Discrepant Beliefs About Quality and Taste
February 4, 2014
STEPHEN A. SPILLER*
HELEN BELOGOLOVA
*Stephen A. Spiller is Assistant Professor of Marketing (e-mail:
stephen.spiller@anderson.ucla.edu) and Helen Belogolova is a doctoral student (e-mail:
helen.belogolova.2015@anderson.ucla.edu) at Anderson School of Management, University of
California, Los Angeles. The authors thank Sanjog Misra, Danny Oppenheimer, Suzanne Shu,
David Tannenbaum, Raphael Thomadsen, Elizabeth Webb, UCLA’s Behavioral Decision
Making lab group, and participants in Wharton’s Decision Processes seminar for helpful
comments and discussions, and especially Robert Zeithammer for assistance with the model.
Any errors are the authors’.
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Discrepant Beliefs About Quality and Taste
Abstract: Consumers can represent sets of products as matters of (objective) quality or matters of
(subjective) taste. We find substantial discrepancies among consumers in how they represent a
given set. Compared to consumers who represent a set as a matter of quality, those who represent
that same set as a matter of taste: a) believe that fewer consumers will choose the same option
that they did; b) are more likely to refer to themselves when explaining their choice; c) are less
willing to pay to trade their less-preferred option for their more-preferred option; and d) are less
likely to use others’ choices to make inferences about the quality of unfamiliar options.
Explaining why another consumer chose a different option (compared to the same option)
increases the likelihood of representing the set as a matter of taste. This work challenges the idea
that there are universally agreed upon domains of quality and taste and shows instead that these
meaningful classifications vary across consumers.
Keywords: taste, perceived consensus, inferences, representation
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Is a student’s choice between an elite liberal arts college and a public state university a
matter of quality or a matter of taste? Is a wine connoisseur’s choice between a bottle of Pinot
Noir that received a 92 from Wine Spectator and a bottle of Merlot that received a 95 from The
Wine Advocate a matter of excellence or a matter of personal preference? Is a cinephile’s choice
between the latest superhero movie and the latest romantic comedy a matter of which is better or
a matter of which she likes more? In the current work, we examine discrepancies in whether
consumers represent a given set of options as a matter of quality or taste. Understanding how
consumers represent choice sets is critical because their representations of the world affect their
behaviors, beliefs, and inferences (e.g., Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Cho and Schwarz 2008;
Deval et al. 2013; Faro, McGill, and Hastie 2010; Legrenzi, Girotto, and Johnson-Laird 1993).
We report six key findings. First, there is substantial disagreement between consumers as
to whether any given set of options varies in terms of quality or taste. Second, consumers believe
their chosen options are more popular when they represent the choice as a matter of quality (vs.
taste). Third, consumers are more willing to pay for their more-preferred option over their lesspreferred option when they represent the choice as a matter of quality (vs. taste). Fourth,
consumers use less self-referential language when explaining a choice that they represent as a
matter of quality (vs. taste). Fifth, these representations are malleable: explaining why someone
else made a different choice increases the likelihood of representing the choice as a matter of
taste. Sixth, upon observing others’ choices, consumers are more likely to make inferences about
which option is better when they represent the domain as a matter of quality (vs. taste). Each of
the above findings holds even when the actual set of options is held constant.
Below, we briefly review research suggesting that different consumers may represent the
same sets differently. We then describe a simple stylized spatial model and develop hypotheses
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about the consequences of using different representations. We provide evidence for these
hypotheses across six studies. Throughout, we use “perceived objectivity” as shorthand to refer
to the degree to which a consumer represents a given set of options as a matter of quality rather
than taste. We use taste in its value-neutral sense, referring to matters of idiosyncratic fit or
personal preference, not “good taste” or “bad taste.”
PERCEIVED OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY
The question of quality versus taste is, at its core, a question of perceived objectivity
versus subjectivity. As individuals develop, their understandings about the nature of knowledge,
and in particular whether a given domain is a matter of objectivity or subjectivity, change (Kuhn,
Cheney, and Weinstock 2000; Carpendale and Chandler 1996). However, it is generally taken for
granted by marketers and researchers that once consumers have reached adulthood, they can
readily recognize and distinguish between domains of objectivity and domains of subjectivity.
These differences between domains affect how people search for and interpret
information. The sources sought for advice and preference for conformity vary between domains
of knowledge and domains of preference (e.g., Goethals and Nelson 1973; Gorenflo and Crano
1989; Olson, Ellis, and Zanna 1983; Solomon, Pruitt, and Insko 1984; Spears, Ellemers, and
Doosje 2009), but the knowledge versus preference distinction is usually assumed to vary across
domains, not within domain. We propose that in addition to across-domain differences, there are
also differences in perceived objectivity between individuals within any given domain.
Although this issue has not been directly addressed in the marketing literature, there is
suggestive evidence about within-domain differences from research on aesthetics and morality.
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Olson et al. (1983; Ellis, Olson and Zanna 1983) informed some participants that physical
attractiveness is an objective determination and others that it is a subjective determination.
Objectivity instructions increased perceived consensus and reliance on consensus versus
consistency information to resolve uncertainty, suggesting that the perceived objectivity of
physical attractiveness is malleable. Goodwin and Darley (2008, 2012) assessed the perceived
objectivity of domains traditionally seen as matters of taste (writers, musicians, speakers, etc.) as
part of a study focused on the objectivity of moral beliefs. Although these domains tended to be
represented as matters of taste, there was disagreement among participants about whether
comparisons were matters of fact. Charters and Pettigrew (2003) found that some consumers
explained their wine evaluations in terms of quality and others in terms of personal preference.
We propose that consumers represent meaningful differences between quality and taste,
and that these representations vary from person to person. Note that this need not be the case.
Consumers could choose based on utility without representing quality and taste as sources of
utility. If they do not represent the distinction between quality and taste, their responses and
behaviors will not vary depending on their classification. However, if they do represent the
distinction between quality and taste, their representations can explain a variety of correlates.
A Stylized Model
Consider two products X and Y sold for the same price, and a consumer with unit demand
who prefers X to Y. We propose that all consumers perceive the two products to be differentiated,
but they disagree whether the differentiation is a matter of quality or taste. For simplicity,
assume consumers measure the difference between X and Y in terms of a continuous singledimensional attribute x scaled to a unit interval, such that X=1 and Y=0 (in other words, x is the
measure of relative “x-ness” of the product). We propose that different consumers can have one
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of two different representations of their own utility function:
1) We say that consumers believe the choice between X and Y represents a difference in quality
when they believe that consumer i’s utility of a product located at x and priced at p to be
U1(x;θ1) = θ1x – p, where θ1 is the monetary value of a unit increase in the attribute x when x
represents quality (utility is measured in dollars).
2) We say that consumers believe the choice between X and Y represents a difference in taste
when they believe that consumer i’s utility of a product located at x and priced at p to be
U2(x;θ2,zi) = –θ2|x – zi| – p, where θ2 is the monetary value of a unit difference in attribute x
when x represents taste, and zi is the perceived location of consumer i's ideal product.
Each consumer believes that all consumers use the same representation, but that individual zi’s
may vary (cf. Orhun and Urminsky 2013). This simple model allows us to make several
predictions. These are discussed in the following sections, with psychological evidence for each.
Perceived Consensus
Quality differences exist independent of any given consumers’ preferences. If higher fuel
efficiency is objectively better than lower fuel efficiency, all knowledgeable consumers will
choose a car with higher fuel efficiency, all else held constant. If color is a matter of taste, the
proportion of consumers choosing blue versus green will depend on the distribution of tastes.
In terms of the model, consumer i who represents his preferences using R (where R is
either 1 or 2 above) believes that he chose by maximizing utility UR. For matters of quality
(R=1), the factors affecting utility U1 are not believed to vary by consumer, so consumers
believe that everyone will make the same choice, and perceived consensus will be high. For
matters of taste (R=2), one factor affecting utility U2 (the location of the ideal product zi) can
vary by consumer, so consumers believe that different people may make different choices, and
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perceived consensus will depend on the perceived distribution of tastes and generally be lower.
