Chapter 4 A da p t i n g R e s e a rc h P r i o r i t i e s to C l i m at e C h a l l e n g e s 97 Captain Timothy Gallaudet By way of introduction, Isaac Asimov once said that science gathers knowledge much faster than society gathers wisdom; I think that is pretty appropriate in view of our discussion about the climate debate. The Navy’s position is this: There is broad scientific consensus on global warming, on the fact that global warming exists, and on the changes that are currently happening and projected to happen with our climate. If you look at the history of this debate, the reality is that the consensus is so strong that it really should not even be regarded as a debate. Back in the 1600s, there was a debate as to whether the Earth revolved around the sun or vice versa. I think the scientific consensus is established today, and there is really little discussion about that fact. The same should be the case for the climate discussion. Climate change is occurring, and the vast majority of scientists agree and view it as such, so the Navy does not really respond to much of the noise that we hear. With regard to research, one of Task Force Climate Change’s goals is reducing the current uncertainties in climate changes and in the projections regarding those changes, as well as identifying potential engineering solutions that might be required to adapt to those changes. Over the past 2 days, we have heard about some of the significant issues that affect maritime forces with regard to climate change. For example, Rear Admiral David Titley described Captain Timothy Gallaudet is currently Rear Admiral David Titley’s Deputy Director of Task Force Climate Change. Captain Gallaudet was commissioned in 1989 after graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy. He holds master’s and Ph.D. degrees in physical oceanography from Scripps Institution of Oceanography in San Diego. He has had 7 years of sea duty, including service in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 98 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 how the melting of the ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica is contributing to sea-level rise. We need to know when and to what extent that sea level will affect our installations. So, that is certainly an area of research interest for the Navy. There is also the question of timing with respect to the reduction in Arctic sea ice. Yet another area of interest for us is better understanding the relationship between climate change and storm intensity. Earlier, Rear Admiral Titley showed data for what is called the average cyclone index; based on such information, there does not appear to be a global consensus on what storms are doing. The oftencited connection between climate change and increasing storms appears a little fuzzy. So, that is clearly an area where additional research could prove beneficial. There are many other areas of potential interest as we will soon discover from four very distinguished, accomplished, and very capable speakers who are established leaders in the federal government with regard to climates and environmental science and applications. 99 Dr. Frank Herr I am going to describe some of the research that Office of Naval Research (ONR) is either conducting or planning for the next 5–10 years. We have made strategic decisions based on Dr. Frank Herr has been the Head of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) Ocean Battlespace Sensing Department since 2001. The Ocean Battlespace Department is responsible for the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ science and technology in ocean and meteorological science, undersea warfare, mine warfare, space technology, and marine mammals. It comprises two divisions and 14 programs spanning sensing, systems, and geophysical processes and prediction. The department also has built and cares for six oceanographic research vessels. From 1996 to 2001, Dr. Herr was director of the Sensing and Systems Division within ONR. His division’s work spanned undersea warfare, mine warfare, and space technology. Dr. Herr currently is the U.S. National Representative for the Maritime Systems Group of The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), where he coordinates technology among the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Dr. Herr was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in August 1998. Dr. Herr joined federal service in 1977 as a research chemist at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and conducted research until 1982 when he joined ONR. Dr. Herr became the Program Manager for Remote Sensing in 1988. From 1992 to 1994, Dr. Herr served on the staff of Admiral Frank B. Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations, as Assistant for Science and Technology to the CNO Executive Panel, N00K. Dr. Herr graduated from Hamilton College in Clinton, New York, with a B.A. degree. He also holds a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. Dr. Herr was a National Research Council post-doctoral research associate. Dr. Herr is the author of 22 scientific and technical publications. Dr. Herr received the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Award in 1994 and again in 2008, a Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Executives in 2005, and the NRL Research Publication Award in 1981. 100 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 conversations that we have had with Rear Admiral David Titley and the work that he has initiated from the Oceanographer’s Office and with Rear Admiral Jonathan White, the Commander Navy Meteorology and Oceanography. Our job at ONR is science and technology. We are supposed to have the long-term view, but in this crowd, we are actually the short-term folks because we are more interested in weather forecasting than in climate change. As Rear Admiral Titley said, those of us in the DoD and the Navy have come programmatically a bit late to the climate change issue. I am leaving it to my colleagues here to get into the climate issues. Actually, my view of the time spans involved in forecasting and climate change is changing. I have started thinking of weather as the government shutdown and climate as an appropriation for FY2011. One of the key things that we are starting to work on is what we are calling Global Seamless Prediction (Figure 1), which is essentially the set of next-generation, coupled ocean–atmosphere–ice models. Currently, we have 28 environmental prediction systems to include prediction system models with assimilation of data that are running at the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) and at the Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC). As Rear Admiral Titley has rightfully pointed out, our large-scale models that are used for atmosphere and ocean prediction are not coupled well enough and they are getting a little bit long in the tooth in terms of the way the code was developed and the model architecture that was used. It is time for a new generation of these systems, and our goal is to build the research that will allow us to put together a fully coupled system that incorporates a higher resolution down to 1/25th of a degree at worst. We also intend to add the Arctic to this model. The coupling will be sufficient over broad scales to include the effects of storms, specifically tropical storms. We have had some good results so far on forecasting the initiation of storms. The effects of internal waves in the upper ocean and the acoustic environment are things that we are particularly interested in getting into these systems as well. So, Global Seamless Prediction overall is a major strategic goal for us. Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 101 Figure 1. Seamless Global Prediction Figure 2. Establishment of an Arctic Research Program Conducting additional research in the Arctic is also one of our major goals. Now, some of you may remember that Navy science and technology was in the Arctic back in the Cold War. At that time, we did not have a lot of partners up there, but we had a pretty big 102 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 program. Over the past 25 years, we have let that Arctic work drop down and focused on other areas to the point that we have been spending a little less than $1 million on a few projects, but we are going to ramp that back up again. We now have more partners in the Arctic than we had before (see Figure 2), and so we are looking forward to a good, robust Arctic program. The issue that we have for the Arctic is to be able to build an Arctic Prediction System that will couple with the Global Seamless Prediction that I described earlier. In particular, we want to be able to establish boundary conditions that are important for the more temporal latitudes. As you may know, we have no climatology for where the Arctic is going now; we do not really have a way to say this is the way the Arctic works. So, we want to build a dynamic model that can couple with the rest of the world and the ocean atmosphere system in order to fill in that big hole in the way the Global Seamless Prediction would operate. We have some very interesting tools that are going to help us that we did not have the last time we were up in the Arctic. One of those is synthetic aperture radar (SAR). The number of passes that our global SAR systems are giving us for the Arctic is actually pretty astounding to me. We want to be able to assimilate all that data and use that information to determine where the ice is and how it is working. Coupling that with the mathematics of the dynamics of ice melting and movement will provide us with a really stupendous model for the Arctic. Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) are another technology that can play a key role in the Arctic. ONR has led a number of these developments; those systems are now sufficiently reliable that we can begin sending them up into the Arctic to do work under ice and in the marginal ice zone. We could not do that in the past, so we are eager to begin. We also have a larger diameter UUV program that will have an endurance of between 30 and 60 days and that will be particularly useful in the Arctic. Placing remote sensors on those underwater vehicles will help us to understand how the halocline is changing, where the marginal ice zone is, and how all that is moving and thereby help us establish new boundary conditions for our Global Seamless Prediction capability. I realize that that is a tall order, but we are moving in that direction. Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 103 In my department at ONR, we have established a process called Department Research Initiatives (DRIs), which are $9–10 million programs over 5 years that develop teams of researchers and then move forward on specific topics. The one that we have recently put in place for FY2012 will kick off part of our overall Arctic program. This specific effort is intended to help us understand the dynamics of the marginal ice zones and provide the science input that would go into a new model (Figure 3). We will also be looking at halocline circulation and air–sea coupling and working on assimilating ice-related information into our models. Figure 3. DRI: Emerging Dynamics of the Marginal Ice Zone The importance of this research was made apparent in a recent conversation I had with researchers from Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC)–Atlantic last week. They told me that they had been making regular trips to areas in the Arctic where we had worked cooperatively 20 years ago. At that time, these areas were essentially Arctic deserts; they received little or no precipitation. However, the last several times that they have visited these places, they have found 5–8 feet of snow. While it is only anecdotal evidence, it provides a good example of the air–sea coupling and the development of air–sea interaction that was not 104 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 there in the past but is now occurring in a very strong way. So, Arctic meteorology is going to be another key element in what we are doing. As we move from weather forecasting models, where we can make reasonably accurate projections out to about 7 days, to working with the climatologists who have been working on their own model systems, we find that there is a gap between forecasting 7 days into the future and making predictions that are now 3 months, 6 months, or 1 year ahead. The question invariably comes up as to whether or not we can pull together the best of what is going on with climate modeling with the forecasting capability and the physics that we have built into the forecast systems used by the Navy and the weather services around the world. So, we have initiated some programs in this area. Figure 4. DRI: Extended Range Prediction In particular, one of our Department Research Initiatives is looking into long-term forecasting on the order of 6 months to 1 year (Figure 4). The task involves a lot of questions that we do not yet fully understand. For example, how do these very large elements Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 105 of the spherical harmonics of the atmosphere and ocean—such as El Niño or the Madden–Julian oscillations—how do they operate, how do they wobble, how do they change, and how can we investigate them in a way that will give us some indication of how we would want to predict them? At the same time, we have to begin to understand from a longrange perspective and a climate perspective what sorts of questions we want to be able to answer in a predictive mode. What the limits of prediction could be is itself an important element, so we are starting slowly in this area. We are going to look for some really brilliant proposals and get the community to start thinking about the idea of extending forecasting by bringing in the best of what we know on climate and to work new avenues of research in that area. We know how long it takes to improve the skill level for our models and prediction systems, about a decade per day of skill increase. At that rate, it is going to be a long time before we have even a 1-month prediction capability. So, you can see why this is an important science and technology issue. 