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Dr. William Waugaman
I appreciate the opportunity to provide the joint perspective
from one of the DoD’s combatant commands as it relates to homeland defense and our infrastructure. Fully 76% of all DoD installations lie within the U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM)
area of responsibility. Thus, when the USNORTHCOM combatant commander thinks about how he is going to execute homeland defense in a joint world, he wants to ensure that all these
of different energy projects support both mission accomplishment
and energy assurance. So, I was very happy to hear Captain Hugh
Hemstreet talk about the importance of the mission. That is certainly where the combatant command is. How do we tie our operational mission together with our infrastructure and keep the two
working hand in hand to accomplish the mission rather than simply
working on compliance on the energy? Developing a CONOPS to
Dr. William Waugaman is currently the National Laboratories liaison
to North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern
Command (N-NC), Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. In this position,
he represents the research and development information exchange
between the Department of Energy’s 17 laboratories and the combatant command. His responsibilities include his role as the science and
technology advisor, homeland security issues, laboratory reachback
during exercises and real-world events, and interagency coordination.
His current areas of interest include electric smart grid security, cyber
security, information sharing, tunnel detection, bioengineering, and
unmanned aerial vehicles. Prior to this position, he was the Deputy
Head of the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and
Dean of the Faculty, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado.
He is a member of the Board of Directors for the Rocky Mountain
Bioengineering Symposium and an IEEE member. He earned his Ph.D.
in electrical engineering from the University of Colorado in 1999.
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bring mission and infrastructure together is very important from the
combatant command point of view.
Several of our speakers have mentioned the 2008 Defense
Science Board study of the DoD’s energy needs and the 2009 CNA
study that examined the cyber security aspects of our electric infrastructure upgrades. [1, 2] This past year, the Quadrennial Defense
Review included a discussion of what improving energy efficiency
will mean from a mission perspective. [3] At USNORTHCOM, we
are focusing not only on improving the efficiency of day-to-day
efficiency operations, but what happens when we have any type
of catastrophic event, whether natural or man-made. How are we
going to be able to continue to accomplish our mission of defending our citizens within the homeland?
When you think about energy from a DoD perspective, liquid
fuels are absolutely huge; but when you think about homeland
defense from a continental United States (CONUS) perspective,
electricity runs the home game and wet fuels run the away game.
And, as we rely more and more on reachback to support our operational forces, that CONUS perspective becomes important for our
deployed forces as well. We have to rely on our national infrastructure and our installation infrastructure to ensure that those missions
are successful. Thus, the electricity running the home game is very
important. As made evident by the ongoing tragedy in Japan, without that electricity infrastructure, it will be very difficult to accomplish the mission.
As it turns out, Mr. Jeffrey Johnson’s efforts to bring in the
legacy infrastructure and add the layers of security is the focus of
the ongoing Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy
Reliability and Security (SPIDERS) Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD) that USNORTHCOM is working on with
the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). As shown in Figure 1, that
JCTD is intended to address four critical deficiencies.
What is SPIDERS trying to do specifically? First of all, we want
to ensure that we can address the very large cyber vulnerabilities
that arise when we add intelligent operations and a cyber layer over
the top of what has traditionally been an analog and mechanical
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industrial control process. As we try to bring these processes into
the smart grid infrastructure and improve our ability to automate,
remotely control, and monitor all of these processes with less human
intervention, how do we protect against potential cyber threats? We
have to be able to use the modern encryption and cyber protection
that Mr. Johnson described earlier while still having the ability to
reach back to the infrastructure that we have already in the ground
because we are obviously not going to replace it all. We have to be
able to interface and work through that upgrade process.
Figure 1. SPIDERS Summary
Thus, cyber security is probably the biggest aspect of SPIDERS.
We are looking at the cyber security of the smart grid infrastructure
both at the installation level and at the interface with the public
utilities. That is where we tie our installation into the civilian infrastructure, because obviously, we do not generate our own electricity. We rely on the public utilities sector to do that. So, we are
concerned with how we interface our future microgrids with those
public utilities and the potential impacts on our NetZero goals.