People tend to believe that they see the world as it really is and that other reasonable
people see the world the same way (Ross and Ward 1996; Pronin, Ross, and Gilovich 2004).
Thus, a consumer who believes that manual transmission is objectively better than automatic
transmission will believe that other consumers will recognize that it is better as well and so will
also choose manual transmission. A consumer who represents the choice between manual
transmission and automatic transmission as a matter of taste will recognize that others may hold
different preferences and choose differently. People who represent a choice as a matter of quality
will perceive a greater consensus than those who see a choice as a matter of taste (Ellis et al.
1983; Goodwin and Darley 2012). This relationship is likely bidirectional. Ellis and colleagues
found that manipulating whether beauty was a matter of subjectivity or objectivity affected
perceived consensus, and Goodwin and Darley found that varying the perceived consensus of
whether a moral action was right or wrong affected its perceived objectivity.
H1:
Consumers who represent a given alternative as objectively better will perceive
greater choice consensus than those who represent it as a matter of taste.
Role of the Consumer in Choice
Whether a choice set is represented as a matter of taste or quality will affect how
consumers reason about their choices (regardless of whether the set truly is a matter of taste or
quality). Products that vary in terms of objective quality may be rank ordered without
referencing personal preferences; the consumer and her preferences are superfluous. Products
that vary in terms of taste, however, necessitate a match between the product and the chooser. As
a result, there will be fundamental differences in the language consumers use to explain their
choices. Pennebaker and Francis (1996) found that when people write more personally involving
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stories, they use more first-person pronouns. We argue that matters of taste are more personally
involving than matters of quality. Holding constant the domain, consumers will use more firstperson pronouns when explaining choices that they represent as matters of taste than when
explaining choices that they represent as matters of quality.
Attribution theory (Kelley 1973) posits that people use the cues available to them to make
causal judgments, and in particular that they may use different schema for matters of objectivity
and matters of subjectivity. Kelley proposed that the situation is relied upon for objective truths
whereas the person x situation interaction is relied upon for matters of taste. This will be
reflected in language, given that referencing people increases the use of personal pronouns. In
terms of the model, a consumer may explain a choice by describing the inputs into utility. For
matters of quality (R=1), choice may be explained without reference to consumer i. For matters
of taste, an explanation without reference to consumer i is incomplete because U2 depends on zi.
Explanations for choices that are represented as matters of quality should include fewer selfreferences than explanations for choices that are represented as matters of taste.
H2:
Consumers who represent a given alternative as objectively better will use fewer
first-person pronouns when explaining their own choices than those who
represent it as a matter of taste.
Willingness to Pay
The amount that an individual is willing to pay for a product should depend on the utility
that she receives from the product, but not on whether that utility is derived from quality or taste.
That is, a consumer should be willing to pay as much as the product is worth to him or her.
Although our simple model does not lead to a different prediction by itself, consumers are
influenced by reference prices (Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004), and are sometimes unwilling to pay
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more for options that they would otherwise choose or prefer (Amir and Ariely 2007; Lichtenstein
and Slovic 1971). Consumers find some sellers’ prices and price changes to be fairer than others
(Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986).
Some of the factors that affect perceived fairness are particularly informative for the
current research. Bolton et al. (2003) found that a price difference based on product quality was
perceived to be fairer than a price difference based on geographic customer base (a matter of
idiosyncratic fit). Kahneman et al. (1986) report a variety of contexts in which demand shocks
are seen as unacceptable reasons to increase prices. Consumers report that it is unfair to raise the
prices of snow shovels after a snowstorm, increase the price of a car when it is in high demand,
or set higher prices merely because there are no near competitors. Most directly, consumers
found it unfair for a landlord to raise rent on a tenant merely because the tenant had a strong
preference for that location after accepting a nearby job. The preference for that unit was a
matter of taste and not quality, and so the increase was perceived to be highly unfair.
We propose that holding valuation constant, willingness to pay will vary according to the
basis for that valuation. If the good has a high value because it is (represented as) a better
product, then there is an acceptable reason to pay a higher price and consumers will be willing to
pay more for their preferred options. In contrast, if the good has an equally high value because it
is (represented as) a good fit, then there is no acceptable reason to pay a higher price and
consumers will not be willing to pay more for their preferred options.
H3:
Consumers who represent a given alternative as objectively better will be more
willing to pay to receive it instead of a different alternative than those who
represent it as a matter of taste.
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Reconciling Discrepant Choices
We have argued that consumers represent choices as matters of quality and taste and that
different consumers may represent the same choice in different ways. Are these representations
malleable? Kuhn et al. (2000) argue that conceptualizations of knowledge change over time as
individuals mature; we posit that these may change on a moment-to-moment basis. Olson et al.
(1983) showed that people were able to shift their representation of beauty as objective or
subjective when directed via explicit instructions. We propose that subtler manipulations can
affect the representations of a variety of consumer domains.
Specifically, we propose that people may change their representations when faced with
others’ discrepant choices. There are (at least) three possible responses to learning that another
consumer made a discrepant choice on a matter of quality. First, a consumer may recognize that
he was wrong and shift his response to be more in line with the other’s response; in our model,
this is given by replacing x with y = 1 – x. Second, individuals may deem that the other
individual is mistaken or biased (e.g., Goodwin and Darley 2008; Ross and Ward 1995; Pronin et
al. 2004); in our model, this requires no update, other than that others’ choices may be made with
error. We propose a third resolution: individuals could recognize that neither consumer made a
mistake, but change their representation of the choice set to be a matter of taste; in our model,
this means changing one’s beliefs about one’s utility function from R=1 to R=2 to reconcile the
choice set. Note that this is distinct from an effect of perceived consensus: even when consumers
recognize that others may make different decisions, making sense of why another consumer
made that discrepant choice is the active ingredient.
H4:
Making sense of why another consumer made a choice that differs from one’s own
increases the likelihood of representing that choice as a matter of taste and
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decreases the likelihood of representing that choice as a matter of quality.
Consumer Inference
Sometimes consumers are familiar with a domain but unfamiliar with a particular set of
options from that domain. What can they learn about those options from observing others’
choices? The different models that consumers use to represent the world affect the inferences
they draw about what underlies a given pattern of data. Just as a researcher who models choice
data allowing for quality differences but no taste differences will come to a different set of
conclusions about both products and consumers than a researcher who models choice data
allowing for taste differences but no quality differences, so will two consumers who use those
different representations of the world. In terms of the model, when z's and x’s are unknown,
others’ choices are more informative about x’s for matters of quality than for matters of taste.
Morris and Larrick (1995) prescribe a normative benchmark by which researchers can
judge whether attributional judgments are discounted too much, the right amount, or not enough.
They emphasize the role of prior beliefs. Someone who holds strong beliefs that John is clumsy
may reasonably make a different set of attributions after observing John trip over a rug than
someone else who holds strong beliefs that the rug is positioned in a hazardous way. Such prior
beliefs have strong influences on consumer inferences. Lay theories can dominate observed
relationships in the data in predicting how consumers will infer missing attribute values
(Broniarczyk and Alba 1994); they can moderate the extent to which consumers infer judgments
based on limited data (Faro et al. 2010); and they can lead to opposing inferences from the same
data (Cho and Schwarz 2008; Deval et al. 2013).
Thus, whether a choice set is represented as a matter of quality or a matter of taste
determines what inferences consumers draw from others’ decisions. If a choice set is represented
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as a matter of quality, all consumers should choose the same option from any subset, so one can
combine choices made by different consumers to rank the options. If a choice set is represented
as a matter of taste, consumers need not choose the same option from any subset, so one cannot
combine choices from different consumers to rank the options without making additional
assumptions. If Mary chose Brand A over Brand B and Paul chose Brand B over Brand C, the
perceived likelihood that Lisa will choose Brand A over Brand C is a function of whether the
domain is represented as a matter of quality or taste.
H5:
Consumers who represent a choice set as a matter of quality will be more likely to
draw rank-order inferences from others’ choices than consumers who represent it
as a matter of taste.