106 Dr. Chet Koblinsky I am going to talk about something that is of great interest to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)— namely, the task of translating emerging climate science into a form that is useful to decision makers. Toward that end, NOAA has proposed a major reorganization of the agency that would result in the creation of a climate service on the management scale of the existing weather service. In addition, NOAA has asked Congress for permission to revise its overall research program to include the satellite service. Before delving into that, I want to talk first about the need for a broader multiagency approach to the overall climate change problem that has come up over the last few years. It is increasingly apparent that no one agency can tackle this on its own. It is going to take the capacity of a number of agencies, especially in cases where the challenge is extremely large like in the Defense Department. In January 2009, just at the end of the Bush Administration, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) invited As Director of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Climate Program Office and leader of NOAA’s climate mission, Dr. Chet Koblinsky leads the execution of NOAA’s climate competitive research programs and the formulation of NOAA’s future climate activities. He joined NOAA in 2003 after a 25-year career as a research oceanographer and science manager at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography and NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. He has published numerous scientific papers and led the development of research satellite missions. He is a recipient of NASA’s Medal for Exceptional Scientific Achievement and the Presidential Rank Award for federal senior executives. Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 107 representatives from some 23 federal agencies to discuss the future of climate research and begin development of next-generation strategy for the U.S. Global Change Research Program. The proposed FY2011 budget provides a total of $2.6 billion across 13 agencies to support that effort. As it turns out, each of those 23 agencies has an interest in climate information. It is not just the four major research organizations—the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy (DOE), NASA, and NOAA. The full suite of mission-driven agencies are finding that they need to respond to mandates imposed specifically by Congress or that they need to react to impending changes in natural resources or protected habitat areas. At the end of the day we found that there was a general need to understand the future at local or regional scales and at a wide variety of time scales ranging from weeks out to decades. This need imposes a tremendous challenge on the modeling community as well as on the research and observational communities. That challenge continues today, although I am pleased to report that we have seen some major breakthroughs. As you may know, the Department of Energy recently decided to open up their major computational facilities to earth science researchers, especially at NASA, NOAA, and the NSF. Earth scientists are now competing for awards to use the DOE’s petaflop (1015 floating point operations per second)-scale computational machines to test their coupled forecast models at different resolutions. NOAA was lucky enough to gain support, through the FY2009 Economic Stimulus Package, to buy two of that class of computational facilities. We have installed one at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee and are using it to run our long-term climate models. We are building a second one in West Virginia that will look at shorter time scales and support development of ensemble and probabilistic forecast information that we can use to test the resolution envelope and see how far our existing tools can be pushed with current technology. At the present, we are running one of our atmospheric models at the Oak Ridge machine in test mode. We are using 1-kilometer resolution globally and have seen some stunning results. If I had more time I could play a video clip that NASA has produced. So far, however, none of us really understand 108 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 how well those models actually simulate reality; how they would play out over time; how they need to be initialized, tested, and verified; or how we should manipulate the huge amounts of data that our major satellite systems are able to provide. In the meantime, however, we are busy running models to support the next generation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Assessment, which is due to come out in the 2013–2014 period. I know that our laboratory at Princeton, for example, has just completed runs on a sequence of models using our tremendous computational capability at Oak Ridge. Other researchers are looking at long-term scenarios of 100 years or more with complex system models that include carbon and nitrogen cycles. Yet others are looking at decadal predictability using a range of initialization levels based on the last several decades and then running forward 30 to 40 to 50 years. Still others are looking at the impact of initializing their runs at higher spatial resolution—say 25-kilometer resolution rather than 200-kilometer resolution—to see how that affects results over a decade or so. While we are not certain yet what these higher-resolution models will show, we are beginning to test the resolution envelope to see if we can enhance predictability. One of the major challenges ahead will be to collect the data necessary to support or verify our predictions. How do we build observing systems that will be useful for initializing these higherresolution models? How do we produce information out of these models that some 23 different agencies will be able to use? If we are interested, for example, in storm extremes, coastal surge extremes, or wave extremes, how do we get that information out of the model? How do we levy requirements to the civilian modeling community so that they can work with us and gain access to the information that they need? Finally, how do we establish the uncertainty bounds on our predictions and forecasts? So what I want to do is talk a little bit about how NOAA is approaching that problem and how it is working with different communities of decision makers. I will provide a couple of examples so that you can see how we are developing our service concept and how we propose to tackle the grand challenge that I have just described. Our proposal includes organizational, Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 109 budget, and mission structures that will enable us to monitor the climate using appropriate observing systems, build our data sets, and then use the data collected to produce products and services that describe the current state of the climate and typical climatologies. We also want to define appropriate climatological norms and applicable climatologies that decision-making communities can use. Today’s products, which typically provide variables like temperature and