Department of Economics
MPhil/PhD Proposal Form
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Ashley
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Piggins
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1
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Individual Rights in the Face of Population Growth:
Externalities and Social Choice
Project Title
Where applicable some institutions such as Teagasc are involved in co-supervision
Research Centre Location for Project:
Galway
Start Date:
Finish Date:
September 2011
June 2015
Is the project externally funded?:
If yes please name the sponsor:
TBD
Breakdown of Funding
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Fellowship Stipend*
Other Project funds
Total
1. PROJECT ABSTRACT
(300 words max.)
People often manifest their disapproval with this or that occurrence of environmental degradation with a
plea that the environment be protected “for their children”. But this request seems without regard to or,
at best, ignorant of the possibility that it is precisely because they are producing too many children that
environmental degradation is occurring. With increased environmental degradation, and the appearance
of cumulative effects of anthropogenic damage on the environment, it seems we may have exceeded an
optimal world population size, akin to that identified by average utilitarianism, beyond which the
externalities caused by the addition of another human being exceed the benefits that may ensue to
society (Samuelson 1975; Brian Arthur and McNicoll 1977).
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Much of the literature in population ethics seems to be concerned with the well-being of the individual
being brought into existence and this is made central to the decision of whether or not to add them to a
utility-unaffected population (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson 2005). However, little direct attention is
given to the impact of a new individual on existing members of society, when it is in fact possible that,
while having children is utility-increasing to parents, the addition of new individuals may be utilityreducing to other members of society. The principles do allow for the effects of externalities into the
determination of whether or not to add an individual, however, there are certain cases where the
incidence of externalities does not preclude an increase in the population size.
The aim of this research is to render central the question of negative externalities resulting from the
addition of new individuals to the population. By introducing a do-no-harm axiom as a criterion for
deciding whether or not to add an additional individual, and putting into question the rights of a decisive
coalition comprised of parents, the impact of new individuals on existing members of society can be
given more importance. Under this premise, the research will also introduce questions of fairness when
the fertility choices of parents impose consumption externalities on others, in the case, for example, of
the consumption of impure public goods (non-exclusive, but rival), such as space, but also in the case of
pure externalities, such as noise. Formulating a do-no-harm axiom in a variable-population model will
thus capture the intuition that existing members of the population need protection from the potentially
negative consequences on the rest of society of parents’ decisions to have children.
The research will employ the axiomatic method in the context of variable-population social choice to
prove a number of propositions to establish properties of population principles in the presence of
externalities.
2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 Title:
Individual Rights in the Face of Population Growth: Externalities and Social Choice
2.2 Objectives: (100 words max.)
To address the following question:
Given that, in some cases, variable-population utilitarian principles allow the ranking of
alternatives as superior although they are not Pareto-superior in the presence of externalities,
can we produce social choices that will limit, or acceptably deal with, the addition of new
individuals who would impose negative externalities on members of the existing population?
2.3 Justification (e.g. economic, gaps in existing knowledge, expected benefits) (400 words max.)
In western countries, where policies aimed at increasing the birth rate and augmenting the population
through immigration, for which the arguments in favour are known (pensions, social security, etc.), the
question arises as to whether these policies account for the increased incidence of environmental
externalities resulting from higher levels of population. This is relevant for existing individuals and their
well-being, but beyond the Malthusian concern of simply feeding the world’s population. One cannot
ignore the ethics related to the impact of the flourishing human species on the natural environment,
which other beings require to live. Indeed, non-biodegradable waste, e.g. plastics, climate change, and
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habitat destruction to accommodate more humans, e.g. roads, housing, factories, airports, agriculture,
are life impeding to other animal species and plants (Matheny and Chan 2005; Blackorby and Donaldson
1992; Sidgwick 1966).
Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2006) present scenarios in which externalities are potentially endured by
society due to fertility decisions, even though these decisions may be efficient within the family unit. In
line with Harford (1998) and others (e.g. Jöst and Quaas 2006), they argue in a welfarist context that in
the case where fertility choices result in additional pollution, then a tax per child is necessary to regain
efficiency since Pigouvian taxes do not suffice to do so in an intertemporal setting.