The Studies
Below, we report the results of six studies. The first three demonstrate differences in
representations of brand pairs across a wide variety of consumer product domains. In Studies 1
and 2 we observe relationships among choice set representation and perceived consensus (H1),
self-reference (H2), and willingness to pay (H3). In Study 3, we manipulate whether the
participant has to explain another’s consistent or discrepant choice and observe the effect on the
participant’s representation (H4). In Study 4, we examine how use of first-person pronouns,
indicative of taste representations, is related to how consistent professional movie critics are in
their evaluations of quality. In Studies 5 and 6, we examine how consumer inferences about the
quality of unfamiliar options depend on whether that domain is represented as a matter of quality
or taste (H5).
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STUDIES 1 AND 2
Studies 1 and 2 test the relationships between perceived objectivity and perceived
consensus, self-reference, and willingness to pay. We examine a broad range of choices within a
substantively important domain: brand choice. Rather than cherry-picking particularly
ambiguous examples, we deliberately vary the category by selecting leading brands from sixteen
different product categories, ranging from beer to package delivery services to cars, to test
whether these effects hold over a broad set of categories (e.g., Lynch 1982). Study 2 was
conducted as a nearly exact replication of Study 1, so we describe it briefly.
Study 1 Method
Participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 200; 64 women, median age of 27)
were recruited for this study. First, participants answered four questions about which of two
branded products they would rather use if the products were equated on price (Choice). There
were 16 total brand pairs, one pair from each of 16 categories, and each participant chose one
brand from each of a randomly selected set of 4 pairs. These brands were selected as leading
brands from 16 widely differing product categories (beer, clothing store, sedan, soda,
smartphone, gas station, credit card, moisturizer, hotel, search engine, digital camera, television,
fast food, shoes, laptop, and package delivery service). Materials for one category, soda, are
given in Appendix A. Second, participants reported their strength of preference for each choice
on a 1 to 7 scale from “Very weak” to “Very strong” (Preference Strength). Third, participants
provided an open-ended explanation of why they made each choice that they did (Explanation).
For each choice, participants reported whether one option was objectively better than the
other or whether it was a matter of opinion (Perceived Objectivity); participants also had the
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opportunity to report that they did not know enough to judge. There were four response options
for each category: (1) “[Brand A] is objectively better than [Brand B]”; (2) “[Brand B] is
objectively better than [Brand A]”; (3) “Neither one is objectively better, it is a matter of
opinion”; (4) “I do not know enough about [Brand A] and [Brand B] to judge.” Note that
participants never saw this item until after they had given all four explanations, so their
explanations could not have been affected by this question. Next, participants indicated how
many other participants out of 100 would choose the same option for each choice (Perceived
Consensus). Participants then indicated how much they would be willing to pay to trade their
less-preferred option for their more-preferred option in a specified context (WTP).
Finally, participants completed the Ten Item Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow,
and Swann 2003) and reported household income, sex, age, and ethnicity.
Study 1 Results
Descriptive Statistics. Overall, 39% of choices were classified as a matter of quality
(participants chose 1 or 2 on perceived objectivity); 47% were classified as a matter of taste
(participants chose 3 on perceived objectivity); and 14% were not classified due to a lack of
knowledge (participants chose 4 on perceived objectivity). Unclassified choices are not included
in the analyses below. See Figure 1 for classifications by domain for Studies 1, 2, and 3. Only
1% of responses indicated that the unchosen option was objectively better than the chosen
option. More informative than the overall percentage of quality responses and taste responses is
the extent of disagreement. Do all participants represent one choice as a matter of quality and
another as a matter of taste, or do some participants represent one choice as a matter of quality
and others represent that same choice as a matter of taste? Of the informed responses, the
average minority response (the lesser of quality or taste responses, and therefore bounded
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between 0 and 50%) was 35%, indicating significant disagreement for each choice.
Insert Figure 1 about here
There was evidence for commonalities across each participants’ four responses. To test
this, we regressed the proportion of informed responses that were taste responses for three
choices on a dummy indicating whether the fourth choice was classified as taste. We ran four
such regressions, rotating the test choice. The excluded choice was a significant positive
predictor (p < .05) in three out of four regressions and trending (p < .15) in the fourth. In other
words, knowing how a participant responded in one domain was informative about how they
would respond in the other three randomly chosen domains. This provides initial evidence that
consumers who represent one set of choices as a matter of taste at a given point in time are also
likely to represent other sets of choices at that same point in time as matters of taste.
In each analysis below, we analyze the variable of interest as a function of whether the
participant reported that the choice set was a matter of quality or taste, including fixed effects for
choice category, random intercepts for participant, and an unstructured error covariance matrix.
We also examine a second set of such models including fixed effects for which option the
participant chose within the category and continuous measures of preference strength (except
when preference strength was the dependent variable) and perceived consensus (except when
preference strength or perceived consensus was the dependent variable). Note that including
fixed effects for which option the participant chose also accounts for differences in actual
consensus. Because each participant made choices from multiple categories from the larger set
but those subsets differed across participants, we analyzed models with continuous dependent
variables using the MIXED procedure in SAS 9.2 and models with dichotomous dependent
variables using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS 9.2. This allows us to use participant-choices as
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the unit of observation while accounting for non-independence. Because the models include
fixed effects for choice category, the estimated effects of perceived objectivity are the result of
differences in perceived objectivity within a given category averaged across categories, and not
comparing categories that tend to be perceived as objective with those that tend to be perceived
as subjective. The reported analyses exclude the interactions between perceived objectivity and
product category, but we also examined those interactions. Across Studies 1, 2, and 3, there was
one marginal interaction and one significant interaction. Those cases are discussed below.
Significance tests and raw and adjusted overall means for Studies 1, 2, and 3 are reported
together in Tables 1, 2, and 3, and raw means are displayed by category in Figures 2, 3, and 4.
Preference Strength. Participants held stronger preferences for choices that they
represented as a matter of quality rather than a matter of taste. The raw difference in means
averaged 1.14, was observed in all 16 categories, and was significant in both models (Model 1:
F(1, 473) = 83.66, p < .0001; Model 2: F(1, 457) = 86.77, p < .0001).
Perceived Consensus (H1). Participants believed that a greater proportion of participants
made the same choice that they did when they represented the choice as a matter of quality rather
than a matter of taste. The raw difference in means averaged 12.88 out of 100, was observed in
all 16 categories, and was significant in both models. See Table 1 and Figure 2. This was partly
driven by a difference in the likelihood of reporting that there was no majority (e.g., that exactly
50 out of 100 participants would make the same choice). Responses indicating no majority
represented 28% of matters of taste and 10% of matters of quality.
Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here
Self-Reference (H2). We assessed participants’ self-references by examining their use of
first-person singular pronouns when explaining their choices. This was measured as a percentage
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of total words in each explanation using LIWC2007 (Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis 2007).
Participants used fewer self-references when they represented the choice as a matter of quality
rather than taste. The raw difference in means averaged 3.32 percentage points, was observed in
15 out of 16 categories, and was significant in both models. See Table 2 and Figure 3.
Insert Table 2 and Figure 3 about here
Willingness to Pay (H3). Willingness to pay (WTP) for one’s more preferred option over
one’s less preferred option was severely positively skewed and varied considerably across
categories. Overall, more than 50% of WTP responses were $0, suggesting that there was a great
unwillingness to pay anything additional for one’s preferred option. We use an indicator variable
for WTP more than $0 as our measure of interest. Participants were more likely to be willing to
pay for their preferred option when the choice was represented as a matter of quality rather than
taste. The raw difference in proportions averaged 28.96 percentage points, was observed in 14
out of 16 categories, and was significant in both models.1 See Table 3 and Figure 4.
Insert Table 3 and Figure 4 about here
Study 2
In Study 2, we sought to replicate the results of Study 1 and ensure that it was not driven
by the decision to word taste using “matter of opinion.” Study 2 was a nearly-exact replication of
Study 1 (N = 200; 85 women, median age of 27; no one who participated in Study 1 also
participated in Study 2) with two exceptions. First, rather than using the word “opinion” in the
response option denoting taste, participants were randomly assigned to see either “taste” or
“personal preference.” Second, the personality inventory measure was dropped. The choice of
1
Fixed effects for the chosen option were excluded from the second model, as they caused the
model to fail to converge because only one participant chose Yahoo!. If search engine choices
are excluded and fixed effects are included, everything remains the same. This same adjustment
held in Study 3 for proportion of responses using third-person pronouns and WTP.