precipitation, are not well suited for climatic issues. We need to know flood frequencies, hundred-year flood plains, and wave climatologies along the coast. While we need to continue to conduct research, we need to target that research on the grand challenge problems of predictability, understanding drought, and understanding how climate impacts marine ecosystems and coastal environments. We also need to develop the next-generation models and test predictability measures, improve our understanding of longer-term climate change, test the resolution envelope, and test our ability to replicate historical changes over time. Once we have done that, we can begin to produce authoritative and timely information that is appropriate for government entities. We also need to work with the private sector to understand their role and interest and help define the proposed climate service from a private-sector-provider point of view as well as a federal-entity point of view. Finally, we need to continue to work with the decision-making communities as we have for the past 20 years to collaboratively define and tailor information that government leaders can use as they try to understand how climatological norms are changing over time. So let me give you two examples. One is more applicable to today’s decision makers, while the other is research oriented and looks to the future. The first has to do with drought-related information. It is clear from looking at both current and long-term trends that the water cycle across the country is going to change. We expect more water to be available at higher latitudes and less at lower latitudes. This is a huge concern in the Western states where water is gold. In anticipation of this problem, the Governors’ Association in that area has been working with the scientific community to try and define how you build preparedness information. 110 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 Typically, state governments are responsible for allocating and managing the large water systems within their borders. They were primarily interested in how you deal with preparedness information for the people who use water in their states rather than developing response mechanisms for existing droughts. So, in the early 2000s, government decision makers met with the scientific community and designed a program to improve observations and consolidate data information with other participating agencies. They wanted to see if they could improve predictability and better understand the impacts of drought. They also want to educate their communities and to build an early warning system that would provide preparedness information to their state governments so that they could better manage the situation in the future. In 2006, President Bush signed a new law that assigned NOAA the lead for the integrated Drought Information System and directed the cooperation of a number of other federal agencies in cooperation with state and tribal communities. I am pleased to report that it is well underway. An implementation plan was quickly developed on the basis of the strategy laid out in the public law. On the order of 8–10 other agencies have joined us in this; the implementation team is made up of over 50 people. We have begun to build out the capabilities to improve observations and tackle the predictability problem. We have also secured resources from Congress to support the effort. We have set up a project office and have developed a basic understanding for how to approach the problem. We realize that we need to work these issues regionally because drought in the Colorado basin is different from drought in the Flint-Apalachicola-Chattahoochee system in the Southeast, the Chesapeake Bay, the Hudson River, the Missouri River, or the Columbia River. So, we are planning to build a national system through a set of regional entities. Two of our first systems are currently underway and almost wrapping up their prototypes—the Colorado basin and the FlintApalachicola-Chattahoochee. What is fascinating is that it is not just scientists sitting around the table. At the regional level, these sessions include not only the scientific community that is developing the information, the drought monitoring, and the outlook Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 111 capability, but also the state, local, and tribal decision makers, as well as representatives from such private industries as ski resorts, ranches, and corporate agriculture. As you may know, there has been some controversy over the last few years in the Flint-Chattahoochee-Apalachicola system about water allocation rights. It turns out that Atlanta wants to draw more water from Lake Lanier than it has in the past. This naturally led to a lawsuit because legally they were not allowed to have that water. Fortunately, it has also resulted in a more open dialogue among the states that use that water as they have tried to resolve such issues. Although the court issue has yet to be resolved, it has helped to socialize the scientific information. We also held a workshop with the Western governors and various members of their policy-making staffs. It was great to see them employing some of the decision tools that we had made available. So that is another example of a very active effort. The outcome provided vision and direction to the scientific community. The involvement of decision and policy makers in such interactions is, I think, an interesting model that is likely to prove useful. A very different approach that we are taking is our work with NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries. Given that their job is to regulate and try to sustain fisheries, they are very interested in how marine ecosystems might change over time and how this might lead to future changes in regulations. This is very much a research problem; it has not yet reached the decision-making context at all. So, we have begun to look at how we would build observing systems, how we would monitor sentinel sites, and how we would begin to factor in ecosystem effort changes in two of our long-term climate models. We have sent scientists to the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton where we run our big models. They are trying to put advanced marine chemistry and nutrient models into some of the lab’s ecosystem models. They are seeing indications that there will be change due to factors such as ocean acidification, nutrient loading, and current cycles. As a result, over the next few years, we may be able to build hypotheses and begin to evaluate. In particular, we want to look at how we could use the protected habitat areas that NOAA manages, both the estuarine 112 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 reserves and the marine sanctuaries, as sentinel sites at different scales and how we would begin to monitor and survey a large marine ecosystem like the California current system. We want to see if we can detect these changes and, if so, set up a program to begin to monitor whether or not change is occurring on a longer time frame. So those are two very different examples; I hope they give you a sense of the complexity of taking on this challenge. We do need direct engagement between the user community and the civilian science community to ensure that we get the best out of both worlds. The civilian science community needs to understand the requirements of the decision-making community. It provides some directed vision for the scientific community to work with and provides goals that the two communities can work together on. Still, each has to have its own capacity to develop and work toward this issue. 