We are also concerned about the use of renewable energy
sources. Currently, the electrical power needs for our bases are
being met primarily by a combination of conventional coal,
nuclear, and natural gas. The intermittent nature of many of our
existing renewable sources—like wind and solar—limits them to
providing less than 10% of our energy. Given that, how are we
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going to meet Secretary Ray Mabus’s goal of getting 50% of our
energy from renewable sources by 2025? How are we going to
meet the Green Navy goals? How are we going to meet the goals
being set by the DoD and by Executive Orders if we cannot get
past 10% right now?
We are also concerned with how we are going to be able
to integrate all the way up to 100% renewable energy and run
NetZero facilities or installations during or after a catastrophic
event. Can we maintain our mission after a catastrophic event and
keep those renewable energy assets connected? Right now if we
have an event, our concepts of operation (CONOPS) call for us to
disconnect all our green energy sources because of the instabilities they have. Thus, that energy cannot be used for sustainment
and mission. As an alternative, we are looking at whether we can
use microgrids to keep the mission moving forward and in the process leverage those renewable sources, not necessarily to maintain
100% mission capability, but to accomplish at least the core mission and keep that going. We need to know how to integrate those
microgrids with our current backup diesel generation.
In a macro sense, the goal of SPIDERS is to bring together in a
cyber-secure environment a microgrid that provides multiple paths
of energy distribution that can be commanded and controlled by
the installation commander according to mission priorities. We
want to be able to allocate those energy assets in a cyber-secure
way so that the renewable energy, energy storage, and backup
diesel generation all work together in a system-integrated demand
response methodology that allows us to do our core missions even
in the event of a prolonged outage.
So, that is what we are looking at when we are talking about
SPIDERS—a cyber-secure microgrid that allows backup diesel generation, renewable energy for sustainment and the enhancement
of the logistics tail in a long-term outage, and energy storage to all
work together in concert.
As shown in Figure 2, we are starting with three locations—
Hickam Air Force Base (AFB), Hawaii; Fort Carson, Colorado; and
Camp Smith, Hawaii—and using a stair-step approach. Because
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the JCTD has to have a 1-year deliverable, we have to leverage the
things that we already have. Thus, we are using a crawl–walk–run
methodology in stair stepping our way—sort of like taking the itsy
bitsy spider up the water spout. Along the way, we will be developing the CONOPS and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
that we need while working in partnership with the Department of
Energy (DOE) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Ultimately, of course, we want to transition the effort to the commercial sector.
Figure 2. Expected SPIDERS Outcome
Hopefully, our demonstration will benefit industry as it works
to improve its own capabilities. The end result will be to enhance
energy assurance as it comes across the fence line to us, so that we
do not need to have our own stand-alone generation capability.
The expected benefits of realizing the capability we are demonstrating in SPIDERS include day-to-day efficiencies, the demand
response aspects of the microgrid, the ability to maintain enhanced
renewable generations well past the 10% threshold, and the
backup generation capability for the catastrophic case. Achieving
these benefits in the face of cyber threats requires that we focus
on cyber security. Accordingly, we have asked DHS, the National
Security Agency (NSA), and the new Cyber Command to serve as
a red team during our operational utility assessments.
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Figure 3 identifies the other organizations that are currently
participating in SPIDERS. In addition to USNORTHCOM and
USPACOM, they include DOE, DHS, five of the DOE national
laboratories, the military services, and the states of Colorado and
Hawaii. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) is
our transition manager and is developing the CONOPS and TTPs
that we will need. We have also involved several local utility companies from the very beginning, because ultimately, we want them
to solve our problem of maintaining a protected energy supply to
our DoD installations.
Figure 3. SPIDERS Participants
REFERENCES
1. Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, “More Fight—Less Fuel,”
2008, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf.
2. CNA, Powering America’s Defense: Energy and the Risks to
National Security, 2009, http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/
Powering%20Americas%20Defense.pdf.
3. Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review,
2010,  http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_
12Feb10_1000.pdf.