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wording (taste vs. personal preference) did not significantly interact with perceived objectivity to
influence any dependent variable, so responses were pooled across this factor. All analyses
replicated substantively and significantly; see Tables 1, 2, and 3 and Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4. There
was a marginal ordinal interaction of perceived objectivity with product category on preference
strength (p < .06), but all mean differences were in the same direction. There was a significant
interaction of perceived objectivity with product category on perceived consensus (p < .05). This
was driven by an unexpected reversal for gas stations. Compared to participants who represented
gas station choice as a matter of taste, those who represented it as a matter of quality believed
that fewer consumers made the same choice that they did. The relationship with perceived
objectivity did not significantly differ across the other 15 categories. As this was the only
significant interaction with product category for any dependent variable across Studies 1, 2, and
3, and this reversal was not present in Studies 1 or 3, we attribute it to chance.
Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence for the relationships between choice set representation
and perceived consensus (H1), self-references (H2), and willingness to pay (H3). Study 3 builds
on these results and examines whether perceived objectivity is malleable.
STUDY 3
Study 3 was the same as Study 1 with one key exception: instead of explaining their own
choices, participants explained the choices of another participant. Participants were randomly
assigned to either explain the choice of another participant who chose the same alternative or to
explain the choice of another participant who chose the other alternative.
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Method
Participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 200; 92 women, median age of 30; no
one who participated in Studies 1 or 2 participated in Study 3) were recruited for this study. The
materials were the same as in Study 1 except that the focus of each explanation was not one’s
own choice, but rather the choice of a same-sex participant who chose the same alternative
(consistent condition) or the other alternative (discrepant condition). See Appendix A. To align
participants on sex, sex was measured at the beginning of the study rather than the end.
Results
We first describe the basic results as a function of quality versus taste, replicating Studies
1 and 2. We then describe the effect of the manipulation on each dependent variable.
Descriptive Statistics. Replicating Studies 1 and 2, 41% of choices were classified as a
matter of quality; 50% were classified as a matter of taste; and 9% were not classified due to a
lack of knowledge. Unclassified choices are not used in the analyses below. Only 1% of
responses indicated that the option that was not chosen was objectively better than the chosen
option. More informative than the overall percentage of quality responses and taste responses is
the extent of disagreement. Of the informed responses, the average minority response was 37%.
In each analysis below, we assess the relationship of the dependent variable with perceived
objectivity using the same models as in Studies 1 and 2.
Preference Strength. Replicating Studies 1 and 2, participants held stronger preferences
when the choice was represented as a matter of quality rather than a matter of taste. The raw
difference in means averaged 1.18, held for all 16 categories, and was significant in both models
(Model 1: F(1, 508) = 74.46, p < .0001; Model 2: F(1, 492) = 77.54, p < .0001).
Perceived Consensus (H1). Replicating Studies 1 and 2, participants reported that their
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chosen option was more popular when the choice was represented as a matter of quality rather
than a matter of taste. The raw difference in means averaged 11.94 percentage points, held for all
16 categories, and was significant in both models. See Table 1 and Figure 2. This was again
partly driven by a difference in the likelihood of reporting that there was no majority. Responses
indicating no majority represented 29% of matters of taste and 9% of matters of quality.
Other-Reference. Because participants in Study 3 explained another’s choice rather than
their own choice, we examine use of third-person pronouns rather than first-person pronouns.
Consistent with, though not significantly replicating, Studies 1 and 2, participants used nonsignificantly fewer third-person pronouns when the choice was represented as a matter of quality
rather than a matter of taste. The raw difference in means averaged 2.02 percentage points and
held for 11 out of 16 categories. See Table 2 and Figure 3. Compared to the proportion of
explanations using first-person singular pronouns in Studies 1 (76%) and 2 (77%), fewer used
third-person singular pronouns in Study 3 (39%). The proportion of explanations that used any
third-person pronouns was marginally lower for choices that were represented as a matter of
quality. The raw difference in proportions was 16.69 percentage points, held for 13 out of 16
categories, and was marginally significant in both models. The significant effects in Studies 1
and 2 suggest that the null finding is an anomaly, there is a difference between explaining one’s
own choice and someone else’s, or Study 3 was underpowered due to the number of 0 responses.
WTP (H3). Replicating Studies 1 and 2, participants were more likely to be willing to pay
for the preferred option when the choice was represented as a matter of quality rather than a
matter of taste. The raw difference in proportions was 30.83 percentage points, held in all 16
categories, and was significant in both models. See Table 3 and Figure 4.
Effect of Reconciling a Discrepancy on Choice Set Representation (H4). We analyze
20
choice set representation (matter of taste versus matter of quality, excluding “do not know”
responses, which did not differ between conditions) as a function of condition with fixed effects
for category and random effects for subject. Compared to participants who explained discrepant
choices, participants who explained consistent choices were significantly more likely to represent
those choices as matters of quality rather than as matters of taste (F(1, 510) = 4.95, p < .05).
Among those who explained another’s choice of the same option, 45% of choices were
represented as matters of taste and 45% were represented as matters of quality (10% were
unknown). Among those who explained another’s choice of a different option, 55% of choices
were represented as matters of taste and 36% were represented as matters of quality (9% were
unknown). This difference held in 13 out of 16 categories.
Mediation Analyses. Does discrepancy have an indirect influence on each of the predicted
consequences of choice set representation? As current macros are not well equipped to handle
mixed model mediation, we analyze individual-level effects. That is, we examine the effect of
discrepancy (0 = consistent, 1 = discrepant) on average perceived consensus, average thirdperson pronoun use, and average willingness to pay anything via the difference between number
of taste representations and number of quality representations; everything is consistent if we use
proportion of informed responses that were taste instead. To avoid confounding within-domain
effects with between-domain effects, we include 15 dummy variables as covariates to account for
which of the 16 choices participants made. Each analysis used Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro
with bias-corrected confidence intervals based on 10,000 bootstrapped samples.
The indirect effect of discrepancy on average perceived consensus via the taste difference
measure was significantly negative (b = -1.11, SE = 0.52, 95% CI: [-2.40, -0.30]): explaining
another’s discrepant choice decreased perceived consensus by 1.11 percentage points through its
21
effect on representation. Controlling for the mediator, the direct effect of discrepancy on
perceived consensus was not significant (b = -1.84, SE = 1.34, t(182) = -1.37, p > .15). The total
effect of discrepancy was significantly negative (b = -2.96, SE = 1.38, t(183) = -2.14, p < .05).
The indirect effect of discrepancy on third-person pronoun use via the difference measure
was significantly positive (b = 0.41, SE = 0.23, 95% CI: [0.08, 1.02]): explaining another’s
discrepant choice increased use of third-person pronouns by 0.41 percentage points through its
effect on representation.2 Controlling for the mediator, the direct effect of taste on third-person
pronoun use remained significant (third-person pronoun use: b = 2.70, SE = 0.77, t(182) = 3.52,
p < .001). The total effect of discrepancy was significantly positive (third-person pronoun use: b
= 3.11, SE = 0.77, t(183) = 4.05, p < .001). The third-person pronoun results should be
interpreted with caution, however, as the written explanation was the manipulation, and so
language use and representation may have moved in tandem.
The indirect effect of discrepancy on proportion WTP via the difference measure was
significantly negative (b = -0.04, SE = 0.02, 95% CI: [-0.09, -0.01]): explaining another’s
discrepant choice decreased willingness to pay by 4 percentage points through its effect on
representation. Controlling for the mediator, the direct effect of discrepancy on proportion WTP
was not significant (b = -0.04, SE = 0.05, t(182) = -0.80, p > .4). The total effect of discrepancy
was trending, but not significantly, negative (b = -0.08, SE = 0.05, t(183) = -1.62, p < .11).
These results show that making sense of another’s discrepant choice can affect perceived
consensus, other-references, and willingness to pay by shaping how consumers represent the
choice. In the mediation analysis reported above, there was no direct effect of the manipulation
on perceived consensus (that is, there was evidence for indirect-only mediation). If we swap the
2
These results replicate when third-person pronoun use was replaced with proportion of
explanations that used any third-person pronouns.