113 Dr. Jeffrey Marqusee I welcome the opportunity to talk to you and explain what we are trying to do at the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP). We have a great partnership with Navy Task Force Climate Change, and I think that you will see that there is a national synergy between our plans and those of both the Navy and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). To begin, though, let me reiterate something that you heard about earlier in this conference, and that is the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). [1] As I am sure all of you are Dr. Jeffrey Marqusee is currently the Executive Director of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and the Director of the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP). SERDP is a triagency (DoD, Department of Energy, and Environmental Protection Agency) environmental research and development program managed by the DoD. SERDP supports research and development to solve environmental issues of relevance to the DoD. ESTCP is a DoD-wide program designed to demonstrate innovative environmental and energy technologies at DoD facilities. ESTCP provides for rigorous validation of the cost and performance of new environmental and energy technologies in cooperation with the regulatory and end-user communities. Prior to his current position, Dr. Marqusee served as a program manager for environmental technology in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security. He was the principal advisor to the Deputy Under Secretary on environmental technology issues. Before joining the DoD, he worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where he advised both the DoD and NASA in the areas of remote sensing, environmental matters, and military surveillance. Dr. Marqusee has worked at Stanford University, the University of California, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. He has a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in physical chemistry. 114 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 aware, this is the first time that the most senior level in the department has set out a specific policy objective focused on responding to climate change. As part of that response, the QDR directed that the DoD conduct a comprehensive assessment for all installations of the potential impacts of climate change on its mission and identify any necessary adaptation. This is a pretty broad statement; initially, I do not think people recognized just how difficult the task would be. At present, there is not a timeline to accomplish that. I think that is both good and bad. I think it is good because it is a very tough job. On the other hand, not having a timeline means that you do not have the pressure or the budgetary support to get things done in a timely way. From our point of view, however, it is probably more important that we develop the right process and develop the right underlying science and technologies so we can do these assessments and enable future adaptation. The challenge of climate change is not something we are going to overcome this year, this next decade, or in our lifetimes. So, given the DoD’s responsibilities for managing its fixed installations, it is important that we establish a process through which the impacts of climate change can be included in the planning process. The Department has begun to develop that process, but it is a long way from being completed. The first step in addressing this was to articulate in more detail what the QDR was talking about. The Strategic Sustainability Plan, which was signed out last year, describes a proposed multitier process for addressing climate change. [2] As part of that, we need to first develop the decision tools and the processes by which we assess impacts and vulnerabilities. After we have used those at the installation level, we can then develop robust adaptation plans. According to the QDR, the research programs that I am responsible for were tasked with providing leadership for the overall effort. While I was quite happy to take on that responsibility, I did not engineer its placement in the QDR. I first learned of the assignment when the QDR was published. In our view, SERDP’s primary role in the DoD’s climate-related challenge is to understand the impacts to DoD installations and translate those impacts to vulnerabilities. In the future, we will Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 115 begin to look at adaptation schemes in a much more serious way. Before we do that, though, we have to really understand what we are adapting to, what the stressors are, and what things are going to really impact our mission requirements. In looking at the DoD infrastructure, we need to look at both the built infrastructure—the Department is responsible for over 300,000 buildings—as well as some 30 million acres of landscape. The Department is responsible for this landscape, both using it to conduct our training and testing missions and stewarding the natural resources included therein. In addition, we use our installations as a power protection point. We have to be able to carry out our mission, whether it is from a harbor or from a desert location, from our installations. They are critical to our warfighting capabilities. I am sure all of you in this audience are familiar with the litany of possible climate impacts to the DoD. Many of these are, of course, very regionally specific. The impacts you are concerned about on a coastal installation are qualitatively different than the ones applicable in Alaska. They are qualitatively different than the ones that apply in the Southwest. However, they do have some commonality in that they are going to affect our built infrastructure in each of those areas. So, we have to know what we need to do to sustain that infrastructure. We need to know the key aspects of climate change that will impact our decisions on where we build our infrastructure and how we select the best sites for each of our missions. And, as we develop our management scheme for natural resources in a stressed ecosystem, we have to accommodate the additional stressor of climate change. From SERDP’s perspective, we try to avoid looking at climate change in isolation. It is one more significant and long-term stressor on a system that is already quite stressed. We are trying to identify ways to manage responses to all of those stresses. To do that, SERDP has initiated a set of what I would call Regional Research Programs that look at the major locations for DoD installations to get a sense of what the impacts are and what tools need to be developed. Down the road, we hope to hand the development of those tools over to groups like NOAA and the climate service. 