These same authors also claim that the perceived externalities of ‘land crowding’ do not exist since the
property and rental markets internalize the cost of additional population. This last argument is remiss in
that it does not account for non-exclusive goods that are rival in consumption, such as, roads, parks,
parking and footpaths, especially those just wide enough to accommodate a baby stroller, or habitat that
supports the existence of other species. Moreover, this point of view does not account for subsidies in
the form of transfer payments and tax credits for children, when such monetary transfers would be
particularly distortionary to property and rental markets since parents require additional housing space
to accommodate their larger family.
In addition, transfer payments earmarked for children (baby bonus, tax credits) or fee reductions in
favour of families (in public transportation, museum entrance fees, e.g.) serve to further increase
parents’ utilities. The funds for these transfer payments are of course obtained through levies. Those
individuals without children receive no such transfer payments, although they pay taxes to support
payments to parents. Thus, not only is their utility potentially reduced by externalities caused by the
addition of new individuals, but it is, for the same reasons, further reduced by taxation aimed at
increasing the welfare of those who have caused their reduction in utility. In a population that has
reached the optimal size where the marginal net benefit of an additional individual is zero, fertilityencouraging subsidies are inefficient and those who make reproductive decisions that benefit society by
not adding individuals are doubly penalized – 1) by externalities caused by further increases in
population, 2) by monetary levies destined to be transferred to parents. In short, those who suffer from
the externalities caused by reproducing individuals are the ones who pay to help generate the externality
that is imposed upon them.
More generally, since existing principles rely on the sum of utilities to compare the relative ‘goodness’ of
alternatives of different population sizes, they sometimes permit the ranking of an alternative, in which
externalities are present, as superior to one in which they are not. As such, it may be possible to make
better population choices by imposing an axiom that ensures the respect of the minimal rights and wellbeing of someone who would be negatively affected by the addition of another individual.
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2.4 Methodology and other details: (Please ensure that sufficient details are provided to enable the
reviewers to establish:
hypotheses, the relevant/appropriateness of methodologies being proposed.) (1,500 words max.)
The proposed approach to address these issues is to employ the axiomatic method, based on desirable
societal criteria, within the framework of variable-population social choice theory, and to explore the
implications of introducing externalities within this framework.
Social Choice Principles that Incorporate Externalities
With the addition of new individuals, space being a limiting factor of production, production increases at
a decreasing rate and average utility decreases (Razin and Sadka, 1995, Ch.5). Hence, there is an optimal
population size beyond which additions to the population are utility-reducing to members of society. As
such, average utilitarianism, whose value function for the addition of a new individual is average utility,
precludes the advocacy of population increases as sensible beyond a certain size. However, this is not the
case with classical utilitarianism, where the increase of total utility resulting from the addition of a new
person leads to the repugnant conclusion (Parfit, 1984), that is, the increase in total utility, no matter
how small, caused by the addition of a new individual always warrants his addition even though this
eventually leads to everyone living in abject poverty.
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson (1984, 2003, 2005) introduce Critical-level utilitarianism in an attempt
to elude the repugnant conclusion by shifting the poverty threshold upward and requiring a minimum
level of utility upon the addition of individuals. However, although in their introduction (2005), these
authors clearly state the consequences of overpopulation: environmental degradation, increased relative
scarcity of resources and low average standards of living, their population principle still allows for the
addition of an individual who would impose externalities on members of the existing population in some
cases. The reason for this is that they continue to compare the sum of utilities between two alternatives
of different population sizes without regard to how the utilities of the individuals that contribute to the
sums are affected. As a result, critical-level utilitarianism is deemed to respect the Pareto principle
because when the alternative violates Pareto, that is, when someone is made worse-off without making
someone else better-off, the alternative is rejected. However, critical-level utilitarianism, as well as
others, can prescribe the addition of an individual when someone is made worse-off, as long as some
have been made better-off in excess of the reduction in utility of others, since in that case, the
alternative is neither worse nor better according to the Pareto principle.