22
mediator and dependent variable so that we test whether the manipulation influenced perceived
consensus that in turn influenced representation, there again was a significant indirect path (b =
0.24, SE = 0.12, 95% CI: [0.04, 0.55]), but there was still a direct effect of the manipulation on
representation (b = 0.71, SE = 0.35, t(182) = 2.03, p < .05): accounting for the effect of the
manipulation on perceived consensus, there was still a direct effect of the manipulation on choice
set representation. This indicates that the manipulation affects perceived consensus through
representation rather than affecting representation through perceived consensus.
Discussion
In our first three studies, we provide evidence for H1, H2, and H3. When consumers
make choices from sets that they represent as matters of quality rather than matters of taste, they
believe those choices are more popular, they use fewer self-references when explaining their
choices, and they are more likely to be willing to pay for their preferred option over another
option. Each of these effects holds controlling for the choice category, the particular option
chosen, and differences in preference strength, and the latter two also hold controlling for
perceived consensus. Moreover, providing evidence for H4, choice sets are more likely to be
represented as matters of taste rather than quality when consumers must explain another’s
discrepant choice rather than another’s consistent choice.
The effect on perceived consensus was partly driven by participants who represent a
choice set as a matter of taste reporting that they believed there was no majority choice. Though
speculative, one possibility is that representing a choice domain as a matter of taste leads to use
of the ignorance prior when considering others’ choices (e.g., Fox & Rottenstreich, 2003).
There could be alternative interpretations of what “objectively better” means to our
participants, but none of these are tenable accounts given our data. First, one might argue that
23
perceived objectivity merely means a very strong preference. Goodwin and Darley (2008, 2012)
show that strength of agreement is predictive of perceived objectivity of moral beliefs. Matters of
quality are associated with stronger preferences than matters of taste, but these are nonetheless
distinct constructs. All results in Studies 1, 2, and 3 hold controlling for preference strength, and
preference strength is not predictive of personal pronoun use. Moreover, Studies 5 and 6 will
involve unfamiliar options about which consumers cannot have preexisting preferences. Second,
one might argue that perceived objectivity merely means that other consumers agree on what is
preferred. However, perceived objectivity predicts other variables controlling for perceived
consensus. Third, one might argue that by “objectively better,” participants mean that some
preferences are preferred to others, but they are still matters of taste and not matters of quality.
While we do not measure this possibility directly, this explanation would not predict the patterns
of perceived consensus, first-person pronoun use, or consumer inferences that we predict and
observe. Moreover, participants in Studies 1, 2, and 3 are given the opportunity to explicitly
classify a choice set as a “matter of opinion” (Studies 1, 3) or “matter of taste” or “matter of
personal preference” (Study 2), which would clearly encompass meta-preferences.
Two key findings are worth emphasizing. First, there is considerable disagreement across
individuals regarding any given choice. This disagreement is not merely that of a “trembling
hand,” but represents more than a third of the population on average. For any given choice, not
only do consumers disagree on which option is best, but also on whether one can even be called
best. Second, this is not a mere artificial label constructed by the researchers, but rather appears
to reflect real underlying differences in the way that consumers reason about their choices.
Language use is a relatively unobtrusive measure, and such language use varies significantly and
substantially as a function of whether a difference is seen as a matter of taste or quality.
24
Moreover, the explanations were recorded before the measure of perceived objectivity, so
participants were not using a researcher-enforced classification to structure their explanations.
This indicates that they are not mere labels that are applied without real consequences, but rather
represent fundamental differences in the ways that consumers represent choices.
STUDY 4: EXPERT CONSENSUS AND MOVIE REVIEWS
If products within a given domain truly do vary in quality, and a set of knowledgeable
experts are tasked with evaluating quality, their assessments will be less consistent with one
another if they focus on matters of taste rather than quality. That is, when experts assess quality,
the basis for evaluation is the same across raters and so they should come to similar conclusions.
In contrast, when experts assess taste, the basis for evaluation differs across raters, and so they
need not come to similar conclusions. As we showed in Studies 1 and 2, explanations that focus
on taste are more likely to use self-references than those that focus on quality. In Study 4, we use
real movie reviews to examine how self-referential language (indicative of a taste representation)
is associated with larger deviations from the consensus evaluation.
Metacritic.com aggregates movie reviews from various publications. A summary snippet
is captured along with the critic’s score of the movie. Scores range from 0 to 100. This score is a
transformation of the reviewers’ rating (e.g., 3 out of 4 stars is given a 75; a B+ is given an 833).
If the critic did not provide a rating, Metacritic assigns the review a score.4 A metascore is
calculated by taking a weighted average of normalized critic ratings, where the reviews are given
proprietary weights according to the critic and publication reputation.
3
4
www.metacritic.com/about-metascores
www.metacritic.com/faq
25
In Study 4, we collected movie review snippets from Metacritic.com. For every movie
critic listed on the website, we collected every review snippet provided for that critic. Some
critics were listed in the directory multiple times based on multiple affiliations (e.g., they wrote
reviews for both The New York Times and The Los Angeles Times). To avoid double counting,
we kept only the entries without any affiliation, though this had neither a statistical nor
substantive effect. We also eliminated reviews of TV shows, though this too had neither a
statistical nor substantive effect. This resulted in 120,381 review snippets by 357 critics for 8,676
movies. In addition, the metascore and the critic score were recorded for each review snippet.
Each snippet was coded for whether it contained any first-person singular pronouns using LIWC
(Pennebaker et al. 2007). Deviation was calculated as the absolute difference between a critic’s
score and the metascore for a particular movie. For example, if Movie A received a metascore of
52 and Critic X gave Movie A a 50, Critic X’s deviation score for Movie A would be 2.
Self-references were relatively rare, as one would expect for professional critic reviews.
6,156 review snippets contained first-person singular pronouns, whereas 114,225 did not.
Among reviews that did contain first-person singular pronouns, the critic scores averaged a 14.41
point deviation (SD = 11.06, median = 12). Among those that did not contain first-person
singular pronouns, the critic scores averaged a 12.56 point deviation (SD = 9.78, median = 10).
On average, critics were 1.83 points (15%) farther from the consensus rating when they used
first-person singular pronouns. This effect is significant at the p < .0001 level, though given the
number of observations, the meaningful result is the effect size, not statistical significance. The
effect holds when including random effects for critic and movie, fixed effects for critics, or fixed
effects for critics and movies when the set is limited to a subset of movies with at least 30
reviews so that the fixed effects are manageable.
26
In analyzing the 242 reviewers for whom an individual-level effect could be calculated
(i.e., who used first-person singular personal pronouns in at least one snippet and did not use
them in at least one snippet), 60% showed an effect in the expected direction, and the effect
averaged 1.31 points. This indicates that the effect holds within-critic, not just across critics.
It is possible, though unlikely, that critics could alter their language use when they
believe that they are likely to diverge from the consensus. Given that the critics’ mission is
presumably to provide a review of the movie, rather than their own personal idiosyncracies, we
posit that they would make a more forceful objective case (fewer self-references, or at least not
more self-references) if they anticipate that the consensus will diverge from their own; however,
we cannot rule this possibility out given the current data. We claim that when experts reference
themselves, indicating that they are assessing taste rather than quality, they diverge more from
the consensus quality assessment. This might not hold for typical consumers if those claiming to
assess quality are not assessing “true” quality.
STUDIES 5 AND 6
Our results indicate that the way people represent a choice set has important implications
for how they assess others’ decisions, how they describe their own decisions, whether they are
willing to pay for the option they prefer more, and how consistent experts are with one another.
How consumers represent a given set of options also has far-reaching implications for how they
reason about the world. As Deval and colleagues (2013) demonstrate, the beliefs that consumers
hold regarding how markets operate have important implications for how they integrate new
information. For example, price promotions can be indicative of good value, but they can also be
27
indicative of low quality. When the “good value” theory is activated, consumers assess a
discounted product more positively than a non-discounted product, but the reverse trend holds
when the “low quality” theory is activated. Consumers with different lay theories can draw
opposing inferences from the same data.