116 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 Ultimately, we want to be able to use the data that they produce as we attempt to identify the DoD’s specific climate-related needs. We are also starting a number of projects on the mitigation and adaptation side, although I am not going to focus on those today. For the most part, they are currently concerned with energy use at our fixed installations. While that is obviously a significant concern, I would like to focus more on the impact and vulnerability work that we have been doing. So, let me turn to the impacts of sea-level rise on our coastal installations. We have started a number of projects covering most of the major areas within the continental United States that we think are likely to feel such impacts: Norfolk, Camp Lejeune, the Gulf Coast, Tyndall Air Force Base, and Southern California to include both Coronado and the Marine Corps base at Pendleton. We initiated these studies some 2 years ago; they will be completed in another year. At that time, the information will be made available to the DoD and the public. In conducting the assessment, we have tried to avoid predicting what future sea-level rise will be, but instead have employed a postulated set of scenarios. Thus, we are asking what would happen if the local sea-level rise was 1 meter, 1.5 meters, or 2 meters. In each case, we want to know what the impact would be on those installations. Many people think that sea-level rise is a simple phenomena to understand. We can all go to the Internet and call up simple maps of inundation. Unfortunately, that tells you very little about the actual problems that we will be facing. So, we are doing very detailed modeling using existing tools as well as building new models to look at the full range of dynamic impacts on these installations to include not only inundation but also such effects as storm surge, impacts to underground freshwater aquifers, and shifts in land cover. When we have completed the model runs, we need to translate the results into a form that means something to an installation garrison commander or one of the mission planners operating from that base. We need to be able to translate the information that you can get out of a local storm surge model into vulnerabilities for carrying out a missions. We also need to recognize that those vulnerabilities are not all for just one point in time. If you lose capability for X hours or Y weeks, what does that mean in terms of Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 117 overall mission execution? In the end we need to take the science of climate change predictions, translate that down to the regional or local installation level, and then translate that down to what a manager actually needs so he can plan and make his installation more robust. We have started a number of projects looking at other regions that we think are going to be impacted in the near term. We are particularly concerned about issues in the Southwest, although our role at SERDP is not to augment or replace the predictive capabilities of organizations like NOAA, NASA, the National Science Foundation, or the Office of Naval Research but rather to take the information they produce and translate it into impacts that our installation managers can use. In the American Southwest, it is clear that over the coming decades we are going to face a climate that is qualitatively different than what we have seen thus far. What does that mean for issues of fire frequency, the presence of invasive species, and the coupling between those effects? How will those factors affect our natural resource management for a system that is heavily dependent on the ephemeral stream flows? If we suddenly reach a situation where the many water bodies in the region are effectively disconnected for longer periods of time, how will that change the viability of endangered species that we are legally required to sustain? We need to develop the science and the tools both to develop new ways to manage that future as well as to inform the regulatory process so that we have requirements that we can manage toward. It does no one any good to set up regulatory requirements that cannot possibly be met. So, we really need to jointly understand what the future will look like and what our options are likely to be. Alaska is yet another area where we are conducting research. The DoD, predominantly the Army, has 1.5 million acres of critical training land in the central part of the state. Alaska is already undergoing significant climatic changes. The permafrost no longer seems to be permanent. Areas that we used to drive across in training are no longer frozen solid. Our whole understanding of the hydrology of that region was based on the belief that permafrost is permafrost. We do not even have the appropriate models that 118 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 will allow us to couple the changes in permafrost to the region’s hydrology. We have to understand the future. Are we going to be managing wetlands that are no longer wetlands? How does this couple to the health of the boreal forest? And how does that then translate back to our range managers who need to use this landscape to train troops while ensuring that the landscape remains healthy landscape? So, we have provided funding to Alaska’s universities, several federal laboratories, the U.S. Geological Survey, NOAA, and selected service laboratories to try to really push our understanding of what is going on. At this point, let me talk briefly about where we are going in the future. One of the big challenges that is out there is how to provide the information that our managers need. How do we develop the decision frameworks or tools that allow either a major command or an installation garrison commander to make decisions about the future? Over the next several years, we plan to initiate a series of pilot projects to explore this space. If you go to people who have responsibility for major DoD installations and ask them if they care about climate change the answer you will usually get is no. If you ask whether climate change will affect their mission, they will say no. However, if you translate that question to one that asks: does the weather impact your mission or does the availability of this research impact your mission, then they will say, “Yes, it is currently getting really tough.” So we need to figure out the specific information the group needs, translate that into decision tools, and then request that information from the science community. While that community is making impressive gains, there is a big gap between being able to predict temperature or precipitation and providing information that tells someone whether or not their installation is vulnerable. As I indicated at the beginning of my presentation, the QDR and the Strategic Sustainability Plan have imposed a requirement for all installations to look at the impact of climate change. While that is a straightforward statement, until we define that