Indeed, C. Blackorby, W. Bossert, D. Donaldson and M. Fleurbaey do show that to avoid the repugnant
conclusion one needs to relax the Pareto-plus axiom. Moreover, P.-A. Jouvet and G. Ponthière (2010),
under the analogy of the Earth as a spaceship (Boulding 1996), propose an analysis that takes into
account longevity, fertility and congestion to show that classical utilitarianism doesn’t necessarily lead to
the repugnant conclusion.
The contribution I propose is to impose an axiom that would enforce the respect of an individual’s rights
to suffer no harm. The expected result is that this would not only preclude the addition of individuals that
reduce others’ utility, but possibly also allow the avoidance of the repugnant conclusion. Y.-K. Ng (1972)
introduces the possibility of modifying social welfare functions to account for externalities in The Bergson
Welfare function with Externality, D.E. Campbell and J.S. Kelly (1997) discuss the conflict between Pareto
and minimal liberalism in Sen’s Theorem and Externalities, and in Negative Externalities and Sen’s
Liberalism Theorem (Saari and Petron 2006), a decisive agent affects minimal liberalism by his ability to
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impose externalities on other agents, thus leading to a dysfunctional society. Using the ideas and results
from these papers, in which the reasoning takes place in a fixed-population context, it would be
interesting to pursue them under variable population to generate new results upon which to base the
decision of whether or not to add new individuals to the population.
Fairness in the Presence of Externalities
Existing literature seems to be concerned with efficiency within the family unit and discussion is given
around whether fairness is maintained within it. However, in addition to inefficiencies endured by society
when families give rise to externalities, there is a question of whether transfer payments paid by nonchildbearing individuals to enhance the utility of child-endowed families is fair. As such, it is worth
assessing whether in the presence of externalities, increases in population, whether they be policyinduced or not, lead to fair allocations according to fairness criteria (Velez 2010a&b, Moulin 2003,
Shapley 1953, Foley 1967, Kolm 1972, Diamantras 1991, Thompson 2006, Thrall and Lucas 1963). For
example, one could determine whether population-monotonic allocations of non-exclusive rival goods
that satisfy axioms of fairness are achievable when the addition of a new individual causes externalities. If
such solutions are not achievable, then it would moreover follow that direct and indirect transfer
payments to parents are unfair.
With recent developments in Germany where the government deciding to cut child-benefit payments has
resulted in the outrage of some, it is worth asking whether the sense that childbearing should entitle one
to special privileges is indeed justified by principles of efficiency and fairness. These are the questions
that I will address in the thesis.
References
Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. K., Suzumura, K. (Eds.), 2006. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. 2. NorthHolland, Amsterdam.
Becker, G.S., Lewis, H.G., 1973. On the interaction between the quantity and quality of children. Journal
of Political Economy 81, S279-288.
Bernholz, P., 1982. Externalities as necessary conditions for Cyclical Preferences. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 97, No. 4, 699-705.
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. 1984. Social Criteria for evaluating population change. Journal of Public
Economics 25, 13-33.
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D., 1992. Pigs and Guinea Pigs; a note on the ethics of animal exploitation.
Economic Journal 102, 1345-1369.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., Donaldson, D., 2003. The Axiomatic Approach to Population Ethics. Politics,
Philosophy & Economis, vol. 2, no. 3.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., Donaldson, D., 2005. Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare
Economics, and Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W., Donaldson, D., Fleurbaey, M., 1998. Critical Levels and the (Reverse)
Repugnant Conclusion. Journal of Economics, Vol. 67, No. 1, 1-15.
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Brian Arthur, W. and McNicoll, G., 1977. Optimal Time Paths with Age-Dependence: A Theory of
Population Policy. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, 111-123.
Broom, J., 1996. The Welfare Economics of Population. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 48, 177-193.
Campbell, D.E., Kelly, J.S., 1997. Sen’s Theorem and Externalities. Econometrica 64, 375-86.
Diamantras, D., 1991. Envy-free and efficient allocations in large public good economies. Economics
Letters 36, 227-232.
Foley, D., 1967. Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economic Essays 7, 45–98.
Harford, J. D. (1998), `The Ultimate Externality', American Economic Review 88(1), 260-265.
Jöst, F. And Quass, M. F., 2006. Environmental and Population Externalities. Discussion Paper Series No.
427, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
Jouvet, P.A. and Ponthière, G., 2010. Survival, reproduction and congestion: the spaceship problem reexamined. PSE Working Papers 2010-15, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure).
Moulin, H., 2003. Fair Division and collective welfare. The MIT Press.
Ng, Y.-K., 1972. The Bergson Social Welfare Function with Externality. The Economic Record, Vol. 48, No.
4, 517-26.
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 2010. About Biodiversity.
http://www.iucn.org/what/tpas/biodiversity/about/
Kolm, S.-C., 1972. Justice et Equité. Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris.
Matheny, G. and Chan, K. M. A., 2005. Human Diets and Animal Welfare: The Illogic of the Larder. Journal
of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18, 579-594.
Räikkä, J., 2001. Coercive population policies, procreative freedom and morality. Philosophy and
Geography, Vol. 4, No. 1.
Razin, A. and Sadka E., 1995. Population Economics. The MIT Press.
Samuelson, P.A., 1975. The optimum growth rate for population. International Economic Review 16, 531538.
Shapley, L. S., 1953. A value for n-person games. In H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker, editors, Contributions to
the Theory of Games, volume II of Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, pages 307–317. Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Sidgwick, H., 1966 (originally published in 1907), The Methods of Ethics, Dover, New York.
Thomson, W., 2006. Fair allocation rules. In: Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura (2006).
Thrall, R.M. and Lucas, W. F., 1963. N-person games in partition function form. Naval Research Logistics
Quarterly 10, issue 1, 281-298.
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Velez, R., 2010a. Fairness and externalities, Mimeo, Texas A&M University.
(http://econweb.tamu.edu/rvelezca/files/Fairness-nad-externalities-RVelez-June-10-2010.pdf )
Velez, R., 2010a. Are incentives against economic justice, Mimeo, Texas A&M University.
(http://econweb.tamu.edu/rvelezca/files/Are-incentives-against-economic-justice-RVelez.pdf )
2.5 Workplan and Timescale: (The objective here is to clearly demonstrate that thought has been
given the major components of the workplan rather than being overly prescriptive).
Task
Title
Timescale
Number
1
2
Text (500 characters)
Complete NUI MPhil
Development and presentation of advanced
research proposal
Literature review of population principles
1st contribution:
Evaluation of existing population
principles under a do-no-harm axiom
Review of social choice literature that
incorporates externalities
2nd contribution:
Establish the link between literature on
externalities and variable population
principles
Review of economic literature on rights of
other species and environmental ethics
3rd contribution:
Application of above results to
environmental policies and animal ethics
Summary of results and final conclusions,
proposition for further research
Number of Months
8
4
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Any other relevant
information
Text (750 characters)
4
7
4
8
4
6
3
2.6 Expected outcomes: (e.g. deliverables) (400 words max.)
3.1 AFFIRMATION
Signature of applicant (student):
____________________________________
Date:___________________
(Attach list of any relevant publications or reports if applicable for the applicant)
Master’s thesis available on-line at:
http://gillian.salerno.perso.sfr.fr/Master/SALERNO_MASTER.pdf
3.2 AFFIRMATION
Signature of primary NUIG supervisor (supervisor): ____________________________________
Ashley Piggins
Date:
(Attach list of 5 most recent peer-reviewed scientific publications for main college applicant)
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“Non-manipulable social welfare functions when preferences are fuzzy” (with Juan Perote-Peña), Journal
of Logic and Computation (2009) 19, pp 503-515.
“Evaluating opportunities when people are uncertainty averse” (with Ruvin Gekker) Economic and Social
Review (2009), vol 40, pp 109-116.
“Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences” (with Conal Duddy and Juan
Perote-Peña), Social Choice and Welfare (2010), vol 34, pp 411-428.
“Freedom, opportunity and uncertainty: a critical review” (with Ruvin Gekker) Homo Oeconomicus
(2010), vol 27, pp 321-325.
“Arrow’s theorem and max-star transitivity” (with Conal Duddy and Juan Perote-Peña), Social Choice and
Welfare (2011), vol 36, pp 25-34.
Signature of Institution Co-supervisor:
___________________________________________________________
(Attach list of 5 most recent peer-reviewed scientific publications for Institution Co-supervisor)
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