As a domain’s perceived objectivity increases, consumers can more readily draw
inferences about unfamiliar products based on quality. Quality is transitive: if Brand A is better
than Brand B and Brand B is better than Brand C, then Brand A is better than Brand C. If others’
choices are based on quality, then others’ choices should be transitive across consumers as well;
if their choices are based on taste, then their choices need not be transitive across consumers. We
examine this hypothesis in a series of two studies using a new product domain (higher
education), a new paradigm, and a new manner of assessing choice set representation. These
studies help us understand how consumers integrate information about unfamiliar options within
a familiar domain. Study 5 establishes the basic relationship and Study 6 rules out artifactual
explanations and examines boundary conditions.
Study 5 Method
Study 5 establishes the basic relationship between perceived objectivity of a domain and
likelihood of drawing quality inferences from others’ choices within that domain (H5).
Participants learned others’ choices that could be indicative of interpersonal preference
transitivity and reported which of two outcomes (if either) was more likely. Participants (N =
100; 24 women, median age of 26) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk for this study.
First, participants read information about four students’ college application and enrollment
decisions regarding five colleges (labeled A, B, C, D, and E). These enrollment decisions
showed the potential for interpersonal transitivity: one student chose B over A, another chose C
28
over B, a third chose D over C, and a fourth chose E over D (A ≺ B ≺ C ≺ D ≺ E). The degree to
which potential interpersonal transitivity is informative about college quality depends on the
extent to which consumers represent colleges as differing primarily on quality rather than taste.
Participants then responded to five randomly-ordered inference items (e.g., “Samantha applied to
College A and College E. She was accepted by both. She chose to enroll at College A. Did
Samantha make a mistake?”) with five-point response scales. The full set of measures is given in
Appendix B. An inference about how the options are rank ordered leads to a strong directional
inference on these items whereas an absence of inference does not.
After responding to each inference measure, participants responded to a three-item, fivepoint scale assessing the extent to which they believe college choice is a matter of quality or a
matter of taste (e.g., “The choice of where to go to college is mostly a matter of getting into the
best school possible.”) Finally, participants reported demographics.
Study 5 Results
A Quality-Based Inference composite was calculated by averaging the five inference
items, scored such that higher numbers indicate a stronger inference regarding quality (α = 0.73,
M = 3.24, SD = 0.59). A Perceived Objectivity composite was calculated by averaging the three
objectivity items, scored such that higher numbers indicate stronger perceived objectivity (α =
.55, M = 2.83, SD = 0.69); scale reliability is admittedly weak, but the individual items generally
provide consistent results. Perceived Objectivity was a significant predictor of Quality-Based
Inference (b = 0.22, SE = 0.08, F(1, 98) = 6.85, p < .05). When interpersonal choices permit
transitivity, the extent to which consumers make quality inferences depends on the extent to
which they believe that choice depends on quality rather than taste (H5).
29
Study 6 Method
Study 6 builds on Study 5 by manipulating the potential for choice transitivity. Some
participants were given the information about Samantha’s choice of A over E (violating
transitivity) in the initial set of information, whereas others were not given that information until
they assessed whether her choice was a mistake. Thus, the initial set of choices was manipulated
to be potentially transitive or necessarily intransitive across individuals.
Study 6 (N = 2025 participants who did not participate in Study 5; 62 women, median age
of 26) was nearly identical to Study 5 with four changes. First, as noted above, some participants
read about four choices that resulted in choices that permitted interpersonal transitivity, whereas
others read about five choices that were necessarily intransitive (A ≺ B ≺ C ≺ D ≺ E ≺ A).
Second, all inference items were displayed on the same page instead of different pages. Third, all
items were in a fixed order, with the exception that the mistake item was counterbalanced to
appear first or last. Fourth, wording of some items was slightly adjusted. In particular, the item
about whether Samantha made a mistake was “[Samantha applied to College E and College A.
She was accepted by both. She chose to enroll at College A.] Did Samantha make a mistake in
her choice to enroll at College A?” The bracketed portion was excluded for the intransitive group
to avoid duplicating information they had seen above.
Study 6 Results
Quality-Based Inference, a composite of five items (α = 0.70, M = 3.05, SD = 0.57), was
analyzed as a function of mean-centered Perceived Objectivity (α = 0.48, raw M = 2.78, SD =
0.67), Violation (contrast-coded: no violation = 1, violation = -1), Order (contrast-coded: mistake
first = 1, mistake last = -1), and all interactions. There were main effects of Violation and
5
We sought to recruit 200 participants, but 2 additional participants completed the study without
requesting payment and therefore their spots remained available for others.
30
Perceived Objectivity that were qualified by a significant interaction between Perceived
Objectivity and Violation on Quality-Based Inferences (F(1, 194) = 4.34, p < .05; see Figure 5).
Replicating Study 5, simple slopes analysis revealed that Perceived Objectivity was a significant
predictor of Quality-Based Inferences when there was no transitivity violation (b = 0.24, SE =
0.08, F(1, 194) = 8.05, p < .01) but it was not a significant predictor when there was a transitivity
violation (b = 0.01, SE = 0.07, F(1, 194) = 0.01, p > .9). This indicates that Study 5’s results
replicate, were not due to scale use tendencies, and were not based merely on the arbitrary
ordered labels “A” through “E.” To examine the types of consumers who are or are not
influenced by the potential transitivity of others’ choices, we conducted a floodlight analysis
(Spiller et al. 2013). The Johnson-Neyman point for Perceived Objectivity is 2.04, meaning that
the estimated effect of transitivity on Quality-Based Inference is not significant for any value of
Perceived Objectivity below 2.04, but is significant for any value of Perceived Objectivity above
2.04. Compared to intransitive choices, potentially transitive choices allowed participants to
make stronger Quality-Based Inferences, but only for those who represent college choice as a
matter of quality. For those who represent college choice as a matter of taste, observing whether
other consumers made potentially transitive or necessarily intransitive choices had no effect.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Unexpectedly, there was also a significant interaction between Violation and Order
estimated at average Perceived Objectivity (F(1, 194) = 9.84, p < .01; the three-way interaction
was not significant). There was no effect of Order in the No Violation condition (p > .2),
indicating that those participants did not update their representation after discovering Samantha’s
choice, but participants made stronger Quality-Based Inferences in the Violation condition if the
mistake item came first (M = 3.01, SD = 0.52) than if it came last (M = 2.67, SD = 0.49; F(1,
31
194) = 10.38, p < .01). A post-hoc explanation for this finding is that consumers are unlikely to
spontaneously consider the fact that Samantha could have made a mistake. Once they considered
that possibility, however, it led them to recognize that there could be a rank ordering and so they
were more likely to make a quality-based inference. Although speculative, this explanation fits
with the findings from Study 3 that participants who explained another’s discrepant choice were
more likely to represent the domain as a matter of taste. Consumers may report that a consumer
chose in error if prompted, but they may not consider that possibility if not prompted.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Six studies indicate that consumers have meaningful, different, and malleable
representations of whether a given choice set is a matter of quality or taste. We next discuss ways
to refine and differentiate the model and several implications.
Refining the Model
Objectivity of Attributes and Weights. We examined sets of products that could vary
along multiple dimensions. In Studies 1, 2, and 3 we chose closely related products for which
attributes other than brand name should have been quite similar, though using enriched stimuli
like meaningful brands means that there could have been other differences between products. In
Studies 4, 5, and 6, movies and colleges vary along multiple dimensions. How are comparisons
of objective quality made across sets of multiple attributes? For a product pair, attributes may be
divided into three sets: those on which the first option objectively dominates, those on which the
second option objectively dominates, and those that are a matter of taste. A consumer may claim
that one option is objectively better if the set of attributes on which it dominates would receive
32
sufficient weight for any reasonable set of weights.
Our stylized model could be updated by modeling objectivity in terms of attributes and
weights. For any given product, some attributes may be represented as matters of quality whereas
others may be represented as matters of taste, and such representations may vary across
consumers. Weights may also be represented as objective or subjective: different consumers may
believe that different combinations of weights are objectively better than others, or that the
combination of weights itself is a matter of personal preference.
