--=---""'"~~~-
521-539.
66
Sellars, Wilfrid.
Science. Perception a.nd Rea.1itvti
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