future scenario in specific terms, it is going to be very difficult for an installation to actually approach the problem. What future climate? As we have heard, there is enormous uncertainty on exactly what we will Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 119 be looking at 10, 20, or 50 years out. So, one of the things that the Department has to identify in the relatively near term is the specific climate scenarios we should plan against. I think the Department is actually in a relatively good position to do this. We are not a regulatory organization. We have no authority on the civilian side. We are only responsible for our military installations. We have a culture and a history of planning in the face of uncertainty. It is perfectly appropriate to look at the extremes; you just have to quantify in what way they are extremes. You have to lay out the possible futures so that you can look at your management options. It does not mean that you need to be robust in the face of every possible future. We need to advance the science and develop the right tools to enhance the management of our installations. By doing that, we will be playing a key role in developing the guidance for the services as we work together to accommodate climate change, whatever it looks like. REFERENCES 1. Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_ 12Feb10_1000.pdf. 2. Department of Defense, Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan FY 2010, Public Version, 2010. 120 Dr. Graeme Stephens I am from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). A person might reasonably ask: why is JPL involved in climate science? The answer is that if you look at the civilian research satellites that are used to measure various Earth-related parameters from space, you will discover that JPL is responsible for more than 50% of the civilian research satellite observations of Earth. Thus, the lab is a major producer of the data that we use to measure and forecast climate change. So, what I would like to do is offer three main points framed around the conversion of science data to actionable information. In my view, that is fundamentally the mission of our climate services. How do you go from data to science and knowledge to really actionable information? I am going to frame three points that touch on that to some extent. Dr. Graeme Stephens completed his B.S. with honors at the University of Melbourne in 1973 and received his Ph.D. in 1977 from the same university. He was appointed to the CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research in 1977 as a research scientist and promoted to senior research scientist in 1982. From 1979 to 1980, Dr. Stephens served as a postdoctoral research student at the Colorado State University Department of Atmospheric Science. He joined the faculty as an associate professor in 1984 and was promoted to full professor in 1991. Dr. Stephens’s research activities focus on atmospheric radiation, including the application of remote sensing in climate research to understand the role of hydrological processes in climate change. He also serves as the primary investigator (PI) of the NASA CloudSat Mission and associated research group, which has launched a satellite to study the internals of clouds using equipment similar to radar. Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 121 First, I think it is pretty important to find what data we need and what specific requirements we would place on those data. To do that, we have to ask the question of what the heck is your mission and what do you actually wish to achieve. Second, we currently have a variety of data collection resources that already exist and could be used to help address this problem. We need to ensure that we optimally exploit those resources. I am going to throw out two examples of many that could be identified. Then I am going to make the point that climate observations are not the same as weather observations. It is just not a matter of making them over a long period of time. There are different sets of observations that are needed really to understand and to predict the climate change. There are all sorts of measurements that are not high on the operational radar screen but are absolutely critical for climate. The third point I want to make is that the DoD needs to be an important stakeholder in defining climate data needs, particularly from the point of view of Earth observations. As I said, the Earthobserving community relies almost exclusively on downwardlooking satellites to measure the Earth’s system; they are absolutely critical for the Arctic. So let us begin by talking about defining the data requirements. Clearly, we have to define what our highest-priority challenges are. Based on my attendance here the last 2 days, I have figured out that we have begun to articulate this, but it is not yet sharply articulated. We have talked about sea-level rise, storm surges, Arctic navigability, and so on, but we have not identified either the specific data that we need or the specific reason that we need it. We really need to sharpen this. For example, what time horizon do we want data for? Clearly we want to predict into the future that is being talked about. Is it a week? Is it a season? Is it a year? Is it decadal? Is it multidecadal? As I indicated previously, many of the essential climate observations are derived from current civilian research satellites that are not part of the operational weather forecasting system. Many of those satellites may not even be ready to be part of an operational 122 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 system. They may be too expensive to be part of an operational system. So, to recap, point number one is define the requirements, the time horizon, the spatial scale, and the latency. These factors will influence how we produce the data and whether the data that we have streaming down now are actually relevant to our mission objectives. Now let us look at two examples of many that exploit existing resources. Our climate projections rely on the observational data records that we have, and that is an activity that is going on now, but that is an example of something we could do with existing resources. I will start with sea-ice change, because it appears that sea-ice change is a big deal for this audience. We learned a number of important lessons from the precipitous loss of sea ice that occurred in 2007. That year’s dramatic loss was off the record book. As a result, we learned that sea ice is vulnerable to climate effects but is relatively invulnerable to other forces. However, it is the other forces that fundamentally will shape whether the sea ice opens up or closes in the summer. It is those other forces that have to do with meteorology weather pattern changes. One of the big factors in 2007 that does not get discussed much is that the atmosphere dried out; the cloud disappeared. There was perpetual sunshine for 3 months. The warmer sea surface temperatures (SSTs) further exacerbated the loss of sea ice and so on. Obtaining information on that kind of energy coming into the Arctic Ocean is pretty important for a prediction of sea ice and seasonal swings in sea ice. We currently do not have the observing systems necessary to address that today, so that is the sort of information that we need in order to understand sea-ice loss. In terms of research satellites, we have unprecedented information from research satellites that I think are ready to be exploited to look at some of these issues with sea ice. It is data coming in that is untapped from the point of view of studying the Arctic. The Arctic’s really interesting, including from the polar satellite point of view. Because all longitudes converge at the pole, all of the polar orbiting satellites will also converge to the pole. That is why you can get 16 synthetic aperture radar (SAR) samples from one satellite in a day. So, you get a lot of data covering the poles. Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 123 The question is: is it the right kind of data for what you have in mind? With the new research observations that we have today, we have unprecedented views of the Arctic that we have never had before. It is a gold mine waiting to be tapped. We are just not tapping it as a research community because we are not challenged to do so. We are doing all sorts of other things. One of our lowhanging fruits is to make use of the capabilities we have today to explore issues related to the loss of sea ice. Another aspect of sea-level rise is that it hits a bit close to home for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Sea-level rise is a pretty complex problem. It involves the changing of the thermal structure of the oceans. It involves ice sheet dynamics and its changes, and it involves solid earth responses. As a result, predicting future sealevel rise is complicated but, given our ability to make observations, it turns out that the sea-level rise problem is in better shape than most other areas of the climate problem. We have systematic observations of sea-level rise. We have incredibly new ways of observing ice-mass loss that we see. We have seen the acceleration of the Greenland Ice Sheet over the last decade from space. However, we currently have no modeling and assimilation tools that describe sea-level rise, so we have a building block program to develop a system that would provide actionable information. We have the wherewithal and we have the interest to do this, so we have a consortium community involved—a number of universities, the JPL, and other communities that are heavily engaged in the sea-level problem, observing sea level, and modeling sea level have put their hands up. They are interested in taking the next step to identify and work with users and determine what the product ought to be and on what scale the products ought to be. My third and last point concerns establishing the DoD as an important stakeholder within the community of civilian observing systems. The DoD has already established stakeholder positions in other aspects of the modeling, but I think the civilian program needs help with their civilian satellite observing systems and would certainly benefit from the DoD’s stakeholder involvement. To further illustrate this point, consider the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF), which is one of the 124 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2011 major weather forecasting centers on our planet. The ECMWF produces weather analysis that gets integrated into the climate record through a process called reanalysis. That process combines over 30,000 surface observations every 3 hours to create a climate record. However, if you disregard the data from the Scandinavian countries, you could count almost on one hand the number of actual surface observations from above the Arctic Circle that go into this reanalysis product. For such data-sparse regions, reanalysis relies on model-based inputs rather than observation-based inputs. Is that good or bad? Well, we do not know, but we know that in key areas the models are particularly bad. Those key areas include ones that relate to energy flow into the Arctic, which is very important for sea-ice loss. We also know that the models are fairly poor at predicting clouds and precipitation, both of which are pretty important for the Arctic climate. As we have heard, we do not really have a climate record for the Arctic. One of the reasons is that the Arctic is very sparsely observed. This is why satellites are so critically important. They can provide the density of observations that you just cannot produce with surface stations, especially given the harsh environment. Satellites have to play an important role. In the case of climate, as I emphasized, many of our key measurements come from civilian research satellites. These measurement systems are fragile. They are fragile because they are primarily tied to discretionary funding lines and are not linked to observations. As a result, they basically come and go depending on budgets, and we have just had two major flagship climate satellites cancelled in the last couple of months. So the situation is fragile. What is of even greater concern is that we do not have a strategy to observe key parts of the climate system from space. We do not have a coherent plan for measuring precipitation globally. Currently, it is all done using research satellites rather than operational ones. We are not measuring snowfall in the Arctic, which is a key part of the water cycle of that region. So, given the fragility of the civilian part of our observing systems, having key stakeholders articulate their needs will strengthen the argument for moving from research systems to operational systems. Chapter 4 Adapting Research to Climate Challenges 125 Q& A Session with THE PANELISTS the number of bases and ships that are available worldQ: Given wide, is the Navy doing anything to outfit these platforms or these locations so as to increase the number of surface observations? Captain Timothy Gallaudet: We have an active observing capability on our ships and stations, so the answer is yes. We are doing it. It is not driven necessarily by climate. It is driven really by a combination of weather for safety and operational effectiveness, but it will have the long-term benefit of supporting and contributing to climate observation systems. you plan to store those data so that they will be availQ: Do able for other uses beyond weather forecasting in support of flight observations? Captain Timothy Gallaudet: Yes, we do. It could potentially provide more justification to keep those programs healthy in a time when decision makers are often looking to trim the budget. Dr. Graeme Stephens: If we start cruising through the Arctic, you are obviously going to be able to provide surface observations that we currently do not have. A lot of those 30,000 surface observations I mentioned come from ships. Our global forecast models currently assimilate the ship observations already. Captain Timothy Gallaudet: I might point out, too, that our submarine force currently collects ice keel measurements that are used in some studies, especially by the Applied Physics Laboratory at University of Washington.