Related Constructs. Perceived objectivity is related to, but distinct from, issues of identity
relevance, attitude correctness, and belief superiority. Consumers are more likely to choose
minority options when the choice says something about their identity (Berger and Heath 2007).
This appears to be similar to our finding that representing a domain as a matter of taste is
associated with perceiving less of a consensus than representing a domain as a matter of quality.
However, even when consumers represented choice sets as a matter of taste, they still tended to
believe that they chose the majority option. More importantly, matters of quality may be just as
relevant to one’s identity as matters of taste. Consider one’s identity as a wine connoisseur: the
domain may be represented as a matter of quality, but that enhances its identity-relevance.
Attitude correctness is also related, yet distinct. Attitude correctness refers to the extent to
which one believes one’s attitude regarding a given issue is the correct one to have (Petrocelli,
Tormala, and Rucker 2007). Together with attitude clarity (knowing what one’s position is), it
forms one component of attitude certainty. The key distinction is that attitude correctness refers
to an attitude towards a particular option whereas representation of a domain as a matter of taste
or quality is about the relationships among options. For example, in our inference studies,
consumers represented the domain as a matter of quality or taste; that could not be captured by a
33
measure of attitude correctness, especially given that the individual options were unknown and
unknowable. Toner et al. (2013) assess belief superiority (and emphasize differences from
attitude certainty), defined as the belief that one’s belief or position is better than another’s. Like
attitude correctness, belief superiority is directed towards a particular option rather than the
relationships among options. This view would have difficulty accounting for the findings
regarding consumer inferences, self-references, and perceived consensus.
Good Taste and Bad Taste. Throughout, we have used taste to refer to idiosyncratic fit or
personal preference. Another important meaning of taste is that referred to by good taste, bad
taste, little taste, or no taste, often referring to aesthetics (for treatments in the consumer behavior
literature, see Holbrook 1999, 2005; Holbrook, Lacher, and Latour 2006; Holbrook and Addis
2007). For example, Holbrook and Addis (2007) examine the relationships among expert
judgment (assessment of quality by experts), ordinary evaluation (assessment of quality by
consumers), and popular appeal (liking by consumers). In a sample of movies, they find that
there is strong correspondence between expert judgment and ordinary evaluation, but a weaker
correspondence between ordinary evaluation and popular appeal (cf. Holbrook et al. 2006). This
suggests that consumers can recognize good taste but show little taste through their choices, as
there is weak correspondence between expert judgment and popular appeal. Placing their
findings in our framework, the appeal to any given consumer could be due to perceived quality
(ordinary evaluation) or idiosyncratic fit which was not measured, but likely related to the
residual of popular appeal when regressed on ordinary evaluation.
Expertise. In our stylized model, individuals who represent a choice as a matter of quality
should necessarily believe that everyone will agree with them. Yet significant heterogeneity
exists. One possibility is simply that people realize that such decisions are not deterministic and
34
there is a stochastic element. A second possibility is that consumers may represent a domain as
partly a matter of quality and partly a matter of taste, and recognize that others’ weightings of
those dimensions may differ from their own. A third possibility is that for some domains,
individuals may recognize that it is a matter of quality yet also believe that others are not
sufficiently knowledgeable to recognize one option’s status as the superior option. In other
words, they may believe that only some consumers have sufficient expertise to recognize quality.
Given this view, it is possible to believe that one option is objectively better, yet also believe that
most people will choose the inferior option.
Implications and Future Research
Delegated decisions. Consumers not only make choices for themselves, but also rely on
others to make choices for them. They may defer medical decisions to their doctors’
recommendations, rely heavily on a real estate agent when purchasing property, or leave their
finances to the management of a financial advisor. One’s willingness to delegate decisions to
others may depend on whether the domain is represented as a matter of quality or of taste. For
matters of quality, domain expertise should matter and be beneficial, whereas for matters of taste
it need not. Note that this is distinct from an effect of perceived consensus, as a consumer may be
more likely to rely on an expert when the domain is represented as a matter of quality rather than
taste independent of perceived consensus if she believes that popular opinion may not be
sufficiently well-informed.
Bidding. In a variety of situations, consumers’ outcomes are determined by the
combination of their decisions with those of others. In first-price auctions, bidders’ bids are
affected by their beliefs about others’ values. If they believe that they value an option because it
is high quality, rather than because it is a good idiosyncratic fit, they will be more likely to
35
believe that others see it as a highly valued option as well, and so will increase their bid
accordingly. This is akin to multiple bidders in the same auction holding discrepant beliefs about
whether the auction is a common-value or private-value auction.
Herding behavior. Others’ behavior is informative, but not always equally informative.
When consumers have noisy signals about the correct choice, they can and should rely on others’
behaviors. This can lead to rational herding to suboptimal options (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992). Consumers will likely believe that others’ choices are more
informative for their own choice when the choice is represented as a matter of quality rather than
a matter of taste. When a given consumer represents a decision as a matter of quality, she is more
likely to follow the herd than when she sees it as a matter of taste.
Conclusion
The distinction between quality and taste is a fundamental aspect of consumer life, but is
typically assumed to be observable as part of the world rather than an individual consumer’s
representation of the world. In the present work, we show that these representations are
associated with other important consumer constructs (perceived consensus, self-reference,
willingness to pay, inference-making), are malleable, and are indicative of expert consensus.
Drawing this distinction has implications for other consumer behaviors, particularly those in
which consumers consider or depend on the behaviors of others, such as bidding, delegated
decisions, and herding, and leaves open to future research the question of additional antecedents
of representations of quality and taste.
36
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40
Appendix A: Sample Materials for Studies 1, 2, 3
CHOICE
For each of the products below, please specify which brand you would rather use. In making
these choices, please assume that there is no price difference between the two options, even
though in the marketplace you might pay different prices for the different brands.
All else equal, I would rather drink a bottle of _____.
Coca-Cola
Pepsi
PREFERENCE STRENGTH
You said that you would rather drink a bottle of [chosen option] instead of a bottle of [unchosen
option]. How strong is your preference?
Very weak (1) to Very strong (7)
EXPLANATION (SELF: STUDIES 1, 2)
You said that you would rather drink a bottle of [chosen option] instead of a bottle of [unchosen
option]. Please use the space below to give 1 to 2 reasons why you made the choice that you did.
[Open-ended text box]
EXPLANATION (CONSISTENT: STUDY 3)
Another participant said that [he/she] would rather drink a bottle of [chosen option] instead of a
bottle of [unchosen option]. Please use the space below to give 1 to 2 reasons why [he/she] made
the choice that [he/she] did.
[Open-ended text box]
EXPLANATION (DISCREPANT: STUDY 3)
Another participant said that [he/she] would rather drink a bottle of [unchosen option] instead of
a bottle of [chosen option]. Please use the space below to give 1 to 2 reasons why [he/she] made
the choice that [he/she] did.
[Open-ended text box]
QUALITY
You said that you would rather drink a bottle of [chosen option] instead of a bottle of [unchosen
option]. Which of the following statements best describes the comparison between Coca-Cola
and Pepsi?
Coca-Cola is objectively better than Pepsi.
Pepsi is objectively better than Coca-Cola.
Neither one is objectively better, it is a matter of [opinion / taste / personal preference].
I do not know enough about Coca-Cola and Pepsi to judge.
PERCEIVED CONSENSUS
You said that you would rather drink a bottle of [chosen option] instead of a bottle of [unchosen
option]. If 100 people took this same survey, how many do you think would choose the same
option as you?
Slider labeled “People making the same choice” from 0 to 100.
WTP
Now suppose that you were purchasing soda at the grocery store. The store was giving away two
12-packs, one of Coca-Cola and one of Pepsi. You were selected to receive the 12-pack of
[unchosen option]. How much, if anything, would you be willing to pay to trade and get the
[chosen option] instead?
$_____
41
Appendix B: Materials for Study 5
Below is information about four high school seniors who are each planning to attend a 4-year
college after they graduate from high school. Each college costs roughly the same amount to
attend (including tuition, room and board, and incidental fees).
Jessica applied to College A and College B. She was accepted by both. She chose to enroll at
College B.
Michael applied to College B and College C. […]. He chose to enroll at College C.
Christopher applied to College C and College D. […]. He chose to enroll at College D.
Ashley applied to College D and College E. […]. She chose to enroll at College E.
QUALITY-BASED INFERENCE
Matthew applied to College A and College E. He was accepted at both. Where will he choose to
enroll?
[Certainly College A, Probably College A, Not Sure, Probably College E, Certainly
College E]
Did Michael or Ashley have better grades in high school?
[Certainly Michael … Certainly Ashley]
Was College A or College E ranked higher by US News & World Report?
[Certainly College A, …, Certainly College E]
Sarah applied to College A, College B, and College C.
Joshua applied to College C, College D, and College E.
Who is more likely to be accepted by College C?
[Certainly Sarah, … Certainly Joshua]
Samantha applied to College A and College E, she was accepted by both. She chose to enroll at
College A. Did Samantha make a mistake?
[Certainly made a mistake, …, Certainly did not make a mistake]
PERCEIVED OBJECTIVITY
The choice of where to go to college is mostly a matter of getting into the best school possible.
The choice of where to go to college is mostly a matter of finding the right fit.
Rankings matter a lot when deciding where to go to college.
[Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree]
42
PERCEIVED CONSENSUS
Study 1
Category
Subject
Item Chosen
Preference Strength
Perceived Consensus
Objective vs. Opinion
.
.
.
.
.
.
Objective (N=310)
Opinion (N=379)
Raw M (SD) Estimated M (SE)
68.37 (20.03) 66.28 (1.02)
55.49 (14.77) 56.93 (0.91)
Estimated M (SE)
64.69 (1.15)
56.98 (1.03)
Study 2
Category
Subject
Item Chosen
Preference Strength
Perceived Consensus
Objective vs. Taste/Pref
.
.
.
.
.
.
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
F(16, 462) = 3.50****
F(1, 462) = 22.70****
.
F(1, 462) = 41.59****
Objective (N=350,351)
Taste/Pref (N=342)
Raw M (SD) Estimated M (SE)
67.76 (18.75) 67.05 (0.94)
55.03 (14.01) 55.57 (0.95)
Estimated M (SE)
64.06 (1.03)
55.42 (1.04)
Study 3
Category
Subject
Item Chosen
Preference Strength
Perceived Consensus
Objective
.
.
.
.
.
.
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
F(16, 491) = 4.63****
F(1, 491) = 22.25****
.
F(1, 491) = 46.78****
Objective (N=324,325)
Opinion (N=399)
Raw M (SD) Estimated M (SE)
67.54 (17.35) 66.62 (0.93)
55.59 (13.90) 56.23 (0.84)
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 474) = 50.71****
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 479) = 80.11****
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 509) = 75.25****
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
F(16, 456) = 5.25****
F(1, 456) = 24.10****
.
F(1, 456) = 34.07****
Estimated M (SE)
63.95 (0.97)
55.73 (0.87)
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, **** p < .0001
Table 1. Perceived consensus as a function of perceived objectivity in Studies 1, 2, and 3.
43
PERSONAL PROUNOUN USE
Study 1: First-person singular pronouns
Category
.
Subject
.
Item Chosen
.
Preference Strength
.
Perceived Consensus
.
Objective vs. Opinion
.
Objective (N=310)
Opinion (N=379)
Raw M (SD)
7.01 (6.78)
10.33 (6.63)
Study 2: First-person singular pronouns
Category
.
Subject
.
Item Chosen
.
Preference Strength
.
Perceived Consensus
.
Objective vs. Taste/Pref .
Objective (N=350,351)
Taste/Pref (N=342)
Raw M (SD)
7.83 (6.91)
10.47 (6.81)
Study 3: Third-person singular pronouns
Category
.
Subject
.
Item Chosen
.
Preference Strength
.
Perceived Consensus
.
Objective
.
Objective (N=324,325)
Opinion (N=399)
Raw M (SD)
3.28 (5.92)
5.30 (6.72)
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 474) = 26.83****
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
F(16, 455) = 1.94*
F(1, 455) = 0.08
F(1, 455) = 6.31*
F(1, 455) = 12.23***
Estimated M (SE)
7.56 ( 0.44)
10.24 ( 0.40)
Estimated M (SE)
7.87 (0.51)
9.85 (0.46)
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 478) = 21.56****
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
F(16, 460) = 1.17
F(1, 460) = 0.04
F(1, 460) = 0.21
F(1, 460) = 16.36****
Estimated M (SE)
7.91 (0.42)
10.44 (0.42)
Estimated M (SE)
8.08 ( 0.48)
10.58 (0.49)
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 509) = 1.64
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
F(16, 490) = 1.02
F(1, 490) = 0.88
F(1, 490) = 1.21
F(1, 490) = 1.04
Estimated M (SE)
4.17 (0.44)
4.75 (0.42)
Estimated M (SE)
4.18 ( 0.48)
4.69 ( 0.45)
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, **** p < .0001
Table 2. Personal pronoun use as a function of perceived objectivity in Studies 1, 2, and 3.
44
PROPORTION WILLING TO PAY MORE THAN $0
Study 1
Category
Subject
Item Chosen
Preference Strength
Perceived Consensus
Objective vs. Opinion
Objective (N=310)
Opinion (N=379)
Study 2
Category
Subject
Item Chosen
Preference Strength
Perceived Consensus
Objective vs. Taste/Pref
Objective (N=350,351)
Taste/Pref (N=342)
Study 3
Category
Subject
Item Chosen
Preference Strength
Perceived Consensus
Objective
Objective (N=324,325)
Opinion (N=399)
.
.
.
.
.
.
Raw %
70.65%
41.69%
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 474) = 32.62****
Estimated % (SE)
70.61 (3.58)
42.64 (3.68)
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
(Excluded to converge)
F(1, 471) = 34.46****
F(1, 471) = 6.21*
F(1, 471) = 7.34**
Estimated % (SE)
64.75 (4.25)
49.65 (4.09)
.
.
.
.
.
.
Raw %
66.38%
40.35%
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 479) = 26.08****
Estimated % (SE)
67.34% (3.83)
40.02% (4.19)
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
F(16, 461) = 0.85
F(1, 461) = 24.44****
F(1, 461) = 5.99*
F(1, 461) = 3.92*
Estimated % (SE)
61.26% (5.18)
48.28% (5.64)
.
.
.
.
.
.
Raw %
74.69%
43.86%
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
.
.
.
F(1, 508) = 36.41****
Estimated % (SE)
74.27% (3.40)
44.51% (3.69)
Fixed Effects
Random Effects
(Excluded to converge)
F(1, 505) = 12.21***
F(1, 505) = 3.16†
F(1, 505) = 16.99****
Estimated % (SE)
70.89% (3.85)
48.53% (3.98)
† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, **** p < .0001
Table 3. Proportion willing to pay for one’s preferred option as a function of perceived
objectivity in Studies 1, 2, and 3.
45
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Study 2
Study 3
Figure 1. Proportion objective (black) versus opinion (gray; Studies 1, 3) or taste or personal
preference (gray; Study 2) by category in Studies 1, 2, and 3.
46
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Figure 2. Perceived consensus by category as a function of perceived objectivity (objective:
black; opinion, taste, personal preference: gray) in Studies 1, 2, and 3.
47
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Figure 3. Personal pronoun use by category as a function of perceived objectivity (objective:
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48
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
% Willing to Pay for Preferred Option
0.0
M
So
da
G
as
Be
er
Fo
od
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s
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ar
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ot
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ar
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am
er
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tp
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ig
D
ar
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
% Willing to Pay for Preferred Option
Study 1
Study 2
Study 3
Figure 4. Proportion willing to pay for preferred option by category as a function of perceived
objectivity (objective: black; opinion, taste, personal preference: gray) in Studies 1, 2, and 3.
49
Figure 5. Strength of quality-based inferences in Study 6 as a function of perceived objectivity
and interpersonal choice transitivity. The ticks inside the axes show the univariate distribution of
each variable. The shaded region surrounding each line represents the 95% confidence band for
the estimated mean. The shaded region between the lines, beginning at “JN = 2.04” represents
the region of significance, with a Johnson-Neyman point of 2.04.
50